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General Lesley J. McNair demonstrated an innovative spirit and exceptional intellectual 
capacity in his efforts to organize and train the U.S. Army for World War II. The influence he 
exerted on Army doctrine, training, equipment development, unit organization, and combined 
arms fighting methods placed him among the handful of generals most responsible for both the 
effectiveness and the flaws of the force that the United States sent to war in 1942. Through his 
strong views and aggressive leadership, McNair played a key role in guiding the Army’s 
interwar mechanization and doctrinal development efforts. Many studies of this period have 
described aspects of his participation in that process. However, no comprehensive study of 
McNair’s forty-year military career exists, largely because he did not survive the war, and he left 
behind no personal memoirs or diaries when he died of wounds inflicted by errant American 
bombs in Normandy on July 25, 1944.  
This study examines General McNair’s full career – from his graduation from the United 
States Military Academy at West Point in 1904, through his death in Normandy forty years later. 
The analysis demonstrates how McNair’s ideas developed over four decades of service, 
culminating in their practical application during the pre-war mobilization period and his 
influence on U.S. Army effectiveness in World War II. Several themes recur throughout the 
period of McNair’s service as the General Headquarters’ (GHQ) chief of staff from 1940-42, and 
the commander of Army Ground Forces (AGF) from 1942-44. He placed significant emphasis on 
the value of officer education and held strong convictions regarding the qualities required in a 
competent commander and soldier, leading him to advocate tough, realistic training. He 
embraced military innovation and technological development and remained personally involved 
in tests and experiments throughout his career to modernize the Army. He strove to gain 
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efficiencies in unit organization by streamlining and standardizing units and training, while 
advocating pooling of specialized equipment and units at corps level and above, thereby 
optimizing organizations for task organization. This study demonstrates that one can discern the 
conceptual roots of all these overarching ideas in McNair’s actions and experiences during the 
several decades of his lesser-known early career.  
This reevaluation of the career of General McNair also provides a lens through which to 
reconsider the question of U.S. Army effectiveness during World War II. While the “materiel 
superiority” narrative still dominates historical interpretations of America’s contribution to the 
war effort, several recent studies have begun to create a competing narrative that depicts a U.S. 
Army overcoming severe mobilization obstacles to develop into an excellent Army on par with 
all of the other major combatants during the war. The analysis offered in this study supports this 
emerging reinterpretation of America’s war effort by reevaluating the career of one of the U.S. 




Many historians advised me against choosing this different dissertation topic, mostly due 
to the concern that insufficient archival records existed to support a detailed analysis of Lesley 
McNair’s career. I did receive encouragement from a few key individuals, but most reminded me 
that no single source of “McNair Papers” exists, and warned me that I would have to visit many 
different archives, all the while wondering whether I would find enough sources to support my 
thesis. These fair and well-intentioned warnings did not deter my stubborn determination to 
pursue my chosen topic, and a combination of luck, persistence, and mostly the help of many 
very talented archivists and historians enabled me to amass a large volume of research data – in 
the end, far more than I could use in this project.  
Regarding the supposed dearth of archival material on McNair’s career, I heard an often-
repeated story, which soon took on the form of folk wisdom or mythology, about an unnamed 
graduate student who started work on a dissertation on McNair but failed to complete it due to 
lack of sources. Some even repeated the rumor that Clare McNair, Lesley’s wife of nearly forty 
years, might have burned his papers out of grief in 1944. I quickly learned, much to my relief, 
these myths contained little if any truth.  
Only one person could ever name the adviser of the mysterious graduate student who had 
tried but failed to write about Lesley McNair’s career. Well after I had embarked on the project, 
a historian recalled Dr. Edward “Mac” Coffman had once worked with a student interested in 
McNair. Upon contacting Dr. Coffman, I learned he did in fact have a student at one time who 
expressed an interest in writing a dissertation on McNair, but the student dropped out of the 
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graduate program in his first semester for personal reasons, before even beginning research for 
his dissertation.  
Later, on one of several research trips, I discovered a set of “McNair Papers” at the 
Library of Congress. A note Clare McNair included with the other materials in the set of boxes 
proved she donated the papers, which include items such as personal letters, original promotion 
“sheepskins,” and scrapbooks of photos and newspaper clippings Clare collected throughout her 
husband’s career. Interestingly, the letters in the collection of personal papers include none to or 
from Lesley – they consist entirely of Clare’s communications with friends of the family and 
Lesley’s professional acquaintances. However, no evidence exists that Clare selectively 
destroyed any of Lesley’s personal records or letters.  
The lack of any unofficial letters in the other archives where I found many excellent 
sources, both in McNair’s and in the records of officers he worked with during his career, 
indicate he simply did not devote time to personal correspondence. After McNair’s death in 
1944, the official historians at Army Ground Forces found enough documents McNair had 
collected over the course of his career to fill several boxes, but these documents consist almost 
exclusively of official correspondence. McNair famously maintained an incredibly arduous work 
schedule throughout his career. He spent World War II in stateside assignments and therefore 
had no need to maintain a lengthy written correspondence with Clare, and he apparently kept 
track of his son Doug’s career through correspondence with officers he worked for, rather than 
by keeping in touch through personal letters. He generally lacked interest in media attention and 
exhibited no desire to establish a “legacy” for himself, although one can only speculate whether 
he might have produced a memoir had he survived the war.  
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These factors taken together provide the most logical explanation for the lack of personal 
letters or diaries in those records that do exist in various archives across the country. McNair 
apparently concentrated on his official duties, leaving social matters for Clare to handle – a very 
traditional arrangement for the time, and an unsurprising one given McNair’s formal, 
businesslike demeanor. 
One historian I particularly respect strongly discouraged me from devoting my time to 
this project, questioning the value of an analysis of the career of a man who merely served as a 
staff officer during World War II. I hope that the following study will underscore the critical role 
that staff officers played during World War II in developing the organizations, training 
programs, and combined arms doctrine that U.S. Army unit commanders relied on for success in 
combat. Staff officers fulfilled a critical function various unit echelons, in the early-twentieth 
century just as they do today, despite the common view of the U.S. Army as “commander-
centric.” The Army has long relied heavily on the capability of its staff officers in the 
performance of it day-to-day operations, but historians rarely produce studies of officers who 
spent the majority of their wartime duty in staff positions. By contrast, commanders play a key 
role given their unique authority and responsibility, and therefore they attract a great deal of 
attention from historians. Nevertheless, even the best commanders would find themselves 
severely hindered by the absence of the many skilled staff officers who serve throughout their 
organizations. 
Lesley McNair served in two high-level positions in the War Department during World 
War II, including his final role as Commander, Army Ground Forces – arguably a “staff” 
position based on the nature of his duties, but in reality command of a staggering number of 
troops serving at training posts across the continental United States. He also possessed a broad 
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range of previous experience serving in command and staff positions, in peacetime and combat, 
spanning the period 1904-44. The profusion of histories of commanders like George Patton and 
Omar Bradley (and their counterparts in the Allied and Axis armies) illustrates the popularity of 
“great commander” history, but the military historiography would benefit from an increase in the 
number of studies of the hardworking yet underappreciated staff officers that helped translate 
their commanders’ vision into executable orders. While America’s great (and sometimes 
controversial) combat commanders deserve study, a large body of archival data remains largely 
untapped that could help correct the current imbalance in the historical record by casting light on 
the contributions of the many staff officers without whom they could not have functioned 
effectively. Perhaps the following study will encourage more historians to explore this relatively 
barren terrain by demonstrating that analyses of the careers of officers who served in staff 
positions during America’s wars not only serve a useful purpose, but also prove equally 
interesting and insightful to those readers seeking to understand the Army’s effectiveness in 
combat throughout America’s history. 
I could not have completed this project without the support, advice, and friendship of 
many people. First, I must thank the staff and my fellow faculty members at the School of 
Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) at Fort Leavenworth. When I submitted my application to 
the graduate program at the University of Kansas’ History Department in 2008, my adviser 
called his friend Candace Hamm, senior administrative assistance at SAMS, since he knew I had 
attended the course several years earlier. Candace, well known as the wonderful lady who really 
runs SAMS, regardless what the many directors and deputies that she has seen come and go over 
the years might have thought, remembers everyone who has passed through the hallways of 
SAMS since she first started working there, and for some reason she put in a good word for me. I 
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am certain to this day that her informal recommendation had more to do with my acceptance as a 
graduate student at KU than any formal recommendation I received. Colonel (Retired) Richard 
Dixon, the Deputy Director for Operations, supported my application for a position on the 
faculty at SAMS – my primary career goal ever since graduating the course four years earlier – 
even though I had only just started my doctoral coursework, and the position required successful 
completion of a PhD program. Without Rich’s support, and that of Dr. Jakob Kipp, SAMS’ 
Deputy Director for Academics at that time, I am certain I would not have made it through the 
screening process and been hired. Since then I have had the opportunity to work in the most 
demanding and rewarding intellectual environment I have ever experienced, where students and 
faculty alike push each other every day to achieve their best. The current Deputy Director for 
Academics, Dr. Scott Gorman, has also provided me invaluable support, entrusting me with 
course author duties, helping me find research funds, and giving me some much-needed time to 
focus on my graduate studies when the calendar allowed it. 
My fellow faculty members at SAMS and CGSC have assisted me immensely, both 
directly and indirectly, as I pursued a graduate degree while working full time. Many took more 
than their fair share of the monograph student load to afford me a little additional time to pursue 
my studies, while others gave me invaluable advice navigating the rough terrain of a PhD 
program, or merely listened to me talk (far too much, I am certain) about my dissertation topic. 
Several coworkers deserve special mention for their friendship and their efforts to keep me 
motivated when times got tough – Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Bruce Stanley, Lieutenant 
Colonel (Retired) Eric Price, Dr. Peter Schifferle (Lieutenant Colonel - Retired), Lieutenant 
Colonel Francis Park, and Lieutenant Colonel Jon Parvin in particular. Finally, Dr. Steve Lauer 
(USMC Colonel - Retired) proved particularly knowledgeable in my topic area and provided me 
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invaluable advice. Steve was kind enough to provide me an unpublished manuscript that both 
benefited my research immensely and gave me an example of a high-quality dissertation that 
demonstrated what a historian can achieve through detailed research, critical analysis, and hard 
work. I am very anxious to see his manuscript appear as a book, as it will go far to shatter much 
of the flawed accepted wisdom that still taints military historians’ understanding of World War 
II. 
Many people at the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at Fort Leavenworth also 
helped me immensely. Several research librarians, including Rusty Rafferty, Elizabeth 
Dubuisson, Aaron Higby, and Jennifer Otto proved particularly helpful in my quest for obscure 
archival documents both at the CARL and from other libraries and online databases. I owe 
Heather Turner a particular thank you for her assistance with innumerable interlibrary loan 
requests, never failing to find the source I needed even when heroic measures were required. 
Archivists at research libraries across the country, some I have met and some I only know 
through phone calls or email, enabled me to do what I was so often told could not be done – find 
primary source data covering Lesley McNair’s entire career, from his pre-West Point years 
through his tragic death in Normandy in 1944. Dr. Tim Nenninger proved especially helpful in 
this regard, helping me navigate the myriad of finding aids and research procedures at the 
National Archives at College Park. I am certain my time there would have been far less 
productive without Tim’s help. Tim also put me in touch with Eric Voelz at the National 
Archives at St. Louis. Eric provided me the researcher’s fabled gold mine when he sent me 
Lesley McNair’s entire personnel file from 1919 through the end of his career – thousands of 
pages of documents many researchers have long assumed burned in a fire that destroyed most 
early-twentieth century military personnel files a half century ago. When I called, Eric checked, 
xi 
and gave me the happy news that McNair’s records had been stored along with those of a select 
group of the military’s most senior officers in a fire safe vault. McNair’s personnel file had 
survived the fire, and before long, Eric provided me a copy of the entire record. I could not have 
completed this dissertation without those files. 
Other archivists also provided invaluable assistance: Dr. Conrad Crane, Richard Baker, 
Carol Funck, Leanne Fawver, and Shannon S. Schwaller at the Military History Institute helped 
me learn about the history of the Army War College during the interwar years, and uncover the 
details of McNair’s experience as a student there in the class of 1929. Mary Sego, Kelly Hiller, 
and Elizabeth Wilkinson at the Purdue University Library sent me invaluable documents that 
helped me reconstruct the fascinating history of the four years McNair spent there as the 
Professor of Military Science and Tactics. Finally, Dr. Boyd Dastrup, Field Artillery Branch 
Historian, and Lyndon Couvillon, former curator of the Fort Sill Museum and now an 
independent scholar, provided me invaluable documents concerning McNair’s service in the 
Field Artillery and at Fort Sill. 
As anyone who has completed primary source research on a limited budget will 
understand, a project like this often depends on financial assistance. A research travel grant 
provided by the KU Office of Graduate Studies paid for one of three research trips – for this I am 
grateful to Dr. Roberta Pokphanh (Program Coordinator) and Sara Gillahan (Accounting 
Specialist). I also want to thank Devon Dougherty of the Verndale Historical Society, who 
provided me information on the town where Lesley McNair grew up, and helped me get in touch 
with Hallie Katnic, McNair’s great-great-granddaughter.  
I owe a particular debt of gratitude to my dissertation committee. My chairperson, Dr. 
Ted Wilson, guided me kindly but firmly through three and a half of the most challenging years 
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of my professional career. He provided not only the skilled instruction and mentorship for which 
the community of military historians knows him so well, but also the occasional extra push I 
needed to stay motivated when it seemed there was no end in sight, or to help me through those 
occasional moments of panic most graduate students experience on particularly difficult days. 
For his unflagging assistance, I will forever owe Dr. Wilson a huge debt of gratitude.  
I also am deeply grateful to two of my committee members who instructed me as a 
hotheaded young major at CGSC, but for some reason still agreed to serve on my committee – 
probably out of sheer curiosity. The first, Dr. Chris Gabel, guided me through my first research 
project on the U.S. Army during the interwar period and its performance at Kasserine pass, and 
his experience and excitement in the early-twentieth century U.S. military helped mine grow 
from the dilettantism of a young major into the foundation of my post-Army career. Dr. Robert 
Baumann, director of graduate programs at the various schools of CGSC, approved both of my 
masters’ theses, and still somehow mustered the courage to serve on my dissertation committee.  
Dr. Jeffrey Moran, my twentieth century American History professor at KU, helped me 
see how little I really know about the history of America during the century in which I have 
spent most of my life. His unique insight and sincere passion for history both reminded me of the 
importance of recognizing the limits of one’s knowledge, and inspired me to keep seeking 
intellectual growth. Finally, Dr. Brent Steele of the KU Political Science Department agreed to 
serve on my committee even though we had not previously worked together, and he provided a 
unique perspective to this chemistry student turned historian who still has much to learn about 
political science. 
In addition to their invaluable advice and moral support, many of the above individuals 
helped me find far more archival research materials than I could possibly use in one project – I 
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hope future endeavors will not only enable me to make effective use of this additional material, 
but also improve upon the work I have completed to date. All of the people mentioned above, 
and many others I am certain my poor memory caused me to forget – an oversight for which I 
sincerely apologize – have helped me complete this research project; nevertheless, any errors or 
omissions are my responsibility alone. 
Finally, I must thank my family for their support and sacrifices over the past three and a 
half years. My wife Amy, in particular, bore a disproportionate share of the burden as I worked 
full time while completing a PhD program at night and on weekends. In addition to tolerating my 
occasional (and surely painfully boring) rants about my coursework and dissertation topic, she 
has shouldered far more than her share of the responsibility for raising our two children over the 
past several years. While my heavy workload has made our rare opportunities to spend time 
together even more precious, this benefit pales in comparison to the challenges it has placed in 
her path, but she has overcome them with unflagging determination and unwavering support. 
After sixteen years together on active duty, we thought we had been through it all together; little 
did we know how hard the first several years of my “retirement” would be. I will never be able to 
repay her for standing by me and seeing this process through with me to the end. Similarly, my 
children, Anna and Mark Taylor, Jr., have lived with an absent-minded or simply absent father 
for the past several years, while I focused almost all my energy on one and three-quarters jobs. I 
only hope we can soon reconnect as a family and in some small measure make up for lost time. I 
cannot express my appreciation for their support, and their understanding that as hard as it might 
have been, the work I have done over the past few years has opened the door for me to a truly 
rewarding and intellectually stimulating second career. For this, I will always be in their debt. 
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General George C. Marshall once called General Lesley J. McNair “the brains of the 
Army” in recognition of the exceptional intellectual capacity he applied to the process of 
organizing and training the U.S. Army that fought World War II.1 The influence he exerted on 
Army doctrine and training, equipment development, unit organization, and combined arms 
fighting methods placed him among the handful of generals most responsible for both the 
effectiveness and the flaws of the Army that the United States sent to fight the war in 1942. 
Through his broad experience, tireless work ethic, and effective leadership, McNair played a key 
role in guiding the Army’s interwar mechanization and doctrinal development efforts, and 
various studies have described his participation in that process. Similarly, the Army’s official 
histories of World War II describe McNair’s role in the procurement, mobilization, and training 
of personnel to enable the growth of the Army from its pre-war strength of just over 100,000 to 
more than eight million by the end of the war. However, no previous historian has undertaken a 
comprehensive study of McNair’s career, perhaps because he did not leave behind a personal 
memoir or diary when he died of wounds inflicted by errant American bombs in Normandy in 
1944. 
                                                          
1 John T. Whitaker, "Lieutenant General Lesley James McNair," in These Are the Generals (New 
York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1943), 126; McNair earned posthumous promotion to the permanent rank of 
General (four star) on 9 September 1954 - see Herbert M. Jones to Mrs. Lesley J. McNair, 10 September 
1954, McNair Papers, National Archives at St. Louis. Nevertheless, most sources still refer to McNair as 
"Lieutenant General McNair"; McNair was never particularly fond of this term of admiration, viewing 
himself as more of a "pick-and-shovel man," and he struck reference to it from the draft he reviewed of an 
official history late in his career. See Ely J. Kahn, McNair, Educator of an Army (Washington, DC: The 
Infantry Journal, 1945), 13. 
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Existing sources that focus directly on Lesley McNair suffer from brevity or lack of 
detailed research. None provides an objective analysis of his long and influential career.2 
However, a large body of literature exists regarding U.S. Army effectiveness during World War 
II, and the Army’s preparations for the war during the preceding two decades (the “interwar 
period”). These works frequently mention McNair. Missing from these works, however, is 
discussion of the depth of experience he gained over the full length of his career, the variety of 
positions he held, and the way his experience and his interactions with other future senior Army 
leaders influenced his thinking about modern warfare. Rather, they usually identify him simply 
as a bureaucrat or in many studies as culpable for some particular error (or errors) that the U.S. 
Army made during its interwar preparations that led to degraded performance during the war.3 
                                                          
2 Larry Lehner and Dorothy Lehner, "McNair: Verndale to St. Lo," (Verndale, MN: Verndale 
Historical Society, 1976), 10; Brooks E. Kleber, "McNair, Lesley James," in Dictionary of American 
Military Biography, ed. Roger J. Spiller (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984), 695-99; John T. 
Whitaker, "These Are the Generals - McNair," Saturday Evening Post 215, no. 31 (30 January 1943): 
123-26; Kahn, McNair, Educator of an Army, 50-54. These four works, the only previous sources 
containing any significant amount of biographical information on Lesley McNair, all suffer from key 
limitations. The Lehners’ short paper, while an admirable tribute to Verndale’s most famous hometown 
boy, contains some factual errors resulting from its amateur nature. Kahn’s 64-page essay lacks 
documentation and serves more as eulogy than biography. Finally, Whitaker’s article consists mostly of 
anecdotes aimed at the general reader, while Kleber’s three-page essay merely provides a short 
biographical sketch intended to give readers a feel for McNair’s personality and work habits. 
3 These many works vary significantly in focus, scope, and quality, but all suffer in their critical 
analysis of McNair’s performance at GHQ and AGF from the lack of a detailed study of his career. The 
lack of a consolidated source of “McNair Papers,” and McNair’s own disinterest in keeping diaries or 
providing personal information to the media, probably have much to do with the broad-brush 
representations one normally finds of him in the secondary literature. For an often-cited and highly 
critical analysis of the Army’s interwar preparations, see David E. Johnson, Fast Tanks and Heavy 
Bombers: Innovation in the U.S. Army, 1917-1945 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998); for other 
oft-cited and more balanced works that provide detailed information on their primary topic, but little 
background on Lesley McNair despite the key role he played in the events they address, see Williamson 
Murray and Allan R. Millett, eds., Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (New York: Cambridge 
University Press,1996); Jonathan M. House, Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century 
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2001); Christopher R. Gabel, Seek, Strike, and Destroy: U.S. 
Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II, Leavenworth Paper 12 (Washington, D.C.: Combat 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1985); ———, The U.S. Army GHQ 
Maneuvers of 1941 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1992).  
 
3 
The existing secondary sources on World War II and the interwar years that mention 
McNair base their evaluation of his contributions to the Army almost entirely on the last four 
years of his career, when McNair served as the chief of staff, General Headquarters (GHQ) from 
1940-42, and the commander of Army Ground Forces (AGF) from 1942-44. The cumulative 
effect of these works leads readers to associate McNair’s name with a litany of training errors 
and combat inefficiencies, resulting in his status as one of America’s most often mentioned and 
most poorly understood general officers of World War II. The many works on U.S. Army 
effectiveness during the war usually offer a detailed analysis of the particular events or factors on 
which they focus, often to support a specific argument regarding modern Army reorganization or 
“Army Transformation,” but they provide rather narrow depictions of McNair himself. In 
particular, these studies fail to identify the immense depth and breadth of experience McNair 
developed over his long career, assessing McNair’s views on issues of organization, doctrine, 
and training as flawed based on hindsight rather than thorough critical analysis. They often 
single out a particular decision he made or action he took without adequately placing it within 
the context of the entirety of his career, or within the complexity of the situation he faced. 
Perhaps the most common flaw in these analyses is asserting a level of individual control over 
decisions and events that McNair simply did not possess. Even at the height of his 
responsibilities as commander of Army Ground Forces, he remained subordinate to the War 
Department General Staff, and coequal to the commanders of Army Air Forces and Army 
Service Forces. Once America entered the war, the Operations Division of the War Department 
often deferred to commanders in the field when their advice conflicted with those of McNair. 
Therefore, previous works that either focus on or mention McNair fail to provide a 
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comprehensive understanding of his career as a whole, or his influence on the U.S. Army’s 
preparation for and effectiveness during World War II.4 
The following study seeks to provide the first comprehensive analysis of Lesley 
McNair’s forty-year military career. It describes many positions he held, experiences he gained, 
and mentors who shaped his thinking, much of which previously lacked coverage in the 
secondary literature. In short, the following puts General McNair in context, revealing how his 
ideas developed over the course of his long career, culminating in their practical application 
during the pre-war mobilization period and the resulting effectiveness of the force America sent 
to fight World War II. Analysis of his intellectual development reveals that the themes historians 
tend to emphasize in the better-known period of McNair’s service – the last four years of his 
career – stem from a thread of continuity that reaches back to his service at much earlier stages 
of his military service. This objective and detailed analysis leads to a better understanding of his 
thinking as a senior officer, and opens the door to new interpretations of his actions and 
decisions which, until now, frequently suffered from misunderstanding or flawed assumptions 
due to lack of context.5  
                                                          
4 For a particularly useful source highlighting the tension between the War Department’s 
Operations Division and its three subordinate headquarters (Army Ground Forces, Army Service Forces, 
and Army Air Forces), see War Department Operations Division (OPD), "Operations Division Files: 
Office of the Director of Plans & Operations, War Department," January 1942 - July 1944, National 
Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, RG 165, Entry 422, Boxes 40-48. 
5 The “Green Books” or U.S. Army official histories of WWII did much to emphasize the last 
four years of McNair’s career and his expertise as an organizer and trainer of troops. No other period of 
his career can be studied in such detail without resorting to archival sources. See Kent Roberts Greenfield, 
Robert R. Palmer, and Bell I. Wiley, The Army Ground Forces: The Organization of Ground Combat 
Troops, United States Army in World War II, ed. Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army 
Center of Military History, 1947; reprint, 2004); Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, 
The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops, The Army Ground Forces: United States 
Army in World War II (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1948). Much less 
information exists in the secondary literature on McNair’s WWI service, but some sources briefly address 
the period, including Kleber, "McNair." 
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By extension, a deeper understanding of the full span of McNair’s career supports a more 
thoughtful and informed perspective on the U.S. Army that fought World War II. His career 
spanned both World Wars and the much-discussed interwar period. By studying McNair’s career 
one can achieve a firmer grasp on the details and significance of these key events in the history 
of the early twentieth century U.S. Army. Furthermore, analysis of how the young Lieutenant 
McNair developed into the lieutenant general who eventually commanded the Army Ground 
Forces serves as a lens through which to reevaluate the effectiveness of the entire U.S. Army in 
World War II. Much as with the misrepresentations of McNair, many studies of America’s 
effectiveness during the war present a tenacious and widespread but deeply flawed accepted 
wisdom, which persists largely due to similarly flawed or shallow analysis. 
For example, Edward G. Miller greatly oversimplified the media reaction to McNair’s 
Armistice Day address to the troops, broadcast on November 11, 1942 over the Blue Network, in 
his book Nothing Less than Full Victory. Titled “The Struggle is for Survival: The Importance of 
Training and Personnel,” but more commonly referred to as “McNair’s ‘Kill or be Killed’ 
speech,” Miller concluded that McNair’s remarks about the need for American troops’ battle 
hardening in combat permitted “the media [to have] a field day.”6 Further, Miller placed much of 
the blame for what he calls the “U.S. Armor Problem” on McNair’s shoulders, since McNair – 
just “an artilleryman” – upon his appointment to senior leadership in GHQ and later AGF lacked 
the imagination to handle his varied responsibilities in these positions.7 
                                                          
6 Edward G. Miller, Nothing Less Than Full Victory: Americans at War in Europe, 1944-1945 
(Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2007), 16. Research shows that letters McNair received from listeners 
writing in support of his remarks greatly outnumber those from listeners writing in protest of it; Various, 
"Folder: Letters in Response to McNair's 1942 Armistice Day Address," 1942, McNair Papers, U.S. 
Library of Congress. 
7 Miller, Nothing Less Than Full Victory, 273. By 1940 McNair possessed a broad range of 
experience that made him something much more than merely “an artilleryman.” 
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In fact, one finds no shortage of critics of McNair’s capabilities as a senior leader during 
World War II in the historical record. Among the most recent examples, Chris Prigge, much like 
Edward Miller, referred to McNair upon his appointment as GHQ chief of staff as merely “a 
field artillery officer.” This erroneously discounts his broad military experience. Prigge went on 
to imply a bias on McNair’s part that led him to an unwarranted belief “that antitank guns could 
be massed to defeat a tank attack,” and caused him to advocate flawed Army organization and 
equipment, particularly within reconnaissance units.8 Such interpretations fail to account for 
McNair’s vast experience in field tests of various organizations and equipment throughout his 
career. 
The following analysis seeks to demonstrate that McNair deserved the nickname 
Marshall gave him. In a military not known for producing famous and prolific theorists (e.g., 
B.H. Liddell Hart, J.F.C. Fuller, G.S. Isserson, V.K. Triandafillov, Antoine Jomini, or Carl von 
Clausewitz), McNair stands out as an intellectual. However, like most military thinkers, he 
worked within a military bureaucracy, which itself existed within a larger national and social 
system. He faced challenges navigating the complex terrain of these systems as did all military 
intellectuals, and not surprisingly, sometimes he failed to predict the nature of future warfare 
with complete accuracy. In other cases, he simply lacked the ability, being only one man – albeit 
an influential one – to resolve the flaws he recognized in those larger systems. Americans in the 
decades between the world wars still harbored a distrust of large standing armies, and their 
unilateralist leaning led them to support congressional actions to constrain military progress 
through stringent military budget cuts and personnel authorizations. McNair could only attempt 
                                                          
8 Christopher Prigge, "Tradition and Transformation: The Origins of the U.S. Armored Cavalry 
Regiments" (Ph.D. diss, Harvard University, 2011), 345. Ironically, earlier in the paper the author points 
out McNair's close relationship since 1918 with George C. Marshall, who hand-picked McNair for the 
position at GHQ in 1940. 
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to do his best to work around these constraints, advising the best possible course given a limited 
range of options. In short, McNair got some things wrong, but given the challenges he faced, it is 
fair to assert that he got much right.  
Further, as James Wheeler pointed out in a recent Army article, McNair now ranks among 
“Marshall’s forgotten men.” Wheeler described these men as leaders Marshall noted as 
particularly capable early in his career and called upon for senior leadership when the need arose 
in 1939. Wheeler wrote his article in response to an earlier article by Cole Kingseed entitled 
“Marshall’s Men,” adding these “forgotten men” to Kingseed’s list of the better-remembered 
men Marshall appointed to key leadership positions during WWII. As Wheeler pointed out, 
McNair’s service “and that of the other forgotten Marshall men, is unknown to most Americans.” 
However, even Wheeler, as he sought to remind his readers of McNair’s contributions, painted 
him with a broad brush. For example, he emphasized Marshall’s role in selecting general officers 
for the Army’s senior leadership positions, but failed to acknowledge McNair’s perhaps equally 
significant responsibility of recommending the division commanders for every division and 
corps the Army activated to fight WWII. Stephen R. Taaffe, however, corrected this oversight in 
his recent book, Marshall and His Generals. As Taaffe pointed out, “Despite all his years in the 
small prewar army, it was impossible for Marshall to personally meet and evaluate every officer 
eligible for the highest ranks and positions.” Therefore, “he had to depend increasingly upon the 
recommendations of others . . . especially General Lesley McNair of Army Ground Forces.”9 
This study seeks to provide a context for understanding McNair at the pinnacle of his 
career by analyzing the full scope of McNair’s forty years of Regular Army service, revealing 
the threads of continuity in his intellectual development that help explain his actions during the 
                                                          
9 James Scott Wheeler, "Marshall's Forgotten Men," Army 58, no. 11. Stephen R. Taaffe, 
Marshall and His Generals: U.S. Army Commanders in World War II, Modern War Studies, ed. 
Theodore A. Wilson (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2011), 6. 
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critical years of the Army’s mobilization for and engagement in World War II. This analysis 
rests on a number of key research questions: In what positions and assignments did Lesley J. 
McNair during his military career? What developmental experiences formed the key milestones 
in the early stages of his career? How did these experiences shape his perceptions and attitudes 
regarding army doctrine, organization, training, and innovation? How did these perceptions and 
attitudes develop over the course of his early career, and shape his actions in the latter stages of 
his career, at the height of his influence? What was General Lesley J. McNair’s ultimate impact 
on the United States Army, not just during the final few years of his career, but throughout the 
entirety of the four decades that he served? And, to the degree that this can be dealt with, what 
has been his legacy? 
Examination of General Lesley McNair’s forty-year military career makes possible a 
better-informed understanding of McNair’s long-term impact on the Army, while revealing many 
previously unknown or rarely mentioned early developmental experiences that influenced his 
performance during the better-known final years of his career. In addition, this account is 
intended to be more than merely a narrative of McNair’s forty years of military service – the 
story of an individual officer who rose to positions of prominence in both World Wars. In a 
sense, it serves as a lens through which to view the early-twentieth century Army in a variety of 
contexts. These include Army culture, technological innovation, relationships between citizens 
and soldiers – particularly during the interwar period – and the ongoing struggle to understand 
the lessons of World War I as the Army prepared to enter World War II. The following analysis 
represents not only the first comprehensive study of General Lesley J. McNair – one of the chief 
architects of the early twentieth century Army. It also seeks to further the ongoing discourse on 
the doctrinal developments, organizational adjustments, mechanization efforts, and other 
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technological innovations the Army implemented after World War I, and the resulting 
effectiveness of the American Army that fought World War II. 
Analyzing the career of an officer whose active service spanned the years 1904-44, and 
involved duty in high-level staff positions during both World Wars and a key role in many 
innovative efforts between the wars, revealed much about both the man himself and the period 
during which he served. This naturally led to many insights regarding the existing historiography 
of the early-twentieth century Army, and particularly its fighting effectiveness during World War 
II, when McNair was among the Army’s most senior general officers, responsible for the 
mobilization training of all the ground forces America sent to fight the war. Over the past several 
decades a standard narrative has dominated the historical discourse regarding the U.S. Army’s 
performance during the war, which, put simply, argues America’s success stemmed from 
material preponderance, which alone enabled the Army to overcome its qualitative inferiority to 
its Axis foe – particularly the vaunted Wehrmacht.  
Given his key role in the preparation of the Army to fight during WWII, McNair serves 
as a key individual with name recognition value, making him an easy target on which to place 
blame for the supposed ineptitude of U.S. Army soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and 
officers. The remarkable longevity of this accepted wisdom regarding the U.S. Army’s 
performance in WWII reveals itself any time historians of the Second World War assemble in a 
group of more than the handful of recent revisionist historians. The accepted wisdom leads to 
statements one still hears at evens like the 2010 Conference of the Society of Military Historians, 
where one panelist stated (to paraphrase), “the U.S. Army never matched the German Army’s 
skill in combined arms mechanized warfare, but somehow won WWII anyway.”  
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The following analysis combines historical perspectives from a number of subfields that 
rarely appear together in a single work. These include the interwar officer education system; 
military and industrial mobilization for both WWI and WWII; the organization and internal 
relationships of the War Department staff during the Second World War; and the effectiveness of 
the U.S. Army once battle-hardening through combat experience enabled it to fight in 
accordance with the organization and doctrine developed during the interwar period. A slowly 
growing body of work has contributed to a growing awareness that it is time to abandon the 
flawed narrative of U.S. military ineptitude only overcome through sheer materiel superiority. 
The following work represents an attempt not only to increase historical understanding of the 
career of one of the chief architects of the WWII Army by revealing previously unknown facts 
regarding his previous thirty-six years of active service; it also should shed new light on the early 
twentieth century Army as a whole. 
The study combines a chronological and a thematic organizational structure. While the 
chapters run in chronological order, certain themes recur throughout the various stages of 
McNair’s career – some possibly familiar, and others newly revealed through archival research. 
Some of the themes do not become clear until the later stages of the study, when their recurrence 
links previously misunderstood or misrepresented actions on McNair’s part to their roots in an 
earlier stage of his career. These themes include McNair’s lifelong emphasis on the value of 
officer education and his strong convictions regarding the qualities required in a competent 
commander. Further, he embraced military innovation and technological development from the 
earliest stages of his service, and the Army groomed him as an officer particularly qualified to 
conduct field tests and experiments to update Army doctrine and organization. He consistently 
strove to improve Army effectiveness by gaining efficiencies in unit organization through 
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various measures of streamlining and pooling of assets – efficiencies in some cases beneficial in 
their own right, and in others necessary due to real limitations in personnel and materiel 
availability. He understood the value of arduous, realistic training to achieve individual and unit 
proficiency, and perhaps more importantly he grasped that all concepts required objective, 
detailed experimentation to test their practical value. He recognized from an early age the 
importance of combined arms fighting methods, and consistently sought to optimize the Army 
for task organization.  
As he strove to inculcate these values in the Army, McNair maintained an exhausting 
schedule throughout his career, regularly working sixteen-hour days and rarely taking leave. He 
traveled thousands of miles on the road and in the air to visit units in training. Finally, he did 
administrative work himself that other officers might have delegated to someone else, not only to 
ensure it met his exacting standards, but also because completing it all required working well 
into the night, something he preferred to do himself rather than requiring such sacrifices from his 
subordinates. Perhaps unsurprisingly, one can discern the roots of all these ideas and traits in 






Existing secondary sources that mention McNair almost without exception focus on his 
service during the last few years of his life, when he served as chief of staff at General 
Headquarters (GHQ) and later commanded the Army Ground Forces (AGF). These sources 
describe McNair as a staff officer responsible for the organization and training of the ground 
forces America sent to fight World War II, but they lack the perspective one can gain by 
analyzing his four-decade long career in both staff and command positions, during peace and 
war. This enhanced perspective sheds light on what many interpret as shortsighted and mistaken 
policies he championed both during pre-war mobilization and after deployment. 
McNair the Young Man and Cadet 
Lesley James McNair lived a small-town existence for most of his youth. His father, 
James McNair, immigrated to America from Comphelltown, Scotland, at the age of eight, in 
1854. James lived in Ohio with his seven siblings and his parents, William and Mary McNair, 
until the 1870s when he moved with his family to Neoga, Illinois. James met and married Clara 
Mantz McNair in Dayton, Ohio in 1880, and moved to Verndale, Minnesota the following year. 
Today, Verndale boasts a population of just over 500, but in the 1880s, the town enjoyed a 
bustling economy, attracting merchants and farmers seeking an entry point to new agricultural 
areas in the northern Midwest. Verndale’s economy centered on packaging wheat brought in 
from the northern prairies, and shipping it to Minneapolis and onward to satisfy demands from 
across the nation. James and Clara McNair operated a general store near the central part of town 
and lived in a small home a block and a half from the store. They raised four children: two sons 
 
13 
and two daughters. They celebrated the birth of Lesley James, their second child and firstborn 
son, on 25 May 1883.10 
Lesley McNair attended school in Verndale through ninth grade, the highest grade 
available at the local school, consistently excelling academically. However, no opportunity 
existed near Verndale for a bright young man to complete high school, prompting the McNair 
family to leave Verndale after fourteen years there. The family genealogy, a multi-volume 
project completed by James Birtley McNair between 1923 and 1960, covered the history of the 
extended McNair family; those originating in Scotland and other parts of Great Britain, including 
those who adopted variant spellings of the last name. The genealogy described James and Clara 
as prominent members of the Verndale community. In addition to his general store, James dealt 
in timber products, and spent a great deal of time in camps looking after his timber interests in 
Nimrod, Minnesota. According to one account, Verndale residents described Clara as a “model 
housewife, devoted mother, and steadfast friend,” whom neighbors regarded an accomplished 
musician. She also maintained a strong interest in local educational affairs. Perhaps this interest 
helped her convince James to sell his timber business and leave behind his beloved camps in the 
woods, so that he could move his family to Minneapolis in 1894, providing Lesley and his 
siblings the opportunity to finish high school.11 
Lesley took full advantage of this opportunity. Driven by the goal of serving as a U.S. 
Navy officer, he finished high school in 1897 with a strong record and competed successfully for 
a position to attend the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis. However, he grew frustrated with the 
academy’s long waiting list, and enrolled the following year in the Minnesota School of 
                                                          
10 James Birtley McNair, McNair, McNear, and McNeir Genealogies: Supplement, 1950 (Los 
Angeles, CA: James Birtley McNair, 1950), 833; Lehner and Lehner, " McNair: Verndale to St. Lo," 9. 
11 McNair, McNair, McNear, and McNeir Genealogies: Supplement, 1950, 833; Lehner and 
Lehner, " McNair: Verndale to St. Lo," 9-10. 
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Business, Minneapolis, Minnesota. There he pursued a degree in the mechanical engineering 
field, studying ordnance construction, woodworking, metalworking, ordnance design, 
bookkeeping, and statistical work. By spring, 1900 he completed this program and, still on the 
waiting list to attend the Naval Academy, he sought admittance to the United States Military 
Academy (USMA) at West Point. The academy notified him of his acceptance to a position as a 
cadet on 1 August 1900.12 
McNair continued his record of outstanding academic performance at USMA. When he 
earned his commission in 1904, he ranked eleventh out of the 124 graduates in his class. He 
received an appointment as a second lieutenant in the field artillery, a branch that suited him well 
due to his skill in mathematics – consistently among his strongest subjects during his four years 
as a cadet. In addition to his commission as a field artillery officer, McNair earned a nickname at 
West Point. As the Lehners recall in “Verndale to St. Lo,” McNair’s “West Point colleagues 
remembered him as a mathematical shark, and called him ‘Whitey’ [because his of his hair, so 
blonde it looked white], a nickname that followed him the rest of his life.”13  
McNair’s particular interests, most notably mathematics, stand out when one compares 
his class rank in each topic to his overall class rank during each of his four years at USMA. For 
example, McNair completed his first year ranked number thirty-one out of 154 “Fourth Class” 
(first year) cadets, but he ranked twenty-fourth in mathematics – his highest ranking among all 
subjects that year. In his second year, he earned his highest overall ranking of his West Point 
career, taking sixth position among the 142 “Third Class” cadets, ranking fourth in drawing and 
tenth in mathematics – his two best subjects that year. McNair struggled a bit in his third year, 
falling to number thirty out of 125 cadets; but he ranked fifth in drawing, twentieth in conduct, 
                                                          
12 ———, " McNair: Verndale to St. Lo," 9-10; Adjutant General, "Summary of Efficiency 
Reports and Account of Services," 1917, McNair Papers, National Archives at St. Louis, MO. 
13 Lehner and Lehner, " McNair: Verndale to St. Lo," 10. 
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and twenty-third in mathematics. McNair finished his senior year as number eleven out of 124 
graduating cadets, ranking eighth in Ordnance & Gunnery, twelfth in mathematics, and 
eighteenth in military efficiency.14 
Always committed to strict discipline both for himself and for others, McNair 
experienced only one lapse in conduct during his four years in the notoriously strict program of 
instruction at West Point. He returned late from leave on one occasion, after visiting a young 
woman named Clare Huster in New York City. Since he married Clare soon after graduation and 
spent the rest of his life with her, the demerit probably seemed a small price to pay.15 Before the 
young cadet’s wedding to Clare, he headed west to begin active service as a second lieutenant in 
the mountain artillery. In the early twentieth century, officers faced stiff competition to earn a 
commission in the field artillery. However, it proved a perfect fit for Second Lieutenant McNair, 
a talented mathematician who also had enjoyed the mentorship of West Point’s mathematics 
department faculty, composed at the time primarily of field artillerymen.16 McNair soon found a 
way to put his exceptional talent in drawing and ordnance design to use, resulting in a four-year 
detour from the standard field artillery career path. 
                                                          
14 During McNair’s four years at West Point, the curriculum only included Drawing during the 
cadets’ second and third years, and only offered Ordnance & Gunnery and Military Efficiency in their 
fourth year. McNair’s talent for drawing, ordnance & gunnery, and mathematics remained consistent 
throughout his active duty career. "Official Register of the Officers and Cadets of the United States 
Military Academy, 1901,"  (West Point, NY: U.S.M.A. Press and Bindery, 1901), 17; "Official Register 
of the Officers and Cadets of the United States Military Academy, 1902,"  (West Point, NY: U.S.M.A. 
Press and Bindery, 1902), 15; "Official Register of the Officers and Cadets of the United States Military 
Academy, 1903,"  (West Point, NY: U.S.M.A. Press and Bindery, 1903), 12; "Official Register of the 
Officers and Cadets of the United States Military Academy, 1904,"  (West Point, NY: U.S.M.A. Press and 
Bindery, 1904), 10. 
15 ———, " McNair: Verndale to St. Lo," 10. 
16 "Official Register of the Officers and Cadets of the United States Military Academy, 1901." 
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Service with the Ordnance Branch 
The newly commissioned McNair arrived at Fort Douglas, Utah in September 1904 to 
undertake his first tour of duty after three months of leave. He served as a platoon leader 
assigned to the 12th Battery, Mountain Artillery. While learning the duties of a young leader of 
field artillerymen, McNair requested in 1905 an examination for detail to the Ordnance Branch. 
He took the exam in February, and the board of examiners recommended approval of his request 
in May. On 22 May 1905, McNair received orders reassigning him to the Ordnance Branch, 
arriving at Sandy Hook Proving Ground in New Jersey on 14 June. While McNair possessed 
exceptional talent for drafting and ordnance, the presence in New York of Ms. Clare Huster 
might also have influenced his decision to request a branch detail to Ordnance, with its promise 
of an assignment on the east coast. He certainly did not waste any time, marrying Clare on 15 
June 1905, the day after his arrival in New Jersey.17 
McNair spent the next four years serving in a wide variety of Ordnance Branch positions. 
Despite his academic proficiency and evident interest in the Ordnance Branch, McNair’s 
efficiency reports from this period reflect mixed performance. This appears to have resulted from 
a shaky relationship with a particular supervisor, but he may also have found it difficult to 
achieve a reasonable balance between his personal and professional life after experiencing five 
years of military routine at West Point and the remote Army outpost at Fort Douglas.  
First Lieutenant G. R. Green, his battery commander at Fort Douglas, recorded only 
positive remarks in McNair’s first efficiency report. Green described the young lieutenant as an 
officer who possessed excellent “Attention to duty, profession zeal and general bearing and 
                                                          
17 "The Adjutant General: Consolidated Cross Reference Card, Personnel File of Lesley J. 
McNair (Pre-1919)," McNair Papers, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C; 
Adjutant General, "Summary of Efficiency Reports and Account of Services, 1917."; Kahn, McNair, 
Educator of an Army, 52; Lehner and Lehner, " McNair: Verndale to St. Lo," 10. 
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military appearance,” and very good “intelligence and judgment shown in instructing, drilling, 
and handling enlisted men.” Green identified McNair as a good equestrian, suited for service in 
the field artillery, or as an instructor at the U.S. Military Academy, and – largely due to his 
“special ability in mechanical drawing and map making” – particularly fit for “detail in Ordnance 
Department.” However, Green found McNair best suited, in the event of war, for service with the 
field artillery.18 
By contrast, McNair’s efficiency reports from his four-year detail with the Ordnance 
Department provide a mixed assessment of the young officer. His first two reports reflect 
performance on par with that of his assignment at Fort Douglas. Colonel G.S. Smith, his 
supervisor during the first year of his branch detail, when he served as a staff officer in the office 
of the Chief of Ordnance, commended his basic skills and characteristics as an Army lieutenant. 
Smith judged McNair “well fitted for detail on the General Staff,” but stated, “to a limited extent 
he appears to be qualified for command of troops.” With no performance deficiencies noted, one 
can only speculate why Smith believed McNair possessed limited potential for command; 
however, this could have been merely a result of his youth and lack of experience. Regardless, 
Smith summarized his report by finding McNair “qualified for his position,” and stating he 
“should be entrusted with important duties commensurate with his experience and rank.” Smith 
recommended McNair for either artillery or ordnance duty in time of war.19 
In 1906, McNair left the office of the Chief of Ordnance for Watertown Arsenal in 
Boston. His first supervisor, Lieutenant Colonel F.E. Hobbs, seemed quite impressed with 
McNair’s performance, finding him excellent or very good in all the basic officer leadership 
                                                          
18 Adjutant General, "Summary of Efficiency Reports and Account of Services, 1917."; "The 
Adjutant General: Consolidated Cross Reference Card, Personnel File of Lesley J. McNair (Pre-1919)." 
19 ———, "Summary of Efficiency Reports and Account of Services, 1917."; "The Adjutant 
General: Consolidated Cross Reference Card, Personnel File of Lesley J. McNair (Pre-1919)." 
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qualities. He deemed McNair fit for detail as “an instructor in the Department of Ordnance and 
Gunnery” or in “command of troops.” Further, Hobbs noted that he commended McNair “in a 
special report made by me to the Chief of Ordnance as to character and service of detailed 
officers who had served under my command.” However, McNair spent his final two years while 
detailed to the Ordnance Branch working for Major C.B. Wheeler, and given the fact that the two 
efficiency reports McNair received during this time stand out as the only ones with any adverse 
remarks, it appears the two officers did not work particularly well together.20 
For example, in his first efficiency report on McNair, written in 1908, Wheeler found him 
reasonably well qualified in the general skills of an officer, but found he possessed “no peculiar 
fitness for detail,” and wrote that McNair’s “capacity for work is not large.” Wheeler clearly did 
not think highly of McNair, writing, “I would not object to his being under my immediate 
command but I would prefer to have an officer of greater capacity.” Wheeler further pointed out 
that he had mentioned McNair unfavorably in an Ordnance Office report earlier that year, and 
believed McNair was “unwilling to devote more time to routine work than the daily office hours, 
no matter how much his work may be in arrears. He has at times worked over hours but there is a 
general spirit of unwillingness.”21  
McNair’s problems with Wheeler continued the following year. His 1909 efficiency 
report, in which Wheeler seemed more pleased generally with McNair’s performance, provided 
positive assessments of his performance and potential, but levied significant criticism near the 
end of his comments. However, this latter text simultaneously reveals the most likely explanation 
for Wheeler’s negative assessment of McNair’s performance. It reads, “Captain McNair’s 
                                                          
20 ———, "Summary of Efficiency Reports and Account of Services, 1917."; "The Adjutant 
General: Consolidated Cross Reference Card, Personnel File of Lesley J. McNair (Pre-1919)." 
21 ———, "Summary of Efficiency Reports and Account of Services, 1917."; "The Adjutant 
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otherwise good efficiency is impaired by his lack of power of appreciating the best methods of 
conducting his duties in accordance with the wishes of his commanding officer for whose 
judgment he has appeared at times to be willing to substitute for his own.” Whatever challenges 
he may have experienced while working for Wheeler, they did not prevent McNair from earning 
promotion to captain in Ordnance (although this promotion did not apply in his basic branch – 
Field Artillery – where he remained a first lieutenant).22 
Despite his difficulties with Major Wheeler, McNair learned a great deal during his four 
years working for the Ordnance Branch. At Watertown Arsenal, in particular, McNair undertook 
an intensive “course of practical profession” that included diverse practical categories of 
experience. In this yearlong course, McNair performed hands-on study of laboratory test 
machines and methods. This included breaking test specimens, metallurgical analysis, foundry 
skills including the melting of bronze and cast iron, the manufacture of steel and pouring of 
castings, and the use of equipment including the forge, steam hammer, bolt machine and shears, 
lathes, planes, shapers, milling and boring machines, and test devices. McNair received practical 
experience during the day, and completed academic work after hours, including the study of 
course notes, reference books, and technical drawings. The expertise he developed served him 
well in the coming years, when the Army turned to him with increasing frequency to oversee 
various equipment tests and boards.23 
                                                          
22 ———, "Summary of Efficiency Reports and Account of Services, 1917."; "The Adjutant 
General: Consolidated Cross Reference Card, Personnel File of Lesley J. McNair (Pre-1919)." McNair 
accepted promotion to first lieutenant in the field artillery on 20 May 1907, but simultaneously earned 
temporary promotion to captain for the duration of his branch detail. This final efficiency report from 
McNair’s Ordnance Department detail makes it appear even more likely his relatively poor evaluations by 
Major Wheeler probably have more to do with a personality conflict than any limited capability on 
McNair’s part. McNair’s evaluations from all the other officers he worked for, including two other 
Ordnance Branch supervisors, describe McNair’s performance in much more favorable terms. 
23 ———, "Summary of Efficiency Reports and Account of Services, 1917." 
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Service with the Field Artillery 
When McNair departed Watertown Arsenal in 1909, he possessed a broad range of skills 
and experience that set him to a degree apart amongst his fellow artillerymen. Building on his 
exceptional mathematical and technical drawing ability, McNair learned the value of 
methodological rigor in the conduct of equipment tests and experiments during his branch detail 
with Ordnance. A traditional field artillery career path could not provide such a wealth of 
broadening opportunities. In five short years, Lieutenant McNair had developed a solid 
foundation of technical and tactical proficiency. 
With his new wife in tow, and restored to his previous rank in the Field Artillery, First 
Lieutenant McNair returned west for service in his primary branch. He received orders 
reassigning him to the 4th Field Artillery at Fort D.A. Russell, Wyoming on July 1, 1909, where 
he took command of Battery C two weeks later. McNair spent the next eight years with the Field 
Artillery at posts in Wyoming, Texas, and Oklahoma, or on combat duty in and around Mexico. 
In these assignments, McNair mastered the demands of service in remote and mountainous 
terrain, and developed a reputation as an energetic, no-nonsense leader. Second Lieutenant Jacob 
L. Devers, a newly-commissioned platoon leader assigned to McNair’s battery after graduation 
from the 1909 West Point class, remembered McNair as an outstanding battery commander. In 
particular, Devers recalled McNair set high standards, led by example, and could get the most 
out of his men – skills critical for successful commanders in the difficult conditions Army 
personnel faced in austere western outposts.24 
The Army soon began to make use of the experience McNair gained during his detail to 
the Ordnance Department. Much of the equipment currently in use by the mountain artillery 
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served its purpose marginally at best. Units of the mountain artillery still used the 2.95-inch 
Vickers-Maxim mountain gun, a weapon obsolete since 1905 when the Ordnance Department 
developed a 3-inch howitzer for the light artillery. Although Ordnance had planned to develop an 
experimental battery to test a new mountain gun the same year, they had made no significant 
progress in the intervening four years (and still had no new mountain howitzer as late as 1916).25 
Therefore, the Ordnance Department tested various modifications to the obsolete 2.95-inch gun, 
modifying its carriage and sight in an effort to make it more suitable for mountain duty. 
Furthermore, most mountain artillery units’ packsaddles, other transport and pioneer equipment, 
and items including kitchen gear and the mobile forge ranged from unsuitable to nonexistent. 
McNair spent much of his four years in command of Battery C working to find solutions to these 
various equipment challenges, conducting tests and participating in boards while training his 
men in extremely arduous conditions.26 
McNair’s work to improve mountain artillery equipment and training contributed to a 
larger Army-wide effort to modernize the field artillery. This project dated to the turn of the 
century, when the poor performance of the field artillery during the Spanish-American War 
prompted American development of a new 3-inch howitzer. Observers of the Russo-Japanese 
War of 1904-05 reported dramatic improvements in field artillery procedures that increased the 
effectiveness of indirect fire. As Janice McKenney noted in The Organizational History of Field 
Artillery, 
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That war involved the clash of large armies armed with modern weapons, resulting in the 
extensive use of trenches. The effectiveness of artillery fire drove both sides to cover, that is, in 
defilade. Laying guns indirectly while in defilade became standard, with centralized control 
provided through the use of telephone wire. Indirect fire control resulted in an increase in the 
number of potential firing locations, and the ability to shift the fire of a great number of pieces 
without physically moving them permitted the use of heavier, less mobile artillery in the field. 
However, field artillery leaders argued Field Artillery organization and personnel management 
hindered its ability to take full advantage of the new 3-inch gun and the advance firing methods 
observers had witnessed in the Russo-Japanese War.27  
After much debate, Congress passed an act separating coast and field artillery into two 
branches in 1907, based on the conclusion that the mission and function of the two sub-fields of 
artillery differed so much that having artillery officers rotate between assignments in the two 
types of units served no useful purpose. The same act “authorized six additional field batteries 
and gave the heretofore provisional regiments legal standing. The regiments, numbered 1 
through 6, each had two battalions of three four-gun batteries. The 1st, 3d, and 5th Field Artillery 
were authorized as light artillery to serve with infantry troops, the 2d and 4th as mountain or 
pack artillery, and the 6th as horse artillery to serve with the cavalry.” The mountain artillery, in 
which McNair served, served the same infantry support role as the light artillery, but relied on 
mules instead of horses to negotiate mountainous terrain, and employed generally lighter, more 
mobile equipment. However, no mountain equivalent of the new 3-inch gun yet existed by 1909, 
despite years of supposed effort to develop one, so one of McNair’s first priorities involved 
testing the existing gun to find ways to maximize the potential of a weapon most artillerymen 
considered obsolete.28 
McNair’s first step in this effort involved traveling with one firing section from his 
battery to Fort Riley, Kansas, in September 1909 to conduct firing tests for six weeks with the 
                                                          
27 Janice E. McKenney, The Organizational History of Field Artillery, 1775-2003 (Washington, 
D.C.: United States Army Center for Military History, 2007), 99. 
28 Ibid., 101. 
 
23 
Ordnance Department’s prototype 2.95-inch mountain howitzer. Upon his arrival at Fort Riley, 
McNair requested detailed drawings of the modified Vickers gun, which he used after his return 
to Fort D.A. Russell to prepare a detailed report on the Fort Riley firing tests, which included 
engineering drawings for a custom mountain artillery piece designed to his specifications that he 
recommended the Ordnance Department build and test. He submitted this report on 5 April 1910, 
and then began planning a training exercise. The Ordnance Department had not yet issued any of 
the new mountain guns to C Battery, so McNair took his men to the Target and Maneuver 
Reservation, Pole Mountain, Wyoming for a month of training in July 1910. This training gave 
McNair his first opportunity to test his battery in field conditions, identify needed equipment and 
training shortfalls, and prepare for more tests, which he planned for early the next year.29 
Meanwhile, during the first few months of 1911 Major William Lassiter of the 5th Field 
Artillery conducted an inspection of the 4th Field Artillery for the Inspector General, Maneuver 
Division, based in San Antonio, Texas. Major Lassiter issued his findings on May 6, 1911, 
having conducted his inspection in March and April of that year (He began the inspection on the 
same day the 4th Artillery’s new commander, Colonel E.D. Hoyle, took command). Before 
describing his detailed findings, Lassiter introduced his report with several general observations 
concerning the challenges he observed in the mountain artillery. These supported his finding 
that,  
The batteries are not thoroughly reliable agencies for the prompt delivery of effective fire. The 
officers are not, as a rule, well skilled in posting their guns and employing them to produce fire 
which is quickly effective. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that, so far as the officers are 
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concerned, this condition is in a great measure due to an imperfect and incomplete system of 
training.30 
Lassiter qualified this assessment, however, noting the unique challenges facing the mountain 
artillery. These centered on the particularly onerous nature of their mission, combined with the 
austere conditions artillerymen endured at posts like Fort D.A. Russell.  
Further, Lassiter pointed out the poor material and organizational state of the mountain 
artillery, emphasizing that, “prompt attention should be given the matter of placing the mountain 
artillery on a better footing with respect to matters of equipment and of interior organization.” He 
provided a list of equipment and methods that needed improvement, including the gun and 
packsaddle, mule loading procedures, and the training of enlisted men. In particular, he advised 
finding a way to simplify the pack mule loading procedures so that enlisted men could learn this 
skill in a reasonably short period. He stressed the goal of eventually replacing the civilian 
packers that the firing batteries required with military personnel, to reduce reliance on 
contractors for combat-related functions. Lassiter’s observations provided a list of mountain 
artillery issues that McNair sought to resolve by leading his battery through various tests and 
exercises over the next several years.31 
Concurrently with Lassiter’s inspection, McNair received orders effective March 13, 
1911 to serve on a Mountain Artillery Board with two other artillery officers from the 4th 
Artillery. Their orders directed the board to observe McNair’s battery as it tested various 
equipment under development for the mountain artillery, including the modified mountain 
artillery howitzer, a replacement for the standard aparejo pack saddle, and miscellaneous other 
field equipment. The board’s first test consisted of a long-range march from Fort D.A. Russell to 
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San Antonio and back, completed between March 13 and July 14. After only a short break, 
McNair took his battery back to the field, conducting another round of firing tests and field 
exercises at Pole Mountain, Wyoming between July 25 and August 13.32  
The War Department terminated McNair’s first Mountain Artillery Board on February 
26, 1912 and approved the board president’s three-page report summarizing its findings. The 
board found that the tests McNair’s battery conducted, both at the firing range and on the march 
from Fort D.A. Russell to San Antonio and back, confirmed, as written in the report, that “there 
is no arm of the service so deficiently equipped as the mountain artillery.” However, the War 
Department soon turned to McNair for further tests of mountain artillery equipment. Less than a 
month after the Mountain Artillery Board issued its final report, McNair received orders to 
conduct further analysis of the equipment identified as deficient in the initial series of tests, with 
a particular focus on the gun and pack saddle. To complete these tests, McNair began planning 
another, longer march that would take the battery through Colorado and then back to Fort D.A. 
Russell in the summer of 1912. While most of the equipment tests would have to wait until this 
upcoming march through Colorado, McNair completed a detailed study of the pack saddle 
problem based on the findings of the previous years’ tests, and submitted this report on May 17th, 
1912.33   
Since most members of the field artillery considered the aparejo saddle deficient as 
currently configured, primarily due to its excessive weight and the skill required for artillery 
personnel to load it correctly (requiring the service of civilian contractors), McNair set out to 
find a suitable replacement. The Ordnance Branch had already devised an alternative 
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configuration for the 1911 field tests that used long canvas bags instead of wooden boxes to 
carry the ammunition. When McNair first saw this design, he realized that the modified 
packsaddle would cause injury to the mules, and he made recommendations to the Ordnance 
Branch for improvements. However, the Ordnance Branch disregarded McNair’s 
recommendations, issuing his battery a set of their modified packsaddles as originally designed. 
McNair designed a test that compared five packsaddle configurations, including three variants of 
the aparejo Ordnance Branch was already considering for adoption (or retention) as standard 
equipment. McNair’s test also included the English packsaddle, commonly in use throughout 
Europe and considered by many mountain artillerymen a superior packsaddle to the aparejo. 
Finally, McNair’s test included a fifth pack saddle of his design, using the basic aparejo saddle 
but equipped with a specially designed ammunition pack and other modifications to improve 
deficiencies he had observed in training and testing of all the other pack saddle variants.34 
In his test, McNair judged the aparejo – in either of its two configurations – worst out of 
the five tested in two categories. The first of these, efficiency, equated to the percentage of the 
total weight of the packsaddle made up by the artillery ammunition it carried – i.e. the ratio of 
ammo weight to total weight. The second, capacity, represented the ratio of the weight made up 
by ammunition in a fully loaded pack to the 350-pound maximum loading capacity of the mule – 
i.e. the degree to which the pack made full use of the mule’s carrying capacity. Further, McNair 
found that the variant of the aparejo developed by the Ordnance Department (equipped with 
canvas bags instead of wooden boxes) provided only slightly better efficiency and capacity than 
the two current configurations. However, the English packsaddle performed equally well in these 
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two criteria, and outperformed all three of the Ordnance Department’s designs in other 
characteristics including durability, load distribution, and packing ease and efficiency.35 
Compared with the poor performance of any of the existing packsaddle variants, 
including the English version, the packsaddle McNair designed performed quite well. In 
McNair’s configuration, the aparejo supported a smaller, more durable, efficiently designed 
canvas ammunition carrier, which improved the packsaddle’s load size, weight distribution, and 
center of gravity. This enabled pack mules to carry heavier loads with far less risk of injury to 
the mule, and made ammunition more readily accessible to the firing batteries. McNair’s men 
constructed the packsaddle to his specifications with materials on hand, and yet it withstood 
more than two weeks of near-constant use without breaking down (the Ordnance Branch’s 
canvas ammo pouch, by contrast, demonstrated poor endurance due to the weak, lightweight 
canvas used to make it). McNair’s packsaddle carried the most rounds in the smallest carrying 
configuration, in two-round packs that one man could easily remove from the pack and carry to 
the firing battery even in rough terrain. Finally, it exceeded all the other configurations in 
efficiency and capacity by 12% or more. Based on these results, McNair proposed his design for 
adoption by the mountain artillery, but given the short period McNair had available to test it, he 
recognized the need for more extensive tests, and identified a number of additional 
improvements he believed it would benefit from. Therefore, he recommended the Ordnance 
Branch construct eight sets of his proposed carriers for issue to his regiment for further testing.36 
Shortly after submitting his detailed packsaddle report, McNair began preparing his 
battery for the upcoming field test, scheduled for June 20 – August 17, 1912. Lieutenant Devers, 
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still serving as a platoon leader in McNair’s battery, participated in this particularly high-profile 
and arduous test, in which McNair led his battery – consisting of three pack trains of fifty mules 
each – on a 51-day, 844-mile march. The battery departed from Cheyenne, Wyoming, headed 
south through Denver, Colorado Springs and Canyon City, and then returned to the Rockies to 
conduct a record-setting high-altitude firing mission at 14,000 feet before returning home to 
Wyoming. However, as late as 1917 Captain Leroy P. Collins wrote a short article published in 
the Field Artillery Journal noting the Army had yet to accomplish the further tests McNair 
recommended, and the standard aparejo configuration remained the one in use: 
I believe that the further test recommended by Captain McNair has never been made. 
There has always existed in our service a strong prejudice in favor of the aparejo to the 
exclusion of other types of pack saddles, probably due to the feeling that what was good 
enough for the old Army in its severe frontier service, is good enough for us. This feeling 
has been strengthened undoubtedly by the influence exerted on the army by the old time 
civilian pack masters. While no one denies that the aparejo has played an important role 
in our past history, yet the great number of sore backs, ensuing after a long march make it 
a matter of great importance that a pack saddle which is easier on a mule's back be 
adopted, if such a one exist or can be developed. Many mules returned from the march 
mentioned with holes in their sides which could not be covered by two hands and these 
were months in healing with no work.37 
Even at this early stage of his career, McNair demonstrated a strong interest in innovation to find 
the most effective equipment for the Army’s use, and he possessed the skill to conduct and 
prepare reports on detailed and methodologically sound tests of such equipment.38 
This conflict between McNair, an ordnance-trained unit commander, and Ordnance 
Branch engineers regarding packsaddles for mountain artillery units serves as an example of the 
challenges caused by the bifurcation of responsibilities for military equipment procurement in 
and employment the early twentieth century. This division of responsibilities caused significant 
problems for the U.S. Army as it attempted to incorporate new technologies when modernizing 
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its organization and doctrine. Historian Daniel Beaver identified the root of the problem in his 
description of the informal nature of the relationships that guided the functioning of the Board of 
Ordnance and Fortification, established in 1885 to conduct a Congress-mandated review of the 
Army’s planned coastal-defense system. Beaver pointed out,  
By 1888 it was clear that construction and location of the new fortifications required formal 
coordination of the technical and construction bureaus and the army combat arms as well as close 
cooperation with the navy. In an unprecedented piece of legislation passed on September 22, 
1888, Congress mandated a permanent Board of Ordnance and Fortification chaired by the 
commanding general of the army and including representatives of the War Department staff as 
well as an independent civilian representative to integrate the coastal defenses of the United 
States. The first formal interbureau managerial experiment by the War Department, it brought 
together engineers, ordnance, signals, and artillery officers to discuss systematic weapons 
research and development, improve cooperation between themselves and with the navy, and 
cultivate technical connections with American industry. 
Under its first commander, the very competent General of the Army John McAllister Schofield, 
the board performed quite well, but as Beaver pointed out, several inefficiencies in its inner 
workings meant its effectiveness relied largely on informal relationships and a spirit of 
cooperation between the commanding general, the secretary of war, and the bureau chiefs. In 
particular, the Ordnance Bureau and the engineers each had their own boards, and they 
controlled the contracting process. This meant “the successful operation of the Board of 
Ordnance and Fortification hinged on personal consultation and informal connections.”39 
As leadership changed among the various departments and agencies that worked with the 
Board over the next ten years, the spirit of cooperation that existed under General Schofield’s 
tenure eroded. By 1899, Secretary of War Elihu Root lost all confidence in the Board, and made 
no mention of it in his annual report that year. However, the War Department took no effective 
action to decisively disband or replace the Board. Implementation of Root’s general staff system 
at the turn of the century left the Board overlooked, and its functions devolved to various 
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agencies, with war planning falling under the purview of the War College Division of the 
General Staff, while the technical and supply bureaus or various special boards retained 
responsibility for weapons and equipment development and standardization.40 Thus, McNair 
possessed the most experience with packsaddles of any of the various individuals or agencies 
involved in their development, and he commanded the units that conducted the field tests, but 
ultimately the technicians in Ordnance branch and industry decided what equipment they would 
procure and field to Army units. 
Meanwhile, McNair’s experimentation with mountain artillery packsaddles and extensive 
field tests drew attention from senior leaders in the branch, including the commandant of the 
Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. This led to the school’s request for a one-year 
detail of McNair to Fort Sill, to put into tabulated and easy to understand form the statistical 
firing data instructors at the school had collected over the previous fifteen months, during which 
the school fired over 7,000 rounds of artillery during various tests and training events. Due to a 
shortage of instructors, the school had only collected the data, but possessed no officer on the 
faculty capable of putting it into useful form. The commandant believed organizing the data into 
a useful format would fully occupy the time of an officer for one year. He requested McNair by 
name to complete the task, writing, “Lieut. McNair, as far as I have been able to observe is fitted 
by disposition and by temperament to accomplish this kind of work in an extremely efficient 
manner.” The War Department approved this request on December 3, 1912, with a report date of 
February 1, 1913, also directing McNair to travel to France to observe French artillery fire about 
midway through this one-year detail.41 
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McNair earned permanent promotion to captain of Field Artillery during his detail at Fort 
Sill, on April 19, 1914. After ten years of peacetime training duty, he soon received the 
opportunity to apply his hard-earned skills in operational combat assignments. From 1914-1917 
he served twice in combat, first as Regimental Commissary, 4th Artillery during the Funston 
Expedition to Vera Cruz (April to September 1914), and later as a battery commander in the 4th 
Artillery in support of Major General John J. Pershing’s Punitive Expedition to Mexico (July 
1916 to February 1917). Between combat tours, McNair returned to the Field Artillery School at 
Fort Sill, where he continued to work on fire procedures and weapons development.42  
Before McNair joined the Funston Expedition, Colonel Berry of the 4th Field Artillery 
requested the War Department assign McNair to his regiment instead of the captain currently 
slated to fill the intended position. Senior Army officers still use this administrative action 
(known as a “by name request” or BNR) in their efforts to fill their organizations with officers of 
known competence or particular ability.43 The War Department granted Berry’s request, and 
McNair supported the 4th Artillery during the expedition. His efficiency report covering this 
period includes the following evaluation of his performance during the expedition: “Under the 
semi-field conditions existing here: Excellent. He has attended to the supply of the regiment in a 
businesslike way.”44 
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Upon his return from Vera Cruz, McNair remained at the School of Fire, where he 
conducted various tests and experiments seeking to improve methods of fire direction and 
control. Evidently, he had performed so well as statistical officer that senior leaders at the Field 
Artillery School managed to retain his services beyond the initial one-year term. In his next 
annual efficiency report, after serving another year at the School of Fire, McNair’s supervisor 
remarked on his particular expertise in ordnance construction and ballistics theory of field 
gunnery, and ranked him “among the first 6 captains of field artillery in efficiency.” In his final 
efficiency report at the School of Fire, completed in May 1916 as McNair prepared to deploy in 
support of the Punitive Expedition, his rater described McNair as “An officer of the highest type, 
thoroughly qualified and reliable,” and rated him “excellent” in all categories.45 
McNair returned to the 4th Field Artillery for the duration of the Punitive Expedition, 
serving as a battery commander and leading troops in combat for the first time. While no records 
appear to exist describing his experience of command in detail, his efficiency report for this 
period indicates he performed in an excellent manner leading his battery 300 miles into Mexico 
and back. His rater and senior rater expressed nothing but praise in his efficiency report, judging 
him excellent in all areas including those related to leading combat troops in the field. Their 
observations included several comments regarding his general competence, including, “An 
excellent officer in both theory and practice,” and “This officer is in my opinion one of the best 
equipped, mentally, morally, and physically, in the service.” Major General John J. Pershing 
signed the report under “First Indorsement,” concurring with the evaluation of McNair’s senior 
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rater, Colonel Allaire.46 This demonstrates that they may not have served closely together during 
the Punitive Expedition, but at a minimum, Pershing read the high praise McNair received in his 
efficiency report and knew enough about his reputation to endorse the remarks. 
These operational assignments further developed McNair’s skill as a leader of 
artillerymen, but more significantly, they steeped the young captain in the principles of 
traditional American warfighting doctrine. Building on its roots as a frontier constabulary, the 
turn-of-the-century American Army remained confident of the primacy of the infantry and the 
power of moral superiority to win battles. Its experiences during the operations in Mexico under 
Funston and Pershing verified in many American officers’ minds the effectiveness of their 
traditional fighting methods. Meanwhile, a radically new form of warfare took shape in Europe, 
where large armies adapted their doctrine to the superiority of the defensive enabled by machine 
guns, massed artillery, and elaborate systems of entrenchments. Meanwhile, the U.S. Army, 
paying little attention to a war they did not expect to fight, continued to emphasize morale over 
technology and expected the infantry to win battles with the rifle and bayonet. In the traditional 
American view, the Infantry provided the main combat force, relying on artillery support only to 
the degree necessary to enable them to close within rifle range and finish the enemy with a 
bayonet charge.47 In this respect, McNair proved unique in his particular expertise with the latest 
fire techniques and equipment, and his efforts to increase the mobility of field artillery so it could 
provide effective support to the infantry.  
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The Punitive Expedition to Mexico in support of Brigadier General John J. Pershing’s 8th 
Brigade proved to be particularly significant for McNair’s career. Not only did the expedition 
offer practical lessons in the employment of mobile artillery; it also gave McNair experience 
with a complex and difficult mobilization, an experience much written about and one he surely 
never forgot. It also exposed him to one of the Army’s most capable leaders, soon selected to 
lead the American  Expeditionary Force (AEF) during World War I. McNair’s service with 
Pershing began a lengthy association that played a key role in the young officer’s career.48 
McNair’s participation in the AEF’s preparation for war began immediately upon 
redeployment from the Punitive Expedition. Upon his return from Mexico, McNair reported in 
January 1917 to Camp Stewart in El Paso, Texas, where he joined the 1st Division and began pre-
deployment organization and training. Working once again for T. E. Merrill and senior rated by 
the division commander, Major General William L. Sibert, McNair continued to impress his 
superiors, as demonstrated by the efficiency report he received upon his arrival in France the 
following August. Rated “excellent” in all areas, this efficiency report highlighted McNair’s 
suitability for service on the General Staff. One cannot tell whether these remarks indicate 
acknowledgement of a decision already made, or assessments that contributed to his selection to 
serve with the AEF General Headquarters (GHQ) Staff. Regardless, the report also reflects the 
excellent reputation McNair developed during his first thirteen years of service, demonstrated by 
Major Merrill’s assessment of his particular skills: “This officer is especially competent in every 
class of duty that has devolved upon him while under my observation [ten months of combat 
service]. He has great ability as an organizer and executive which especially fit him for important 
staff duties in high command in war.” However, Merrill’s “general estimate” of McNair 
                                                          




indicates he hoped to retain him in the division, as indicated by his comment, “I earnestly 
recommend that he be given command of one of the regiments of field artillery in our temporary 
forces, preferably a regiment of new type material.” For his part, Sibert summed up his 
evaluation of McNair with the recommendation to assign him to “General Staff or command 
with advanced rank.” Based on his long and impressive service record, McNair was sure to find 
himself entrusted with significant responsibility as America entered the World War.49 
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World War I 
Preparing for a New Kind of War 
The United States observed the outbreak of World War 1 with both dismay and 
detachment. While some citizens supported American involvement in the war, most Americans 
expressed the determination to remain neutral – a predisposition espoused by President 
Woodrow Wilson. However, as historian Ronald Schaffer argued, “after the outbreak of war in 
Europe, Wilson’s administration proclaimed American neutrality but began taking actions that 
made it, before 1917, an undeclared participant.” As a result, the government expended a great 
deal of effort shaping the perceptions of a divided public to gain their support for the war effort. 
Through propaganda efforts and decisive action to stamp out public dissent, enthusiasm for 
American participation slowly spread, while dissidents learned to stay quiet, and Americans 
became mentally prepared to serve, whether at the front or supporting a war economy at home. 
America possessed perhaps the best-suited economy of the war’s major belligerents to support 
the effort it entailed, but the nation’s focus on internal development over the previous decades 
had done little to prepare it for the demands of rapid military mobilization.50  
Unlike its success preparing the public, the Wilson administration made little progress 
readying either the military or industry to fight a major conflict in Europe. By the time America 
entered the war on April 6, 1917, it had missed the opportunity to mobilize the nation’s industrial 
capacity in support of the war effort. The military also prepared only marginally well, as 
historian Edward Coffman argued, “during the formative period, which continued into the early 
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months of 1918, delays, mistakes, and confusion hampered the developing war effort: yet, 
progress was made.”51 
Transatlantic shipping tonnage in 1917 remained the same as it had been in 1810, and 
shipbuilders completed only a few new ships, the first of which they finally launched in 1918, in 
time to support the war effort. Similarly, plans to produce airplanes, tanks, artillery and machine 
guns all resulted in few if any weapon systems appearing in time to outfit the AEF, which had to 
rely mostly on French and British equipment in combat. Even the U.S.-made Springfield rifle 
remained in short supply, requiring many American soldiers to use the inferior British Lee-
Enfield instead.52  
Throughout the mobilization period, the continued existence but unclear status of the 
Board of Ordnance and Fortification led to dysfunction in weapons and equipment design, 
procurement, and fielding. The Board continued to perform tests and make recommendations, 
but they had little effect. In general, military equipment users provided desired performance 
specifications – which emphasized effectiveness in actual combat conditions – to the engineers 
in Ordnance Branch, who then worked with industrial leaders to create a system or weapon that 
achieved an acceptable fit with the field commanders’ specifications, based more on the 
principles of efficiency and mass production. No central control or spirit of cooperation guided 
the Board’s efforts as they had under Schofield’s leadership, causing unresolved disputes to 
linger on for long periods while Army units remained hamstrung in their efforts to modernize. 
Daniel Beaver argued more effective use by the War Department of the Board of Ordnance and 
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Fortification could have led to resolution of such disputes and improved the Army’s equipment 
development and acquisition process as it prepared for participation in the war.53 
For example, two decades of controversy plagued the issue of fielding machine guns for 
the cavalry and infantry, beginning at the turn of the century when the weapons finally developed 
adequate reliability for field use. Ordnance standardized the Vickers-Maxim gun and the Colt 
Fire Arms Company won the initial contracts to produce the weapons. However, military 
personnel by that time realized the machine gun offered usefulness for all of the combat arms, 
but the Vickers-Maxim – a heavy, water-cooled weapon, offered only a defensive capability 
because it weighed over 100 pounds including ammunition and tripod. The infantry managed to 
develop techniques to employ the Vickers-Maxim, but the cavalry could not effectively transport 
it or deploy it quickly in action.54  
The desire to find a single weapon suitable for both branches led to the examination in 
1909 of the Benét-Mercié light machine gun by General William Crozier, Chief of Ordnance. 
Weighing less than thirty pounds, the weapon was, in Beaver’s words, “a technician’s dream” – 
light, cheap, clip-fed, air-cooled, and equipped with a folding tripod and quick-change barrels. 
Ordnance placed the Vickers-Maxims in storage, replacing them with this apparently ideal 
weapon, soon nicknamed the “Benny-Mercy,” The new machine gun failed in field use on every 
count. It lacked the defensive power of the heavy Vickers-Maxim, and performed more like an 
automatic assault rifle than a machine gun. Even clamped onto a forty-pound tripod, the infantry 
complained of poor accuracy and the inability to provide sustained fire. The cavalry appreciated 
its portability but otherwise found it unsuitable due to its instability (and resulting inaccuracy) 
due to its low weight. Finally, the machine gun, machined to very fine tolerances, jammed far too 
                                                          




easily even in slightly dusty conditions. While individuals saw potential in the light machine gun, 
Ordnance had placed its bets on a single machine gun that served neither branch’s needs.55  
Beaver highlighted a more fundamental issue than the eventual choice of a particular 
machine gun for use in the war. The War Department finally solved the machine gun impasse 
due to the imminent threat of war, acknowledging no single machine gun could satisfy the 
various capabilities that different branches and applications required of the weapon, and 
ultimately ordering in May 1917 the Browning water-cooled heavy machine gun and the 
Browning automatic rifle. This and other last minute expedients did nothing to resolve the root 
cause of the procurement problem – conflicting views between individual Army officers from 
the combat arms and Ordnance, the opportunism among private companies seeking to sell 
military equipment, congressional intervention based on political priorities, and most importantly 
no single individual or department leading the process. Beaver contended that had the individuals 
in power grasped the true scope and nature of the problem, they could have used the Board of 
Ordnance and Fortification to resolve the dysfunction that crippled the pre-war procurement 
process.56 
Army training proved similarly deficient, due in large part to the ineffectiveness of 
Secretary of War Baker and a succession of incompetent Chiefs of Staff of the Army. The Army 
benefited from the appointment of Peyton C. March as Chief of Staff in March 1917, but he took 
office too late to make the necessary changes quickly enough to affect the AEF’s readiness for 
combat. Therefore, soldiers received inadequate training resulting from outdated concepts of 
war, shortages of rifles and heavy weapons, and disruptions in unit cohesion due to a constant 
turnover caused when soldiers departed unit training early to deploy as replacements to the front. 
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The Army also suffered from an overemphasis on the moral element, demonstrated, as Mark 
Grotelueschen points out, by the “human-centered view of battle that dominated the Fort 
Leavenworth courses” leading to “the curriculum’s blatant neglect of recent technological 
developments – including those in such crucial areas as artillery, machine guns, aircraft, and 
automobiles.” Most American officers remained rigidly attached to the dogma of lightly armed 
infantrymen, rapidly maneuvering by foot, unencumbered by heavy weapons, intent on executing 
an offensive culminating in a heroic bayonet charge that would drive away a terrified enemy, 
even as events on the battlefield in Europe proved this view increasingly outdated.57 
The AEF sought to enable this unique doctrinal approach by placing extremely large 
numbers of infantrymen in huge units that far exceeded the size of comparable allied formations 
at every echelon, most clearly embodied in the giant AEF “square” division of 28,000 men, 
double the size of Allied or German divisions. As Mark Grotelueschen points out, historians 
have identified several reasons for this organizational decision. These include a shortage of 
trained officers, Pershing’s desire to place Regular Army officers in command of all AEF 
divisions, and the political priority to maintain AEF uniqueness in organization and doctrine to 
deter the Allies from breaking up U.S. units for piecemeal employment to reinforce existing 
British and French units. However, the AEF’s organizational decisions primarily supported the 
tactical approach envisioned in open warfare doctrine, which Pershing and his adherents believed 
required these massive divisions to create and exploit penetrations in enemy lines on a stabilized 
battlefield, where poor mobility limited the ability to conduct forward passage of divisions 
through the lines or support attacks with mobile heavy weapons systems. Battlefield experience 
since 1914 also led the AEF to expect extremely high casualty rates. Since they believed a 
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division must possess the capability to attack an entrenched force, create a penetration, and 
conduct a pursuit after pushing the enemy onto open ground, AEF leaders believed it must 
possess enough men to absorb significant losses and keep fighting.58 
These mobilization and training deficiencies and organizational decisions resulted in the 
AEF arriving in France sorely unprepared for combat. Although they provided invaluable 
support to the eventual Allied victory, this resulted as much from the effect on German morale as 
any battlefield success. Further, while AEF combat performance generally improved with 
experience, the AEF suffered severe losses, particularly in the Meuse-Argonne, where twice as 
many American soldiers died than in the U.S. Army’s second-deadliest battle (Okinawa, during 
the Second World War). One can only speculate how many losses a more effective pre-war 
organization, training, and mobilization process might have prevented.59 
Fighting the War 
Secretary of War Newton D. Baker selected Pershing to serve as the overall commander 
of the U.S. Army in France in May 1917. Baker saw him as the obvious choice, given his recent 
command experience with the Punitive Expedition, his loyalty to the Wilson administration, and 
his robust health and soldierly appearance – factors that led Baker to choose him over his closest 
competitor, Major General Leonard Wood. Pershing also actively campaigned for the position. 
Pershing returned to America in February, recalled early from the yearlong Punitive Expedition 
that, by fortunate happenstance, provided a core of seasoned veterans around which to build the 
AEF from an otherwise poorly prepared Army and National Guard. Upon his return, as S. L. A. 
Marshall recalled, Pershing  
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called a conference of correspondents and said to them: “We have broken diplomatic relations 
with Germany. That means we will send an expedition abroad. I’d like to command it. Each of 
you must know some way in which you can help me. Now tell me how I can help you so that you 
can help me. Here was frank ambition, and nothing wrong with it. The history of America in 
World War I is written in Pershing’s shadow because he wanted it that way.60 
Marshall went on to describe the enigma that was “Black Jack” Pershing. He overshadowed the 
story of the war and the efforts of his various peers and rivals in a way unseen in any previous 
American War, yet he displayed no particularly “deep military wisdom.” He inspired confidence 
in his political superiors, yet displayed an austere, introverted character to his subordinates and 
soldiers. Further, “he had fundamental qualities that went far in the shaping of an army – 
patience, sobriety, emotional balance, and an unshakable fortitude.” He led soldiers to achieve 
their best not through ruthless discipline or charisma – he was never “popular with troops” – but 
through tough training, high standards, and an ethical code of fairness. Nevertheless, Pershing 
faced a daunting challenge, suffering shortages in every resource the AEF required, including 
trained soldiers, equipment, and time.61  
In the years leading up to America’s involvement in the war, divisions existed in both 
government and society with regard to issues ranging from whether the United States should 
send a military force to France, to how it would form, equip, and prepare such an expedition. 
When Congress declared war against Germany in April 1917, the United States Army comprised 
only 5,971 officers and 121,797 enlisted men. Mobilization of the National Guard enabled the 
expansion of Pershing’s American Expeditionary Force (AEF), but the National Guard consisted 
of only another 174,008 marginally trained officers and enlisted soldiers – far short of its 
authorized strength of 450,000. The passage of the Selective Service Act in May 1917 
established a wartime draft, leading to formation of the National Army and enabling the AEF to 
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grow in strength to more than two million men at war’s end. Nevertheless, it took almost a year 
from the passage of the act before the first trained and equipped American forces finally arrived 
in France. In addition to an overall shortage of men, the pre-war Regular Army’s officer corps 
consisted mostly of men senior in age but junior in rank. A system of promotion based on 
seniority combined with a shortage of positions of higher rank resulted in slow promotions for 
promising young officers, while senior officers tended to serve long after they had passed their 
prime. Thus, the U.S. Army’s senior leadership consisted largely of officers who no longer 
possessed the fitness or drive necessary for combat service. Therefore, Pershing faced significant 
challenges finding qualified officers to fill command and staff positions in the AEF.62  
The shortage of qualified senior officers in the pre-war U.S. Army presented an 
opportunity for young and energetic leaders such as the 34-year old Captain Lesley McNair. 
When Pershing’s forces returned from Mexico on 5 February 1917, McNair had to wait only 
three months before earning promotion to major and reassignment to the General Staff Corps.63 
Major McNair deployed to France as the 1st Division’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Training. He 
first met Major George C. Marshall, the 1st Division’s Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, 
during this deployment – the two officers shared a stateroom during the voyage across the 
Atlantic Ocean.64  
Soon after his arrival in France, McNair earned promotion to lieutenant colonel and 
found himself reassigned to the GHQ training division (G-5) of the AEF, as the Chief of 
Artillery Training and Tactical Procedures. McNair continued to impress Pershing with his 
exceptional performance and military bearing, and Pershing rewarded this performance by 
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promoting him to colonel in June 1918 and brigadier general – making him the AEF’s youngest 
general officer at the age of thirty-five – in October 1918. As the senior artillery officer of the 
GHQ training division, McNair worked closely with Pershing and continued to benefit from his 
mentorship. This close working relationship resulted in Pershing’s influence leaving its mark on 
McNair, who displayed similarities to Pershing ranging from views on doctrine to leadership 
style and military bearing throughout the remainder of his career.65 
Perhaps most significantly, McNair shared Pershing’s views on doctrine, regarding both 
open warfare in general, and specifically the superiority of observed artillery fires to support 
infantry in the attack. As Boyd Dastrup noted, 
McNair, the senior field artillery officer on the AEF staff, reflected Pershing’s thinking. In 
November 1918, he vehemently criticized European unobserved map firing techniques and 
advocated the superiority of the American doctrine of observed fire. He explained that the 
Europeans concentrated on unobserved indirect fire rather than focusing on observed fire and 
pushing field artillery forward to support the infantry advance. A strong sponsor of indirect fire, 
McNair wrote that unobserved map fire was causing too many infantry casualties because it 
seldom engaged obstacles to the infantry advance as observed fire could. Whereas observed 
indirect fire offered flexibility, unobserved fire was rigid and prohibited adjusting to meet 
changing tactical requirements like observed fire could, making American technique superior.66 
Dastrup argues, however, that even though Pershing and McNair agreed regarding the 
advantages of observed fire, they failed to grasp the true superiority of the method – its ability to 
paralyze the enemy in depth, an essential capability to enable a war of maneuver. Nevertheless, 
McNair’s support of open warfare concepts and observed fire set him apart not just from the 
European artillerymen that preferred map firing techniques, but from those officers in his own 
branch who shared the European view. This demonstrates McNair, from a very early stage in his 
career, grasped the true potential of field artillery to break the deadlock of stabilized warfare.67 
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Pershing held strong opinions regarding the desirable characteristics of an army officer. 
He believed they should be physically fit, possess stamina, exhibit high standards of appearance, 
and exude confidence, while also possessing the ability to grasp quickly and communicate with 
clarity the key points of a situation. As a result, Pershing moved many senior Regular Army 
officers aside because they did not meet his standards, replacing them with younger and more 
capable junior officers. As a case in point, Pershing relieved Major General William L. Sibert, an 
engineer officer selected by Secretary of War Baker to command the 1st Infantry Division. Sibert 
possessed a high reputation in Washington, but Pershing disapproved of him on many counts: he 
was old, had no combat experience, demonstrated a poor grasp of training, and lacked 
confidence. Upon receiving reports that Sibert displayed a disturbing pessimism during a visit by 
a group of American dignitaries to his command post in France, Pershing finally ordered him to 
return to Washington on 15 December 1917. This step demonstrated both his lack of patience 
with substandard officers and his authority to appoint and relieve commanders in the AEF as he 
saw fit.68  
Pershing relieved many other officers, including other division commanders. On the same 
day that he ordered Sibert back to Washington, Pershing relieved Major General William Mann, 
commander of the 42nd “Rainbow” Infantry Division. Mann was sixty-three, overweight, and not 
particularly energetic; however, he did demonstrate a propensity to take advantage of his 
political connections back home to defy Pershing’s wishes. While Pershing possessed limited 
ability to influence congressional representatives, his authority in France was unquestioned, and 
Mann soon found he had picked a fight he could not win. Pershing had always been critical of 
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National Guard officers, and this episode only served to reinforce his already significant 
reservations, particularly concerning their appointment to command positions. Fortunately, a 
highly competent officer, Major General Charles D. Menoher, relieved Mann, and the Rainbow 
Division went on to serve admirably in combat. Nevertheless, the implications were clear – a 
stagnating Regular Army officer corps and reliance on National Guard units to facilitate Army 
expansion led to significant challenges for the AEF regarding officer competency, particularly at 
senior levels.69  
Service on the AEF staff exposed McNair to an influential mentor in General Pershing; it 
also provided a formative experience that significantly affected McNair’s ideas regarding Army 
organization and doctrine. Preparation of the AEF for war required a major transformation of the 
small American frontier army to a European-style conventional force, and the ensuing expansion 
meant raw recruits soon vastly outnumbered the core of regular army soldiers and officers. 
Nevertheless, the Army’s traditional view of war fighting lived on in the form of an infantry-
centric doctrine championed by Pershing and his like-minded traditionalist cadres as “open 
warfare.” This term took on a particular meaning in the preparation for war, becoming a catalyst 
for debate both within the AEF and between the AEF and its French and British Allies.  
As described in a 1917 platoon training manual, “the terms ‘trench-to-trench attack’ and 
‘attack in open warfare’ . . . differentiate from an instructional point of view between the 
methodical attack of highly organized defenses and such attacks as may occur at a later period of 
an offensive after the main system of the enemy’s defenses has been penetrated.” This 
description of open warfare as distinct from trench warfare represents a broad effort by Army 
traditionalists to resist adoption of European fighting methods developed in the early years of the 
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war. This resistance resulted not only from the Army’s roots in its frontier constabulary 
traditions, but also supported the broader goal of retaining AEF independence on the battlefield. 
This goal stemmed from guidance issued by President Wilson on 4 May 1917, who had no desire 
to see AEF combat units piecemealed out to serve under British and French command. This 
explains in part why the apparently distinct open warfare and trench warfare actually resembled 
each other more than they differed. Essentially, according to doctrine trench-to-trench warfare 
held precedence when units engaged the enemy from static positions at close range. However, 
upon assuming the offensive, doctrine held that AEF units would transition to open warfare, with 
the goal of breaking through the enemy’s static defenses and pressing the attack to achieve 
penetration in depth.70  
Nevertheless, many AEF senior leaders arrived in France convinced that their offensive-
minded open warfare doctrine and massive divisions would enable them to break the deadlock of 
the trenches – an illusion that did not fade until problems began to emerge on the battlefields of 
France. Once they actually engaged in combat, the effects of the rapid mobilization of AEF 
divisions began to show. While open warfare dominated American military discourse before the 
war, its greater complexity exceeded the training capability of the AEF’s rapidly mobilized and 
deployed units, causing most of them to focus on trench warfare methods during both pre-
deployment training and on the battlefield. The rapid mobilization that prevented mobilized 
divisions from preparing adequately for the combined-arms fighting methods that open warfare 
required led to rigidly planned operations, poorly executed attacks, and ineffective use of 
supporting weapons. In addition, shortage of communications equipment and limited artillery 
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mobility meant attacking infantry lacked sufficient fire support once they moved beyond the 
range of their supporting artillery. While many division commanders successfully adapted and 
found innovative solutions to the challenges they faced, this breakdown between the peacetime 
discourse on warfare and the reality the AEF encountered in battle resulted in massive casualties, 
highlighting the need to review Army doctrine and unit organization after the war.71  
Assessing the War’s Lessons. 
Despite the AEF’s difficulties conducting open warfare on the Western Front, the Army 
determined from a series of post-war evaluations that it possessed generally sound doctrine. Both 
the AEF and the War Department appointed formal boards to analyze the Army’s combat 
experience in detail. The AEF convened more than twenty boards between December 1918 and 
June 1919, chaired by the most senior, experienced officers serving with the AEF.  
The members of the Lassiter (artillery) Board, formed on 11 June 1919, originally 
included Brigadier General McNair.72 The Lassiter Board tackled perhaps the single most 
significant challenge the AEF faced – the difficulty of providing adequate mobile fire support to 
infantry in the attack. The board made several key recommendations for post-war artillery 
development intended to increase its mobility and firepower while enhancing its ability to 
provide timely and accurate fires in support of maneuvering infantry.73 However, just one week 
                                                          
71 Millett, "Cantigny," 180-82. Colonel Charles P. Summerall, serving as the senior artilleryman 
on the Baker Mission, insisted in 1917 that GHQ needed to double the number of guns in support of the 
infantry, but GHQ did not agree. For more on the artillery debate, see Grotelueschen, The AEF Way of 
War, 36-37; for an explanation of how societies adapt their discourse on war when encountering the 
reality of warfare, see John A. Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: 
Westview Press, 2004), 331-41.  
72 William Lassiter, "Report of a Board of Officers Convened Pursuant to Special Orders No. 
289-0," December 11, 1918, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, RG 120, 
Entry 23, Box 3; The Adjutant General, "General Order 169, Paragraph 9, GHQ, AEF," June 18, 1919, 
McNair Papers, National Archives and Records Administration, St. Louis, MO. 
73 William O. Odom, After the Trenches: The Transformation of U.S. Army Doctrine, 1918-1939 
(College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1999), 26-29; Millett, "Cantigny," 182-84. 
 
49 
after the formation of the Lassiter Board, McNair received orders reassigning him as one of the 
thirty-four members of the inaugural faculty of the Army School of the Line, currently reforming 
at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Thus, instead of assessing these critical lessons of the war on a 
board in France, McNair would teach these lessons at the Leavenworth schools. He also helped 
incorporate them into the Army’s new doctrine as it sought to develop the means to conduct 
combined arms warfare – the essence of modern warfare and the means to break the defensive 
deadlock of the trenches of WWI.74 
Reestablishing the Leavenworth Schools. 
As the Army returned home from France in 1919 and closed the staff college at Langres, 
it formed the School of the Line and the General Service School at Ft. Leavenworth as first- and 
second-year programs to reestablish the pre-war Leavenworth staff schools. Like its pre-war 
predecessor, the General Service School concentrated on division, corps, and army-level 
operations while leaving matters of regiment-level and below to other Army schools. The school 
relied on a small but hand-selected inaugural faculty chosen from among the AEF’s top officers. 
McNair, having returned after the war to his permanent rank of major, served as a member of the 
General Service School’s faculty of thirty-four officers, whose contributions influenced the army 
far out of proportion to its size. The members of this faculty established the foundation for an 
educational system that remained in place throughout the interwar period, building on the 
preexisting curriculum from Langres to develop an updated yearlong course for a new generation 
of general staff officers. Their role proved so important that the War Department sent a team 
from the Inspector General’s office in 1920 to evaluate the faculty’s performance. The inspection 
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team singled McNair out for particular praise after their inspection.75 Several members of this 
inaugural faculty, McNair included, eventually earned permanent promotion to general officer 
rank, and returned to Fort Leavenworth later in their careers to serve as commandant of the 
Leavenworth schools.76  
In addition to their influence on the Army’s education system, the post-war General 
Service School faculty carried on the tradition of Leavenworth’s involvement in the writing of 
various doctrinal manuals, including the Field Service Regulations (FSR), building on the 
foundation provided by the AEF Board findings to write the 1923 FSR. This updated manual 
incorporated the lessons of World War I while addressing changes in military technology since 
the preparation of the 1905 version, and it became the “authoritative basis for the instruction of 
the combined arms for war service.”77  
While the 1923 Field Service Regulations represented a comprehensive update to pre-
World War I large-unit tactical doctrine, the key lesson the Army drew from its experience of 
open warfare was the conviction that the fundamental characteristics of war had not changed. 
The innovative spirit represented by motorization, mechanization, and efforts to incorporate new 
military technologies remained focused on finding ways to fight more effectively according to 
traditional methods. The infantry, while increasingly viewed as a member of the combined arms 
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team, remained the primary means to execute an offensive doctrine emphasizing maneuver, 
firepower and the human element. It is illustrative that the 1923 Field Service Regulations was 
the first version to contain general principles of war – the “immutable” principles of the 
scientific, Jominian tradition of military theory.78  
However, while officers at Leavenworth and the War Department embraced the 
immutability of certain general principles of war, they distinguished between war – a general 
term for the phenomenon as a whole – and the practice of specific forms of warfare. They 
discounted European methods of warfare as inadequate and developed a comprehensive doctrine 
based on American military tradition and experience. Military theory – often thought of as the 
sole province of European intellectuals – influenced the Army’s post-war revision of both its 
doctrine and its educational system. A small group of the Army’s most influential officers, 
including Major McNair, guided the Army’s interwar transformation process in keeping with the 
fundamental principles of war – principles they believed the AEF had validated on the 
battlefields of France, while seeking to understand the evolution of warfare with the advent of 
new technology and fighting methods. Therefore, American military thinkers like McNair sought 
ways to employ new military technology and doctrine or maximize organizational efficiency in 
an effort to develop new war fighting methods, rather than merely update existing methods so 
that they could fight a future war in fundamentally the same manner in which they had fought the 
last one.79 
However, not all officers involved in the post-war discourse saw these matters the same 
way. Three schools of thought emerged after the war, each arguing for a different interpretation 
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of its lessons. Traditionalists adhered to Pershing’s view that highly mobile infantry relying on 
the rifle and bayonet would win America’s future wars. Firepower advocates, led by Major 
General Summerall, argued that successful attacks depended upon the use of overwhelming 
firepower to destroy enemy defenses before the infantry advanced. Finally, a small group 
advocated a combined arms approach in which infantry would possess a great deal of mobile 
firepower, including automatic rifles, machine guns, grenades, mortars, 37mm guns, and mobile 
howitzers; some officers even foresaw the need to develop a capability to provide instantaneous 
support with heavier weapons. The combined arms approach emerged as the predominant view 
in the immediate post-war period, and the 1923 FSR formally indoctrinated it. McNair, perhaps 
due to his general staff experience, emerged as one of its most vocal advocates. Thus, the 
appearance of principles of war in the 1923 FSR do not support the interpretation of a stagnant 
post-war U.S. Army doctrine focused on the trench warfare of the World War.80 
During the first seventeen years of McNair’s early career, he learned how to manage an 
artillery battery in rough terrain, how to lead men in arduous circumstances, and how to conduct 
sustained offensive operations on foreign soil. His World War I experience of the theory and 
reality of open warfare fixed these early military experiences and the American traditions they 
represented in McNair’s mind. A 1921 article he wrote for The Field Artillery Journal reveals his 
early struggle to reconcile the realities of the modern battlefield with the traditional methods that 
remained at the core of Army doctrine. In this article, entitled “Infantry Batteries and 
Accompanying Guns,” McNair described the need for mobile artillery to accompany the infantry 
on the attack to enable them to overcome enemy strong points and support weapons that survived 
the initial bombardment. The article emphasized themes that recurred throughout McNair’s 
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interwar service, such as balancing the relative benefits of supporting versus attached artillery 
(i.e. “pooling” of assets versus assigning them directly to subordinate units), proper command 
structures and appropriate missions for supporting arms, and the need for combined training in 
common core tasks. McNair closed the article by reiterating this latter theme: “the full 
effectiveness of infantry batteries and accompanying guns cannot be developed merely through a 
high state of individual knowledge and training on the part of the infantry and artillery; a team-
play is necessary which can be attained only by the two arms actually working together. This 
combined training should be acquired in the training area rather than on the battlefield.”81  
For the remainder of his career, these ideas guided McNair’s efforts to organize and train 
the army for its next great test in the cauldron of battle. This was true despite the fact that the 
combined arms view remained unpopular among many officers, some of whom placed the 
perceived welfare of their branch over that of the Army as a whole. With primacy came priority 
– for funding, new equipment, and specialized training.82 While an artilleryman at heart, McNair 
demonstrated early in his career that he would fight for the strength of the combined arms 
approach, even if this led him to strive for efficiencies through techniques like streamlining and 
pooling. Many of his peers vehemently resisted such concepts, often protesting the loss of 
control this would mean over assets like division artillery or other tactical-level organic units. 
Nevertheless, McNair’s extensive experience led to the conviction that modern warfare required 
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combined arms fighting methods, and he doggedly fought to instill this mindset throughout the 
Army. 
McNair served with distinction for almost three years prior to and during World War I 
under the close supervision of John “Black Jack” Pershing, one of America’s most enigmatic and 
demanding generals. McNair learned a great deal from his mentor. He exhibited the traits 
General Pershing required of a successful Army officer, and Pershing’s leadership left its mark 
on McNair as well. Pershing demonstrated his approval by personally decorating McNair after 
the war with the Distinguished Service Medal, in recognition of his outstanding 
accomplishments as the AEF’s chief of artillery training.83 Shortly thereafter, with Pershing 
looking on, Marshal Henri Petain presented McNair with the award of Officer of the Legion of 
Honor.84  
Upon his return from France, McNair reverted to his permanent rank of major – but 
unlike many who served with the AEF, he remained an up and comer among the Army’s officer 
corps, beginning his postwar service in the key position of instructor at the Army School of the 
Line.85 Here McNair found himself at the forefront of what modern commentators refer to as the 
interwar mechanization process. His experience in France convinced him of the benefit of close 
infantry-artillery coordination, leading McNair to view innovation as a means to improve 
combined arms fighting methods, rather than a rationale for providing priority funding to a 
particular branch.  
McNair’s next assignment further broadened his already far-ranging base of experience. 
Building on several defining aspects of his career history to date, including his artillery expertise, 
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combat experience, general staff service, and innovative spirit, McNair found himself serving 
once again on a general staff, but in a very different capacity than in the past. He also soon 
assumed duty as president of a board testing the capability of several types of military 
equipment, immersing him in an intense and growing debate that proved central to the Army’s 
modernization efforts. As this next assignment demonstrates, McNair had established by 1920 a 
reputation as an officer who could handle a wide variety of tasks and a high level of 
responsibility, while maintaining remarkable objectivity – a set of capabilities that grew both 




McNair, War Planner 
The “McNair Board” 
Major McNair departed Fort Leavenworth in December 1920, and arrived in Hawaii after 
a brief period of leave on 13 February 1921.86 Like all his peers who missed the opportunity to 
attend the Leavenworth Schools due to the World War, but later served as instructors there, 
McNair also departed with credit for graduating, in accordance with General Orders No. 74, 
which ensured his inclusion on the Initial General Staff Eligible List.87 When McNair reported 
for duty, Major General Charles P. Summerall, the Hawaiian Department commander, chose to 
use him in just this capacity, appointing him to serve as his Assistant Chief of Staff for 
Operations (ACofS, G3).88  
After spending the previous twenty years as a company-grade leader, a staff officer 
responsible for training, or a faculty member at an Army educational institution, McNair 
possessed no experience as an operations officer or war planner. Nevertheless, he applied the 
same dedication and energy to this new role as he had to his previous positions, and as always he 
performed with distinction. Summerall soon entrusted him with a great deal of responsibility, 
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directing him to lead the development of a joint defense plan to counter an attack of Oahu by the 
naval and air forces of Japan, the nation that currently represented the United States’ chief 
strategic concern. This represented a significant change in perspective and increase in 
responsibility for McNair, but as in the past, he welcomed the challenge and exceeded all of 
Summerall’s expectations.89 
McNair approached this daunting task with his usual determination and energy, despite 
the many challenges that stemmed from the Army’s longstanding and heated debates regarding 
the capabilities of coast artillery and aviation in defending against an attack from the sea. 
Summerall placed great trust in McNair by assigning him to lead this effort. Both the U.S. and 
Japan had signed the Five-Party Treaty in 1922, which prohibited fortification of military bases 
in the Pacific. While America abided by the terms of the treaty, U.S. political and military 
leaders suspected Japan of secretly fortifying its Pacific military bases in violation of the treaty. 
Even when the treaty lapsed in 1930, Congress lacked the funds to invest in fortifications in the 
Pacific. Therefore, from 1922 until the late 1930s U.S. forces relied on the Coast Artillery Corps, 
along with Army and Navy aviation, to support the ground forces’ efforts to defend Oahu against 
what many believed to be an imminent Japanese attack. Japan presented the major strategic 
threat to the U.S. in the Pacific, and Navy leaders in particular remained convinced they “would 
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sooner or later fight Japan,” leading them to develop and continually update war plan Orange 
throughout the interwar period.90 
Major McNair began the project of updating the Oahu defense plan by presiding over a 
board consisting of himself, two officers from the Coast Artillery Corps, and one officer from the 
Air Service. This board (aptly named the “McNair Board”) convened to “investigate, consider 
and report on the powers, limitations and combined training of the Coast Artillery Corps and Air 
Service in coast defense” as directed by the War Department in a letter dated April 21, 1923. The 
War Department directed the board to submit its findings by December 1923 to help resolve the 
growing debate both within the military and among national political leaders over the potential of 
coast artillery, antiaircraft artillery, and aerial bombers to defend coastal areas against attacks 
from the sea and air. The McNair Board began its investigation in May 1923 by collecting all 
available data on coast artillery and aviation capabilities, eventually citing nine references in 
“Inclosure 1” of the final report. The board then developed and evaluated a detailed test 
methodology, enlisting the support of units based on Oahu to optimize the methodology and then 
conduct the actual tests. The board sought both to confirm existing data from the previous tests 
cited in the report, and to collect additional data to support or deny the conclusions resulting 
from previous studies.91 
The board, relying largely on the support of volunteer aircrews and coast artillery 
personnel, performed two types of tests. The Air Service conducted airplane bombing tests “to 
determine the accuracy of airplane bombing as a function of altitude and to investigate the 
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subject generally,” while the Coast Artillery evaluated “anti-aircraft firing to determine the 
accuracy of anti-aircraft firing as a function of the altitude of the target.92 Despite the seemingly 
distinct nature of the two types of tests overseen by the board, they did not suffer the ill effects of 
branch bias and lack of cooperation often associated with the postwar period, when the Army 
found itself short on funds and therefore rarely in agreement about weapons development 
programs. On the contrary, the board made every effort to not only develop and describe in the 
report sound methods for conducting bombing and firing tests and calculating the accuracy of 
fire, but also to eliminate error and bias from the tests. As the board report attests, “In addition to 
the regular bombing crew, pilot, reserve pilot and bomber, each plane carried a Coast Artillery 
officer who observed and recorded the time of release of each bomb, the altitude by altimeter, the 
azimuth of the plane by ship’s compass at the instant of the release and the approximate position 
of the point of impact of the bomb.” Further, the on-board observer fired a Very pistol at the 
moment of release to notify ground observers, who observed the point of impact using standard 
Coast Artillery azimuth instruments manned by trained observers, both on the ground, and on 
board the tug or bomber towing the target.93  
Further, the board made every feasible effort to minimize error, using not only multiple 
trained observers and the latest observation equipment, but also conducting lengthy preparatory 
training to standardize bombing methods and improve the proficiency of the four bomber crews 
that flew the actual test missions. The board recorded the bombing results for each crew 
separately to enable identification of variations in test results resulting from differences in 
aircrew skill. This enabled the board to minimize erroneous interpretations in the test results. 
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Further, the test participants met regularly to discuss ways to standardize and optimize testing 
methods, and spent considerable time experimenting with various procedures before beginning 
the actual tests. This careful preparation resulted in thorough standardization of test equipment 
and parameters. Factors standardized by the test participants included altitude, airspeed, and 
procedures for bomb drops, the models of aircraft and bombing sights used, target towing cable 
lengths, and target types and colors. The board identified challenges associated with the use of 
dummy bombs, and developed procedures to minimize error caused by their unique 
characteristics. Finally, participants developed improved maintenance procedures to optimize the 
performance of bombing mechanisms, and considered the effect of meteorological data and other 
variables that could influence test results.   94 
Given the care and diligent effort the board committed to the tests, McNair demonstrated 
admirable objectivity when he wrote in the final report dated February 11, 1924. He closed the 
report with a tentative conclusion and a call for further analysis: “While it is by no means 
contended that the tests were exhaustive, they were nevertheless as thorough as possible with the 
time and means available, and it is believed that the results are a useful contribution in the 
solution of the problems involved.” In fact, the board report stated the methods developed and 
preparations undertaken would “prove of continuing usefulness in carrying out similar 
investigations and more particularly in the training of bombardment aviation and anti-aircraft 
artillery.” General Summerall clearly agreed with this assessment, writing a letter of 
commendation that he sent to McNair and the other members of the board, and included in their 
annual efficiency reports.95 
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The McNair board report supported its findings with extremely detailed descriptions of 
the methods used, the preparations made, and the recorded results of the various tests. After 
describing the test procedures and data analysis methodology employed, the board report 
summarized its overall conclusions, which it supported with twelve inclosures totaling ninety-
two pages of detailed tables and charts. These enclosures contained the results of each individual 
bombing run or antiaircraft artillery target engagement, collective results depicted as scatter plots 
reflecting spherical probability analysis, and detailed descriptions of the equipment used and the 
mathematics performed to calculate the results. A particularly interesting chart depicted the 
relative anticipated distances of artillery and aircraft to the various types of ships based on their 
anticipated deployment in a possible enemy naval assault.96 
Overall, the board came to very positive conclusions, stating, “The major caliber coast 
gun is effective and essential against naval targets. Against large targets it is more accurate than 
the bomber, except beyond ranges of about 25,000 to 30,000 yards.” Further, “The bomber is a 
powerful means of attacking naval targets at relatively great distances from the coast. Its 
methods are simple and direct.” However, “Its effectiveness may be impaired by weather 
conditions and visibility. It is vulnerable to hostile aviation and anti-aircraft agencies; hence it 
lacks the solidity and dependability of the seacoast gun.” Finally, “The anti-aircraft artillery on 
land is a thoroughly effective means of defense against the bomber, provided it is available in 
adequate quantity and that searchlights and listening apparatus are capable of detecting and 
illuminating the target.” Clearly, the board not only made every effort to include representatives 
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from all the affected combat arms in the tests, but also sought to provide a fair and even-handed 
analysis of the results.97 
The board also highlighted several observations secondary to the overall results, but 
useful in considering future efforts to improve the effectiveness of the various means of defense 
tested. The report pointed out the relative survivability advantage of mobile over fixed coast 
artillery pieces, and identified the need to develop antiaircraft guns capable of engaging bombers 
at their maximum bombing altitudes using timed fuse rounds with large burst radii. Significantly, 
some of the board’s most useful insights came from the air service crews who flew the test 
missions. These included identification of imperfections in bomb release mechanisms and the 
accuracy of bombsights, supporting the finding that aerial bombing was “an art to a great extent; 
the perfection of instruments of precision which will render it less dependent on the personal 
element should be pushed.”98 
As mentioned above, General Summerall commended the board members for their 
diligent efforts and outstanding results. Furthermore, he endorsed the board report on March 12, 
1924, pointing out some of the McNair Board’s more enlightening and significant findings. In 
particular, Summerall pointed out that the results demonstrated significantly better performance 
of aerial bombing in these tests as compared to the findings reported by Lieutenant Commander 
Grow, U.S. Navy, in 1923. In Grow’s report, which appeared in the U.S. Naval Institute 
Proceedings in December 1923, bombing attacks from 11,000 feet achieved only a fifteen 
percent rate of hits, while bombing attacks from 3,000 feet achieved a slightly better nineteen 
percent rate of hits. Using a target similar in size, aircrews flying McNair board missions 
achieved significantly higher hit percentages, achieving an average hit rate against moving and 
                                                          




stationary targets of sixty-five and one-half percent at 3,000 feet, and twenty-eight percent at 
11,000 feet.99 
Nevertheless, the unbiased and comprehensive findings of the McNair Board rarely 
appear in the historical record. In what appears to be the only recent work that mentions the 
McNair Board, the author, David E. Johnson, badly misrepresented its findings. In his highly 
critical assessment of the U.S. Army’s post-World War modernization efforts, Fast Tanks and 
Heavy Bombers, Johnson distilled the lengthy and balanced conclusions provided in the McNair 
Board report into a few short phrases, making it appear the biased effort of a field artilleryman to 
demonstrate the coast artillery’s superiority over aviation. Johnson wrote: 
In May 1923 the Hawaiian Department convened a board to examine ‘the powers and limitations 
of Coast Artillery and Air Service.’ Major Lesley J. McNair, himself an artilleryman, headed the 
board, which determined that the coast artillery provided a better defense against enemy naval 
forces than aviation, because air power is often “impaired by weather conditions and visibility’ 
and ‘is vulnerable to hostile aviation and anti-aircraft agencies.’ McNair concluded that air power 
‘lacks the solidity and dependability of the seacoast gun.’100 
In his sparse summary of the McNair Board’s efforts, Johnson neglected to mention any details 
of the board’s composition or methodology. He also drastically oversimplified the board’s 
conclusions, selectively quoting only this small fraction of the report that mentions the areas in 
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which coast artillery enjoyed advantages over aviation, while neglecting to mention those that 
discussed aviation’s unique capabilities and advantages over the coast artillery. He also failed to 
point out the significantly better performance of aerial bombers the McNair Board reported 
compared to Grow’s analysis of previous tests. 
Johnson also provided a similarly flawed summary of the impact of the McNair board. 
He merely mentioned the reaction of Major General Mason W. Patrick, chief of the Air Service, 
to the McNair Board’s findings, claiming Patrick “was incensed at the assertion that bombers 
were highly vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire and that the coast artillery was a better naval defense 
agency than the Air Service.” Johnson argued Patrick came to the conclusion that, “the coast 
artillery, whose existence was jeopardized by the advent of the airplane, was trying to reassert its 
primacy in coast defense and perhaps even carve out a new niche as an anti-aircraft force.” 
Johnson did not even mention the inclusion of anti-aircraft artillery in the test, which would have 
demonstrated the inaccuracy of the previous claim. Johnson concluded, “The McNair Board had 
little impact because the War Department supported Patrick’s assertion “that the development of 
aviation has rendered ‘the continued maintenance of the majority of our Coast Artillery 
installations uneconomical.’” As the following events show, the McNair Board not only had 
significant impact – both within the Hawaiian Department and at the highest levels of the 
government – it also served the very specific purpose of supporting an updated plan of defense of 
Oahu – none of which Johnson mentioned in his account.101 
The Oahu Defense Plan of 1924 
The McNair Board’s findings contributed directly to the other major project McNair 
completed as the G3 of the Hawaiian Department in 1924. The War Department sent guidance to 




Summerall between January 1920 and September 1923 to revise defensive projects and plans, 
and in particular to reassess the Army’s role in the defense of Oahu, in support of the updating of 
the overall War Department Mobilization Plan. In response to this guidance, Summerall directed 
McNair to update the defense plans for Hawaii, and in particular for the island of Oahu. McNair 
accomplished this through a detailed staff study titled “Basic Project for the Defense of Oahu,” 
which McNair completed shortly after the McNair Board report, and Summerall approved on 
February 9, 1924. Part I of the plan consisted of a detailed, forty-three page “Estimate of the 
Situation,” beginning with the following mission statement: “The mission of the Hawaiian 
Department in a Red-Orange situation is to protect the naval base at Pearl Harbor against naval 
and aerial bombardment, against enemy sympathizers, and against hostile expeditionary forces, 
supported or unsupported by a hostile fleet.”102  
The estimate rested on the assumption that Orange (Japan) might pursue one of two 
possible courses of action in a future war that would affect the Hawaiian Department: “a. Naval 
action in the Pacific primarily, with only incidental military operations, referred to hereafter as 
the naval plan.” and “b. Military and naval action, referred to hereafter as the military plan.” The 
enemy estimate also anticipated two possible strategic approaches by Orange. If Orange 
executed the naval plan, it would seek to “eject Blue completely from the Pacific and to close the 
Pacific ports of Blue. The plan doubtless would contemplate the reduction of the Philippines, 
Guam, and Oahu. Oahu would be needed by Orange as a naval base.” By contrast, the military 
plan would involve an attack directly against the continental United States, either through 
Canada or over the western U.S. coast. In either of these “military plan” scenarios, the planners 
assumed Orange would “be inclined to ignore the Blue forces on Oahu, at least initially.” The 
                                                          
102 Lesley J. McNair, "Basic Project for the Defense of Oahu," February 9, 1924, National 
Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, RG 337, Entry 58, Box 1, 1-43. 
 
66 
planners assessed the military plan would exert the greater pressure on Blue, but “Orange, 
however, for political, economic or other reasons, might be unwilling to assume so great a 
burden and decide to adopt the naval plan.”103  
Those familiar with the Rainbow Plans or Plan Orange would probably not find anything 
atypical about the analysis contained in the 1924 Basic Project for the Defense of Oahu. The 
estimate of the situation thoroughly evaluates likely enemy and friendly courses of action, to 
include the plans of action for the various Blue (U.S.) forces in response to the various possible 
actions of Orange. The estimate shows surprising prescience in its predictions given the early 
date of its preparation, and correctly assesses that Orange would benefit more from occupying 
than destroying the military facilities on Oahu. However, for the purposes of this analysis, the 
most striking characteristic is the fact that Lesley McNair, usually known for his skill in 
mobilizing, organizing, and training ground troops, led this joint planning effort. Further, he 
considered thoroughly the wide range of possible enemy and friendly actions, and the many 
factors like terrain, enemy sympathizers, and possible imposition of martial law involved. 
Finally, he based the plan not only on detailed staff work, but also on exercises conducted 
between 1921 and 1923 that augmented and tested against reality the findings of the staff 
analysis, and on the results of the McNair Board. 
McNair’s basic plan described a defense of Hawaii relying on 94,000 ground troops, 
reinforced by additional airplanes and coast artillery, and prepared to enforce martial law and 
employ poison gas to repel Japanese invasion.104 However, it also included a number of branch 
plans and additional considerations, depending on possible variations such as whether the Army 
would impose martial law, how many reinforcements would arrive in Hawaii and how quickly 
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they could deploy, and the location of the majority of America’s naval forces at the onset of 
Orange aggression. As stated in the G-3 Appendix to the plan, signed by General Summerall in 
February 1924, “The plans of action governing the several basic war plans are set forth in the 
Basic Project in a more comprehensive and coordinated form than has existed heretofore.105 
Attesting to the high quality of the staff work and exercises supporting McNair’s plan, Army 
Chief of Staff General John J. Pershing approved it with only slight modification in August 
1924.106 
While McNair overcame significant difficulties to develop a feasible and realistic plan of 
defense, this brief foray into war planning stands in stark contrast to the majority of postings he 
held over the course of his long career. It also serves to demonstrate the intense and divisive 
nature of branch and service rivalry that had emerged in just five years since the World War 
ended. Soon after McNair left Hawaii for his new assignment to work with the Reserve Officer’s 
Training Corps (ROTC), the results of the McNair Board and the issues it studied soon came 
under scrutiny at the national level. The McNair Board report drew significant criticism, 
particularly from members of the Air Service. This criticism, exemplified by the findings of the 
1925 “President’s Aircraft Board,” did not bode well for future interservice cooperation as 
leaders like McNair found their efforts to conduct objective analyses questioned by biased 
observers. 
The President’s Aircraft Board of 1925 
The publication of The McNair Board Report and the updated Plan for the Defense of 
Oahu marked the apogee of McNair’s assignment in Hawaii. His tour of duty there ended 
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officially on 11 February 1924, when he took several months of leave before reporting for duty 
on 30 June 1924 as the Professor of Military Science and Tactics (PMS&T) for Purdue 
University’s Reserve Officer Training Course (ROTC). However, this change of duty did not 
mark an end to McNair’s involvement with the board he presided over in Hawaii or the reaction 
the McNair Board Report prompted among various military and political leaders. Instead, his 
efforts as Summerall’s G3 soon gained national attention, particularly concerning the ongoing 
debates regarding the role and capabilities of aviation in the military service. Before shifting 
focus to McNair’s service in the Purdue ROTC program, it seems appropriate to finish the 
current story by recounting the national-level events that took place in 1925, largely in reaction 
to McNair’s war planning efforts in Hawaii, and which affected him directly in a high-profile 
event near the end of the year.107 
The War Department convened a “Special Naval Board” in early 1925 “to report to the 
president on the development of aviation.” This board relied for documentary evidence primarily 
on the McNair Board report of 1924, since this report contained the results of the most recent and 
diligently conducted tests on the subject. The Chief of the Air Service, Major General Mason W. 
Patrick, wrote to the Adjutant General on February 12, 1925, to comment on the McNair Board’s 
findings. General Patrick noted that the Chief of Coast Artillery, Major General Frank W. Coe, 
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made the following assertion in his annual report of September 8, 1924: “the bomber is 
outmatched by the anti-aircraft artillery at all altitudes which can now be reached by service 
bombers, provided that the target can be seen (Par.58).” Patrick pointed out that to support this 
assertion, Coe quoted the following passage from the McNair Board report: “The anti-aircraft 
artillery on land is a thoroughly effective means of defense against the bomber, provided it is 
available in adequate quantity and that searchlights and listening apparatus are capable of 
detecting and illuminating the target (Par.63 a).108 
Patrick stated in his letter to the Adjutant General that he and Coe attended a meeting 
called by the War Department Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations (ACofS, G3) “for the 
purpose of coordinating the War Department testimony to be given before the Special Naval 
Board.” Patrick stated that at this meeting, he pointed out “certain obvious errors in the 
calculations of the McNair Board which, when corrected, practically nullified the value of the 
board’s conclusions.” According to Patrick, when he made this observation, 
General Coe admitted certain of the facts presented and I [Patrick] naturally assumed that no 
further reference would be made . . . to a document which presented conclusions based on 
calculations of such obvious inaccuracy. I therefore refrained from submitting the report to the 
War Department . . . believing that the necessity thereafter had ceased to exist.109 
Patrick went on to state that despite his assumption to the contrary, it seemed “considerable 
credence is still given to the conclusions of the McNair Board,” and provided a number of 
somewhat technical criticisms of the McNair Board’s methods and assumptions that he believed 
led to significant mathematical inaccuracies in the evaluation of the data collected by the board.  
To support his criticisms, Patrick referred to the findings of an “expert technician” in the 
Ordnance Department named Dr. Loring, who conducted a purely mathematical assessment of 
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the McNair Board data without considering the “fundamentally erroneous assumptions” that, 
according to Patrick, led the board to false conclusions. Patrick listed six “corrections” provided 
by Dr. Loring (listed as “b.” through “g.”). In the first three “corrections” that Patrick quoted 
from Loring’s report (“b.” through “d.”), Loring found that the board: “endeavored faithfully and 
impartially” in its conduct of an extended test to answer the War Department’s questions; gave 
unanimous support to the findings reported; and revealed no indications of bias or unfairness 
against any arm of the service. In the next two (“e.” and “f.”), Loring found that the results 
obtained by both the Air Service and the Antiaircraft Artillery “were not the best that could be 
expected with the latest equipment.” In his final point (“g.”), Loring found that “the report of the 
McNair Board may not do full justice to the possibilities either of the Air Service or of the 
Antiaircraft Artillery,” although he did not believe this resulted from any unfairness to one 
service in favor of the other.110 
Upon receipt of this letter from Major General Patrick, the War Department forwarded it 
to the Office of the Chief of the Coast Artillery, Major General Coe, for comment. One 
interesting difference in Coe’s response is that unlike Patrick’s, it included point “a.” from Dr. 
Loring’s assessment of the McNair Board report: “a. That the board was made up of 
representatives of several branches of the Service and included an Air Service Officer.” One 
cannot help but wonder why the Chief of Air Service left this particular point out of his reference 
to Dr. Loring’s assessment. In fact, since Loring only looked at the data and not the detailed 
description of the methodology and assumptions supporting the analysis of that data, his 
observations do not account for two key facts. He could not have known that, in addition to the 
one Air Service officer who served as a member of the board, four aircrews volunteered many 
hours of their time training for and perfecting the methods of the tests before they actually 
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measured any data. Further, he did not know that all the test participants met frequently to refine 
test methods and assess training progress before conducting the tests. Therefore, many members 
of the Air Service participated in the process, benefiting from the preparatory training both in 
individual flying and bombing skills and as a service in developing updated bombing techniques 
and maintenance procedures. Most significantly, these aircrews’ long-term participation in this 
collaborative process gave them many opportunities to voice objections to the methods or 
assumptions guiding the tests, had they desired to do so.111  
Regardless, after quoting all seven of Loring’s “corrections” to the McNair Board report, 
Coe argued, “the report of the McNair Board is entitled to weight as the impartial and 
dispassionate conclusions of a diligent and able board of officers and that quotations from this 
report when so described are entitled to weight as the best information now available.” Finally, 
Coe concluded that while they represented the best findings currently available, the McNair 
Board’s conclusions should not serve as “the approved conclusions of the War Department.” 
Thus, the adjutant general made the following assessment, approved by the Secretary of War, of 
the input provided by Majors General Patrick and Coe: “Matters of controversy have not yet 
been decided by the War Department.”112 
In September 1925, President Calvin Coolidge ordered Curtis D. Wilbur, Secretary of the 
Navy, and Dwight D. Davis, Acting Secretary of War, to appoint a group of retired military 
officers, judges, and congressional representatives to form the “President’s Aircraft Board.” This 
came as a response to the ongoing and increasingly heated military debate regarding air power, 
combined with speculation in the popular media concerning the capabilities of the Air Service in 
defense of America against foreign attack. A handwritten note on the front cover of the final 
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board report reveals the primary motivation behind formation of the board. The note reads, 
“Released for morning papers Dec 3.”113  
The President’s Board heard the testimony of ninety-nine witnesses. Aviators accounted 
for more than half of the witnesses because, in the board members’ view, “there has been a 
widespread impression among flying men that their point of view and professional opinions have 
not been enough considered, that large matters of policy have been determined by men without 
flying experience.” Further, the board made it clear to these “flying men” that they desired their 
testimony to reflect their own opinions, “whether or [not] those opinions coincided with the 
opinions of the departments.” However, even this board faced great difficulty in finding clear 
answers to the matters in contention. On the third page of their report, the President’s Aircraft 
Board wrote that they encountered throughout their proceedings significant conflict in the 
testimony of the ninety-nine witnesses they questioned. Further, they expressed surprise that this 
conflict involved not only matters of opinion, but also questions of fact. However, they found 
that in most cases “the apparent differences in fact are merely different conclusions resulting 
from partial statements of fact.”114 
After a brief discussion of the background to the controversy, the board presented their 
findings by dividing the report into two parts. The first part addressed several of the primary 
questions regarding matters of controversy, while the second recommended actions the President 
should direct with respect to the Army, the Navy, and industry as the main supplier of 
aeronautical materiel. A number of interesting conclusions, approved unanimously by the board, 
appeared in the report. The board recommended a continued separation between military and 
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civilian aviation, since any such union would only breed distrust of the intentions of commercial 
aviation as it sought to extend its domestic reach. However, the board also warned against the 
false notion that investment in a large air power would amount to a “peace movement.” On the 
contrary, the board pointed out that despite the natural sea barriers America enjoyed, it must still 
invest adequately in its defense while sustaining its policy of avoiding becoming embroiled in a 
European-style arms race. Perhaps more importantly, the board cautioned against the belief that 
the appearance of a new style of weapon could “change the ultimate character of war. The next 
war may well start in the air but in all probability will wind up, as the last war did, in the 
mud.”115 
The board also made several recommendations for encouraging the growth of both 
civilian and military air strength and capability, including encouraging commercial uses of 
aviation, improving existing aviation law, insurance, and government oversight, encouraging 
investment, and basing decisions regarding military aviation strength on realistic assessments of 
potential enemy aviation capability. While the board agreed that the nation currently faced no 
significant threat of aerial attack from another nation, they did not discount the possibility of 
such a threat in the future, or the need to prepare to counter it. Finally, the board did not 
recommend formation either of a separate Department of National Defense encompassing the 
existing military services, nor did it recommend creation of a separate air force equivalent to the 
Army and Navy, as either action would run counter to the principle of the military services 
“acting as integral parts of a single command.”116 
In the second half of the report, focused on recommendations regarding the Army, Navy, 
and industry, the board recommended changing the name of the Air Service to the Air Corps, and 
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considering it equivalent to the other branches of the Army, like the Artillery, Infantry, and 
Cavalry. However, it did not recommend supporting the Air Service’s requests for removal from 
the control of the War Department, arguing that aviation officers’ frustrations associated with 
serving under and competing for promotion against non-flying officers did not outweigh the need 
to maintain unity of command. They also did not support the assertion that the military should 
make sufficient investments in aviation technology to replace all aircraft with the latest models. 
In short, the board found that “obsolete” did not equate to “unsafe,” and that sufficient 
investment could be made to continue improving military aviation technology without constantly 
maintaining a fleet comprised of only the most modern and capable aircraft available.117 
Many other, relatively minor recommendations followed in the second section, but 
perhaps the most significant and prescient statement appeared in the closing paragraph of the 
report. After stating that the members of the board did not all initially agree on the matters under 
deliberation, they ended their report with the following statement: “We have reached a 
unanimous conclusion because we have approached our task in a spirit of mutual 
accommodation and understanding. The same spirit may prove helpful both to those charged 
with the grave responsibility of developing the policies in regard to the use of aircraft in national 
defense and to those who encounter the hazards of actual operations in the air.”118 
This spirit of mutual accommodation failed to materialize among the various military 
branches or services. Far from unique to questions of air power, similar disputes over funding, 
equipment capabilities, doctrinal roles, unit organization, and command hierarchies continued to 
hamstring the Army, particularly in the realm of mechanization and the attempt to turn the ideal 
concept of “combined arms” into a reality. Neither the McNair Board nor the President’s Aircraft 
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Board did anything to forestall the increasingly volatile interbranch and political rivalries 
infecting both the War Department and national-level leaders in 1924-25, which only grew worse 
as such debates and struggles for limited funds continued in the coming years.  
Awareness of all the details – not a highly selective sampling of interpretations and data 
points – regarding this little-known episode in McNair’s early career provides a new perspective 
on his depth of experience and commitment to detailed, unbiased experimentation. McNair’s 
peers and immediate superiors recognized him as a meticulous, hard-working, objective, 
innovative, and intellectually gifted officer. One can only imagine how frustrating he must have 
found this whole episode and how it must have affected his views as he faced similar challenges 
throughout the remainder of his career. 
The Billy Mitchell Trial 
One final event that transpired in 1925 deserves mention here because of Major McNair’s 
little-known but direct involvement. On November 20, 1925, just ten days prior to the release of 
the results of the “President’s Aircraft Board,” McNair received orders from the War 
Department’s Adjutant General directing him to travel to Washington on temporary duty to the 
Trial Judge Advocate, to testify at the court martial of the famous advocate of air power, Billy 
Mitchell.119 Put simply, Mitchell found himself facing a court martial due to his ever-increasing 
stridency in claiming America lacked a competent Air Service, and would continue to lack one 
as long as it remained subordinate to the Army. While most historians of early twentieth century 
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American military history probably have some familiarity with the Mitchell court martial, the 
historical record indicates most are probably unaware of McNair’s involvement in the trial.120  
As they prepared their case, the prosecution learned that Mitchell visited Hawaii during 
the same period that the McNair board prepared for and conducted its tests of Air Service, Coast 
Artillery, and Anti-Aircraft capabilities. After his visit, Mitchell based many of his assertions 
about the supposed ignorance of non-flying military men regarding the potential of airpower on 
what he claimed to have seen in Hawaii. His criticism and misrepresentations of the Hawaiian 
Department’s attitude toward airpower infuriated Major General Summerall, who unsuccessfully 
sought appointment as president of Mitchell’s court martial. However, given the centrality of 
what he had supposedly witnessed in Hawaii to Mitchell’s claims, the Adjutant General ordered 
both Major McNair and Major General Summerall to testify at Mitchell’s court martial. Their 
testimony provide vital to the prosecution’s case, enabling them to demonstrate the intentional 
misrepresentations and inaccuracies in many of Mitchell’s statements. 
For example, Summerall refuted Mitchell’s claims that he observed a chronic lack of 
resources for the Air Service in Hawaii due to its non-flying superiors’ lack of willingness to 
provide it adequate support, demonstrating that he had done just the opposite, redistributing 
resources from other branches of service within the Hawaiian department to augment the Air 
Service. Further, McNair’s (and Summerall’s) testimony refuted Mitchell’s claims that during 
his visit to Hawaii in 1923, no plans for the defense of Oahu existed. As McNair pointed out, 
during this time the Hawaiian department not only had a plan for the defense of Oahu, but 
McNair and his operations staff had already begun work updating it, resulting in the revised plan 
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they published in early 1924. McNair also refuted Mitchell’s supposed “prescience” in predicting 
the possibility that Japan might initiate a war against America with some form of sneak attack 
against a vulnerable base like Pearl Harbor or the Panama Canal. He pointed out that these 
predictions held striking similarities to the planning assumptions in a 1920 document entitled 
Joint Army and Navy Action in Coast Defense – one of many references McNair and his staff 
used in developing the updated plan for the defense of Oahu. 121  
McNair also demonstrated that during his tour there, the Hawaiian department recognized 
Pearl Harbor, and particularly the oil storage tanks there, as key vulnerabilities that defense plans 
must account for. Mitchell had long claimed a monopoly on this insight, but McNair exposed 
Mitchell’s claims not only as unoriginal, but also as a willful misrepresentation. His testimony 
demonstrated that simple ignorance could not explain Mitchell’s false statements, since Mitchell 
had made no effort to interact with the joint team involved in the McNair board or Oahu defense 
planning when he was in Hawaii. Mitchell chose to remain very secretive during his visit, and 
McNair made it clear that Mitchell could have known about current and ongoing defense 
planning had he chosen to. Instead, he consistently refused to divulge why he was there. In doing 
so, Mitchell passed up the opportunity to talk to key people who could have divulged the true 
nature of the situation in Hawaii, choosing instead to spread rumor and falsehood upon his 
departure.122 
The criticism that McNair’s plan for the defense of Oahu attracted from men intent on 
furthering the interests of their branch or service illustrates the severity of the problem of branch 
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bias, particularly in an era of increasing budget constraints. Always the selfless servant, McNair, 
along with his fellow board members, devoted six months of his career to an objective, detailed, 
and cooperative inter-service study of the ability of existing weapons systems to contribute to the 
defense of Oahu from a naval assault. In stark contrast to this objective, diligent, and cooperative 
effort stands the example of Billy Mitchell, a man who snuck around Hawaii gathering 
intelligence like an enemy spy. Mitchell later claimed no defense plans existed when defense 
planning went on in frenzied activity all around him. He also failed to recognize the fact that 
McNair included Air Service personnel in this planning effort, and recognized them by name for 
their contributions. Mitchell also asserted that the Hawaiian Department ignored and under-
resourced the Air Service when in fact Summerall reallocated resources from already under-
funded ground units to support Air Service development. 
This brief episode in Lesley McNair’s career represents but one of the many fascinating 
periods in his four decades of service that remain unknown to most historians of the early 
twentieth century Army. Another development that could potentially put McNair’s plans for a 
career in the Army in jeopardy first emerged during his tour in Hawaii. In his 1922 annual 
physical examination, his hearing test revealed slight hearing loss in his left ear; however, the 
report indicates the doctor identified “no pathology,” and recommended no further action. His 
1923 exam indicated the same reduced hearing, but as his 1924 exam notes, once again the 
doctor gave no treatment advice and ordered no additional tests. However, the 1924 report does 
indicate that the doctor noted of McNair’s ears, “Drums slightly thickened,” and advised McNair 
continue the “Regular examinations by E. E. N. T. Clinic” that he had begun on his own 
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initiative after the previous year’s exam. Otherwise, the examining doctor noted no mental or 
physical deficiencies that would limit McNair’s continue service in garrison or field duty.123 
The long, slow grind of the postwar years that must have seemed interminable to McNair 
and his peers tends to receive quick and broad-brush treatment from modern writers. Some 
choose to ignore it, but far worse, others choose to cite selectively events from the period to 
support a certain argument. The McNair Board and its aftermath serve as an important example, 
given the stark contrast between the objectivity, methodological rigor, and spirit of cooperation 
inherent in the board’s efforts, contrasted with the narrow, biased, and poorly researched 
representation of events presented in one recent work on the Army’s modernization efforts after 
the World War. Nevertheless, the peacetime Regular Army after the World War provided many 
diverse experiences to those officers who remained in the service. After four years of intensive 
experience as an operations officer and war planner, McNair received orders to report to Purdue 
University, where he served as Professor of Military Science and Tactics. At Purdue, McNair 
gained his first experience of training civilians in the art of soldiery.  
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Professor of Military Science and Tactics at Purdue University, 1924-28 
While military officers such as Lesley McNair debated the meaning of the Army’s 
experience in World War I and prepared for the likelihood of another war, much of American 
society rejected the idea of American involvement in another European war. Simultaneously a 
pacifist movement spread from Europe across the globe. Pacifism arose in Europe as a reaction 
to the war’s death toll, combined with the perception that the major powers’ political and 
military leaders lacked the appropriate regard for the value of human life. Popular literature, 
poetry, and music recorded the misery and suffering caused by the war, as memorials appeared 
on battlefields and in cities around the world. Indicating the widespread power of the pacifist 
movement, sixty-one countries, including the United States, signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 
1928, which outlawed war as a means to settle international disputes.124  
Well before this symbolic event, the U.S. Congress acceded to the public’s longstanding 
distrust of a large military by significantly reducing the Army’s size and budget. With the 
passing of the 1920 National Defense Act (NDA), Congress limited the size of the post-war 
Army to 297,717 personnel. Cuts in appropriated funds further reduced actual personnel strength 
to 175,000 in 1920. By 1923, the Army reached a low of 118,750 men. In the event of a war 
America could not avoid, Congress envisioned mobilization of a sizable National Guard and 
Organized Reserve to augment the small cadre of regulars.125 
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The Regular Army officers who remained on active duty after the war did not accept this 
optimistic vision of the future. They understood the fact that war existed throughout history as 
one of the few constants of human culture, no matter the cost to the combatants who waged it. 
Further, they knew the risk involved in relying on mobilization of reservists in time of war. As 
McNair witnessed while on the AEF staff, National Guard units often required as much training 
as units formed of inductees, and their officers rarely exhibited the necessary skills to command 
large organizations in combat. Fortunately, a small but dedicated pool of mid-level officers chose 
to remain on active duty even though they soon came up against “The Hump” – a stall in 
promotions caused by senior officers remaining on active duty for want of better career 
opportunities. This meant that mid-level officers typically spent more than a decade at the grades 
of captain and major.126  
Fortunately, the 1920 NDA included several initiatives intended to improve the readiness 
of both the National Guard and the various reserve forces the Army would depend on in time of 
war. In addition to serving as the nation’s immediate defense force, the Act called on the Regular 
Army to train this large civilian force. The Army would do this, in part, through the Reserve 
Officers Training Corps (ROTC). While its origins date back to the nineteenth century, the 
ROTC program saw its first formal implementation in the 1916 NDA, passed as a measure to 
accelerate American preparedness for participation in World War I. The 1920 NDA renewed and 
updated ROTC’s charter after the war. By 1923, the program comprised 104,000 cadets, and 49 
percent of Army personnel had served in positions that involved training civilians, whether the 
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ROTC or a similar program.127 After leaving Hawaii, Major McNair found himself serving in the 
first such duty position he would perform during the interwar years.  
McNair reported for duty at Purdue University in Lafayette, Indiana on May 1, 1924, 
after four months of leave. His service with the ROTC marked the beginning of a ten-year stretch 
of assignments as either an administrator or student at some form of military training institution. 
However, Purdue provided a new challenge for Major McNair, who found himself training 
civilians for the first time. His only similar experience to that point, working with recently 
mobilized National Guardsmen during World War I, left him with a negative view of the 
potential of civilians inducted into military service. In contrast to that experience, McNair’s 
assignment at Purdue gave him a chance to provide thorough peacetime military training to a 
large group of civilian officer cadets– an arrangement that enabled far greater effectiveness than 
attempting such training in the midst of a large-scale mobilization.128 
In addition to training cadets during his four years at Purdue, McNair also interacted with 
a variety of senior college officials, local and state politicians, and civilian activists. This 
provided a broadening experience for a mid-grade officer whose service over the previous 
twenty-one years consisted primarily of duty at isolated outposts and during combat 
deployments. McNair embraced the varied challenges of this new assignment, and made great 
strides in developing Purdue’s ROTC program into a first-class organization. This experience 
enhanced McNair’s reputation as an officer who could handle the diverse responsibilities of 
senior leadership, while making Purdue’s ROTC department one of the nation’s best.129  This 
                                                          
127 Ibid., 234-35. 
128 "The Debris, 1927,"  
http://earchives.lib.purdue.edu/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/debris&CISOPTR=22281 (accessed 2 
July 2011). 
129 "Reports of the President and Other Officers of Purdue University," in Bulletin of Purdue 
University (Lafayette: Purdue University, 1928), 111. 
 
83 
period of his career also provides great insight into McNair’s personal and professional views 
because of the high volume of articles he produced during his tour – articles that expressed his 
strong opinions about pacifism, the need for national military preparedness, and the importance 
and nature of military training in colleges and universities. 
ROTC traces its roots to the earliest days of the Republic. Based on the American 
tradition of decentralized power and distrust of large standing armies, national defense depended 
after the revolution on a citizen army. The militia system, formalized by law in 1792, identified 
all male citizens aged between eighteen and forty-eight years as potential soldiers. However, 
training remained a local responsibility, and no formal system existed for the development of 
officers to lead militia forces. This situation resulted from a uniquely American dilemma. The 
citizenry demanded an officer corps that exhibited high standards of professionalism and 
personal conduct, but simultaneously resisted the maintenance of a standing army large enough 
to threaten civil liberties and civilian control of government. Thus, military leaders found 
themselves forced to seek an appropriate balance between these opposing views.130 
Seeking a feasible means to generate a pool of capable officers to lead the various local 
militias, Captain Alden Partridge, a former superintendent of the U.S. Military Academy at West 
Point, established in 1819 the first private institution dedicated to officer training. The American 
Literary, Scientific, and Military Academy (later renamed Norwich University) sought to 
graduate men trained as military leaders but instilled with American democratic values. While 
many Norwich graduates entered service in the Regular Army, the majority remained in the 
civilian community. By seeding communities with these graduates, Partridge sought to improve 
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the effectiveness of local militias by increasing their officer training standards to a level similar 
to the United States Military Academy at West Point. By contrast, the southern military 
academies established in the first half of the nineteenth century – most notably the Virginia 
Military Institute and the Citadel – focused more on character development by reinforcing 
southern military traditions than on increasing the militia’s effectiveness.131 
A rift began to form between West Point, which increasingly limited entrance to the sons 
of America’s established elite, and the less formal military training programs at other colleges 
and universities. The intense socialization process endured by West Point cadets caused the 
public to view them as a distinct subset of American society. Graduates’ predilection to interact 
and marry within the small but growing circle of former graduates and their families reinforced 
this perception. This led to both increased tension between professional military men and citizen-
soldiers, and Regular Army officers’ distrust of enlisted men. The formation of the United States 
Naval Academy in 1845, a military academy rooted in an even more elite tradition than that of 
West Point, only exacerbated this tension. Thus, as Michael Neiberg explains, on the eve of the 
American Civil War,  
two trends dominated decisions regarding American military personnel. The first was a perceived 
functional need, consistent with the prevailing social structure, for a small, highly 
professionalized officer corps drawn from an increasingly small group at or near the top of the 
American social structure. The second, contradictory, trend was a cultural preference for citizen-
soldiers, ill-prepared and unprofessional though they were, to act as a counterbalance to the 
antidemocratic tendencies Americans feared in their own officer corps.132 
However, the early years of the Civil War highlighted the value of military training at 
civilian colleges and universities, because the Confederacy, which drew on a much larger pool of 
such institutions than did the North, initially benefited from its surplus of competent officers. By 
contrast, the North, which had access to fewer formally trained officers, made up the difference 
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by appointing civilians (mostly those with political connections) to lead many of its military 
formations. To resolve this shortage of competent officers, the Congress included in the terms of 
the Land Grant Act of 1862 the requirement for colleges and universities founded under the act 
to include military instruction in their curricula.133  
While this initiative seemed promising, the training suffered due to a lack of War 
Department interest or standardization. For example, Congress and the War Department 
neglected to specify whether colleges should make military instruction compulsory for all 
students, and failed to provide clear guidance on the program of instruction. Colleges received no 
details as to the required content of the military training curriculum, or even the number of years 
of training students should complete. The War Department made no effort to assign the best 
officers to training duty at colleges, and officers saw such duty as an unpleasant diversion from 
the typical career path. After graduation, the War Department did not even keep track of the 
whereabouts of military training program graduates.134 
Nevertheless, by 1900, forty-two colleges and universities offered some form of military 
instruction. At this early stage, the program offered no scholarships and enjoyed little support 
from the War Department. For decades, institutions with military education programs had relied 
primarily on faculty members who possessed prior military experience to serve as instructors. In 
several supplementary acts after the Civil War, Congress authorized the detail of Regular Army 
personnel to assist with this military training, but by 1898, only one hundred officers served in 
this capacity across the country. Therefore, while colleges increasingly viewed military training 
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as their civic responsibility, they chafed at the lack of support they received from the War 
Department. The program did benefit, looking back, from improved standardization during the 
latter half of the nineteenth century, and generated a steadily growing number of officer 
graduates.135 
After America’s difficult mobilization to fight the Spanish-American War, Secretary of 
War Elihu Root sought to rationalize military policy around two primary goals: the development 
of a system to maintain military preparedness, and the creation of a federally controlled reserve 
force.136 Two key acts passed by Congress in 1903 stemmed from these efforts. The General 
Staff Act established the position of Army Chief of Staff and provided for a military planning 
group in the War Department, improving the nation’s ability to anticipate and prepare for war. 
The Militia Act increased the federal government’s authority to train and enforce discipline 
among National Guard units, providing for a trained reserve that the president could mobilize 
quickly when needed. In step with these initiatives, the War Department slowly began to pay 
more attention to the military training programs on offer in the various land-grant colleges. For 
example, after the Spanish American War the War Department began an annual competition in 
which they inspected university military training programs, selecting ten each year for 
recognition as “distinguished institutions.” The selected programs could then each nominate one 
cadet for commission in the Regular Army.137  
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By 1912, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Chief of Staff General Leonard Wood 
sought to extend the opportunity for post-graduation federal service to more cadets, by offering 
reserve officer commissions in the Regular Army to several hundred students each year. 
However, this effort garnered little congressional support. Wood recognized that increased War 
Department oversight of college military training programs relied in part on removing these 
programs from the control of the Department of the Interior, where it had resided since passage 
of the Land Grant Act of 1862. While Wood enjoyed support from a number of senior college 
officials, it would take the threat of another war to motivate Congress to create the federal officer 
reserve he envisioned.138 
As the likelihood grew that America would enter the World War that had engulfed 
Europe in 1914, a change in strategic thinking occurred based on the realization that America 
could no longer count on the oceans to shield the nation from enemy attack. This led the General 
Staff to present a strategic analysis to Secretary of War Lloyd Garrison in 1915 entitled “A 
Statement of a Proper Policy for the United States.” Predating the better-known “Rainbow Plans” 
drafted after World War I, the Proper Policy laid the foundation for strategic plans to protect 
America from attack by sea. It also articulated the requirement for a competent officer corps, 
eventually leading to the establishment of the ROTC program. Based on an evaluation of the 
threat posed by contemporary European armies, the Proper Policy estimated the requirement for 
a force of “500,000 trained and organized mobile troops at the outbreak of the war,” plus another 
500,000 available within 90 days. Further, the policy estimated that the Army would need “at 
least 500,000 troops to replace the losses and wastage in personnel incident to war.”139  
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The report relied on the assumption that any forces not on active duty and required to 
fulfill the projected strength requirements must come from federal organized reserves, not 
National Guard troops. The War Department reasoned that a well-trained response force not only 
must respond quickly to federal orders, but must also receive standardized training – something 
difficult to accomplish if the nation relied on the National Guard to provide those forces. The 
limitations of units assigned in areas with different climates, and subject to a wide variety of 
state-controlled training plans, made reliance on the National Guard for federal defense seem 
unjustifiably risky. Since wholesale disbandment of the National Guard posed equally significant 
disadvantages, including fierce resistance from Congress, the War Department settled on the 
compromise solution of relying on organized reserves to provide the required troop strength 
anticipated by the Proper Policy. The planners also concluded that these organized reserve troops 
would require Regular Army officers to train them in the event of mobilization. Thus, the Proper 
Policy served as the strategic planning document that established the requirement to develop a 
new source of reserve officers who could earn Regular Army commissions. These officers would 
serve on active duty for several years and then revert to reserve status, prepared for federal 
mobilization should the need arise. Finally, War Department planners determined that existing 
military training programs in colleges and universities provided the best source of the officers 
required, provided they received adequate support and resources from the federal government.140 
It took the threat of war to provide the impetus needed to formalize that expansion. When 
war broke out in Europe in 1914 America sought to remain neutral, but as the conflict wore on 
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and the likelihood of avoiding the conflict diminished, Congress passed the National Defense 
Act (NDA) of 1916. This act fundamentally altered the nature of federal authority over the 
National Guard in time of war, while establishing America’s modern military structure – a 
structure that differed in reality from that codified in the NDA. As historian Barry Stentiford has 
pointed out, after passage of the NDA America’s military consisted of “the Regular Army, the 
Volunteer Army, the Officer’s Reserve Corps, the Enlisted Reserve Corps, and the National 
Guard when in federal service. In truth, only the Regular Army and the National Guard actually 
existed.”141  
Nevertheless, the act did significantly increase both the size and formalization of college 
and university military training programs, standardizing them in the form of the ROTC. These 
programs shared the common goal of training officers in preparation for the possibility of a 
future American military mobilization. The newly established ROTC program formalized the 
nation’s many longstanding and diverse military instruction programs by delivering a 
standardized curriculum intended to prepare students for combat service as officers in the 
organized reserve and National Guard. Thus, the ROTC system represented the realization of the 
reforms Secretary of War Elihu Root and Army Chief of Staff Leonard Wood envisioned at the 
turn of the century.142 
As Michael Neiberg has written, “ROTC served as an effective compromise that offered 
something to all interested parties.” It enabled the War Department to standardize and regulate 
the military training that officer candidates received. It provided a more effective curriculum for 
instructors who desired to increase the quality of training they provided. The National Guard saw 
the program as an excellent source of officers, since the colleges trained mostly locals who 
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would either take National Guard commissions or serve on active duty for a few years before 
reverting to Guard or reserve status in their home state. Finally, ROTC provided the War 
Department with an affordable means to accomplish the dramatic expansion of officer training 
necessary to support the large-scale mobilization envisioned by the Proper Policy. Such an 
expansion relying on growth of military academies would have exceeded the available funding 
many times over.143 
Neither did the fundamental provisions of the Proper Policy emerge intact in the 1916 
NDA. The concept of an all-federal reserve envisioned by the War Department planners faced 
considerable resistance from the National Guard operating as a powerful political lobby. When 
the dust settled, a compromise emerged in which the National Guard not only remained intact, 
but also grew in size and stature, in exchange for the provision that the president possessed the 
authority to mobilize and federalize the National Guard in time of war. In return, the War 
Department shouldered the responsibility of providing equipment, training, and pay for National 
Guard Units in training. In sum, this represented a victory for the War Department, because this 
resource and training burden brought with it the authority to enforce federal standards in the 
conduct of National Guard training – the next best alternative to a separate federal organized 
reserve. The National Guard, in keeping with America’s militia tradition, remained the primary 
source of national defense forces to supplement the Regular Army in time of war, but for the first 
time the National Guard had to meet federally-determined training standards. The concept of a 
federal reserve force also survived the debates surrounding passage of the Defense Act, in the 
form of the Volunteer Army and the Officer’ and Enlisted Reserve Corps, but these 
organizations existed in peacetime only on paper. Therefore, the War Department recognized a 
need for a professionally trained officer corps to take command of these units upon mobilization. 
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To provide the officers required to lead this organized reserve, the 1916 NDA created the ROTC 
program as originally envisioned by the War Department.144 
While the ROTC program formed by the 1916 NDA came too late to provide a 
significant percentage of the officers who served during World War I, at least 50,000 officers 
who deployed with the American Expeditionary Force received military training from land-grant 
colleges. Similarly, the expanded ROTC codified in the 1920 NDA provided only 100,000 
officers for service during World War II – a small minority of the total officer pool required 
during the mobilization effort. However, George C. Marshall reported after the war that, 
“without these officers the successful rapid expansion of our Army . . . would have been 
impossible.”    145 Thus, ROTC proved a fruitful program, and one that soon emerged as a 
common experience for Army officers who served during the interwar period.146 
When Major Lesley J. McNair reported for duty as the new professor of military science 
and tactics at Purdue University, he joined the ranks of officers responsible for leading one of the 
nation’s many new ROTC programs. As designed by the 1920 NDA, ROTC departments offered 
both a two-year program for freshmen and sophomores – a compulsory program at many 
universities, including Purdue – and an advanced program for juniors and seniors who desired to 
continue military training and earn a commission upon graduation, whether in the Army Reserve, 
the National Guard, or possibly in the Regular Army. Purdue conformed to this basic academic 
structure, while operating since 1919 as a purely motorized field artillery unit. This made 
Purdue’s ROTC program a perfect fit for Major McNair – a highly respected artilleryman with 
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years of experience conducting experiments in new field artillery techniques – a practice he 
would continue at Purdue.147 
This assignment also vastly increased McNair’s exposure to civilian leaders and the 
public media. Other than his appearance at the Billy Mitchell Trial, the young artilleryman had 
previously maintained a low public profile, even when serving as a general officer on the AEF 
staff. However, his assignment as the professor of military science and tactics at Purdue placed 
McNair in a position involving interaction with civilian trainees and community leaders, directly 
in the midst of the growing interwar pacifist debate. Perhaps surprisingly, considering his 
previous low-profile demeanor, McNair engaged in this debate with passion and eloquence, 
writing articles and delivering speeches at Purdue that recognized the virtue of pacifism as an 
ideal, but pointed out the necessity to maintain military readiness to confront the dangers 
presented by the real world. 
When the time came, Congress only halfheartedly implemented the 1920 NDA – due to a 
combination of factors including pacifist sentiment, isolationist leanings, and economic 
concerns. As described above, the NDA approved an active force only slightly over half the size 
of that recommended by senior military leaders, but congressionally mandated force caps and 
budget cuts further limited the Army’s size to less than a quarter of the 500,000 men the War 
Department hoped to retain in the Regular Army. These constraints often put men like McNair, 
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when serving in positions that involved interacting with civilians, in direct contact – and often 
conflict – with leaders of the pacifist movement. Fortunately, at Purdue McNair found an ally in 
college president Dr. Edward C. Elliot, who believed that America required a strong national 
defense, and provided unwavering support to Purdue’s ROTC program.148 
McNair wrote several articles while at Purdue that reveal his perspective on the growing 
pacifist movement in America and his conviction in the importance of military training in 
civilian institutions after the World War. As Edward Coffman describes in The Regulars, 
“Americans traditionally had little interest in and less respect for soldiers in peacetime. Many 
civilians may have lived through the 1920s and 1930s without ever seeing one, while a few may 
not even have known of their existence.”149 McNair recognized this indifference or ignorance 
among much of the American public only added to the challenge the pacifist vocal minority 
posed to the spirit of civic duty he believed necessary to prevent the interwar officer corps from 
falling into a lethargy that could lead to its physical and intellectual stagnation. Some officers 
who remained in service after the war did indeed lack drive and stayed on active duty long after 
they lost their youthful vigor. However, a large pool of mid-grade officers strove to maintain 
high standards of training throughout the interwar years while working to incorporate new 
technologies and fighting methods into Army doctrine and organizations. These officers 
remained devoted to their cause even though many found themselves frozen at their post-war 
rank for thirteen years or more, waiting for promotion opportunities that did not materialize 
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because senior officers served well into their fifties and sixties.150 While at Purdue, McNair took 
great strides both to maintain the vitality of the Regular Army officer corps and to instill 
Purdue’s student body with a belief in the benefits and importance of military training. 
The first article McNair wrote while at Purdue, entitled “Military Training at Educational 
Institutions,” appeared in 1925 in The Purdue Engineering Review. In the article, McNair 
described the nature and value of military training at civilian institutions. He responded directly 
to those critics of the ROTC who believed students could more effectively use the time devoted 
to military training in colleges studying academic subjects – particularly the “wondering 
freshman and indignant sophomores” compelled to participate in ROTC. He pointed out that 
Purdue’s president, Dr. Elliot, who had received military training while a student at the 
University of Nebraska, asked similar questions of his commandant, Lieutenant John J. Pershing. 
While McNair remained unsure whether Elliot found Pershing’s answers to his questions 
satisfactory, he pointed out that Elliot had emerged in the 1920s as one of the nation’s most 
ardent supporters of military training for college students.151 
McNair first explained the organization and history of the ROTC, mentioning its roots in 
America’s militia tradition and its progression from the informal program of the nineteenth 
century to the NDA-formalized system established in 1920. Emphasizing the program’s role in 
national military preparedness, McNair pointed out that despite its voluntary nature, the senior 
ROTC program existed in 1925 at 127 institutions across America, with 82,761 students in 
training. In fact, even more schools desired to form ROTC programs of their own, but could not 
because the War Department lacked the required funds. However, with another 42,743 students 
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enrolled in Junior ROTC programs in high schools and other institutions across the country, the 
nationwide total of students receiving military training in 1925 exceeded 125,000.152  
McNair then described the various motives that led institutions to establish ROTC 
programs, and the two main qualities students developed as a unique benefit of participation. He 
argued that colleges such as Purdue provided military training from both a sense of patriotism, 
and a desire to produce good citizens. More important, however, military training prospered in 
institutions of higher education because it had proven its worth as component of adult education. 
In other words, ROTC did not benefit students merely by preparing them for war, but also by 
providing general educational benefits that resulted primarily from two intangible forms of 
character development. McNair identified these two benefits as discipline, which he pointed out 
as equally important to all successful adults, whether a civilian or a soldier, and leadership, 
which also serves as an important component of any adult’s character.153  
To illustrate his point, McNair pointed out that many students graduated college after an 
average or sub-par academic performance, only to surpass their peers in their civilian careers. He 
attributed these cases largely to the benefits of leadership and discipline, and pointed out that Dr. 
Elliot himself had stated that only the Military Department, among all those at Purdue, included 
leadership training in its curriculum. Thus, McNair sought to demonstrate that the benefit of 
military training extended not just to those students bound for active service, but also to the large 
majority of ROTC students who planned to remain in civilian life after graduation. He argued 
their military training provided all ROTC participants discipline and leadership skills, 
contributing to the self-confidence necessary to put their “book learning” to maximum use.154 
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Also in 1925, McNair made an early foray into engaging the public media by writing a 
letter to the editor of the Army and Navy Journal. Perhaps emboldened by his participation in the 
Mitchell Trial and the publicity over his Oahu defense tests and planning, McNair wrote this 
letter in response to a congressional bill, taking a position on the question whether the War 
Department should adopt a selective promotion system for Army officers. The letter exhibits the 
maturity and confidence of an officer willing to engage in debate on military matters not only 
with fellow military officers, but also among civilians. It also reveals his expertise in matters 
well outside the purview of the typical artillery officer, and his deeply held convictions regarding 
the Army’s need for committed, high-quality officers. In his letter, he provided a detailed and 
well-reasoned argument in support of the principle of a selective promotion process, but 
disagreed with the system proposed by the bill currently before Congress.155 
McNair’s argument for modifying the proposed selective promotion system centered on 
the relative benefits of such a system depending on the officer’s rank. For example, he supported 
the system of selection for general officers and pointed out its broad acceptance throughout the 
Army, noting, “We have far abler general officers by selection than we would have by seniority.” 
He then made the case that, based on the vital importance of the positions they held, the Army 
should also select its colonels – men it relied on to serve in key positions including brigade 
command and division chief of staff – using a selective promotion system. In particular, McNair 
argued this would minimize the common experience among contemporary officers of observing 
regiments in training in which lieutenants-colonel or even majors possessed greater potential for 
brigade command than that of the actual commander.156 
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However, McNair argued the situation changed at grades below colonel. While he 
admitted, “the grade of captain, the company commander, is, like that of colonel, of 
disproportionate importance,” he pointed out that in his own experience many officers who made 
excellent company commanders failed to rise to the demands of higher rank. Many such men 
remained mired in the details that consumed the company commander’s attention, “forever 
fussing with details and interfering with their subordinates.” On the other hand, because often a 
captain “is only beginning to find himself as an officer,” average company commanders often 
made effective colonels since their “real ability develops later.” Thus, McNair concluded merit-
based selection of captains for promotion “should be undertaken with hesitation,” and such a 
system should not govern promotion of lieutenants.157 
Considering the question of promotion by selection (reward for individual merit) as a 
whole, McNair therefore supported the method in principle, as a change that would serve the 
good of the Army. However, he recognized limitations in the application of a merit-based 
promotion system to all ranks of officers, despite its apparent benefits. He noted three main 
concerns with the proposed selection process. These included the possibility of improper outside 
influence, the tendency of officers serving on promotion boards to favor subordinates with whom 
they had served, and the imperfection of information that could lead to inaccuracies in an 
officer’s personnel file.158 
To avoid these pitfalls, McNair recommended a number of “safeguards,” which he 
argued would prove effective only when formalized by law. Many of the safeguards he 
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recommended still exist in today’s officer promotion system. McNair’s recommendations 
included providing promotion boards clear and standardized criteria to govern their selection 
decisions. He believed boards should rely only on official (not personal) records, and base their 
promotion decisions on an officer’s full history of performance under a variety of supervisors 
rather the completion of one exceptional assignment or the receipt of several glowing evaluations 
from the same supervisor. McNair also suggested the Army use a selective promotion system 
among officers who had served ten years or more and achieved the rank of captain, 
recommending a graduated use of promotion by selection depending on rank. Under McNair’s 
proposed system, the Army would promote all general officers based on merit, but only half of 
all colonels, and only ten to twenty percent of lieutenants colonel and majors. He also argued 
such a system could only avoid branch bias by determining how many officers a board would 
promote from each branch before each selection board met. Finally, McNair recognized that 
even with the most stringently applied control measures, governed by law, such a system might 
prove unpopular “with the majority of the Army, for the majority will be adversely affected 
individually. It is inevitable that the most carefully devised system will result in some injustice 
and some heart-burning, but it is nevertheless believed that the net result would be greatly 
increased efficiency.”159 
The following year, 1926, McNair turned his attention to the problem of pacifism and its 
effect on military training in an article he wrote for The Purdue Alumnus titled “Pacifism at 
Purdue University.” Purdue had recently earned recognition by the War Department as a 
“Distinguished College” for the sixth time (a distinction it earned during every year of McNair’s 
tenure as PMS&T), standing out that year in comparison to other colleges’ programs by a wider 
margin than ever. Clearly, Purdue possessed a high-performing and motivated body of ROTC 




cadets. Nevertheless, not everyone at Purdue supported the idea of compulsory military training 
in college. The first significant evidence of opposition to the ROTC program came to McNair’s 
attention shortly after the college’s 11 November 1925 Armistice Day observances. The guest 
speaker for the event, Colonel Paul V. McNutt, a member of the Officers Reserve Corps and 
Dean of Law at Indiana University, focused his remarks on pacifism, of which he had begun to 
see, in McNair’s recollection of his speech, “unmistakable signs of activity.”160 
One Purdue ROTC cadet recalled McNutt in a 1926 Field Artillery Journal article as “a 
fine example of a leader of men, tall, of fine physique, piercing black eyes and a voice that 
commands attention and respect.” Singling out McNutt’s address as one of the best given that 
day, Cadet Major W.G. Hinckley highlighted the Dean’s remarks regarding his concern with 
pacifism: 
I have been troubled of late by a serious matter. Certain groups of individuals, some of them 
honest and well-meaning,-- some of them not, are seeking to exact a pledge from persons of 
military age never again to serve this nation in time of war and to destroy their love for this nation 
as a nation. I have no abuse for those who are honest and well-meaning. I agree with them that 
the abolition of war is a consummation devoutly to be wished. I emphatically disagree with them 
as to the means of achieving that end. 
Hinckley quoted McNutt on several points that supported his anti-pacifist position. McNutt 
reminded the more than 4,000 attendees of the Armistice Day events that America, as a rich 
nation in “a distracted, bankrupt, but armed world,” must remain vigilant in its national defense. 
He recalled the dismal failure of America’s efforts to lead its neighbors in disarmament in the 
past, only leaving the nation open to the threat posed by its more powerfully armed neighbors, 
including Mexico. McNutt particularly disagreed with the assertion that military preparedness 
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made America a nation of “militarists,” arguing that neither he nor any other soldier who had 
seen war wanted to experience another one.161 
However distasteful the experience of war, McNutt rejected the concept “that the 
abolition of war can be brought about by the disarmament of America alone or by the taking of a 
slacker vow by the youth of this land.” Disarmament would only lead to lawlessness within 
America and vulnerability to attacks from abroad. Reminding the audience of the sacrifice of 
America’s fallen, McNutt states “I know what our soldier dead would say to the slacker vow. . . . 
‘Be prepared. If the danger comes, fight on, fight on to victory.’”162 In his Alumnus article, 
McNair describes a debate that ensued in the “Student Opinion” column of the campus 
newspaper, The Exponent, over the several days following the Armistice Day observances. First, 
a student criticized McNutt’s remarks and military training at Purdue. Another student soon 
joined in with an editorial opposing military instruction in colleges, leading to growing debate 
among the student body and, in McNair’s opinion, “definite indications of a desire to agitate the 
question of compulsory training.”163 
Two individuals added fuel to the fire over the coming months. First, leaders among the 
Purdue faculty and student body received in January 1926 copies of a 31-page pamphlet written 
by Winthrop D. Lane and published by “The Committee on Military Training,” a group that 
included Jane Addams, Carrie Chapman Catt, John Dewey, W.E.B. DuBois, and James Weldon 
Johnson. As McNair describes it, the pamphlet recited “in detail the progress of military training 
in educational institutions since the World War, asserting that the War Department is making 
great strides in militarizing the country.” McNair quotes a particularly troubling passage from the 
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pamphlet, which states, “the deep danger of military training is not that it teaches a boy how to 
handle a rifle, but that it leads him to think in the psychology of war.”164 
Close on the heels of the appearance of Lane’s pamphlet, the executive secretary of the 
National Council for the Prevention of War, Mr. Frederick J. Libby, spoke three times in 
Lafayette, Indiana on 28 February 1926. In his Alumnus article, McNair points out that Libby 
spoke, “twice from pulpits and once at the Y.M.C.A.” In these speeches Libby voiced his 
advocacy of the United States’ joining the league of Nations and abolishing compulsory military 
training in colleges and all military training in high school. He also, as McNair puts it, “did not 
advocate disarmament, but opposed ‘pyramiding of armament,’ whatever that means.” 
Anticipating the impact Libby might have on the Lafayette community and the student body at 
Purdue, McNair arranged for ROTC cadets to attend Libby’s presentations. Overall, these 
attendees “were surprised at the weakness of his arguments, although impressed with their 
subtlety.” To pin Libby down on some of these more subtle points, McNair had members of the 
ROTC Order of Military Merit (junior and senior honors students) prepare written questions. 
Libby sent written replies not long after he left Lafayette.165  
Libby’s responses demonstrated his standing as a pacifist based on Christian principles, 
his belief that “the Monroe Doctrine is being stretched too far nowadays,” and his conviction that 
while America should not disarm, it also should not increase armaments because “It is the 
psychology accompanying increase of armaments that is endangering future peace.” Libby’s 
solution returned to armament reduction by international agreement –in short, making America’s 
security subordinate to the international community’s desire for peace. McNair followed this 
summary of Libby’s responses to his students’ questions with a description of the reaction 
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among the student body at large. During the week following Libby’s visit to Lafayette, The 
Exponent contained multiple attacks from students opposing his pacifist, internationally focused 
stance on national security. Only one person stepped forward in defense of Libby’s position – a 
local preacher who criticized The Exponent as prejudiced for publishing only views that ran 
counter to those expressed by Libby. Eventually, debate shifted away from Libby’s remarks to 
the more general question of compulsory military training at Purdue. However, after Libby’s 
visit students found the Lane pamphlet, previously made available only to select members of the 
faculty and student leadership, distributed to everyone on campus – both faculty and students.166 
McNair next provided examples of similar events taking place at “practically every 
campus where there is military training,” usually led by local ministers with the support of 
national organizations like Libby’s, and generally opposing military training on the grounds that 
colleges should seek ways more in keeping with Christian ideals to avoid wars in the future. One 
leaflet these organizations distributed to students prior to college enrollment, intended to urge 
them to oppose military training, referred to “the Military Problem” on campuses, and argued, 
“All groups might profitably take steps to abolish the requirement of compulsory military 
training in colleges as undemocratic and Prussian.” This leaflet provided a list of pacifist 
references that included War: Its Causes, Consequences and Cure,” by Kirby Page, author of the 
infamous “Pacifist Pledge”: 
Let the churches of America say to their own government and to the peoples of the earth: We feel 
so certain that war is now un-Christian, futile and suicidal that we renounce the whole war 
system. We will never again sanction or participate in any war. We will not allow our pulpits and 
classrooms to be used as recruiting stations. We will not again give our financial or moral support 
to any war. We will seek security and justice in other ways.” McNair called this “Treason under 
the guise of religion!167 
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McNair next revealed links between the pacifist, anti-military training movement, and 
American communist and socialist organizations. One individual in particular on which he 
focused, Paul Blanchard, served as publisher of The Amalgamated – the union newspaper of The 
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers. As described in the Lusk Report of 1925, prepared 
by a committee of New York legislators, Blanchard not only fomented strikes among 
Amalgamated union workers; he also spoke in February 1926 at Wyoming University against 
compulsory military training in colleges. McNair pointed out the similarity of Blanchard’s 
argument to Libby’s, both of which emphasized the supposed damaging psychological effect of 
military training on the young men who received it. However, McNair also brought into question 
the notion that Christian ideals motivated Blanchard, quoting from a recent issue of The 
Amalgamated: “It is up to the workers of this city to break up this criminal union (of the 
employers). They are digging graves for themselves and we will see that they are ducked into 
them. They try to do all in their power to crush and disorganize you, but we can stand and 
overpower the whole damned bunch.” Apparently, not all opponents of military training in 
colleges drew their motivation from Christian-inspired pacifist tendencies.168 
McNair ended the article on a positive note, pointing out first that America emerged from 
the War with Spain having learned valuable lessons that strengthened the nation’s defenses. 
While this did not prepare America for the immensity of the task it would face during World 
War I, a war “the pacifists assured us would never occur,” it left the country better prepared than 
it had been in 1898. Since the end of the World War the nation had struggled with the tension 
between pacifist tendencies, and the knowledge among senior political leaders that America must 
remain prepared for war. Despite the delay in passage of the 1920 NDA, and the relatively low 
funding and personnel strengths for which it provided, President Coolidge had firmly supported 
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the act and ensured its continued funding even as he sought disarmament through international 
agreement.169 
Focusing on Purdue itself, McNair highlighted the support provided to ROTC by Dr. 
Elliot. In a letter to McNair dated 28 January 1926, Elliot wrote,  
Here, at Purdue University, the R.O.T.C. is regarded as an integral and valuable element in the 
plan of technical education, to which this institution is primarily devoted. However, entirely apart 
from the question of the specific training of men for reserve military commissions, and entirely 
apart from the relation of the military training to engineering instruction, I consider that the 
R.O.T.C. contributes largely and efficiently to the development of those essential qualities of 
which dynamic character is composed – the sense of personal responsibility, the inspiration of 
leadership, and a recognition of the eternal place of order and organization in human society. . . . I 
have always considered that this training had an equally important aim of giving to the young 
men, who are fortunate to receive it, something in sharp contrast to the present day tendencies 
toward personal irresponsibility and lawless individuality; making them realize that strength of 
character depended upon certain common realities of life rather than upon sentimental 
preachments. 
Pointing out that Elliot wrote this letter before the pacifist stir caused by Libby and the Lane 
pamphlet, and not in response to them, McNair added his own assessment. He pointed out that 
America had pacifists before the World War, and despite their views falling victim to the facts of 
that war, pacifists remained active upon its conclusion. He assessed the situation at Purdue as 
“quiet after the recent exposure of the fallacy of Mr. Libby’s views, but the fact must not be 
overlooked that the basic cause of the agitation, these national pacifistic and communistic 
organizations, are still very much alive. The pacifist strives to influence and exploit public 
opinion by propaganda. The best antidote is an enlightened and thoughtful public opinion.” In 
this well-researched and written article, McNair made great strides in administering the antidote 
to Libby and the pacifist tendencies he sought to spread.170  
While the ROTC programs at Purdue and some other universities across America faced 
pacifist opposition, professional officers like McNair successfully defended their programs. 
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McNair’s Alumnus article demonstrates the brief spike in pacifist activity at Purdue and the effort 
required in countering it, but this represented only a small minority of the difficulty Regular 
Army officers faced in their efforts to maintain military preparedness and secure government 
funding for Army personnel, equipment, and training in the 1920s. Nevertheless, dedicated 
regular Army officers and students across America continued ROTC training with War 
Department support, however minimal based on the limited implementation of the 1920 NDA. 
However, one event in 1926 would demonstrate just how integral to the success of Purdue’s 
ROTC program Dr. Elliot judged McNair’s leadership.  
Having arrived at Purdue in the fall of 1924, McNair had served less than two years when 
the chief of the Field Artillery Branch, Major General William J. Snow, sent Dr. Elliot a letter on 
10 March 1926 informing him he would soon have to relieve McNair for pressing duty at Fort 
Bragg. Snow said in his letter that he recognized the disruption this would cause to Purdue’s 
ROTC program, but he assured Dr. Elliot only McNair could suitably perform the work required 
by the Field Artillery Board. He needed McNair to lead the board’s effort to update the field 
artillery drill regulations, and he assured Elliot he would provide the best possible officer 
available as a replacement.171  
The day after he received this letter, Dr. Elliot forwarded it to Acting Secretary of War 
J.R. Hines, voicing his strong objections to the planned relief of McNair. Elliot noted the 
dramatic improvements McNair had achieved in his short time at Purdue, having “completely 
demonstrated his distinctive fitness for the many and different tasks belonging to our corps, 
which numbers more than fourteen hundred men and is the largest light artillery organization in 
the country.” Elliot explained McNair arrived to find the detachment in disarray from the 
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frequent changes of leadership preceding his assignment, but due to his “strong character, his 
personal force and his technical competency, Major McNair developed a morale and standards of 
performance which have the hearty approbation of the University and the State.” Because of the 
recent challenges Purdue had faced with the rising specter of pacifism, and McNair’s skillful 
handling of this challenge, Elliot feared McNair’s early relief would result in far more than mere 
degradation in the program’s quality. Rather, Elliot believed losing McNair at this critical 
juncture could make the provision of military training at Purdue unsustainable. In short, Elliot 
believed the early departure of McNair could lead to the end of Purdue’s ROTC program, and he 
conveyed this concern in very clear terms to the acting secretary of war.172 
Dr. Elliot’s strident objections soon achieved the desired effect. On 18 March, just one 
week after Elliot wrote his letter, Acting Secretary of War Hines responded with a brief note, 
granting Elliot his wishes. Hines assured Elliot, “The Department appreciates the valuable 
services being rendered by Major McNair at Purdue University, in view of which it is not 
contemplated relieving him until the completion of his normal tour of duty at his present station.” 
Two days after Acting Secretary of War Hines wrote his letter to Dr. Elliot, Major General Snow 
also wrote a letter confirming he would not move McNair early. Snow wrote:, “the situation as to 
personnel has changed somewhat so that an excellent officer, upon whom I did not count, has 
become available to me for the special work I contemplated using Major McNair for; and, 
accordingly, I shall leave him with you.” This brief exchange demonstrates the outstanding 
reputation McNair had achieved by 1926, within his branch, at Purdue, and even at the level of 
the Secretary of War.173 





Prior to his departure from Purdue in 1928, McNair wrote two articles, one published in 
Purdue’s 1928 Debris, and the other in the February, 1928 edition of The Coast Artillery 
Journal, summing up his experience of four years training ROTC cadets. In his Debris article, 
McNair commended Purdue’s program for its achievements during his tenure there, giving full 
credit to the student officers for earning recognition as a Distinguished College in the three 
consecutive annual inspections the War Department conducted under his tenure. He also 
declared the program equally likely to earn distinction in the 1928 inspection, which McNair 
would miss by about a month.174 
McNair also addressed Purdue’s struggles with the nation-wide pacifist movement to 
eliminate military training in colleges, pointing out “The University was by no means immune to 
these activities, but the authorities and the students were quick to reject the unsound 
propaganda.” In fact, the struggle “served a useful purpose, however, in stimulating discussion of 
the principles and objects of military training.” With the height of the debate well behind them, 
McNair found the students “increasingly thoughtful and responsive as to the educational 
possibilities of the training,” recognizing the broad range of benefits it provided. Specifically, he 
found the sophomore class benefited in particular from this process of reflection. One “more of a 
liability to The Corps than an asset,” the sophomore class achieved a generally improved attitude 
toward compulsory military training. McNair assessed the sophomore class, once “indifferent” or 
even “troublesome,” in 1928, “by their proficiency, their budding leadership, their example and 
their numbers, are collectively the backbone of The Corps.” As evidence, McNair pointed out 
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that batteries with fewer sophomores than their peers tended to perform comparatively worse in 
training. Thus, McNair’s ROTC program at Purdue emerged from the pacifism struggle a 
stronger unit, capable of more effective collective training, and composed of a cadre of cadets 
more dedicated to the ROTC mission and their own individual training than before the debates of 
1926.175 
In his article for The Coast Artillery Journal, titled simply, “The R.O.T.C.,” McNair 
sought to achieve two basic goals. First, he described the ROTC program and the nature and 
need for further training and development of its graduates. Second, he requested support for the 
program from members of the National Guard and Reserves, primarily to fight pacifist 
tendencies wherever they appeared, and solicited their representatives to ensure ROTC continued 
to receive the funding it required. He described the quality of the ROTC officer, based largely on 
the more than 830 hours of military training received over four years in the program. Regarding 
this latter topic, McNair emphasized the breadth of ROTC training, beginning in the first two 
years with a focus on basic drill and soldier skills, and culminating in the final two years 
emphasizing practical experience in leadership development. In short, McNair argued, “Never 
before in our history have we produced officers so carefully schooled, except at the national 
academies.”176 
Regarding the latter points, McNair provided an assessment many citizens and perhaps 
many reservists likely found bold, if not truly surprising. He makes his thoughts on pacifism 
particularly clear:  
As to the spasmodic attacks against R.O.T.C. by pacifists, reds, pinks, chronic objectors, and 
publicity seeker, amateur, and professional, the line of action is simple and clear: inform the 
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people. Once the cloud of misinformation, exaggeration, and false logic is dissipated, there need 
be no fears as to the verdict of the great mass of Americans.177 
To support this point, McNair provided several key points of fact. Military training at colleges, 
regardless whether required or elective, did not derive from any legal requirement or War 
Department coercion; it existed solely as a matter of institutional policy at each school. Further, 
the colleges decided the specifics of the training programs, conforming only to the general 
guidance that they should focus the first two years on individual discipline, and the second two 
years on leadership. He argued that the success of the program stemmed mostly from the fact 
that both the colleges and the government derived significant benefit from ROTC; the former 
experienced dramatic educational benefits among program participants, while the government 
gained a pool of highly trained reserve officers for potential duty if the need arose for national 
defense. Finally, McNair debunked the common misperception that the government funded 
college ROTC programs. In fact, in Purdue’s case, not only did the college receive no 
government funding for ROTC, the program cost Purdue $8,000 per year – a cost the college 
gladly paid due to the evident benefit accrued to both the individual cadets and the institution.178 
However, McNair expressed concern that – despite prior congressional support for the 
program – future developments could spell trouble for its continuation. While colleges received 
no direct funds, they did depend on the large stocks of equipment remaining in the wake of the 
World War. Once depleted, these stocks would require replenishment for ROTC programs to 
continue providing realistic training, and this would require congressional funding “In spite of 
the very proper considerations of economy,” and the looming increased “pinch of the budget.” 
Thus, McNair sought both to educate readers of his article for The Coast Artillery Journal on the 
nature and successes of the ROTC program to date, and the impending budget crisis that posed a 
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significant threat to the program. He asserted that the Army could only avert this threat with a 
concerted effort by the portion of the populace who understood and supported the need for 
national preparedness, which required trained officers – and much of the informed public served 
in the Guard or Reserves in some capacity.179 
A physical challenge resurfaced near the end of McNair’s tour that made problematic 
McNair’s professional advancement. Prior to departing Purdue, McNair’s hearing loss 
significantly worsened, from a reading of 15/20 in his left ear – consistent throughout the 
previous several years – to a reading of 4/20 (he continued to test 20/20 in his right ear). This led 
the examining doctor to recommend McNair report to Walter Reed General Hospital for further 
treatment, which the Adjutant General, B. B. Parrott, approved on August 8, 1927. McNair 
proceeded to Walter Reed where, after a comprehensive examination conducted while on 
inpatient status from August 11-27, the Ward Surgeon documented McNair’s hearing loss, 
including the addition of tinnitus to his symptoms, and recommended his return to duty, with no 
further action. McNair remained cooperative and frank (as described by one of his doctors) 
throughout the examination, and admitted his hearing loss began shortly after his graduation 
from West Point. With his condition fully documented, McNair returned to Purdue to finish his 
final year of duty there.180  
McNair earned promotion to the permanent rank of lieutenant colonel on 9 January 1928, 
after serving only seven years as a major, or about half as much time in “the hump” as many 
officers during the interwar period.181 Furthermore, McNair had developed into far more than 
merely a field artillery officer with little or no experience outside his basic branch. His first 
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twenty years of service included a diverse range of duty positions that made full use of his wide-
ranging skills and interests. He served a four-year branch detail in Ordnance soon after 
graduating from West Point, and the Army put that experience to use in a number of field 
equipment tests prior to World War I. On the AEF staff, he not only oversaw artillery training 
among all the AEF’s combat formations; as a general staff officer he performed many tasks to 
improve overall AEF effectiveness, even leading an effort to resolve problems with current 
methods for the fitting of soldiers’ boots upon initial entry. His exceptional performance on the 
AEF staff earned him several promotions, leading to his distinction as the AEF’s youngest 
brigadier general. After the war, he served as a member of the individually selected inaugural 
faculty of the General Service School at Fort Leavenworth, not only developing the field artillery 
curriculum, but also working with thirty-three peers from a variety of branches to reestablish a 
post-war system of field-grade officer education in the States.  
Upon his assignment in 1921 to the Hawaiian Department, McNair stepped well outside 
of his field artillery experience to serve as Brigadier General Summerall’s operations officer. 
During this assignment he gained extensive war plans experience, developing a comprehensive 
plan of defense for Oahu. He also put his innovative spirit to use, conducting detailed and 
objective tests of aviation’s ability to defend the island from aerial and naval attack – tests that 
soon garnered attention at the highest levels of the U.S. government. Upon departing Hawaii, he 
led one of the nation’s largest and most highly regarded ROTC programs at Purdue University, 
demonstrating not only the ability to train field artillery cadets, but also to engage in high-level 
debate with civilian and government leaders on a wide range of topics. These included analysis 
of a potential officer promotion system based on merit, assessing the merits of military training 
in civilian universities, and confronting the dangers pacifism posed both to national defense, and 
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to military training programs across America. McNair proved so effective in his duties at Purdue 
that the university’s president, Dr. Edward Elliot, believed at the height of the pacifist movement 
in 1926 that Purdue’s ROTC program might not survive its anti-military training campaign 
without his leadership. In short, by 1928 McNair no longer fit the mold of the typical officer of 
field artillery. After twenty-four years of service, he had developed a degree of maturity and 
experience that made him stand out among his peers as a multi-talented and highly respected 
officer. His next assignment as a student at the U.S. Army War College provided him a chance to 




The Army War College, Class of 1928-29 
McNair received the opportunity to build on his war planning experience in Hawaii as a 
student in the U.S. Army War College class of 1929.182 As did all Army War College attendees 
after the World War, McNair worked on various student committees updating actual U.S. war 
plans throughout the year of instruction. As Michael Matheny has explained, after its 
reestablishment in 1919 the War College “began as an adjunct to the War Department’s General 
Staff to assist in the preparation of war plans. Unlike the General Staff School [at Fort 
Leavenworth], the War College worked with real war plan scenarios.” The college emphasized 
joint training, including not only the various military services but also the political and economic 
considerations involved in national military mobilization.183 However, during McNair’s post-
World War service at Fort Leavenworth, in Hawaii, and at Purdue University, both the 
Leavenworth Schools and the Army War College underwent significant changes. While many 
studies exist that describe the evolution of the curriculum at Leavenworth, few authors have 
written such analyses of the War College, leaving a gap in historical understanding of the role 
the War College played in senior officer education in the 1920s and 1930s.  
The War Department defined the post-WWI organization and curriculum of the War 
College at the direction of Secretary of War Baker, who summarized the most significant 
challenges the nation faced in mobilizing for the World War in his annual report for 1919: 
                                                          
182 War Department, "Special Orders No. 198," August 28, 1928, McNair Papers, National 
Archives and Records Administration, St. Louis, MO; McNair's pre-AWC physical exam made note of 
his hearing loss, neither deeming him permanently incapacitated for field service nor recommending 
sending him before a reitrement board. H. C. Fisher, "Report of Physical Examination," January 10, 1929, 
McNair Papers, National Archives and Records Administration, St. Louis, MO. 
183 Matheny, Carrying the War to the Enemy, 57-58. 
 
114 
It has been made specially apparent that General Staff officers for duty with the War Department 
and for larger expeditionary forces should have broader knowledge, not only of their purely 
military duties, but also a full comprehension of all agencies, governmental as well as industrial, 
necessarily involved in a nation at war, to the end that coordinated effort may be secured from all 
these agencies, and that they may be employed economically and efficiently both in the 
preparation for and during war.184 
Secretary Baker recognized that most of the War Department’s challenges associated with 
mobilizing for and fighting the First World War stemmed from economic and industrial issues 
related to mobilization for war, and the logistical requirements associated with changes in 
military technology. Tactics and doctrine also posed a significant problem, but one the War 
Department could deal with more easily and quickly. The War Department sought to resolve the 
most significant challenges by educating the Army’s future senior officers to deal with them 
before another mobilization situation arose, at the Army War College.185  
Baker asserted that the prewar officer education system had proven “inadequate and 
duplicatory in many respects.” Therefore, he directed a comprehensive review of the entire Army 
officer education system, aiming to improve school curricula, and reorganize the school system 
as required. Thus, the first Army War College commandant after the World War, Major General 
James W. McAndrew, reviewed the school’s entire curriculum. Upon reflection, he realized that 
he could best achieve the goals Secretary Baker identified by reorganizing the faculty and 
developing a new curriculum based on the staff organization of the AEF, rather than that of the 
pre-war organization of the War Department. Fortunately, it turned out the 1920 NDA 
established a new War Department based on similar logic, resulting in a post-WWI War 
Department organized much like the AEF staff, and closely aligned with the Army War College 
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curriculum and faculty, worked out by McAndrew between 1919 and 1921. As historian George 
Pappas has pointed out, “McAndrew’s visionary decision enabled retention of the core 
curriculum of the Army War College basically unchanged from 1919 to 1941.” However, 
modifications of the Army’s officer education system did occur during this period, causing 
several significant changes both at the Leavenworth schools and at the Army War College in the 
decade before McNair’s arrival there.186 
For example, the challenges that McNair struggled with while PMS&T of Purdue’s 
ROTC program also affected Regular Army officer education. Facing the same budget 
constraints as ROTC, both the Leavenworth schools and the Army War College experienced War 
Department modifications to their organization and curricula in an effort to gain efficiencies. As 
the War Department made adjustments, the schools updated their curricula to support their new 
educational goals, which evolved in line with their organizational structure. Isolationism and 
pacifist sentiment contributed to the budget limitations through its influence on congressional 
decisions regarding Regular Army personnel caps, which led many to perceive a reduced need 
for military training because only about half as many officers served on active duty as originally 
envisioned by the authors of the 1920 NDA. Just as pacifists sought to eliminate military training 
at Purdue and other civilian colleges, the isolationist American public saw no need for lengthy 
and expensive military schools to train officers for leadership during mobilization and war. They 
believed America had no need to prepare for such activities given America’s inward political and 
economic focus during the 1920s. Thus, budget constraints forced senior Army officers to look 
for efficiencies even as they struggled to keep the professional military education system alive. 
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The clearest manifestation of this challenge emerged when General of the Armies 
Pershing convened a board of officers in February 1922 to assess the organization and mission of 
the Army’s entire senior officer education system. Pershing appointed Brigadier Edward F. 
McGlachlin, who had replaced McAndrew as commandant of the War College in July 1921, to 
chair a board of officers appointed to determine how to restructure a school system designed for 
an army of 280,000 (as specified in the 1920 NDA), when Congress clearly intended to ensure 
that the Army never achieve that actual strength. With Regular Army numbers dropping quickly, 
falling below 150,000 by mid-year, Pershing wanted to optimize the Army schools for actual 
Army officer strength, to increase efficiency and reduce wasteful spending. As Harry Ball 
explained, “Fundamentally, the problem was money.”187 
The McGlachlin board’s evaluation of the Army schools at Fort Leavenworth and the 
War College convened on February 20, and soon devolved into a struggle between two 
competing priorities. While budget cuts and personnel caps pointed to a need to seek efficiencies, 
existing war plans called for a minimum number of trained officers, which the Army could not 
produce under some of the recommended courses of action. Colonel Hugh A. Drum, 
Commandant of the School of the Line at Leavenworth, proposed perhaps the most drastic 
reductions, recommending disestablishment of the Army War College by combining it with 
Leavenworth’s General Staff School, preferably holding the combined course at Leavenworth. 
Drum believed the combined school could cover the subjects already in the curriculum plus those 
topics currently taught at the Army War College pertaining to the theater of operations. Thus, the 
                                                          
187 ———, Of Responsible Command, 180. The nation’s celebration of the Allied victory in 
World War I soon turned to disillusionment, leading to congressional rejection of Wilson’s goal to 
include America in the League of Nations, and Presidential candidate (and Wilson’s successor) Warren G. 
Harding campaigning on the slogan “Return to Normalcy.” Thus, in the 1920s America wanted peace and 
a return to isolationism, and saw no need to spend heavily on what many deemed an unnecessary defense 
force. See Matheny, Carrying the War to the Enemy, 45.  
 
117 
new combined school would teach subjects applicable to echelons ranging from army corps 
through theater army, while the School of the Line would teach topics pertaining to army 
divisions through corps. For those aspects of the Army War College curriculum dealing with 
matters of mobilization relating to industry, war plans, and the Zone of the Interior, Drum 
suggested the War Department could teach these subjects to thirty-five officers detailed annually 
to their headquarters for a work-study program.188 
Representing the other side of the debate, Brigadier General William Lassiter, War 
Department G-3, reminded Pershing that the approved mobilization plan required 1,650 general 
staff trained officers: 800 from the School of the Line, 500 from the General Staff School, and 
350 from the Army War College, based on the specific topics covered at each school. Lassiter 
remained convinced mobilization plans justified retention of all three schools with the 
established numbers of graduates, regardless of reductions in overall Army personnel strength. 
Further, he advised against expedients such as Drum’s “understudy” program of officers detailed 
annually to the War Department. Neither he nor any of the Army War College faculty believed 
that arrangement would enable those officers to master the complexities associated with 
mobilizing the nation for war or provide enough trained officers even if the program proved 
effective.189 
When McGlachlin submitted his board results to Pershing on March 30, they included a 
majority report, a minority report from Colonel Harold B. Fiske, chief of the War Department G-
3 training branch, a dissenting opinion from McGlachlin, and several less contentious dissenting 
views. Despite this lack of consensus, the board did agree on one key point – it did not 
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recommend closing the Army War College. In fact, contrary to Hugh Drum’s recommendation, 
the majority report recommended leaving the War College in situ, while combining the two 
schools at Leavenworth into a single Command and General Staff School (CGSS) to provide a 
single year of instruction in command and general staff duties from brigade through corps level. 
McGlachlin opposed this recommendation, intent on finding a solution that would generate 
enough trained officers each year to lead an effective mobilization should the need arise. He 
argued for retention of both schools at Leavenworth, with the School of the Line focused on the 
division, and the General Staff School on the corps and field army.190  
McGlachlin also dissented regarding officer career timelines. He argued for a minimum 
of four years’ service between an officer’s graduation from the Leavenworth schools and 
selection to attend the Army War College, while the majority report recommended only a two-
year gap. McGlachlin believed extending the gap to four years would minimize the competition 
and jockeying for position that took place at present. McGlachlin observed that students 
reporting to the War College shortly after graduating from Ft. Leavenworth arrived “subdued, 
lacking in initiative and expression, and inclined to ‘play the instructor,’ attempting to do what is 
wanted rather than come to independent conclusions on the basis of study and reason.” He 
believed that four years of service with troops after attendance at the Leavenworth Schools 
would provide time for the officer to develop the necessary maturity and experience needed to 
gain the maximum benefit from the more open-ended problems they would work on in their War 
College committees.191 
McGlachlin raised a significant pedagogical issue by pointing to the similarities and 
differences that existed between the two schools. For example, both schools used the applicatory 
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method of instruction, although quite differently. Historian Peter Schifferle has defined the 
applicatory method at Leavenworth as “the use of large lectures, smaller conferences that 
engaged students in dialogue with instructors, formal committees of ten students and two 
instructors, and graded problem-solving exercises.”192  
The Army War College faculty’s use of the applicatory method varied from that of their 
counterparts at Leavenworth in two key ways. The best-known difference centered on 
Leavenworth instructors’ use of school solutions as tools against which to compare and grade 
students’ solutions to the many tactical problems they worked on. The accounts of many 
historians and some graduates contributed to a generally negative historical interpretation of the 
Leavenworth school solution. Many historians of the interwar period, particularly those critical 
of the U.S. Army of the 1920s-1930s, define the Leavenworth school solution in similar terms to 
those used by Jörg Muth: “the sole example for a correct approach to and result of every 
exercise.”193  
Schifferle argued that school solutions did not represent the sole acceptable solution; nor 
did a student automatically fail an exercise for developing a solution that varied from the school 
solution. Rather, a group of instructors, often with the assistance of students, developed the 
school solution, gaining their department heads’ approval before use in conducting and grading 
exercises, where they merely served as examples of satisfactory solutions. Instructors did 
sometimes mark points off for seemingly insignificant oversights, and some may have leaned too 
much on the school solution to determine students’ grades. However, the senior faculty intended 
school solutions to provide an acceptable means for solving a problem, to facilitate discussion 
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and comparison with alternatives the students developed, and most instructors used them as 
intended. Sometimes the school solution illustrated an error in a student’s solution, or merely 
provided an alternative solution, while in other cases it supported the student’s logic. Regardless, 
the faculty continually updated school solutions to incorporate changes in doctrine, insights 
gained through faculty discussions, and particularly good ideas developed by students.194  
The Leavenworth Schools also differed from the Army War College in that Fort 
Leavenworth students performed most of their practical work individually. The curriculum 
provided few opportunities for team building or even learning from peers. The faculty intended 
the students to master doctrine, primarily through lectures by and discussions with instructors. 
This practice undoubtedly led to a less effective program of instruction than one that emphasized 
team building and group learning.195 However, it also suited the needs of the Leavenworth 
schools, for many students received their first formal education for service at division and higher 
echelon units. Given most Leavenworth students’ lack of experience in large units or general 
staffs, they needed to learn the basics before attempting to engage in group discussion and 
committee work. In short, the Leavenworth schools served an entirely different purpose than the 
Army War College. 
While both schools used curricula that emphasized military history and logistics, Col. H. 
B. Crosby, Army War College assistant commandant, noted the fundamental difference in the 
Army War College approach in his orientation lecture to the 1924-1925 class: 
I believe I speak the truth when I say that no one helps his rating by blindly accepting the views 
of the faculty on any subject. This is distinctly a college – where we learn from an exchange of 
ideas and not by accepting unquestioned either the views of the faculty or the views of the 
student. At Leavenworth we accepted and should have accepted the principles and doctrines laid 
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down by the faculty of that school. Here we reach our own conclusions, faculty and student, 
following a full and free discussion of the subject.196 
Crosby makes an important but subtle point in this quote when he says students at Leavenworth 
“accepted and should have accepted the principles and doctrines laid down by the faculty.”197 
Crosby grasped the fundamental difference between the Leavenworth schools and the 
Army War College; at Leavenworth, many students encountered the doctrinal concepts covered 
in the curriculum for the first time, and they needed to learn and demonstrate their understanding 
of that doctrine. Functioning as the Army’s common language, doctrine provided the foundation 
for how units would operate; the goal was to establish a common understanding that provided the 
essential ability to anticipate friendly units’ and fellow commanders’ actions and communicate in 
a standard set of terms. Thus, the school solution may have frustrated students who objected to 
the implication that they represented the only way to solve a problem or accomplish a task. 
However, the school solution actually provided a method that reflected current doctrine, enabling 
all students to develop a vital common understanding of that doctrine. Before one can diverge 
from doctrine effectively, one must understand it. Officers developed the latter skill at 
Leavenworth, before learning the former skill at the Army War College. As Matheny puts it, 
“Leavenworth was about training; the War College was about education.”198 
Another standard-bearer for the traditional narrative of U.S. Army ineptitude during the 
interwar period, David E. Johnson, has criticized the Army officer education system in his much-
cited book, Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers. Unfortunately lumping together what happened at 
the Leavenworth schools and the Army War College, Johnson has written, “The Army school 
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system, rather than serving as an agent for change, focused almost completely on accepted 
doctrine.” After describing the echelons each school focused on, Johnson claimed: “Collectively, 
the schools focused on developing officers who could supervise the mobilization, fighting, and 
supplying of a mass army along World War I lines.” Johnson then argued, “Although the 
Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, was generally viewed as the ‘source of 
Army doctrine and procedure,’ it was clearly a captive of the Army’s sanctioned doctrine. 
Instruction remained riveted on conservative doctrines, largely ignoring emerging, competitive 
perspectives such as mechanization and air power.”  
Johnson made a common and fundamentally flawed argument by conflating correlation 
with causality. He failed to acknowledge the need to establish a common understanding of the 
Army’s accepted doctrine among the tiny core of Regular Army Officers that would oversee the 
rapid expansion and training required during a large-scale mobilization like the one they had 
experienced in the previous war. More important, he did not understand or acknowledge the 
significant differences between the missions and instructional methodologies that distinguished 
the Leavenworth Schools and the Army War College. In particular, in his goal to prove the 
Army’s neglect of emerging technologies in its officer education system, he failed to mention the 
many lectures and committee work Army War College students took part in at Carlisle Barracks, 
which included significant emphasis on topics like air power, mechanization, and motorization – 
the very subjects he claimed the Army school system neglected.199  
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In his effort to prove the neglect of emerging technologies in the Leavenworth curriculum 
caused Army officers’ ignorance or distrust of their potential, Johnson failed to grasp the 
fundamental difference between the purpose of the Leavenworth and the War College 
experience. At Leavenworth, officers learned the language and procedures of their profession, 
leading naturally to a focus on matters already covered in existing doctrine. At the War College, 
usually after two to four years’ service in the field, officers explored topics both applicable to 
higher-level command and staff work, and related to emerging doctrine and nascent 
technologies. Army officers have long known that one must first understand doctrine before 
consciously diverging from it. All mid-level officers require the former skill, and the 
Leavenworth Schools focused on instilling it in its students; not all officers required the latter 
skill, and those that did learned how, in the 1920s and 1930s as today, at the War College or 
other post-Leavenworth educational institutions.   
While the McGlachlin board did agree on the issue of school reorganization, other issues 
in addition to time between attendance at Leavenworth and the War College remained in dispute. 
Harold B. Fiske, Chief of the Training Branch of the War Department G3 and a member of the 
McGlachlin board, authored a “minority report” that Ball described as “an interesting scheme.” 
Fiske proposed a functional alignment of the school system rather than one based on which 
echelons each school focused on in its curriculum. He recommended Leavenworth return to its 
pre-war focus on “the serious study of battle, where tactical doctrine would be developed, taught, 
and disseminated to the Army.” The War College would focus on “the management of raising, 
training, supplying, sustaining, and moving armies and all components of armies. For the elite of 
the elite, there was to be the study of high command.” While interesting, one can only speculate 
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how this scheme might have worked, since the Army remained committed to a school system 
delineated by “branch of service and tactical echelon,” Ball concluded.200  
In May 1922, having weighed the various recommendations and dissenting views 
produced by the McGlachlin Board, Pershing made his decision. He concurred with the 
consolidation of schools at Leavenworth into one institution to be named the Command and 
General Staff School (CGSC), to which selective entrance would enable 250 officers per year to 
attend. He also decided on a two-year period between graduation from CGSC and selection for 
the Army War College. In terms of curricula, CGSC would instruct its students on matters 
pertaining to echelons through the army corps, and the War College would focus on the field 
army and other elements making up the theater of operations. Ball pointed out that a fundamental 
shift underpinned these decisions – one that bore a strong similarity to the last War College 
reorganization. Reflecting the 1907 curriculum redesign, Pershing shifted the Army War 
College’s focus from “preparation for war” to a curriculum that devoted at least equal attention 
to “conduct of campaigns.” In other words, Ball argued: 
after Pershing’s decision, the study of the totality of the phenomenon of war had to compete with 
study of the combatant phase. Pershing’s decision was not necessarily wrong, but it was limiting. 
To use Elihu Root’s terms, Pershing moved the War College away from the study of the great 
problems of national defense and toward the narrower problem of military science.201 
The education system focused on the doctrinal lessons derived from the AEF’s WWI experience 
and sought to correct perceived problems arising from that experience. 
By 1922, the War College had adjusted its curriculum and reorganized its faculty to align 
with the consolidation of the Leavenworth schools, and to match the organization of a wartime 
general staff, with G-1, G-2, G-3, and G-4 courses that “taught lessons in personnel, intelligence, 
operations, and supply, respectively. Courses in war plans and command rounded out the early 
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curriculum.”202 The student committees reviewed and proposed updates to existing war plans for 
the War Department through practical exercises conducted in each course by individual 
committees of students through use of the applicatory method.203  
During McGlachlin’s tenure as commandant, he sought to improve both joint 
interoperability and military interaction with civilians in other government departments and 
leaders of industry. He launched a fundamental shift in focus, rejecting McAndrew’s view that 
the War College should focus on preparing its graduates for the primary role of general staff 
officer and espousing the view that it should prepare graduates for large unit command. As 
Pappas has noted, McGlachlin adjusted the curriculum in what he viewed an “unremitting 
attempt . . . to impress the College with the idea that Command is the great thing in war, the true 
determinant of success or failure, and that the General Staff officer, while a part of the command, 
is but an adviser, an agent, a subordinate coadjutor of the Commander.”204 Thus, recent 
graduates of CGSC encountered a curriculum at the War College based on an educational 
philosophy that bore little in common with Leavenworth’s, and aimed for very different 
educational outcomes. However, while parts of America recoiled from the notion of war, these 
institutions, each in their own way, ensured a generation of officers remained steeped in the 
Army’s doctrine and the demands of national mobilization.  
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Somewhat contrary to Pershing’s guidance, McGlachlin retained his basic philosophy for 
the War College’s chief aims. Pappas credited McGlachlin for a “reorientation of the entire 
purpose of that curriculum. His insistence that preparation for war in time of peace and the actual 
conduct of a conflict were not the prerogatives of the military services alone but concerned 
equally the civilian departments of the Government and the industry of the nation gave to the 
course of instruction a distinct flavor of what today would be termed ‘international relations and 
political science.’”205 He also sought to eliminate what he and others viewed as the overemphasis 
on competition among students by adopting a pass-fail grading system and encouraging 
cooperative work. In response to high attrition rates during his first year as commandant, 
McGlachlin took measures to end age waivers (the War Department G-1 had, in previous classes, 
issued numerous waivers overriding the 52-year old student age limit), and apply more stringent 
selection criteria.206 
McGlachlin made significant strides during the 1922-23 class. He selected a student body 
that possessed a greater variety of experience and background than previous classes. He also 
shifted the nature of the education away from what Ball described as a “magnified applicatory 
method to a version of the contemporary graduate school, characterized by individual study and 
research, a gathering in seminar (‘committee work’ at the War College), and a reinforcing lecture 
program.” Ball concluded that by the end of the academic year, “the War College had begun 
moving in a direction quite different from what had become the traditional system of training 
officers by immersing them in the applicatory method.” While the college still lacked 
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comprehensive examinations and the requirement to write a thesis, groups rather than individuals 
worked together to find solutions to problems.207 
Historian Michael Matheny has stressed that the consolidation of the two schools at 
Leavenworth into one meant that, “the overlap between the two institutions [CGSC and the War 
College] in operational art virtually ceased.” While the Army War College continued to use the 
same doctrine and texts dealing with large unit operations as at CGSC, it “persisted on its own 
path of educating students through exercises, lectures, and conferences on joint and combined 
operations.” Meanwhile, the consolidation at Leavenworth led to the production of more 
graduates, but – most scholars assert – few critical thinkers capable of innovative group work. 
CGSC instilled doctrine as a common language and way of thinking; the education required to 
create practitioners of operational art awaited CGSC graduates at the Army War College.208 
The officer education system continued to evolve even as McGlachlin implemented 
Pershing’s guidance and applied his own philosophy as commandant of the War College. Soon 
after Pershing modified and approved the recommendations of the McGlachlin Board, he 
appointed Harold Fiske to review implementation of these decisions. Fiske’s assignment was to 
eliminate overlap between the CGSC and War College curricula. Aided by McGlachlin’s 
assistant commandant, Colonel Edgar Collins, Fiske recommended a program that made no 
significant changes to the one currently in place under McGlachlin’s supervision. However, the 
Fiske Board did delineate the boundary between CGSC and the War College along unit echelon, 
rather than functional lines. The Board recommended the following War College Mission 
statement: “To train officers for (a) high command and staff to include units higher than army 
corps, (b) the War Department General Staff duty and duty in the office of the Assistant 
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Secretary of War, (c) Corps Area Command and General Staff duty.” Pershing approved this 
mission, which also made clear the echelons in which graduates would serve by adding to the 
Board’s recommendations the following statement: “The War College course will include the 
tactics of a typical army, acting independently or within an army group, covering phases of 
concentration, advance, deployment, combat and pursuit, with the general details of supply 
incident thereto.”209 With this guidance, the War College assumed responsibility for all matters 
related to preparation for war, from the tactics and logistics of several echelons of Army 
organizations, to joint operations, to the complexities associated with economic and industrial 
mobilization. 
Pershing ordered the new mission supplemented by his guidance to take effect during the 
1924-1925 academic year. By then a new commandant would oversee its implementation. The 
War Department reassigned McGlachlin to command the Panama Division, effective upon 
graduation of the 1923 class (McGlachlin chose to retire instead), and selected Major General 
Hanson E. Ely as his successor. It remains unclear whether McGlachlin’s relief stemmed from a 
difference of philosophy with Pershing or the more routine general officer reassignment cycle. 
Ball has written: “it was Ely who had convinced Pershing that the War College should teach field 
army operations, and that time for this instruction could be provided by reducing the time 
devoted to the G-1 and G-4 courses. Ely now had the opportunity to prove his thesis.” Based on 
the timing of Ely’s relief of McGlachlin, the curriculum for 1923-1924 remained essentially the 
same as McGlachlin planned it – Ely therefore concerned himself with implementing the many 
changes slated to take effect during the 1924-1925 class – one that posed numerous 
challenges.210  
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First, the new curriculum would add the necessary content to address field army and 
army group operations. Further complicating matters, the 1924-1925 War College class would be 
the first to contain graduates from the two different Leavenworth configurations, with half being 
graduates of the two-year course, a quarter being graduates of the one-year course, and another 
quarter having no Leavenworth experience at all. Notably, little room remained in the curriculum 
for training officers for service in the office of the Assistant Secretary of War because the 
increased focus on tactics shunted aside topics related to industrial mobilization. Therefore, 
while Matheny correctly noted that Leavenworth served more for indoctrination and the War 
College provided instruction in operational art, neither school focused on preparing officers for 
the demands of national mobilization for war, risking challenges much like those faced in the 
difficult preparation for AEF deployment to participate in World War I. 
During his four-year tenure as commandant, Ely adjusted the curriculum in an effort to 
cover all the required elements, while providing at least a basic introduction to the issues related 
to industrial mobilization. The creation of the Army Industrial College in 1924, considered a 
CGSC equivalent but devoted to the education of about thirty-five procurement branch officers 
per year, helped seed each War College class with a small number of students possessing a 
reasonably sound background in mobilization issues. Meanwhile, the War College curriculum 
focus on mobilization narrowed almost exclusively to issues of manpower by 1927. However, 
the War College did benefit from an increasing emphasis on war planning committee work on 
actual War Department “rainbow plans,” even though these exercises neglected considerations of 
strategy, assuming “simply that a war had begun and that the object of war was obviously, 
victory.”211 
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Several other modifications, successes, and failures occurred under Ely’s watch. 
However, indisputably when the final class graduated under his supervision as commandant, the 
War College remained in a quandary, torn between competing priorities. In his effort to cover all 
the required curricular topics adequately, Ely recognized that the requirement to prepare students 
both for service on the War Department General Staff and to deal with the challenges of running 
a field headquarters left little time to confront issues of national mobilization. By 1927 he still 
had not found an adequate balance, and little evidence of McGlachlin’s broad-approach 
philosophy remained. By Ball’s estimate, “all of Ely’s four years were test years. It was Ely’s 
successor who finally articulated the role of the War College in a way that brought an end to 
experimentation and set the War College on a bearing that remained relatively constant.”212  
Major General William D. Connor of the Corps of Engineers replaced Ely as 
commandant in November 1927. Thus, Connor had been the commandant for one year before 
McNair arrived at the War College as a member of the 1928-29 class. Army Chief of Staff 
Charles P. Summerall, who had replaced Pershing’s successor John L. Hines in November 1926, 
made no changes to Pershing’s guidance during Ely’s tenure as commandant.213 However, in 
1927 he began to make changes at both Leavenworth and the War College, partially reversing 
Pershing’s decisions. To resolve several problems caused by compression of the School of the 
Line and the General Staff School at Leavenworth into the single-year Command and General 
Staff School, Summerall directed lengthening of that course to two years beginning in 1928. He 
did not return responsibility for field army operations to CGSC; that instruction remained the 
responsibility of the War College. However, he approved a new Army War College mission, 
including a fundamental shift that differentiated between two basic types of activities – training 
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and instruction. This distinction recognized that certain duties related to conducting Army and 
joint operations on a general staff required specific skills, and the War College bore the 
responsibility of providing the necessary training to ensure its graduates possessed those skills. 
By contrast, other duties (for example, those related to War Department or Assistant Secretary of 
War staff duties), required more than simple proficiency in certain skills, and the War College 
could only go so far in providing instruction to help its graduates develop the necessary intuition 
and insight.214  
Connor received these instructions in December 1927, a month after assuming duties as 
commandant. However, with the 1927-1928 class already in place, Connor left their curriculum 
essentially unchanged, while working with his faculty to determine how to make the necessary 
adjustments for the following year. Two faculty members in particular, Troup Miller (a G-3 
instructor) and Walter C. Sweeney (head of the G-1 department) provided Connor detailed and 
influential advice. Miller wrote a succinct history of the curriculum since 1919, using it to 
support his argument that war-planning instruction had gradually emerged as the primary topic in 
the curriculum, at the expense of both field operations and command. Sweeney made the 
important point that, as Ball put it, “past rhetoric about ‘command versus staff’ and ‘operations’ 
tended to obscure the fundamental problem facing the War College. That problem, as Sweeney 
saw it, was that the War College had two related but nonetheless distinct fields of interest. One 
field was the preparation for war; the other was the conduct of war.” Based on Sweeney’s advice, 
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Connor seems to have pursued a curriculum redesign founded in a Clausewitzian conception of 
war, and he intended the redesign to lead not just to a rational curriculum, but also to one with 
rationality easily apparent to the students.215 
In March 1928, Connor issued guidance to his faculty regarding how they would modify 
the curriculum for the 1928-1929 class. This mostly involved streamlining both the curriculum 
and faculty organization. They would divide the course itself into two phases; “Preparation for 
War,” and “Conduct of War.” They would cut the faculty from seven sections to four: G-1, G-2, 
G-3, and G-4 (eliminating Command, Assistant Secretary of War, and War Plans divisions). 
Connor expressed his logic for the faculty realignment as logical based on the operation of actual 
units which, when operating effectively, could manage all activities pertinent to the preparation 
for and conduct of war in the four primary staff sections (based on the original French model). 
Connor also had no qualms about eliminating the Command section. He held strong views 
regarding the much-debated topic – whether command required special training. Connor believed 
the same education would prepare an officer for service on a general staff or large unit 
command; the characteristics required of a commander stemmed more from natural qualities than 
anything learned in a classroom. He believed the schools should produce competent officers, and 
the Army’s fielding of competent commanders relied on an effective selection process.216 
Connor made other less significant changes to the War College curriculum. For example, 
he added more industrial mobilization problems to the curriculum, and increased the length of 
the war plans course by six weeks. Thus, McNair and his peers participated in multiple 
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committees, enjoying several opportunities to serve in peer leadership positions while working 
on actual war plans that involved not just military, but also industrial and political planning 
considerations.217  
The War College assistant commandant, Colonel J. L. De Witt, provided an orientation to 
the 1928-1929 class on 4 September 1928. His orientation consisted of “a general outline of the 
course, its scope, the organization for and the methods of work.” He also addressed the recent 
changes caused by the consolidation of the Leavenworth schools into the Command and General 
Staff School, describing the new War College mission as consisting of four main goals as 
prescribed in Army Regulations 350-5: 
(a) To train officers in the conduct of field operations of the army and higher echelons; and to 
instruct in those political, economic and social matters which influence the conduct of war.  
(b) To instruct officers in War Department General Staff duties and those of the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of War.  
(c) To train officers for joint operations of the Army and Navy.  
(d) To instruct officers in the strategy, tactics and logistics of large operations in past wars, with 
special reference to the World War.218 
DeWitt summed up the school’s purpose in simple terms – the faculty sought to prepare officers 
of proven potential for service on the General Staff of the War Department, or on the general 
staff or as the commanders of large units, and to conduct effective joint planning and operations 
with their fellow officers in the U.S. Navy.219 
DeWitt also told the incoming class, “the work of the Faculty and the students should be 
so intimate and closely interwoven that all will get the benefit of the experience of his fellows. 
Apart from the course, the bringing together of so many men from all the activities of the Army 
and Navy is in itself most beneficial.” DeWitt made it clear the faculty considered the students 
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“selected officers of proven efficiency, as demonstrated by their records.” Therefore, the school 
was not concerned with testing or weeding out of the students – its sole focus was to educate and 
train them so they could reach their maximum potential.220  
DeWitt addressed the use of the two terms “train” and “instruct” in the War College 
mission, demonstrating that he, like Connor, understood differences in interpretation of these 
terms existed among U.S. military officers. As DeWitt put it,  
Exception may properly be taken to the words “train” and “instruct”, they being synonymous as 
used, because the course here can hardly be expected to actually “train” an officer, but rather to 
give him an opportunity to gain a fundamental knowledge of the basic principles essential to the 
performance of Command and General Staff duties. The education of a General Staff officer must 
embrace a familiarity with what is necessary to qualify and officer for high command, for the 
education of the higher leader and of the General Staff officer must be along the same lines: the 
suitability, however, of an officer so educated for either duty is dependent on his temperament 
and his natural qualities.221 
DeWitt emphasized the importance in an institution like the War College of encouraging 
initiative and original thought so long as individuals based their ideas on sound reasoning and 
mastery of the relevant facts. He described the instruction the students would receive as indirect 
rather than direct, with the faculty planning courses and supplying references, while giving the 
students full latitude to reach their own opinions, conclusions, and recommendations. DeWitt 
then briefly described the organization of the course. He explained the breakdown of the course 
into two approximately equal parts. The first, Preparation for War, would last about five months 
and “terminate in the actual preparation of one or more war plans.” The second, Conduct of War, 
would take place over the next four months, culminating in “one or more joint Army and Navy 
operations.”222 
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DeWitt next described the individual study project, which required that each member of 
the class prepare an individual study on a subject of the student’s choosing (once approved by 
the Commandant). DeWitt explained these studies should be broad enough to “require General 
Staff action in that it is of interest to the Army or Navy, or both.” He also told the students they 
should choose topics that addressed questions “that now need attention or will need attention in 
the near future, i.e., what you consider as one of the more important problems facing the Army 
or some branch thereof.” He emphasized that each study’s “solution of its questions should 
contribute something of value to the betterment of national defense.”223 
DeWitt made some very interesting comments about committee work that not only 
revealed the nature of the War College’s educational environment, but also demonstrated its 
similarity to the best modern professional military education (PME) institutions. Explaining that 
the students would complete much of their work in general staffs or committees, DeWitt 
emphasized the criticality and challenging nature of this type of work. In particular, he 
highlighted the role of the chairman, who must lead his committee while “lacking the powers of 
command” – referred to today as peer leadership, and requiring “tact, judgment, patience, and 
forbearance.” By providing all students opportunities to serve as either committee or sub-
committee chairmen or leaders of staff sections, the faculty would teach its students the similar 
but distinct skills of coordination and cooperation.224    
DeWitt pointed out that the faculty would disregard rank when making these assignment 
decisions, and “the injection of it into consideration after assignments are made is productive of 
harm.” He also emphasized the importance of creativity and initiative in committee work, 
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stating, “The officer who wants to follow a model has not an aptitude for General Staff work.” 
He stated many students might complain that they needed more time to complete their committee 
projects, but not only did the college have to fit many topics into a relatively short period, but the 
students would benefit from learning to work under pressure. Michael Matheny has emphasized 
that the work conducted in these committees contributed significantly to the War College 
students’ understanding of operational art by making them effective staff officers, capable not 
just of combat leadership, but also of conducting detailed war planning as leaders or staff officers 
working in a cooperative spirit.225 
McNair’s War College education began with the Preparation for War course, conducted 
in sections aligned with those of a general staff. The Operations and Training Division (G-3) 
sub-course came first, beginning with an orientation on September 4, 1928 from the Director of 
the G-3, Colonel E.H. Humphrey, a cavalry officer. The first two weeks consisted of a series of 
lectures on topics including “The Development of the War Department General Staff and its 
Relation to other War Department Agencies,” “The Joint Army and Navy Board and the War 
Plans Division of the War Department General Staff,” “Naval Organization,” and the “War 
Department General Mobilization Plan.” Committee work began on September 14, 1928, with 
eight committees running concurrently, culminating in committee presentations and assessments 
involving the entire class at the end of the course. The committees focused on a variety of topics, 
including: (1) plans and preparations for the Franco-Prussian War; (2) plans and preparations for 
the Russo-Japanese War; (3) development of rules, regulations, and procedures for map 
maneuvers and field exercises; (4) U.S. War Department plans and preparations for wars of the 
United States from the Revolutionary War through the World War; (5-7) German, British, and 
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French land forces plans and preparations for the World War; and (8) British and German naval 
war plans and preparations for the World War.226 
During the approximately two weeks of committee work, the students also participated in 
a variety of conferences where they gained insights that contributed to the findings in their final 
committee reports. The conferences addressed topics including the future organization and 
employment of Air Forces, War Department mobilization and concentration plans, peacetime 
U.S. military policy and defense requirements, and the organization, equipment, and employment 
of mechanized forces in future wars.227 
McNair first served in Committee 3, chaired by Lieutenant Colonel T. W. Brown of the 
Infantry, tasked to study “Rules, regulations, and procedures for the conduct of Map Maneuvers 
(War Games) and Field Exercises at the Army War College.” As described in the G-3 Course 
Orientation, Committee No. 3 served a unique purpose. Given the commandant’s intent to 
increase the emphasis on the Conduct of War Course during the 1928-1929 academic year, 
Humphrey directed Committee No. 3 to conduct its work with the intent of improving the quality 
of war games and exercises planned to take place in the second half of the year.228 The 
committee produced a thirty-page report, consisting of a synopsis and two detailed supplements. 
Basing their research on both the particular needs and facilities of the War College, and 
observations from students and faculty who had participated in prior maneuvers and war games, 
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the committee developed a set of recommendations specific to the war college, but also 
applicable to the general role of map maneuvers and field exercises in military education.229 
Supported by a two-page bibliography that supplemented the committee’s review of the 
War College Mission and the Commandant’s Directive to the class, the members completed their 
report with unanimous approval. It contained the following section describing the “Place of Map 
Maneuvers and field exercises in military education.” 
The committee’s conception of the place of map maneuvers and field exercises in military 
education is that they serve best as a means of giving practice in the application of the principles 
of strategy, tactics, and logistics to the solutions of concrete military problems, and also that they 
serve as a means of testing proposed military operations, thus determining the soundness and 
adequacy of the plans for said operations.230 
The committee relied on a conference involving the whole War College class, in which their 
peers identified the common problems they had experienced with various war games and field 
exercises during their previous assignments. The report contained nine common observations, 
but emphasized a few key issues that revolved around umpiring. Successful, productive war 
games and exercises relied primarily on results delivered in a competent and timely manner by a 
single, well-prepared umpire. This required both adequate training and preparation of individual 
umpires, and effective exercise design to enable umpires to familiarize themselves with the 
situation, make fair and consistent decisions based on commonly understood rules, and deliver 
their decisions rapidly to avoid artificial delays in execution.231  
The conference yielded several additional observations. Officers expressed frustration 
with the frequent shortage of sufficient information about the enemy, even when blue forces 
acted appropriately to obtain it. Many had experienced “unsound situations, due usually to a 
failure to carry the preliminary play far enough to discover them.” This usually led umpires to 
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inject unrealities “into the situation to prevent the error impeding the play. Dissatisfaction and 
loss of interest among the players” usually resulted from this problem. The conference 
participants also objected to the practice of jumping ahead to a new phase of the operation for the 
sake of time management, rather than letting operations play out to their logical conclusion. They 
lamented the frequent neglect of logistics considerations in exercise design and execution. 
Finally, they remarked on the routine failure to provide adequate maps and other necessary 
materials to all war game or exercise participants, including umpires. The committee highlighted 
the most significant observation in the first paragraph of the section summarizing the conference 
findings: “The success or failure of an exercise depends largely upon the personality of the 
umpire. Careful selection of umpires is essential.”232 
The committee concluded that Leavenworth’s “Methods of Training (Provisional)” of 
1925 covered the topic adequately and advised the faculty make the manual available to all 
appropriate parties participating in future War College war game and exercises. To correct 
deficiencies in execution noted by the committee, they recommended several basic changes, all 
involving umpire procedures. These included timing the exercises appropriately to ensure 
umpires possessed adequate knowledge of the situation to make logical decisions, assigning a 
single umpire with the authority to render timely and final decisions, and ensuring umpires 
conducted sufficient preliminary play to ensure the war game would not devolve into an 
unrealistic situation. The committee also recommended assigning additional umpires to various 
supporting units, rather than organizing them along functional lines (i.e., G-1, G-2) which 
inevitably led to situations in which umpires had to make decisions in situations for which they 
found themselves unprepared.233  
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The committee not only provided a detailed bibliography of existing documents 
necessary to run a war game or exercise effectively; they also wrote in Supplement No. 1 of their 
report a guide to “The Conduct of Map Maneuvers at the Army War College.” This supplement 
described in detail the duties of the umpire, assistant umpire, and players, and procedures for the 
conduct of war games and exercises. Two particularly helpful charts at the end of the supplement 
depict the organization and coordinating relationships of the umpire, his staff, “red” and “blue” 
liaison sections, and the players, intended to maximize efficiency and effectiveness of the 
umpiring process.234  
Finally, in Supplement No. 2, “Compilation of Reference Data,” the committee provided 
a standardized set of data to guide the decisions of umpires. This data dealt with issues ranging 
from damage credited to aircraft based on conditions such as altitude and target type, 
effectiveness of anti-aircraft artillery, space and time requirements for movement of various unit 
types, logistic requirements and loss calculations based on the type of combat action, and combat 
effectiveness of various ground units. Despite their report’s level of detail, the committee 
members acknowledged they had not developed a comprehensive list of data. In fact, they 
provided a list of additional data the War College faculty and student body should compile and 
add to the supplement to improve the completeness and accuracy of the data for use in future war 
games and exercises. Nevertheless, the committee provided remarkably detailed data given the 
time available, the small size of the committee, and the fact that no actual large-scale maneuvers 
of the sort simulated at the War College had taken place since before the Great War. This 
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supplement also includes a detailed, full-page bibliography of additional sources, from doctrinal 
manuals to joint board results and test results, to improve the quality of umpire decisions.235 
By the end of the G-3 course, McNair benefited from many lectures on a wide range of 
current topics, and participation in a number of student conferences to support ongoing 
committee work. He possessed a unique expertise gained through his immersion in a detailed 
study of the conduct of war games and exercises as a member of a five-man committee assigned 
to study this topic. McNair’s committee produced a detailed report that described common 
problems with war games and exercises, and identified the root causes of those problems. Most 
importantly, the committee recommended solutions, preparing both a guide to the conduct of 
maneuvers and a detailed set of data to facilitate umpiring – the most important, and typically the 
most flawed component of previous exercises, both at the war college and in the students’ 
previous experience.236  
Upon completion of the G-3 Course in early October, McNair and his classmates moved 
on to the G-1 (Personnel) Course. While shorter (only two and a half weeks, compared to over a 
month in the G-3 Course), the G-1 Course covered a great deal of ground, almost exclusively 
related to personnel-related mobilization issues. These centered on procurement (either voluntary 
or through some form of conscription or selective service), the role of the Reserves and the 
National Guard in time of war, and the issue of personnel replacements and morale in deployed 
armies. Following the same pattern as the other courses, the G-1 Course included a series of 
lectures, mostly from senior personnel in the War Department G-1 and the Adjutant General’s 
office. However, the lecture series also included a diverse range of other speakers. A 
representative of the Navy Personnel Office spoke about naval personnel plans. The Chief of the 
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Militia Bureau discussed federalization of National Guard forces in time of war. The Judge 
Advocate General explained the legal relationship of the War Department to the other 
departments of government. Finally, Mr. C. R. Dooley, a representative of industry, discussed 
America’s civilian wartime personnel concerns, since the World War had demonstrated the 
competing priorities of mobilizing men to fight, and keeping men on the production lines so 
industry could produce adequate war materiel.237 
Following the lectures, the students participated in a series of conferences on the topics 
outlined above. Just like in the G-3 Course, the findings of these conferences supported the work 
of the student committees, of which eleven convened to study some aspect of personnel 
mobilization for war. While each committee reported on a significant issue related to personnel 
acquisition and retention (in both the military and industry), two of them stand out as particularly 
interesting. The first, Committee No. 5 on “Reserve Systems for the Regular Army and National 
Guard,” bears particular significance because McNair served as its chair. The second, Committee 
No. 7 analyzed the issue of “Replacements,” a topic the War College faculty deemed a major 
problem that the Army had never solved satisfactorily and must solve before undertaking any 
future large-scale mobilization.238 
In accordance with the G-1 Course committee directives, McNair’s Committee No. 5 
conducted “A study of reserve systems which might be adopted to make up deficiencies in the 
present peace strength and organization of the Regular Army and National Guard and thus 
provide more adequate forces for immediate and effective employment in the outbreak of an 
emergency.” The directive pointed out that reductions in the size of the Regular Army and 
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curtailment of the development of the National Guard meant the nation would suffer “an acute 
shortage of trained men available for active operations at the outbreak of a war.” Therefore, the 
committee should determine whether the Army could overcome this challenge through a system 
of reserve forces “obligated to join the organized forces when emergency requires.” The 
directive also highlighted the fact that “G-3 is greatly interested in this study also, and the G-3 
viewpoint should not be lost sight of in reaching conclusions.”239 
In his History of the United States Army Russell Weigley provided a succinct explanation 
of the problem McNair’s committee confronted. Observing that “America in the 1920’s was 
dedicated not only to the dream that wars had ended forever, but even more strongly to the more 
prosaic fetish of economy in government. The goals of the National Defense Act of 1920 broke 
down because Congress and the executive gave them lip service but little practical support.” 
Therefore, not only did the Regular Army receive funding adequate to support only slightly more 
than half its authorized strength – the National Guard and Organized Reserves suffered as well. 
Limited appropriations meant the National Guard also only reached about half its authorized 
strength throughout the 1920s. Further, while the ROTC system provided a pool of Reserve 
officers, its Organized Reserve Enlisted Reserve Corps “was practically nonexistent because 
there were no means of recruiting it.”240 McNair’s committee faced a daunting challenge since 
the Army could do little to resolve these issues. 
McNair organized his committee into four subcommittees, the first three composed of 
two officers each, and the fourth made up of five officers. The first subcommittee studied the 
reserve systems of foreign armies, the second the reserve system of the U.S. Navy (including the 
Marine Corps), and the third the reserve system of the National Guard. The fourth subcommittee 
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required several more officers because of its particularly challenging task – it sought to “develop 
a system which will provide an enlisted reserve for the Regular Army, including a draft of 
necessary legislation and an estimate of the annual cost involved.”241 
The first (and shortest) subcommittee report found that of several foreign nations’ reserve 
military systems studied, “the reserve system of Great Britain is the most nearly applicable to the 
needs of the United States, since it is based on voluntary recruitment. The various categories are 
based on state of training and degree of availability. Most categories receive training annually. 
All are paid.”242 The subcommittee, consisting of Majors Harding Polk and Troy H. Middleton, 
came to this conclusion after comparing the recruitment and reserve systems of eight countries – 
seven of which relied at least to some degree on compulsory systems, although in some 
countries, soldiers could choose whether to continue voluntary service in the reserves after their 
compulsory period ended. The subcommittee used pre-war data for Germany, since the Treaty of 
Versailles forced them “into the Voluntary classification with a standing army with no reserves 
and a long period of enlistment.” Since in the event of a future war no reason existed to assume 
Germany would continue to abide by these constraints, the subcommittee chose to rely on pre-
war statistics for their study instead of data drawn from the system imposed after the World 
War.243 
The subcommittee summarized the overall workings of the systems they compared in two 
charts. The first chart depicted key data regarding the seven countries it analyzed that employed 
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reserve systems based to some degree on compulsory service: Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, 
Italy, France, Japan, and Germany. The chart compared the age range at which countries deemed 
men liable for service, the age of conscription, the period of active training, the total numbers of 
men in both the active force and reserves, and the number of years men spent in the reserves 
after active service. Interestingly, the subcommittee found that Switzerland possessed the best-
trained Army, even though only 494 personnel served on active duty, with over 300,000 in 
reserve status. The chart also indicated that all countries recognized various classes of reserves 
depending on age limits, used some form of voluntary service after the compulsory period ended, 
conducted periods of active training for reservists who remained in “1st class,” and did not all 
induct and train the entire pool of available conscripts each year. 244 
Only Great Britain used a purely voluntary reserve system. For all recruits, this system 
included a total of at least twelve years of service, consisting of three to nine years of “service 
with colors” (active duty service in the Regular Army or Territorials) with the remainder of the 
twelve-year commitment served in a reserve status. The subcommittee summarized the overall 
workings of this system in a separate chart, depicting the various career paths a soldier could 
follow depending on whether he chose to serve with the Regular Army for some period before 
transition into the reserves, or served initially with the “Territorials” (Militia). Regardless which 
path a soldier chose, once on reserve service they all attended one twelve-day camp and twenty 
drills annually, and all received pay for this service. If recalled, all soldiers returned to active 
service at the rank achieved upon transition to reserve status. Despite its purely voluntary nature, 
the subcommittee found this system had enabled Great Britain to “produce about 100,000 Class I 
Reserves. The system appears sound.”245 
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The second subcommittee studied the reserve system of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. 
Led by a Marine, the subcommittee consisted of Lieutenant Colonel W.N. Hill and Major W.M. 
McCaughey. In a very short report (three pages with a five-entry bibliography), the 
subcommittee pointed out that in 1925 the Navy Department produced the Naval Reserve Act. 
Once it became law in July 1925, the act created three classes of reserve forces within the Navy: 
the Fleet Naval Reserve (F), the Merchant Marine Naval Reserve (M), and the Volunteer Naval 
Reserve (V). The Fleet Naval Reserve, divided into five sub-classes, consisted of approximately 
18,700 men and, depending on sub-class, required personnel to perform some period of ship duty 
for pay annually, and remain ready to augment the active Navy if required. The Merchant 
Marine, serving a commercial function but prepared to augment the Navy’s transport fleet if 
required, had “no analogous class in the Army.” Finally, the Volunteer Naval Service sought to 
provide additional personnel for use in time of emergency. This force had no annual service 
requirements and received no pay, even when attached to divisions of the Fleet Naval Reserve 
for voluntary training.246 
The Marine Corps Reserve, also formed under the provisions of the Naval Reserve Act of 
1925, consisted of two parts: the Fleet Marine Reserve and the Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve. 
Much like the Navy’s Fleet Reserve, the Fleet Marine Reserve consisted of four classes 
depending on prior rank and time of service. Also like in the Navy system, class determined pay 
when serving on active duty for annual training periods. The Volunteer Marine Corps Reserve 
differed only from the Navy’s in that enlisted men must pass a physical examination to join. 
Otherwise, no annual training requirements (or pay) stemmed from service in this Reserve force. 
Combining both categories, by 1928 the Marine Corps had formed a reserve consisting of 500 
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officers and 8,400 enlisted men, but of that total, about 5,000 enlisted men served in the 
Volunteer Reserve and had received no training.247 
The subcommittee concluded, “The Naval Reserve System is sound and workable.” They 
found it had produced sizable numbers of men ready to augment the active Navy and Marine 
Corps in time of emergency. However, the committee members recognized “some of the features 
of the Naval Reserve system are not desirable for the Army, especially that which provides for 
the former enlisted men of 16 or 20 years service being held in the reserve with 1/3 to 1/2 of their 
base pay. This would be an expense that would be considerable and constantly increasing.” The 
class found most useful as a model for an Army Reserve transferred men who had completed 
only four years of active duty to the Reserves, with minimal obligations for training (and 
similarly low pay) along with the commitment to mobilize if needed and rejoin the active force. 
Thus, the report concluded with the statement that the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve systems 
provided suitable models on which to base an Army Reserve system.248 
The third subcommittee found itself tackling a rather more contentious and problematic 
issue – that of the reserve system for the National Guard. The subcommittee soon discovered two 
rather significant issues. First, the National Guard was recruiting personnel to serve as reservists 
to augment National Guard units in the event of mobilization when a viable Army Reserve 
system did not yet exist for the Regular Army. Second, many of the National Guard’s recruits 
served as reservists either aligned to augment an existing unit, or unaligned, when 368 units (out 
of 3,894 total units in the National Guard Program) remained unformed. Although plans existed 
to create these remaining unformed units by 1933, the board found the allocation of recruits as 
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reservists aligned with existing units a waste of personnel resources when several hundred 
authorized units remained unformed.249 
Further, the board pointed out that while federal law provided for a system of reserves to 
bring the National Guard up to full strength in time of emergency, and made provision for these 
reservists to attend field training as opportunities and funding allowed, “as a matter of fact, funds 
are never available. Since men receive very little training before becoming eligible to enter the 
reserve and receive no training while in the reserve, it would appear that the value of a reservist 
over a new recruit is quite small.” The board interviewed “officers on duty in the Militia Bureau, 
officers who have been on duty with the National Guard, State Adjutant Generals, and National 
Guard officers” to support their findings. Three key weaknesses of the current system of 
National Guard reserves emerged from their research. Lack of pay deterred recruits from 
entering the reserve or from conducting training once inducted, National Guard unit commanders 
lacked the time to recruit active personnel and reservists, and “The enrollment of reservists has 
not been pushed from above as no trouble is anticipated in filling up units in case of 
emergency.”250 
The subcommittee found that the lack of pay served as the major deterrent to building up 
a National Guard Enlisted Reserve. However, it did not recommend provision of funding for 
National Guard Reserves given the fact that the Regular Army currently lacked any enlisted 
reserve system, and the need for reserves for the Regular Army outweighed any similar need for 
the National Guard. In short, any resources committed to forming an enlisted reserve should go 
toward creating a reserve system for the Regular Army first. They also pointed out that aligning 
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National Guard Reserves primarily to units prioritized by the War Department as most likely to 
activate early would not prove feasible, since the alignment of National Guard reservists 
remained a state function, and any federal attempt to influence state control would violate the 
constitution.251 
Based on these observations, the subcommittee came to a number of conclusions. It 
found that the existing system did not provide nearly enough reservists to bring National Guard 
units up to full strength in time of emergency, and since assigning recruits to reserve status did 
not aid in the creation of authorized but unformed National Guard units, “The value of a National 
Guard reservist over a new recruit is very small.” Further, while the current National Guard 
reserve system cost the Federal Government nothing, it also provided negligible benefit. 
Therefore, the National Guard should assign any soldiers it recruited to fill existing units and 
form authorized but unformed units. In the unlikely event that the federal government budgeted 
funds to provide pay for reservists, those funds should go towards funding a Regular Army 
reserve system, a need that far outweighed the need for National Guard reserves. The 
committee’s final recommendation read, “It is recommended that no change be made in the 
present provision of law or regulations for an Enlisted Reserve for the National Guard until an 
enlisted reserve for the Regular Army has been provided.”252 
McNair’s fourth subcommittee faced a much tougher challenge – the design of a reserve 
system for the Regular Army, to include draft law that, if enacted, would put the proposed 
system in place. The subcommittee of five officers, including one from the Navy, began it study 
by evaluating the Regular Army’s missions (both peacetime and in time of war), its current 
                                                          
251 Ibid., 4. 
252 Ibid., 5-6. 
 
150 
strength, its readiness to accomplish its missions, and the implications for the formation of an 
Army Reserve.253 
The subcommittee began its report with a section titled “Facts bearing on the study.” The 
facts provided begin with the Army’s stated mission in peace and in war, and then detail the 
current strength of the Army and the impact of that reality on the Army’s ability to accomplish 
its mission. In accordance with Army Regulation 135-10, the Regular Army bore the 
responsibility for a mission made up of five parts: 
(1) To provide adequate peace garrisons for the coast defenses within the continental limits of the 
United States. 
(2) To provide personnel for the development and training of the National Guard and Organized 
Reserves. 
(3) To provide the necessary personnel for the overhead of the army of the United States wherein 
the duties are of a continuing nature. 
(4) To provide adequate garrisons in peace and in war for our overseas possessions. 
(5) To provide an adequate, organized, balanced, and effective expeditionary force which will be 
available in emergencies, within the continental limits of the United States or elsewhere, and 
which will serve as a model for the organization, discipline and training of the National Guard 
and Organized Reserves. 
The report also included an extract from the Secretary of War’s report for 1925, which stated 
that, “the primary mission of the Regular Army is to provide a defensive force capable of 
defending the country on the outbreak of war against any force which could likely be brought 
against it before the civilian components could be prepared for battle.” The subcommittee report 
ended this summary of the Regular Army’s missions with the statement that “All of the missions 
cited above are of vital importance and no single one of them can be safely neglected.”254 
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However, the realities of fiscal constraint and isolationist influence meant that the 
Regular Army found itself in 1928 in a position in which it could not with confidence claim 
readiness to accomplish its assigned missions. In fact, the subcommittee next addressed the 
difference between the numbers of reserves needed to bring the Army up to wartime strength 
given its authorized personnel strength, compared to its actual manning levels. The 
subcommittee acknowledged the total numbers of personnel the Army might need in a crisis 
would vary widely depending on which of its many missions the nation called on it to execute. 
Nevertheless, since “the present strength is entirely inadequate for the fulfillment of the peace-
time missions of the Regular Army,” the whole system rested on a false fundamental assumption. 
Instead of an Army capable of its peacetime role and needing reserves only for augmentation in 
the case of a national emergency, any system of reserves the subcommittee devised must account 
for those routine missions for which the Regular Army currently found itself unprepared, as 
well.255 
For example, the subcommittee wrote, “Since our coast defenses are now undermanned 
and partly inactive, the mission of providing adequate garrisons for these defenses for war 
purposes is included in this discussion.” The unpreparedness of the coast defenses represented 
only the tip of the iceberg. Of the 17,728 officers and 280,000 enlisted men currently authorized, 
the Regular Army only consisted of 12,000 officers and 115,000 enlisted men assigned. Further, 
a recent War Department decision to increase the strength of the Air Corps by 15,000 men “is 
now being made at the expense of the other branches of the army.” Thus, reaching the planned 
initial Regular Army war strength of 450,000 required an increase of 223,000 men, rather than 
153,000 given a Regular Army at its full assigned strength. Complicating matters even more, the 
Regular Army did not currently possess its authorized force structure of nine army divisions: 
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“three infantry divisions are entirely inactive, leaving but six infantry divisions at less than peace 
strength.” Thus, mobilization would require not just reinforcing understrength divisions. Rather, 
it would face the much more daunting task of bringing six divisions up to strength while forming 
three new divisions – one third of the total force.256 
This led the subcommittee to a logical but disturbing conclusion. Any acceptable system 
of reserves would have to bring the Regular Army up to at least the strength of 450,000 
designated in the 1920 NDA. However, due to the current severely limited force structure of the 
Army, “the strength at present provided for by appropriations cannot be made to provide such a 
reserve [one sufficient to increase the Regular Army to its wartime authorized strength] without 
making the already inadequate Regular establishment merely a training machine for turning out 
reservists.” In other words, the subcommittee recognized that, at its current strength, the War 
Department could not employ any significant portion of the Regular Army to fight while 
receiving and training additional reserve forces; rather, it would have to use the Regular Army as 
trainers and cadres for units almost wholly consisting of untrained or poorly trained reservists. 
Therefore, the subcommittee argued any system of reserves must provide for at least 91,000 fully 
trained personnel, ready immediately to join their designated units to help train the expected 
masses of untrained reservists. Any viable system of reserves must enable the Regular Army, at 
whatever strength it currently existed, to focus on dealing with the national emergency that 
prompted mobilization, rather than simply serving as trainers for new recruits. As the 
subcommittee saw it, “The only limit which should be placed on numbers to be provided is that 
imposed by the ability of a force of 115,000 men to turn out trained reservists without detriment 
to peace-time missions.”257 
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Having described the challenges the current environment posed to the Regular Army and 
any system of reserves contemplated, the subcommittee next listed the “Conditions which must 
be met by any system which may be adopted.” The system must provide at least enough 
personnel to deal with a minor emergency, and ideally enough to deal with a major one. It must 
provide the required reserves in the most economical manner possible, without relying on any 
further reduction in or placing any additional burdens on an already understrength Regular 
Army. It should “in no way hinder the development of the National Guard and Organized 
Reserves” or interfere with their recruiting efforts. It should include a system of periodic training 
to maintain the combat readiness of reserve forces, and require a service commitment sufficient 
to keep the reserve strength at the required level over the long term. Finally, the subcommittee 
recognized the fact that the Congress would not approve any system based on compulsory 
service, so it acknowledged the system must rely on volunteers, and therefore must include a 
system for paying reservists for periods on active duty served to conduct required training.258 
The subcommittee referred to the findings of the other three subcommittees to look for 
the best model on which to base an Army Reserve system. Given the current socio-political 
climate, the subcommittee realized it must recommend a system the nation could sustain at 
acceptable cost and with minimum disruption to the Regular Army’s ability to perform its 
missions. In its report, the subcommittee wrote, “consideration has been given to the systems in 
effect in foreign armies with special reference to the British system, and to the Navy, Marine 
Corps and National Guard reserve systems.” Therefore, the subcommittee recommended an 
interim solution based on the best aspects of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps’ systems, pending 
implementation of a long-term system based on that of the British Army.259  
                                                          




Under the interim system, the Army would offer enlistments directly into the reserve to 
soldiers who had completed at least a first-term enlistment and “held honorable discharges with 
character at least good.” This met the primary criteria that reservists must possess sufficient 
training to remain ready for immediate field duty – something the Army could not replicate 
through any abbreviated training process. Similarly, they did not recommend ROTC units as 
sources of enlisted reserves since they provided officer-specific training and generated reserve 
officers. Neither did they recommend Civilian-Military Training Centers (CMTC) as sources of 
enlisted reservists as they did not provide sufficient training and even if they did, the produced 
far too few trainees to generate the required numbers of enlisted reservists.260 
As a long-term solution, the subcommittee recommended a system much like the British 
one. Soldiers would enlist in the Army with a dual commitment: an initial term with the Regular 
Army, followed immediately by a reserve period, during which the soldier would receive $24 per 
year plus a $100 bonus if called onto active duty for training or administrative purposes to defray 
travel and other costs. The subcommittee did not recommend periodic or annual training since 
they believed this would prove too disruptive to the individual’s civilian career and would not 
provide a training benefit that warranted the cost. Finally, under the recommended system, 
soldiers called back to active service would return at the grade held upon discharge, and the 
Regular Army reserve system would remain entirely distinct from the National Guard or any 
other reserve system.261 
The subcommittee devoted several pages of their report to a detailed analysis intended to 
determine the optimum period of active and reserve status in a soldier’s overall enlistment. They 
considered the readiness of reservists, based on the amount of training received while in active 
                                                          
260 Ibid., 4. 
261 Ibid., 4-7. 
 
155 
service, their main priority. Based on this, they recommended a three-year initial period of active 
service, the same as that required of current enlisted recruits and demonstrated to provide not 
only sufficient training but also the opportunity to serve overseas. They also recommended 
providing soldiers the option of reenlisting for a second active duty term, or transitioning to 
reserve status for a period of four years – enough time so that once the Army implemented the 
system fully, it would maintain the requisite numbers of reservists each year. Finally, in 
accordance with the committee directive, the subcommittee drafted a three-page amendment to 
the 1920 NDA that would have enacted their recommendations into law. However, the War 
College did not submit this draft amendment through the War Department for congressional 
consideration. The 1920 NDA remained unchanged and underfunded, while the work of the 
subcommittee served purely educational purposes.262 
In the overall committee report and synopsis, McNair informed the Director of the G-1 
Division that all of his subcommittees had completed their assigned tasks and submitted written 
reports, noting that each had gained the full concurrence of all committee members, along with 
the overall committee recommendations in the consolidated report. McNair and his fellow 
committee members gained a particularly detailed understanding of the problem of establishing a 
system of Enlisted Army Reserves, and briefed the whole class on their findings. Unfortunately 
the problem remained unsolved despite the fact that systems existed both in Great Britain and in 
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America’s own Navy and Marine Corps, that provided proven models that worked at low cost 
and on a purely voluntary basis.263  
Of the several other committees that convened during the G-1 Course, Committee No. 7 
stands out as the most interesting one in which McNair did not directly participate. It dealt with 
the problem of replacement personnel – a problem that had plagued the U.S. Army since the 
American Revolution, and had eluded a feasible solution ever since. The committee organized 
into two subcommittees to study the problem. The first subcommittee conducted historical 
analyses of America’s attempts to develop a functioning replacement system in past wars 
spanning from the American Revolution to the World War, and of the systems employed by the 
British, French, and German armies during the World War. The second subcommittee developed, 
according to AWC curricular records, “a proposed scheme for the replacement of personnel in a 
future major war with special consideration to maintaining the territorial integrity of 
organizations.” Based on these studies, the committee proposed a replacement system for use in 
a future war that involved creation of “permanently constituted units to receive, administer, train, 
and distribute the individual replacements intended for their respective organizations.”264 
No American Army, including the Union or Confederate forces during the U.S. Civil 
War, had developed and implemented unchanged a viable replacement system. In some of its 
previous wars the Army required no replacement troops, but in those in which it did, 
preparations made before the conflict proved untenable and required modification. In no case did 
a combat force arrive at an optimal solution for the replacement problem. The committee focused 
in particular on the replacement system the AEF attempted to implement during the World War, 
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since it provided not only a recent example, but also one that revealed several major flaws. Upon 
the outbreak of the World War, the U.S. Army had no replacement system. It developed one 
when it organized the AEF, but the General Staff had to revise the system several times during 
the war, mostly due to a consistent failure to send enough replacement personnel from the United 
States, which eventually required the AEF to break up twelve combat divisions in France for use 
as replacements.265 
Subcommittee No. 1 studied the “Cause of the Failure of Replacement System in the 
World War” in detail, devoting an appendix on this topic to their report on wartime replacement 
systems of the major combatants. The subcommittee found that the War Department assigned the 
Provost Marshal General additional duty as Director of the Draft on June 26, 1917. In this new 
capacity, the Provost Marshal General wrote to the Secretary of War recommending the numbers 
of personnel he believed the Army required to mobilize the Regular Army, National Guard, and 
National Army units, and to provide replacements for the Regular Army and a National Guard 
Reserve. He recommended drafting 700,000 men to complete organization of existing units, plus 
another 300,000 men to serve as replacements. In its response to this recommendation, the 
General Staff argued the AEF would require an initial draft of at least 1,500,000 personnel. 
However, one week after receiving this recommendation, the president chose to induct even 
fewer men than the number proposed by the Provost Marshal General, directing the secretary of 
war to call for only 687,000 men in the initial draft. Of these, only the first 187,000 raised would 
fill Regular Army and National Guard units; the other 500,000 would be “called to the colors as 
they might be needed for the National Army.”266 
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Strangely, and with no explanation offered by the subcommittee, the War Department did 
not modify its mobilization plans, even though it would have fewer than half the number of new 
recruits to facilitate mobilization than the number recommended by the General Staff. They went 
forward with their forty-two division plan and that led to the obvious conclusion:  
Unless some steps were to be taken in July or August, 1917, immediately to raise and train a 
sufficient quota of troops and Line of Communications troops, this personnel, which would begin 
to be urgently needed by the expeditionary force during December, 1917, would not be 
available.267 
Since the War Department never secured approval to raise these replacement personnel, the 
predicted crisis arose, leading the AEF to take the only step available to it – that of breaking up 
divisions in France, wasting the unit training invested in them during mobilization, to use their 
personnel as individual replacements. The initial draft call of only 687,000 men simply could not 
provide enough personnel to form an adequate pool of replacements, and a second draft call did 
not come until April 1918 – far too late for those draftees to arrive in France for employment in 
1918.268 
The first subcommittee did find that “a very comprehensive replacement Project was 
eventually evolved though much confusion and waste of effort was encountered during the many 
and various stages of its evolution. But comprehensive as this ultimate replacement project was, 
it was utterly unable to prevent the final crisis in the replacement situation in France.” Thus, the 
replacement system in place in the Army’s war plans in 1928 looked much like the system 
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eventually worked out near the end of the World War. However, since significant numbers of 
replacements from the United States never materialized, the system remained untested in combat. 
Therefore, a second subcommittee sought to develop the broad principles that should guide a 
viable replacement system, and recommend changes to the one currently in place. This second 
subcommittee also analyzed “The value and desirability of maintaining the territorial integrity of 
units according to area of origin,” and estimated the number of replacement troops required in 
the event of a future war, both initially and over the course of a protracted conflict.269  
The subcommittee noted that both France and Germany started the World War with the 
goal of territorial integrity as a priority in their replacement systems, but both failed to achieve it 
due to overload caused by excessive casualties, particularly when concentrated in particular 
units. Further, the members found that the relative independence of the British colonies forced a 
high degree of territorial integrity on their replacement system, and they observed that the 
current corps area organization of the U.S. Army caused its units to reflect local origins as well. 
The subcommittee argued that several benefits derived from territorial integrity, including 
increased pride and esprit among the troops, special interest in the unit from local media, and 
enhanced willingness among communities to provide replacements to units raised from among 
their populace. However, the system also possessed disadvantages, particularly in the case of 
high casualty rates, which could not only cause certain communities to suffer disproportionate 
loss, but also make provision of replacements from those same communities an unfair or 
infeasible burden. In fact, the subcommittee recognized that “It must be accepted that this policy 
will tend to break down in practice as the war progresses.” Nevertheless, the subcommittee 
agreed “the advantages outweigh the disadvantages, and that the policy of maintaining the 
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territorial integrity of units according to area of origin should be applied to the Army of the 
United States.”270 
In considering the question of numbers of replacements needed, the subcommittee used 
the World War as a source of recent and relevant empirical data. The resulting analysis focuses 
on two phases of the war: the opening phase in which German divisions engaged in open 
warfare, and the last year of the war in which American divisions fought stabilized or trench 
warfare. In both cases, divisions sustained losses of up to fifty percent but maintained sufficient 
morale to continue fighting, as long as replacements arrived fairly quickly (“within three or four 
days”). The subcommittee’s analysis of casualties and replacements during the World War led to 
the following analysis: 
 
Table 1: AWC G-1 Course Committee No. 5 – Estimated Monthly Replacements by Division271 
The subcommittee based these figures on three assumptions: a division would fight no more than 
one battle each month significant enough to result in a fifty percent casualty rate (about 6,000 
men); men returned from hospitals would supply an increasingly higher proportion of the needed 
replacements each month, and few divisions would fight a major battle once per month.272  
                                                          
270 ———, "AWC G-1 Course, Supplement No. 2 to Committee No. 7 Report," 1-2. 
271 Ibid., 2. 
272 Ibid., 2-3. 
 
161 
The subcommittee next identified three principles to serve as the foundation for any 
future system of replacements. Given the severe shortage of recruits in the World War, they 
unsurprisingly addressed this issue as their first principle. The subcommittee identified the need 
to provide sufficient replacements initially to bring all mobilized units to full strength, and form 
a reserve of trained replacements sufficient to account for both ordinary monthly losses, and 
exceptional losses (up to 50% of the strength of each division engaged). Next, the replacement 
system should provide additional replacements “sufficient to maintain the necessary flow of 
trained replacements to meet all losses, both ordinary and exceptional,” as calculated in Table 1 
above. Finally, the Army should mobilize no new units “until full provision has been made for 
maintaining old units at full strength.” These principles all seem intended to enable the U.S. 
Army to avoid a replacement debacle like that they endured during the World War.273 
The foregoing analysis supported the subcommittee’s proposal for a new replacement 
system. They began by summarizing the key differences between the proposed system and the 
one currently in place. The current system did not include a method of maintaining unit territorial 
integrity, it made no provision for the organization of replacements, or establishment of 
replacement centers, and it did not provide as many replacements as the number required by the 
proposed plan.274  
The subcommittee report concludes with a description, supported by several diagrams, of 
the characteristics and functioning in wartime of its proposed replacement system. The first 
change would eliminate the replacement battalions currently authorized in the Field Service 
Regulations from the division organizations, increasing them to replacement depots of much 
larger size (i.e. a brigade, in the case of a division). These replacement depots would consist of 
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trained and organized units, inactive in peacetime, but formed during mobilization and deployed 
with the combat divisions in time of war. These depots would operate in echelon in the Army (or 
combat) and Communication Zones, linked to depots in their parent unit’s territorial region in the 
Zone of the Interior. Thus, each corps area would mobilize a replacement center, “where 
replacements will be trained, armed, equipped and organized, and sent to the corresponding 
replacement depot unit in the theatre of operations.” Similarly, each combat division would have 
a dedicated replacement depot to receive and train both replacements and soldiers returned from 
hospitals. Finally, because of their organization as an actual unit, with a headquarters and 
subordinate organizations made up of troops from each of the combat branches, the Army could 
employ these replacement depots as combat units in an emergency, rather than breaking them up 
for use as individual replacements in other divisions.275 
The subcommittee closed its report by pointing out several strengths of this proposed 
system, and describing in text and graphics its functioning in time of war. It highlighted the 
similarity of the proposed system to that of the British Army, which “withstood the test of the 
World War” and remained in effect in 1928. The report highlighted the criticality of supplying 
sufficient recruits – without adequate numbers even a well-designed replacement system would 
fail. Finally, it highlighted the key advantages of the proposed system: it consisted of “a simple, 
flexible and definite plan, which can be provided for by tables of organization.”276 This last point 
stands out as particularly significant, since inclusion in the tables of organization meant the 
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Secretary of War and War Department would not deal with the problem of replacements in an ad 
hoc, rushed manner as in previous wars. 
The Army War College G-1 Course exposed all of the students in the 1928-1929 class to 
a detailed examination of the primary issues associated with manpower mobilization for war. In 
particular, the curriculum included committee work, led by Lieutenant Colonel McNair, to 
propose a system of reserves for the Regular Army, which the Army currently lacked. It also 
included a committee dedicated to the study of one of the Army’s most vexing problems – 
development of a viable replacement system – a problem the Army had failed to solve in any 
previous war that required replacements. These studies demonstrate that despite the underfunded, 
understrength condition of the Army in 1928, the War Department was determined to ensure that 
the Army’s future senior leaders were assured the opportunity to attend the War College and to 
study there the problems associated with modern warfare. This yielded, as one result, a pool of 
senior officers prepared to lead the Army’s mobilization for a potential future conflict.  
The G-4 Course came next in the curriculum, running from 29 October to 24 November. 
The course covered a broad range of studies of the Army’s supply organization, including “the 
operation and control of supply; evacuation, transportation, hospitalization; requirements, 
procurement, storage and distribution of supplies; war reserves; coordination of Army and Navy 
supply; industrial support of war and its relation to the military effort.” While this diverse 
curriculum exposed McNair to many aspects of logistics central to the management of a war 
effort, he appears not to have held a leadership position on any of the G-4 course committees. 
This may have stemmed from a conscious decision by the faculty based on his having just 
finished serving as overall chairman of a committee in the G-1 Course. The faculty strove to give 
all students a chance to serve in a leadership role as stated policy. However, he would have 
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participated in the various conferences and committee reports during the three weeks of the 
course, gaining an exposure to all of the course content.277 
McNair did lead a subcommittee in the next course in the War College curriculum, the 
G2 (military intelligence) Course. While to some observers the sequence may have seemed odd, 
the faculty placed the G-2 Course after the G-3, G-1, and G-4 courses as a conscious decision. 
As explained in the course orientation, “the preceding courses have set forth essential elements 
of the “Estimate of the Situation” relating to our own forces. We now should assemble the 
necessary facts upon which to deduce the actions and intentions of possible enemies.” The 
preface to the course orientation ended with an enlightening comment about the philosophy of 
the course and the education that it hoped to deliver: 
There are two points of view from which military information must be studied and evaluated: 
first, what the information means to us; second and more important, what it means to the foreign 
country in determining the lines of action open to it in case of war, and in estimating its probable 
intentions. It is difficult for us to work ourselves into the mental attitude of a foreigner and to 
think as he does, but this we should attempt to do in the G-2 Course.278 
This important statement highlights a key distinction between the duties of the intelligence 
officer and other staff officers, and demonstrates the faculty expected the students not merely to 
study the duties of a G-2 staff officer, but to learn to think like the enemy – a key to developing 
realistic and comprehensive war plans. 
The “Orientation and Outline of the Course” went on to list the four primary purposes of 
the G-2 Course:  
To furnish instruction in those matters relating to ‘Preparation for War’ with which the G-2 
Division is primarily concerned. 
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To prepare certain intelligence data for use by the class later in the school year in connection with 
the preparation of war plans. 
To acquaint the members of the class with the duties and responsibilities of the G-2 Division of 
the War Department General Staff. 
To inform the class concerning those nations which either singly or in coalition may possibly be 
opponents of the United States or her allies in war. 
Interestingly, the orientation stated that the course also had a “cultural motive” in that it aimed 
“to stimulate interest in world politics, economics and social conditions, beyond a bare 
superficial knowledge of those subjects.”279 This observation highlights the significant shift the 
Army War College sought to create in an officer’s way of thinking. The faculty not only 
expected the officers to develop original, creative solutions to the problems they studied; it also 
sought to broaden their worldview, instilling in them an interest in world events and an ability to 
see a military problem from a perspective other than their own. 
Like the other courses, the G-2 Course consisted of lectures, committee work, and 
conferences. The lectures presented to McNair’s class covered both general considerations 
related to the current world situation, and detailed briefings on various countries including 
Russia, Great Britain, Mexico, Japan, and China. Committee subjects included G-2 contributions 
to war plans, international law and U.S. foreign policy, comparative military power and 
resources among potential enemies of the U.S., and analysis of specific countries (mostly the 
same as those covered in lectures).280 
McNair served on Committee No. 8, G-2 Studies on the British Empire. The faculty 
broke the committee down into two subcommittees, the first of which, chaired by McNair, 
updated the previous year’s military estimate of the British Empire. The second subcommittee 
revised existing monographs on Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Quebec, considering their 
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feasibility as possible theaters of operations. In addition to updating the existing staff estimate on 
Great Britain, McNair’s subcommittee had to consider the implications of Great Britain’s likely 
intentions and the most dangerous coalitions it might join, as determined by Committee No. 3. 
Unfortunately, the AWC curricular files do not contain the updated staff estimates or other work 
prepared by Committee No. 8 or McNair’s subcommittee, probably because the officers worked 
on actual war plans and, given their classification, the AWC returned the documents to the War 
Department upon completion of committee work. 
Similarly, the outline of the next course in the curriculum, the War Plans Course, 
identifies the fact that McNair served in the G-3 Division of Group No. 5, “War Plans – Green,” 
which dealt with possible hostilities between the United States and Mexico, but none of the plans 
updated during the 1928-1929 War Plans Course exist in the War College archives. The Course 
Orientation does provide a general description of the organization and goals of the course, which 
ran from January 2 to February 16, 1929. Overall, the course served three purposes: to provide 
instruction in development of war plans by giving the class the opportunity to organize as staff 
and work on actual, current war plans; to illustrate the necessity to coordinate Army and Navy 
plans; and to update materials for use during the Conduct of War Course later in the year.281 
The War Plans Course Orientation also directed each of the six student planning staffs to 
prepare four component parts to each plan they updated: the joint plan, the Army strategic plan, 
the Army concentration plan, and the Army mobilization plan. In these components the students 
would address matters of joint cooperation, national and military strategic objectives and the 
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operations required to achieve them, detailed troop movement tables within the Zone of the 
Interior to support planned operations, and a method for mobilizing the required personnel. 
While the faculty did not expect the student groups to develop complete, executable plans given 
the time allotted, they did expect them to address the required areas with respect to present 
conditions based on detailed research of all information available. The faculty did not provide a 
specific required format for the planning staff products. However, they did expect a “simple, 
flexible, and practicable” plan that “definitely set forth the objectives upon the attainment of 
which it is counted to win the war and the operations to be undertaken initially to that end,” 
which would “form the basis of the initial concentration and strategic deployment.”282 
Immediately after the War Plans Course ended the students found themselves confronting 
the second half of the Army War College program of instruction – the Conduct of War Course, 
scheduled to run from February 18 to June 25, 1929. The course consisted of map maneuvers, 
map problems, terrain exercises, and field reconnaissance. Students assigned to various general 
staff positions studied the strategy and tactics of field armies, and addressed both army and joint 
considerations in their practical exercises. While the actual war plans they worked on do not 
exist in the AWC curriculum archives, they also studied historical cases, which are present in the 
course records. The Conduct of War Course served four purposes: to train participants for 
positions of high command, to test the soundness of the war plans prepared in the preceding 
course, to familiarize the class with the mobilization-related features of certain areas of the 
United States, and to train officers in the conduct of map maneuvers and command post 
exercises. The faculty sought to provide the students a range of different experiences by 
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organizing the course into six periods, assigning the students to different groups and positions 
during each period.283  
For example, during the first period McNair served as the chairman of Command Group 
No. 3, which analyzed French operations on the Western Front in 1914 from mobilization 
through the First Battle of the Marne. McNair divided his committee into five subcommittees; 
one for each staff section – G-1 through G-4 – and a fifth (consisting of McNair and one other 
officer) that conducted the analysis from the perspective of the French commander, General 
Joseph Joffre, and his chief of staff. The committee’s final report of nearly sixty pages provides a 
thorough assessment of French mobilization and operational plans and actions, going beyond a 
mere recounting of events to provide a critical analysis of French decisions and their outcomes. 
In particular, McNair’s subcommittee emphasized the illogical French decision to assume the 
offensive, despite their lack of any advantage in mobilization or troop strength, perceptively 
linking this decision with the post-1871 “military renaissance” that led to the French “creed of 
the offensive.”284 
In the second period of the Conduct of War course McNair served as recorder, attached to 
the “Assistant Umpire Group for Historical Studies.” The students conducting the historical 
study analyzed the attack of the British Fourth Army in August 1918 by conducting map 
maneuvers, facilitated by umpires who executed each side’s plan for the day, rendering 
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decisions, and providing updated information to the staffs overseeing the Red (Great Britain) and 
Blue sides conducting the map maneuvers. The second period gave McNair a bird’s-eye view of 
the umpire process for a map maneuver, through his recording of the various assistant umpires’ 
actions, and their interaction with the Chief Umpires for each side, who rendered all major 
decisions and supervised the work of the red and blue command groups. He also soon found 
himself contributing to the War College faculty’s procedures for conduct of umpire duties during 
maneuvers.285 
While the records for the Green map maneuver apparently no longer exist, the War 
College archives do include the records of a lengthy debate that ensued during the maneuver 
between Major General Connor and his staff regarding the quality of execution of the map 
maneuvers. This prompted a comprehensive review of the AWC maneuver procedures, including 
detailed and honest critical input from one of the student command groups. Based on guidance 
he received from Conner, the assistant commandant, Colonel DeWitt, directed each 
subcommittee of Command Group No. 3, the one that conducted the Green map maneuver, to 
submit a set of written recommendations for improving maneuver execution procedures two 
weeks after the maneuver ended.286  
Writing for the command group’s umpires, McNair authored a three-page memorandum, 
one copy of which contains handwritten comments, presumably from a faculty member, 
indicating his response to McNair’s recommendations. (The notes indicate concurrence with all 
of the points, although in some cases no solution to the problem identified currently existed.) 
                                                          
285 John L. DeWitt, "Course at the Army War College, 1928-1929, Conduct of War, Second 
Period, Outline of the Course, Oranization for Work and Assignments, General Instructions," April 1, 
1929, Military History Institute, AWC Curricular Archives, 1928-1929, 4, 6; Gole, The Road to Rainbow, 
166. 
286 "Memorandum from Colonel Dewitt to Student Command Group No. 3, War Plans Course, 
Subject: Report on Techniques of Green Map Maneuver,"  March 7, 1929, Military History Institute, 
AWC Curricular Archives, 1928-1929. 
 
170 
Additionally, a cover sheet indicated that many of the criticisms offered by the various 
subcommittees appeared in many or all of their individual reports. This cover sheet summarized 
the common observations and indicated that the faculty made corrections to many of the noted 
deficiencies before execution of the next exercise (handwritten remarks on McNair’s report also 
indicate concurrence with almost all of his criticisms, and correction of most). Thus, McNair 
helped provide valuable insight that improved procedures specific to the conduct of map 
maneuvers at the AWC.287 
Many of McNair’s comments not only applied to umpire procedures at the Army War 
College, but also provided insight valuable in the conduct of umpire duties in any exercise. For 
example, McNair advised giving ample time for participants to familiarize themselves with the 
situation before execution began, and he pointed out the challenge with appointing “partisan” 
umpires, or umpires attached to one side and therefore often partial to that side when rendering 
decisions. He also advised providing more time for deliberation, coordination, and staff 
conferences, by having the command groups work through fewer situations, but more 
deliberately and in more detail. Finally, McNair expressed doubt that map maneuvers could 
replicate the actual functioning of a staff, but they did offer value in teaching command and staff 
duties, as well as testing war plans.288 
During the third period, the course focus shifted to a Blue-Orange scenario, both sides 
fighting without allies. For this period, McNair served in the G-4 (Services of Supply) staff 
section on the Blue side. Like the other map exercises, no copies of the actual plans used as a 
basis for the situation exist in the curriculum records; they include only a summary of the basic 
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situation and troops available to each side, along with guidance for conduct of the exercise. 
Similarly sparse records exist for the fourth period, in which McNair found himself in the Blue 
forces’ G-3 section, facing a “special situation” involving an Orange invasion of Blue 
possessions in the Western Pacific Ocean, followed immediately by Red and Maroon (Italy) 
naval force operations against Blue shipping in all other oceans. While seeming rather unlikely 
in retrospect, this special situation shows the comprehensiveness of the War Department’s 
“Rainbow Plans,” and the diversity of training opportunities they provided for the AWC and its 
students.289 
The fifth and sixth periods of the Conduct of War Course involved a significant change in 
activity for the class. Instead of another map maneuver, the student staff groups first conducted a 
command post exercise in field conditions, and then a reconnaissance of the Northeast Theater. 
As described in the command post exercise instructions, the exercise differed from a map 
significantly: “(a) Actual terrain conditions will govern in all plans and orders; (b) All 
headquarters will be operated under field conditions, as far as it is practicable to do so; (c) Signal 
communications and message centers will be installed and operated by the Signal Corps. These 
facilities will be used exclusively in the exercise.” The faculty provided cars and airplanes to 
facilitate command group reconnaissance, and brought in faculty from the Quartermaster Corps, 
Air Corps Tactical, and Signal Corps Schools to serve as assistant umpires and provide technical 
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advice. As in the map maneuvers, staff groups studied both historical cases and existing War 
Department plans, only in field conditions on real terrain.290  
The sixth period’s command post exercise took place at Fort du Pont, Delaware, from 
June 6-15. Unfortunately, records that reveal the position each student held during the exercise 
exist only for the Red forces. They only show that McNair participated as a member of the Blue 
side – not what position he held. Nevertheless, student officers on each side studied, from the 
perspective of their role on the general staff, the specific effects of the terrain and infrastructure 
of the area surveyed on the conduct of military operations. Unlike the previous map maneuvers, 
in which the effect of terrain proved much harder to visualize, on this reconnaissance, the class 
could evaluate roads, bridges, airfields, supply depots, railroads, hospital facilities, Army arsenal 
and depot capacities, and many other military aspects of the terrain first-hand. One group, 
assisted by Naval War College faculty, studied a “special area” to evaluate plans for Army-Navy 
cooperation and evaluate the suitability of various sites to support an amphibious landing and 
follow-on logistic support and resupply. The participants also focused on the suitability of 
various types of terrain for motorized and mechanized operations. Thus, through both the fifth 
period command post exercise and the sixth period area reconnaissance, the class applied the 
education they had received in lectures, committees, and conferences to real terrain, in field 
conditions.291  
The command post exercise and reconnaissance served as the culminating events of the 
Army War College curriculum. Only two days after the end of the reconnaissance, Major 
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General Connor gave a short closing address to the soon-to-graduate class, noting he had already 
covered many potential topics during his direct interaction with the students, faculty, and War 
Department Staff throughout the year. Therefore, he limited his address to only two subjects – 
one general, and one personal. First, Connor reminded the class that the demand among officers 
to attend the Army War College far exceeded the school’s capacity. He told the class,  
I mention this at this time merely to bring out the fact and impress upon you that while the 
Regular Army itself is a nucleus in our National Army, that you and the other graduates of the 
Army War College are a nucleus within a nucleus, and remembering that to whom much is given, 
much will be expected, and obligation rests upon you and that obligation is to use the things you 
have learned here in regard to the doctrines of national defense and the principles of military 
training, not only in your ordinary military duties but, what is of more importance I think, that 
you should spread them to the Army at large and by the “Army” I want to use the word in its full 
sense, its legal sense, and it is just as important that you should spread sound doctrine to the 
civilian components of the Army as it is that you should spread sound principles to the Army 
itself.292  
Connor next moved on to the personal part of his address.  
After mentioning the potential value of self-assessment as a means for each graduate to 
continue to improve his performance, Connor brought up the topic of aging. He touched on a 
particularly relevant issue in an Army that often retained officers in their current grade for more 
than a decade, and had no system for moving aging officers aside to make room for the upward 
mobility of their more youthful and energetic subordinates. In his injunction to keep young, 
Connor explained, 
Youth means vigor, enthusiasm and receptivity. Without health, which is vigor, a man can neither 
take advantage of the opportunities that a kind fate or his own ability may give to him, nor can he 
enjoy any measure of success that may come to him for any reason. Without enthusiasm you 
cannot hope to inspire in others that will to do, that belief in your projects, which is half the 
victory in the battle toward achievement. Without receptivity to new ideas and methods, you are 
living in the past, you are a tale that has been told in this world of today where new marvels 
spring into being with startling frequency.293 
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Connor had addressed two of the most critical challenges the graduating officers would face in 
the aging, under-resourced Army they would soon reenter. He reminded them of the need to seek 
continued self-improvement while educating the civilian Army that the nation would rely on 
upon mobilization in time of crisis. He also reminded them they must each confront the 
challenge of remaining youthful in mind and body, amidst an aging body of Regular Army 
officers, to deal with the intellectual and potentially physical challenges of the future.  
Upon graduation, McNair received an efficiency report for the academic year in which 
Major General Connor rated him “superior,” with no noted deficiencies, and recommended him 
to hold peacetime command or staff positions at the brigade, division, or War Department 
General Staff level. Connor judged McNair “An officer of high professional attainments, able, 
energetic and of sound judgment, quiet but forceful.” He also found his potential for high 
command or a senior position on the War Department General Staff “superior” and evaluated 
him fully qualified for duty with civilian components. This exceptional efficiency report 
included a letter of commendation as well. As mentioned above, the college required all students 
to complete an individual research project – a challenging task given the already hectic schedule 
caused by reliance on the applicatory method, in which most instruction occurred via student-led 
practical exercises. Demonstrating his by now well-established work ethic, McNair prepared a 
report that Connor selected for forwarding to the War Department as a “study of exceptional 
merit made at the Army War College.”294 His commended individual staff study reflected the 
impression this education left on McNair. The paper focused on how the War Department should 
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use the limited funds available each year to maximize the level of preparedness among all arms 
of the U.S. military – active, National Guard, and reserve.295  
In his seventeen-page paper, supported by seven highly detailed tables and graphs, 
McNair provided a fifteen-point conclusion. His recommendations included establishing a more 
specific national military objective, continuing development of the Regular Army while either 
slowing or suspending expansion of the National Guard, increasing use of ROTC graduates as 
officers in the National Guard, expanding the Organized Reserves and improving their officer 
development programs, and providing pay for all personnel serving in the reserves. These 
conclusions supported his overall recommendation “that the Regular Army as a whole and the 
War Department especially, with broad vision, continue their efforts, so notably successful to 
date, to the end that there may be a maximum of military preparedness with the total resources 
available from year to year.”296 
While he could not control national-level decisions regarding appropriation of funds, his 
research study reflected McNair’s continued concern about reliance on a National Guard over 
which the Federal Government held little authority, limiting the Regular Army’s ability to affect 
its training readiness or officer education. It also demonstrates that he believed limited defense 
dollars would provide a greater return if spent on a federally controlled and monitored Army 
Reserve – a capability the nation currently lacked. 
McNair departed the Army War College having completed a challenging curriculum 
intended to prepare graduates for high command and senior general staff positions. He also 
attended at a time when the curriculum, having just undergone significant changes as part of the 
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reorganization of the Army’s officer education program, included a particular focus on both 
military and civilian-industrial mobilization for war. While we do not know what his views were 
about the year spent in Carlisle Barracks, it is clear that McNair departed the Army War College 
in the summer of 1929 ready to embark on a new stage of his career. He had set himself apart as 
a superior officer even among the subset of officers selected for attendance, while receiving an 
education that prepared him for duty as a commander or general staff officer in an upper echelon 
Army unit. McNair enjoyed numerous opportunities in the coming years to make use of the 
insights he gained at the Army War College to foster innovation and improve Army effectiveness 






Innovation and Training in the Early 1930s 
Upon his graduation from the Army War College, McNair returned to his basic branch, 
serving as the deputy commandant of the Field Artillery School for the next four years. While 
McNair served in a largely administrative position, he contributed significantly to innovative 
efforts the Gunnery Department pursued during his tenure there. A long-time believer in the 
superiority of observed fires and the need to provide forward guns and observers to support 
attacking infantry, McNair strongly support the Gunnery Department’s effort to find ways to 
provide faster, more accurate, and more effective fire support in open warfare conditions. He 
contributed most significantly to the innovative methods the Gunnery Department developed by 
protecting them from the resistance of senior officers who opposed their ideas because of the 
centralized control they would impose over guns traditionally controlled by battery commanders. 
Innovation at the Field Artillery School, 1929-33 
The 1923 Field Service Regulations devoted more pages to the issue of artillery support 
to the infantry than any other topic. While artillery might arguably be the queen of modern battle, 
unreliable communications and difficulty observing and adjusting fires remained a major 
challenge to the realization of artillery’s full potential. The Field Artillery Branch devoted 
significant effort to finding solutions to these problems, particularly at the Field Artillery School, 
Fort Sill, Oklahoma. Moving his family from West Lafayette, McNair reported for duty on July 
23, 1929 to serve as the assistant commandant of the Field Artillery School.297 Long known as an 
outstanding officer in his branch, subordinates acknowledged the new energy McNair brought to 
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the position, and to the Field Artillery School as a whole. Major Carlos Brewer, Chief Instructor 
in the school’s Gunnery Department, later said McNair “could get an awful lot out of people,” 
and called him “extremely thorough and very, very capable.”298 
McNair put these qualities to use, overseeing all activities of the Field Artillery School, 
and in particular supporting the Gunnery Department’s efforts to develop and instruct students in 
new fire direction techniques. The school had already made some progress improving delivery of 
fires by the time McNair arrived at the school, but it achieved perhaps the most significant 
advances during his four years there. While McNair served in an administrative position and 
appears to have had little direct involvement with the Gunnery Department personnel who 
actually development, tested, and trained new fire procedures, he oversaw all training activities, 
and all memoranda and reports produced by any of the school’s departments passed across his 
desk. In retrospect, the progress made at the Field Artillery School in modernizing gunnery 
procedures seems truly remarkable, particularly since postwar conservatism and lack of funding 
for weapons technology hindered the efforts of the dedicated personnel assigned to the school. 
Nevertheless, McNair saw the potential in their efforts and lent essential support to the officers 
of the Gunnery Department.299 
In an article titled “Fort Sill and the Golden Age of Field Artillery,” Russell A. Gugeler 
of the U.S. Army Center of Military History has described the process of post-war artillery 
innovation that had already begun in the school’s Gunnery Department and continued with 
McNair’s support during his tenure as Assistant Commandant. In the first several years following 
the end of the World War, Regular Army officers recognized the need to overcome limitations in 
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the artillery support available during that war. Limited mobility of guns, inadequate means of 
communications, and laborious fire direction techniques greatly reduced the effectiveness of 
American field artillery during the war. Furthermore, only a few years after the war many 
artillerymen already recognized that machine guns mounted on newly developed tanks made a 
future scenario in which war consisted primarily of static fighting between entrenched forces 
highly unlikely. Therefore, officers in the Field Artillery School’s Gunnery Department sought 
ways to adapt artillery to the more fluid, mobile form of future warfare likely in a future 
scenario. However, despite sporadic efforts to improve fire techniques, Gugeler argued, “there 
was less agreement on the direction of the changes than there was resistance to changes of any 
kind.300 
The Field Artillery Center finally began to make progress upon the assignment of Major 
Jacob L. Devers, McNair’s former platoon leader, as Director of the Gunnery Department in 
1925. Described by one historian as “a man of action and decision,” Devers commenced a 
deliberate effort to make fire direction procedures both less complicated and more effective. 
Realizing that forward observers possessed the most current and accurate understanding of the 
battlefield situation, Devers began experimenting with letting them control artillery fire from 
their positions – a method of conducting observed fired McNair had strongly advocated since the 
World War. He also directed his department to begin updating regulations adopted from the 
French during the World War. The aim was to simplify procedures for firing the 75mm howitzer 
                                                          
300 Russell A. Gugeler, "Fort Sill and the Golden Age of Field Artillery," 31 January 1981, Field 
Artillery School Archives, Morris Swett Technical Library, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, 7. Gugeler, author of the 
unpublished biography of Major General Orlando Ward, sent this unpublished article to Mr. Lester 
Miller, an archivist at the Morris Swett Library, in 1981. 
 
180 
while retaining the main strength of that doctrine – increased artillery effectiveness through the 
simultaneous delivery of massed fires.301 
When Major Carlos Brewer reported as the new Chief Instructor of the Gunnery 
Department in 1929, he took charge of an organization already infused with an innovative spirit. 
Brewer agreed with Devers’ assessment that achieving effective fires required relying on 
observed rather than timed fires. He also supported the concept of massing fires by placing fire 
direction responsibility at the battalion rather than the battery level, even though this ran contrary 
to longstanding Field Artillery Branch tradition. Traditionalists believed battery commanders 
should retain full control over their batteries, including execution of fire missions, and they 
appeared unlikely to change their minds about this principle as long as no senior artillery leaders 
embraced these new ideas.302  
Several technological limitations hindered both Devers’ and Brewer’s efforts. No method 
then existed for the battalion to control the individual batteries in open warfare, since batteries 
typically emplaced a thousand yards apart from each other, relying on wire communications or 
very large radio sets, and that seriously limited mobility. Calculation of fire data also depended 
on accurate knowledge of the location of the firing battery and the target, requiring accurate and 
detailed maps (relatively easy to obtain on the stabilized fronts of World War, but harder to come 
by in open warfare). Unobserved fire also required detailed surveys to determine the location of 
each individual battery, and the positions of planned or likely targets. These surveys could take 
hours to complete. Radio operators still communicated in Morse code, adding delays in 
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transmission of target location data to the battery to an already laborious process. Finally, no 
method existed to calculate fire missions at the battalion level for each battery to execute in 
concert.303 
Brewer made it his goal to find a faster way to prepare batteries to fire and a feasible 
method of engaging targets of opportunity with massed fires. The capability to provide timely 
and accurate fires, mass fires effectively, and provide mobile artillery support to maneuvering 
units had eluded America’s artillery throughout the World War, and still required the 
development of improved techniques and new technology. Significant breakthroughs finally 
began to emerge in the early 1930s, just when McNair arrived at the Field Artillery School and 
provided the impetus required to overcome traditionalism and turn new concepts into formal 
doctrine.304 
An article Carlos Brewer wrote for the July-August 1931 edition of the Field Artillery 
Journal described “Flash-Sound Ranging,” one method the Gunnery Department employed to 
overcome the laborious methods the field artillery had relied on during the World War. Flash-
sound ranging showed potential as a way to estimate the range to an enemy battery and conduct 
counter-battery fire without relying on accurate maps. Brewer pointed out that flash and sound 
ranging equipment had improved since the war, and required only six hours to set up (it took up 
to forty-eight hours during the World War). Brewer still considered this an excessive amount of 
setup time, but he saw potential in combining flash and sound systems and using calculations 
devised by the Gunnery Department to derive a more accurate position estimate by combining 
the information the two systems provided. Brewer described the method’s pros and cons and 
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admitted it remained experimental, but emphasized the value of developing innovative means to 
prepare the field artillery for motorized warfare.305 
Brewer also made strides in developing new methods for adjusting observed fires. 
Several years’ experimentation with the use of aerial observers highlighted the difficulty of 
relaying map coordinates over the radio using Morse code. Frustration with this system led 
Brewer and his Gunnery Department to develop a new adjustment technique in which observers 
transmitted basic corrections rather than detailed map coordinates to the firing battery. The aerial 
observer estimated the distance between a round or barrage’s point of impact and its intended 
target, and simply transmitted the observed error – i.e. “200 left, 400 over” – to the fire control 
personnel, who used this information to calculate adjustments and transmitted them to the gun 
crews. This significantly reduced time between barrages, and allowed spotters to guide rounds 
progressively closer to targets using real-time information without relying on detailed maps. First 
Lieutenant Edwin L. Sibert, one of Brewer’s instructors, found ways to teach ground observers 
the same technique. This method initially showed great promise, and proved so easy to employ 
“that untrained soldiers could adjust fire after only a little instruction.”306 
These new techniques sped up the process of transmitting adjustments to a battery, but 
pinpointing the battery’s fire on target or achieving accurate and timely massed fires still proved 
problematic. Since no procedure yet existed for centralized calculation of fire data for multiple 
batteries firing from separate locations, massed battalion fires still required each battery to rely 
on its own observer and to calculate its own fire data. Individual observers had to adjust their 
battery’s fire onto the correct target, and do so quickly and in a coordinated manner to achieve a 
battalion “fire for effect.” In practice, the Gunnery Department and its students found this very 
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challenging. Observers often failed to identify the correct target or took too long – usually twenty 
to thirty minutes, if not more – to adjust fire onto the target. In fact, accurate adjustment of 
individual battery fires proved so difficult for students that most did not even advance to the 
point that they could attempt to coordinate efforts with other observers to mass battalion fires. In 
1931, when Major Orlando Ward joined the Gunnery Department, he soon found himself swept 
up in the faculty’s enthusiasm and added new energy into the quest for innovative methods to 
overcome the deficiencies in the support the Field Artillery provided the Infantry during the 
World War.307 
McNair shared this enthusiasm as demonstrated by the annual reports he prepared for the 
commandant each year. In his first report, submitted on June 11, 1930, McNair addressed the 
importance of the instruction students received in the school’s advanced course. In particular, he 
emphasized the gunnery department’s work to modernize fire direction techniques:  
There has been and will be a continuing effort to shape the courses so that the instruction in the 
methods peculiar to the World War will not be unduly emphasized at the expense of methods 
which would be more appropriate for a war under other conditions. It is contemplated to lay 
greater stress on artillery fire against tanks, and it is expected to improve the gunnery methods 
and practical execution against such targets. The use of the range finder demands greater 
emphasis in view of conditions where maps would not be available or when there would be 
insufficient time to use them in connection with the preparation of fire. 
Further, McNair emphasized the importance of field artillery officers attending the Advanced 
Field Artillery Officer’s Course. In his first year at the school, he noted cases of officers missing 
that opportunity because they received orders to report to Fort Leavenworth, where, per Army 
Chief of Staff Summerall’s direction in 1928, the course once again consisted of two years of 
instruction. McNair argued,  
It is to be regretted that it has been found necessary in some cases to detail officers of field 
artillery as students to the Command and General Staff School without their having passed 
through the advanced course at this school. If the necessity continues, it clearly would justify a 
return to the one-year course at the Command and General Staff School. In other words, as far as 
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the field artillery is concerned, the advanced course at Fort Sill is far more essential than a second 
year at Fort Leavenworth. 
Having completed less than a year of his tour of duty McNair already saw the potential in the 
new techniques under development in the gunnery department and their importance to future 
field artillery battery commanders. Beginning with his first annual report, he urged the Field 
Artillery School commandant to support both the modernization efforts and field artillery 
officers’ opportunities to receive training in the new methods under development, even if it 
meant not attending the second year of instruction at Fort Leavenworth.308 
McNair further supported this recommendation by pointing out the need for more 
artillery personnel in the field qualified to provide unit training – an ability that required the 
education received at the various advanced courses at the Field Artillery School. These included 
not only the Field Artillery Officer’s Advanced Course, but also advanced courses in 
horsemanship, motors, and gunnery. During the preceding year, the school had completed and 
gained War Department approval for the full set of base texts for the Extension Course of the 
Field Artillery School – a first since the World War. Therefore, the educational materials existed 
to support training in field units, but shortages in experienced personnel to lead the training 
would persist unless more artillery officers attended the three advanced courses at the Field 
Artillery School.309 
McNair devoted the second half of his 1931 report to the results of a survey given to 
students of the previous year’s advanced course. The faculty had observed a wide range of field 
artillery expertise among attendees of the battery officer’s course, despite all students reporting 
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for attendance at approximately the same point in their careers. In particular, the Gunnery 
Department, as mentioned above, observed a significant lack of experience and ability adjusting 
observed fires, demonstrating the neglect among field units in this type of training. Therefore, 
the school required attendees of the course to fill out a survey prior to graduation to try to 
determine why their skill levels upon arrival at the Field Artillery School varied so much. 
McNair believed the results of the survey would reveal ways for the branch to increase the 
quality of artillery instruction in the field. This, in turn, would enable the Field Artillery School 
to begin instruction at a more advanced level, improving the output of the battery officer’s 
course. Combined with the War Department approved Extension Course materials and a larger 
pool of advanced course graduates to lead instruction in in the field, this initiative would both 
increase the quality of training in units, and the proficiency of battery officer’s course graduates, 
raising overall proficiency across the branch.310 
The survey included eighteen questions to determine each officer’s time in commissioned 
service, experience in field artillery units, service in gun batteries, type and quality of unit 
instruction received, specific tasks trained, and whether their level of experience upon reporting 
for the battery officer’s course affected the difficulty they experienced completing it. McNair 
reported ten conclusions and several additional observations from the answers to the survey, with 
the overall finding unsurprising – many common tasks went untrained in most field artillery 
units, and most units that did conduct training failed to do so to the minimum acceptable 
standard in accordance with field artillery training publications and regulations. The answers also 
indicated problems already suspected through informal observations at the school – in particular, 
a general lack of experience in the field conducting observed fire missions. The overall results 
led McNair to call for “remedial action.” This included a number of steps, but they came down to 
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two basic remedies. The first involved revision of the Army regulation that covered unit training, 
since in many instances it either set unreasonable or unsupportable training requirements, or 
failed to establish the standards that training should meet. The second involved leadership – in 
short, ensuring commanders from the troop all the way to the corps area level possessed the 
knowledge and took the action necessary to participate in and oversee quality unit training. 
McNair summed up his conclusions with two salient points: “Means should be devised to bring 
home to battery and higher commanders their responsibilities in connection with the training of 
junior officers,” and “In assigning officers to duty with troops, special attention should be given 
to providing suitable instructors in the various subjects.”311 
The additional energy Orlando Ward brought to the Gunnery Department, and McNair’s 
efforts to support innovation at the Field Artillery School while finding ways to improve 
proficiency across the branch, ensured progress continued during the 1931-32 academic year. In 
particular, Gugeler highlights two events that helped the Gunnery Department in its efforts to 
improve fire direction procedures that year. First, Brewer discovered a recently arrived book in 
the school library titled Field Guns in France, written by a French officer named Lieutenant 
Colonel Neil Fraser-Tytler who served as an artillery observer during the World War. Brewer 
found Fraser-Tytler’s account quite compelling, making him rethink just how much the U.S. 
Field Artillery Branch needed to change the way it supported the other arms, and he told all his 
instructors to read it. The book described Fraser-Tytler’s efforts to accompany the infantry and 
remain as far forward on the battlefield as possible, so he could see the targets they needed the 
field artillery to neutralize as they advanced. Using a telephone system he developed that 
simplified communications with the gunners, Fraser-Tytler could direct their fire onto point 
targets, quickly shifting from one to the next, to enable the infantry to keep advancing past 
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machine gun nests or other strong points. While Fraser-Tytler used a fire correction method very 
similar to the one under development in the Gunnery Department, he described a manner of 
employment much different from the one Brewer envisioned. As Gugeler put it, “Tytler-Frazer’s 
concept of moving the artillery fire from point to point on the battlefield, and shifting it rapidly 
as the infantry needed help, went well beyond the artillery’s accepted role during the World 
War.” It also went well beyond what Brewer envisioned accomplishing at the Field Artillery 
School. The book made both Brewer and Ward rethink just how much they could accomplish by 
improving American artillery fire procedures.312 
McNair highlighted the other significant event for gunnery innovation that year in his 
annual report of June 15, 1932. He closed the report by noting the receipt of new radio 
equipment – the SCR 131, 161, 171, and 163 radios – in sufficient quantity to begin giving 
instruction in their use, as well as experimenting with them during the traditional Saturday 
morning Gunnery Department tests. McNair described excellent results with the radios, 
particularly during the end-of-year field exercise. To McNair, their performance indicated, “a 
greatly enlarged sphere of usefulness for radio communication is at hand. It appears entirely 
probably that definite steps may be taken conservatively, looking toward the progressive 
substitution of radio for wire. It is proposed during the coming school year to exploit the 
possibilities of the new equipment to the utmost.”313 
By late 1932, the larger field artillery community had started paying attention to the new 
developments at the Field Artillery School. The November-December 1932 issue of the FA 
Journal includes in its “Field Artillery Notes” section a short article titled “Gunnery Liaison 
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Methods.” The article begins with a pointed statement: “The advent of the SCR-161 short wave 
radio set has introduced new possibilities in liaison between the field artillery and infantry. 
Practical work already has shown that the artillery’s response to calls for fire from the infantry 
can be speeded up materially.” The article’s purpose is to summarize the recently issued “Field 
Artillery School note No. G-47, ‘Gunnery Liaison Methods.’” However, the final paragraph of 
the introduction to this short article reminds the reader, “These notes are authorized by the Chief 
of Field Artillery for use at the Field Artillery School only. Where in conflict with TR 430-85 
they are to be considered as experimental, being tested at the Field Artillery School, and 
unorthodox until embodied in the Field Artillery Manual or other regulations.” After this 
introduction, the article merely describes the new fire adjustment methods based on transmitting 
error corrections rather than lengthy map data, highlighting the potential of the new radio to 
increase the ability of the field artillery to provide flexible fire support in fluid situations. While 
considered experimental, this brief article demonstrates the Field Artillery School’s efforts to 
foster its innovative spirit throughout the branch.314 
The new radios, like their wire-based predecessors, still only transmitted and received 
Morse code, but the advantage they offered in mobility alone gave them great potential for 
changing the way field artillery directed fires. Similarly, Brewer’s efforts to change fire direction 
procedures achieved progress, but left much work to do. Brewer understood the shortcomings of 
unobserved fires – one of the biggest limitations in America’s artillery employment during the 
World War – and he reminded McNair they had long shared this understanding in a memo he 
wrote the Assistant Commandant on the Gunnery Department’s achievements just before his 
departure: 
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I remember reading a report during the progress of the war of a staff inspection made by Brig. 
Gen. L. J. McNair in which he described a certain engagement which he observed from a good 
OP [observation post] near the front line. In this report the failure of the artillery to utilize 
available observation was criticized in terms somewhat as follows: ‘If I had had command of a 
single battery I believe I could have inflicted greater damage on the enemy with observed fire 
than an entire regiment did with the rolling barrage.’315 
Brewer may have recalled “Extracts from ‘Notes on Recent Operations,’ by Brigadier General 
Leslie [sic] J. McNair, General Staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F.” from the April-June 1919 issue of The 
Field Artillery Journal. Reporting on an attack he observed in which American forces broke 
through the enemy trench system and attempted to transition to mobile warfare, McNair 
lamented the American forces’ failure  
to cease the extravagant methods of map firing and utilize direct observation. The terrain afforded 
excellent observation posts and battery positions. Observed fire was used barely – if at all. It must 
be inferred either that artillery commanders do not appreciate the immense advantage of adjusted 
fire, and the waste and loss of effectiveness in searching areas, or that the lack confidence in the 
ability of their battery commanders in the rapid preparation and conduct of observed fires. It is 
conservatively estimated that of the ammunition fired during the first two days of this operation, 
50 per cent was wasted.316  
Brewer used his memorandum, written to a like-minded senior field artilleryman that he 
obviously respected, to both summarize the work of the Gunnery Department he supervised and 
make recommendations for the way forward. He had a very capable successor in Orlando Ward, 
but also recognized the important role of continuity McNair would fulfill. 
Brewer and McNair definitely agreed on the superiority of observed fires, demonstrated 
by an article McNair wrote based on his experiences in the World War, published in 1921. In this 
article, McNair displays a deep understanding of combined arms attacks in both trench-to-trench 
and mobile warfare conditions. He also makes a passionate and well-argued case for the need to 
provide attacking infantry with mobile accompanying guns, and explains the artillerymen 
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operating these batteries must learn to transition from pre-calculated to observed fires upon 
penetrating the enemy’s initial defenses and continuing the attack to secondary positions. 
McNair argued this required close proximity of supporting guns to lead infantry elements, since 
battery commanders must remain close enough to the front to observe fires, and close enough to 
the guns to provide adjustment instructions, to overcome the limitations of communications 
technology. In short, McNair made an early and powerful argument for combined arms training 
of observed fires, a key element of mobile warfare and an unpopular one among many field 
artillerymen who believed it ceded too much control over artillery to infantrymen. Regardless, 
during his tour with the AEF in France and after, McNair remained a staunch advocate of 
combined arms operations and training, and in particular, mobile, observed, responsive artillery 
fires. McNair’s innovative spirit and concern for the effectiveness of the Army over the needs or 
wants of the branch set him apart even at this stage of his career from the traditionalist majority 
in the field artillery. The Army could not have assigned a better-suited artilleryman to oversee 
the training and innovative efforts taking place at the Field Artillery School in the early 1930s.317 
Brewer’s seven-page memorandum focused on his strong desire to improve in a future, 
probably motorized war, the quality of support provided by American field artillery during the 
World War. He lamented the time lost since the war merely seeking ways to refine the laborious 
and ineffective French methods the AEF adopted during the war (the unobserved map-calculated 
and highly orchestrated rolling barrages McNair so highly criticized), and summarized the 
advances his department achieved in just a few short years. Brewer did realize, however, that the 
new fire direction techniques his division taught required a level of competence difficult to 
achieve and sustain in the U.S Army of the early 1930s, due to their complexity and the need for 
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regular practice to maintain the necessary skill. As a remedy, he offered two primary 
suggestions. In addition to McNair’s efforts to standardize fire direction procedures and improve 
gunnery training in the field, Brewer recommended creating a subset of artillery specialists 
known as “Gunnery Officers,” drawn from the best-qualified graduates of the Field Artillery 
Officer’s Advanced Course (he believed only about half the latest classes’ graduates 
demonstrated the requisite skill). Since they could focus on fire direction procedures to the 
exclusion of other areas of field artillery practice, these officers stood a much better chance to 
gain and retain the competence modern gunnery methods required.318 
Secondly, Brewer recommended a reorganization of artillery units to group these gunnery 
officers together at the artillery battalion, coinciding with a change in gunnery procedures 
involving the consolidation of fire direction at the battalion headquarters. While Brewer had not 
yet overcome the technological challenges of adjusting several batteries’ fire from a single 
headquarters, and relying on one observation point to provide adjustment data for more than one 
battery, he saw this as the only way to continue moving forward and sustaining the progress his 
gunnery department had achieved during his and Jake Devers’ tenure there. Brewer summarized 
several advantages of this new organization, from easing the training of Gunnery Officers and 
their ability to share new ideas, to improved staff coordination, simplified OP placement and 
security, and the creation of maps more quickly and accurately than when attempted at multiple 
battery-level headquarters. However, Brewer recognized the single most likely obstacle facing 
this recommended organization: “Probably the greatest objection of all is that this will rob the 
batter commander of one of his time honored prerogatives, that of firing his own battery, and 
tend thereby to stifle his ambition and desire to have an efficient firing battery.” However, 
Brewer believed the branch could overcome this objection, and noted from his own observations 
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while serving with the Gunnery Department that battery commanders strove to deliver the most 
accurate fire possible, wherever the fire direction responsibility rested.319 
Nevertheless, Brewer had not yet developed a procedure for calculating fire adjustment 
data in a consolidated battalion gunnery section and then transmitting it to each firing battery.320 
The responsibility would fall to his successor, Orlando Ward, to solve this problem while 
McNair fended off the resistance from Field Artillery Branch traditionalists who believed the 
battery commander should fire his own guns. Fortunately, as Gugeler put it, “From the 
beginning, [Ward] enjoyed several advantages: Brigadier General Lesley J. McNair, then the 
Assistant Commandant [and serving in his current permanent rank of Lieutenant Colonel], 
supported all efforts to simply or improve artillery support; Ward understood artillery techniques 
thoroughly; and he inherited from Brewer a group of about 15 capable and enthusiastic gunnery 
instructors.” Describing Ward’s methods, Gugeler points out his hands-off approach and lack of 
strict control. Ward encouraged new ideas, even ones that seemed impracticable, believing the 
officer might not only see the infeasibility of his idea, but in doing so, develop a new one. 
Gugeler quotes one of the Gunnery Department officers, later Major General John M. Lentz, as 
recalling, “His methods were not obvious. There was no prodding, no laying out of objectives, 
only a gentle happiness with every new thought, every development. The result was a vastly 
greater change in every facet of our technique than has ever happened before or since.”321 
Progress accelerated under Ward’s leadership. Building on the previous several years’ 
experimentation, Ward’s open-minded approach to developing new methods soon led to 
discovery of a rapid and relatively simple method of controlling fires and calculating fire data at 
the battalion. The gunnery instructors realized the main hindrance they had experienced to date 
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involved using several observers, each trying to adjust their own battery onto the same target 
simultaneously, often leading them to confuse another battery’s rounds for their own and 
therefore miscalculating further adjustments. Not long after Ward took over as Chief of the 
Gunnery Department, the instructors worked out a new fire adjustment method. A single 
observer adjusted one battery until it placed a round on target, at which point the battalion used a 
newly devised technique to calculate and send firing data to the battery that had fired and the 
others that had not, enabling them all to place, quickly and accurately, massed fires on the target. 
After seeing this new method in action during one of the department’s standard Saturday 
morning gunnery experiments, Ward realized they now knew not only how place accurate fires 
on a target of opportunity in ten minutes – a process that had previously required several hours – 
they also could do so as a battalion, achieving accurate fires with unprecedented speed and mass. 
Upon returning from the firing range to his office, Ward described the results: “It was just like 
squirting a hose at the target.”322 
In the process of solving the problem of calculating fire data for separate batteries at the 
battalion, the gunnery instructors formed a new organization that eventually evolved into the Fire 
Direction Center (FDC). The FDC consolidated all the complex procedures associated with 
adjustment of fire in a single organization. Answering directly to the battalion commander, the 
FDC received correction data from the forward observers, who no longer had to calculate 
adjustments since the FDC calculated fire data for each battery. With accurate maps the battalion 
could consistently achieve accurate concentrations in ten minutes; without maps they required 
more time, but the procedure still worked exceptionally well.323 
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Working in this exciting, innovative organization, gunnery instructors continued to 
improve artillery fire direction by refining procedures and developing new techniques, some 
deceptively simple, like the back-azimuth technique that eliminated the need for time-consuming 
surveys by enabling a battery to calculate its position based on the trajectory and point of impact 
of fired rounds. One of these new techniques, the range fan, developed by First Lieutenant 
Charles C. Blanchard, enabled FDC personnel to measure range and deflection (lateral error) 
with a single device, rather than a range scale and protractor. The range fan consisted of a fan-
shaped piece of clear plastic, connected to the map by a pin placed at the location of each firing 
battery. By shifting the position of the range fan based on a round’s point of impact, an 
artilleryman could quickly calculate both the range and angle of deflection adjustments. Field 
artillery battalions soon adopted Blanchard’s range fan as standard equipment.324  
Similarly, while the new procedures dramatically sped up fires delivered on opportunity 
targets, or prior to completion of battery position surveys, Ward also sought ways to speed up 
surveys to improve artillery responsiveness when a forward observer had not yet reached a 
position where he could provide adjustment data. Another young officer in the Gunnery 
Department, Captain John M. Lentz, jumped at the opportunity to work on this problem. 
Realizing both the antiquated French survey equipment and the inaccurate aerial surveys they 
relied upon created most of the problem, Lentz borrowed instruments from the Coast Artillery – 
including the far more accurate transit – and developed a procedure for testing the speed and 
accuracy of surveys conducted using them. Convinced that they average officer would never 
have allowed his experiment, since the Field Artillery at that time did not possess the transit and 
developing a procedure relying on unauthorized equipment served no use, Lentz gave full credit 
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to Ward for allowing him to develop yet another procedure the Army later adopted for 
widespread use.325 
The Gunnery Department developed several additional new or improved methods to 
adjust fire, including improved fire calculation tables, map overlays, and aerial photography 
techniques. However, Ward’s greatest obstacle remained “the resistance, by most of the artillery, 
particularly the Chief’s office, to taking any of the prerogatives away from the battery 
commander.” Ward argued it made sense for a battery commander to control his own battery’s 
fire if engaging a target it could neutralize with four guns or less, but larger targets required the 
massed fires of the whole battalion, which only the FDC, using the new procedures developed by 
the Gunnery Department, could achieve. With officers from other departments attending 
Saturday morning gunnery practice and seeing the amazing results the Department could 
achieve, Ward grew confident the drastic increases in speed, flexibility, and accuracy would 
outweigh traditionalist concerns, and began to urge the school to adopt the new procedures for 
instruction to all students. His biggest immediate obstacle stemmed from the fact that his 
department, rather than the Tactics Department, should teach fire direction. With this achieved, 
the sheer efficacy of the new procedures, propagated through the branch via annual classes of 
graduates trained in the new procedures, would eventually overcome traditionalist resistance.326 
Ward faced a tough battle when he confronted the Tactics Department. However, Lesley 
McNair had established a reputation among his peers as a highly competent artilleryman, and in 
his fourth year as Assistant Commandant, he wielded significant influence at the Field Artillery 
School. An advocate of innovation for many years, McNair supported Ward, and convinced the 
Commandant to grant Ward’s request, giving the Gunnery Department the freedom not only to 
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continue experimenting, but also to train students at the Field Artillery School in the latest fire 
direction techniques. Resistance among senior field artillery officers remained, and the War 
Department did not support immediate implementation of the FDC. However, the Gunnery 
Department now had control over fire direction instruction, and with it, the freedom to influence 
the thinking of every young field artilleryman who attended the Field Artillery School about how 
much the branch could achieve using the latest procedures.327 As these young artillerymen aged 
and increased in rank, they might finally hold sway over the traditionalists currently preventing 
the Artillery Branch from overcoming the challenges that hindered its effectiveness during the 
World War. 
McNair submitted his final annual report at the Field Artillery School on June 7, 1933. 
Significantly, he did not mention the new developments in the Gunnery Department, probably 
realizing he had nothing to gain by risking the success in transferring responsibility for fire 
direction instruction to the Gunnery Department by advertising that change to the traditionalists 
among the more senior officers in the Branch. His report did emphasize the updating of texts, 
following on from the previous year by discussing the ongoing revision process, along with 
efforts to print enough texts for use at the school and for distribution to the field. As Regular 
Army artillery personnel gained proficiency, he recommended implementation of admittance 
tests to ensure students met minimum qualification standards before acceptance into the school’s 
various courses. He also highlighted the lack of motorized equipment in the 1st Battalion, 1st 
Field Artillery, that prevented it from conducting motorized tactical training. McNair 
emphasized the need to acquire the necessary equipment at the school, arguing in modern 
conditions at least half of all instruction should cover motorized rather than horse-drawn 
artillery. Finally, McNair mentioned the dramatic impact on the school of the newly created 
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Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), a New Deal program put in place by President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. Since the program relied on Regular Army personnel to run the CCC’s many civilian 
work camps, most Army units and schools lost many personnel. The Field Artillery School lost 
sixty percent of its personnel, forcing it to close the academic year early, on May 22, 1933. 
McNair stated the school retained sufficient personnel to maintain minimum functioning in each 
of its key departments, and expected to resume functioning upon arrival of the fall class.328 
McNair’s efficiency reports from his four years at the Field Artillery School invariably 
rated him a superior officer, qualified both for promotion to the next highest grade, and for 
command of a regiment in peace or a brigade in time of war. In the section evaluating his 
suitability for duty with civilian components (required by Army Regulation 600-185) he received 
a similarly consistent qualified rating. After a brief seven-month period working for Colonel 
George P. Tyner, Acting Commandant of the Field Artillery School, McNair served under the 
new Commandant, Brigadier General Wm. M. Cruikshank, for the duration of his time there. He 
clearly made a strong impression on Cruikshank, who wrote the following unusually long “Brief 
General Estimate of this Officer” (section “R” of the form) on McNair’s final efficiency report 
before departing the school:  
A superior officer in the highest sense of the word. Extremely well informed, hard working and 
conscientious. Very tactful, a fine disciplinarian and gets results from all with a minimum of 
friction. Very pleasing personality, liked and respected by all. I cannot give him too much credit 
for the continued progress and efficiency in the Academic Division of the F.A. School during his 
four years service here.329  
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Not only did Cruikshank deem McNair “Suitable for civilian contact,” he added the handwritten 
statement: “Eminently qualified for any duty to which he may be assigned.”330 
McNair had obviously made quite an impression within his branch. After his excellent 
performance at the Field Artillery School, and his overall very strong record of performance 
since the World War, the Army selected McNair for battalion command. He reported to Fort 
Bragg, North Carolina on July 1, 1933 where he took nine days of leave before assuming 
command of 2nd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery. 
Battalion Command at Fort Bragg, 1933-34 
Like the rest of the Army, the Field Artillery Branch remained in a consistent state of flux 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s. Largely due to the severely under strength and budget 
constrained condition of the Army, units frequently reorganized, redesignated, and shifted from 
the control of one higher headquarters to another. McNair experienced this situation firsthand 
when he received orders to report to Fort Bragg, North Carolina upon his selection to serve as a 
battalion commander. 
In accordance with Special Orders No. 112, dated May 15, 1933, the War Department 
relieved McNair of duty at the Field Artillery School, reassigning him to the 16th Field Artillery 
at Fort Bragg effective June 30, 1933 “for assignment to duty.” While these orders did not 
specify that duty as battalion command, McNair’s efficiency report for the period July 1, 1933 
through June 30, 1934 listed nine days of leave enroute, followed by service as battalion 
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commander for the rest of the upcoming year. However, the report indicated he commanded the 
2nd Battalion, 83rd Field Artillery, not a battalion in the 16th Field Artillery.331  
The two-volume set on the Field Artillery in the Center of Military History’s “Lineage 
Series” helps to clarify the situation. The War Department constituted the 16th Field Artillery 
Regiment in the Regular Army on July 1, 1916 and the regiment organized on May 21, 1917 at 
Camp Robinson, Wisconsin. After service with the 4th Division during the World War, the War 
Department inactivated the regiment on September 21, 1921 at Camp Lewis, Washington. The 
following year it activated the 1st Battalion at Fort Myer, Virginia, assigning it initially to the 4th 
Division. However, the War Department reassigned the battalion back and forth between the 4th 
and 8th Divisions several times over the next twelve years. Concurrent to one of these 
reassignments, the War Department activated the 2nd Battalion at Fort Bragg on September 5, 
1927. However, less than a month later, on October 1, 1933 the 16th Field Artillery Regiment 
received orders reassigning it once again from the 4th Division to the 8th Division, concurrently 
inactivating the 2nd Battalion at Fort Bragg.332 
The 83rd Field Artillery Regiment also formed prior to the World War. Constituted on 
July 1, 1916 in the Regular Army as the 25th Cavalry, the unit organized on June 5, 1917 at Fort 
D.A. Russell, Wyoming. It converted from cavalry to field artillery, and Field Artillery Branch 
redesignated the unit on November 1, 1917 the 83rd Field Artillery, assigned on December 17, 
1917 to the 8th Division. The War Department inactivated the Regiment (less 1st Battalion) on 
January 7, 1922 at Camp Benning, Georgia, and disbanded it (again, less 1st Battalion) on 
February 28, 1927 (1st Battalion concurrently reorganized and redesignated as the 83rd Field 
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Artillery Battalion). The War Department reconstituted the 83rd Field Artillery Regiment on 
March 17, 1930 and assigned it to the 8th Division (the War Department simply reorganized the 
83rd Field Artillery Battalion as the 1st Battalion, 83rd Field Artillery, reforming the rest of the 
regiment on paper; the other battalions remained inactive). The War Department relieved the 
regiment on October 1, 1933 from assignment to the 8th Division and assigned it to the 4th 
Division, concurrently activating the 2nd Battalion (a horse artillery unit) at Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina.333 
Thus, McNair apparently commanded the 2nd Battalion, 16th Regiment from July 1 
through October 1, 1933, when his command changed from the inactivated 2nd Battalion, 16th 
Field Artillery to the newly activated 2nd Battalion, 83rd Field Artillery Regiment (records do not 
reflect whether this merely consisted of re-flagging an existing unit). While clarified in the 
lengthy Field Artillery lineage volumes, McNair’s efficiency reports – probably due to 
regulations governing generation of such reports based on how long an officer served in a unit or 
for a particular supervisor – make no mention of this turbulence. His first efficiency report as 
battalion commander mentions only the 2nd Battalion, 83rd Field Artillery, while his second, 
covering the brief period from July 1 to September 1, 1934 includes command of the same 
battalion plus a short period of detached service at a Civilian Military Training Camp (CMTC). 
These efficiency reports do reflect consistently superior performance, as judged by the 
regimental commander, Brigadier General Manus McCloskey. In particular, the senior rater on 
his second evaluation, the newly assigned 4th Corps Area Commander, Major General George 
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Van Horn Moseley, added the remark, “Colonel McNair is one of the outstanding officers of the 
Army,” and signed his name to this indorsement above his official signature block.334 
Thus, while no other information appears available on McNair’s battalion command, 
these efficiency reports indicate he performed as well in this assignment as he did in previous 
positions, drawing the attention of yet another senior officer who singled him out for particular 
commendation. Further, due to the turbulence in the field artillery community, McNair probably 
faced significant administrative challenges during his command, reorganizing and re-flagging the 
unit after only a few months. Nevertheless, he performed yet again in a superior manner, and 
soon found himself reassigned to another high-profile command, although one of a very different 
nature.335 
District Command with the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), 1934-35 
McNair departed Fort Bragg in August 1934, having received orders to serve as 
Commander, Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) District “E,” VII Corps Area, at Camp 
Beauregard, Louisiana.336 McNair began this tour of duty at a time when America was 
continuing to suffer the financial debilitation caused by the Great Depression. The Army officer 
salaries and annual raises set by Congress in 1922 may have put them in a better position than 
many Americans, but left them much worse off than federal employees in other branches of 
government, who received higher wages and more than double the annual pay raises of Regular 
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Army personnel. When Franklin D. Roosevelt won the presidency in 1932 and implemented his 
New Deal policies, the situation for members of the Regular Army only worsened, including 
implementation of a fifteen percent annual pay cut and one unpaid month per year, from 1933 
through 1935.  
Roosevelt established the CCC to put young, unemployed civilian men to work, but the 
program significantly affected Regular Army personnel as well. Almost all Regular Army 
officers served a one-year assignment as a commander or leader in a CCC district over the life of 
the program. While most contemporary accounts about the CCC emphasized the role of the 
military in establishing the organization, they also emphasize the absence of any military training 
at the camps. The administration turned to the Army to establish and command the camps, and 
equip and organize the individuals joining the CCC, because the Army possessed the capacity to 
mobilize a large number of people quickly and effectively. However, aware of the prevailing 
pacifist sentiment in early 1930s America, the administration ensured (and publicized) the 
conscious avoidance of militarization in the camps.337 
The Regular Army answered the call, but reluctantly, given the massive personnel 
demands with no apparent benefit to the Army. The Army still lacked an Organized Reserve, and 
the CCC program seemed to some the ideal opportunity to create one. Most Army officers also 
saw their support of the program as a diversion of an already skeleton force away from its 
primary mission of national defense. Nevertheless, despite the reduction the Regulars 
experienced in their own military readiness, the Army did derive some benefit from the program. 
As Charles Johnson put it: 
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The Army benefited from the CCC in a variety of ways. The Corps provided a valuable training 
experience for a large number of reserve officers, the Army utilized CCC labor to perform badly 
needed conservation work on military reservations, and 2 1/2 million enrollees acquired skills that 
were potentially useful to the War Department. The Army was in a position to misuse its 
authority over the enrollees, but it did not abuse its power because of its awareness of the 
probable public response to anything resembling the militarization of the camps, its knowledge of 
the Administration’s hostility toward such action, and its clear understanding of the proper place 
of the military in a democracy.338 
The Army provided an irreplaceable capability to establish and run the program, but it did not 
approach the mission as a military one, or view the CCC personnel as military trainees or 
reservists. Only time would tell if the Army would derive any significant long-term benefit from 
the program. 
In preparation for his reassignment to command of CCC District “E,” Colonel McNair 
received orders on August 18, 1934 to report to Fort McPherson, Georgia, for a meeting with 
Major General George Van Horn Moseley, commander of the 4th Corps Area. Two days later, 
after his meeting with McNair, Moseley wrote Brigadier General Manus McCloskey, 
commander of the 83rd Field Artillery Regiment and McNair’s immediate supervisor, to inform 
him of his decision to reassign McNair. Moseley, who took particular notice of McNair during 
his assignment at the Field Artillery School, wrote, “I know you will be sorry to lose McNair, but 
I also appreciate that you are willing to cooperate with us fully so that we may keep up a fine 
record throughout the whole Corps Area in handling these important activities.” The CCC 
program, a major initiative at the forefront of Roosevelt’s New Deal, attracted a great deal of 
attention from the War Department and political leaders, and Corps Area commanders 
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experienced significant pressure to assign quality officers to district commands. District “E,” in 
particular, presented significant challenges to the commander.339 
As Moseley explained to McCloskey in his letter of August 20, unlike all other CCC 
districts, no Regular Army post existed to serve as the headquarters for District “E.” While 
General Fleming, Adjutant General of the Louisiana National Guard, offered the use of Camp 
Beauregard as the district headquarters, this atypical arrangement required particular effort both 
in establishing and maintaining the district headquarters, and in coordinating CCC activities with 
Louisiana National Guard and state government officials. Moseley wrote, 
I have been searching for a highly desirable man to relieve Packard [the outgoing commander], 
and I hit upon McNair. I have known McNair for many years and I look upon him as one of the 
very best officers in the Army. It will be a great relief to us to turn over that command to such a 
fine leader. 
Moseley’s meeting with McNair apparently reinforced his confidence that he had selected the 
right man for the job, since he immediately arranged for McNair to visit Camp Beauregard and 
familiarize himself with the district and its thirty-three camps before departing Fort Bragg 
permanently for his new assignment. McNair departed Fort McPherson by train the next day for 
Shreveport, Louisiana, and from there to Barksdale Field for air transport to Camp 
Beauregard.340 
McCloskey’s response to Moseley revealed both McNair’s fitness for the complexities 
involved in the District “E” command, and the immense pressure the Regular Army experienced 
                                                          
339 4th Corps Area Adjutant General, "Orders Directing McNair to Report to Fort McPherson, 
Georgia," August 18, 1934, McNair Papers, National Archives at St. Louis, MO; George Van Horn 
Moseley, "Major General George Van Horn Moseley to Brigadier General Manus McCloskey," August 
20, 1934, McNair Papers, National Archives at St. Louis, MO; He only had time to send Clare a brief 
telegram before departing: “For Mrs. L J McNair Slated to command Beauregard District Involves 
permanent change of station Date unknown at present Leave today for Beauregard . . . home Date later 
Love Lesley" Lesley J. McNair, "Lesley J. McNair to Clare H. McNair," August 20, 1934, McNair 
Papers, National Archives and Records Administration, St. Louis, MO.  
340 Van Horn Moseley, "Moseley to McCloskey, August 20, 1934."; 4th Corps Area Adjutant 
General, "T. H. Lowe to Commanding Officer, Barksdale Field, Louisiana," August 20, 1934, McNair 
Papers, National Archives at St. Louis, MO. 
 
205 
in its rush to establish the CCC camps and receive the massive civilian workforce. Writing on 
August 24, the day McNair returned to Fort Bragg, McCloskey assured Moseley he understood 
the challenges McNair would face, largely due to the “immense distance between our eastern and 
western companies of about 600 miles,” and had compiled for McNair all the necessary 
background information and regulations to help him in the transition to his new command. 
McCloskey’s letter only reinforces the fact that the Regular Army understood it must assign 
quality officers to CCC commands, stating, “Like you, I regard Col. McNair as one of the 
outstanding officers of the Army and I know that he will handle his District most 
successfully.”341 
McNair officially assumed command of District “E” on 5 September 1934. He 
immediately began dealing with the wide array of responsibilities associated with managing 
more than thirty CCC camps spread out over two states (Louisiana and Mississippi). In addition 
to property accountability, coordination with various state government and Louisiana National 
Guard Officials, securing necessary equipment, ensuring safe work and living conditions, and 
answering many requests for employment at a CCC camp, McNair’s personnel file contains 
temporary duty orders demonstrating he spent a great deal of time conducting inspection visits to 
various camps. For example, between January 21 and February 18, 1935, McNair made seven 
trips by car to camps in his district, usually visiting two or three camps per day. His senior 
subordinate officers maintained similar travel schedules, usually to provide their individual 
expertise when called for by a particular problem.342 
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McNair highlighted one of the CCC’s key areas of emphasis in his introduction to a 
pamphlet entitled “Progress in Education in District “E” C.C.C.” Acknowledging the enormous 
challenges initially facing the program, from lack of facilities and educators to the need to 
develop an academic curriculum, McNair wrote, “Camp educational advisers have been 
improved and will be improved still further, and the young men themselves are learning that the 
instruction affords them a fine opportunity for self-improvement.” McNair emphasized the 
relevance of the educational program within the CCC’s overarching goal of “building young men 
for better and more useful and successful citizenship,” which involved both physical and mental 
development. He wrote, “This education rounds out his camp life; his daily work, his 
recreational activities, and his educational efforts blend to make a rational and healthful 
whole.”343 
Like all of the officers who participated in the CCC program, McNair received valuable 
practical experience in mobilizing, housing, supervising, and building the mental and physical 
toughness of young inductees. Reserve officers in particular benefited, since the lack of an 
Organized Reserve meant before the creation of the CCC, almost all ROTC graduates received 
no annual training after receiving their reserve commissions. Regardless, McNair soon moved on 
to a new stage in his career – like many Army War College graduates, McNair began to ascend 
into the ranks of the Army’s senior leadership, meaning accelerated promotions and positions of 
greater responsibility. The first indication he might soon leave the CCC arrived in November 
1934 in the form of orders to report to Fort Benning for a special physical to determine his 
fitness for continued active service and promotion.344 
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McNair passed his annual physical in January 1934, with his longstanding hearing loss 
noted but no treatment or administrative action recommended. Nevertheless, promotion boards 
required a special promotion physical, so McNair received orders on November 19, 1934 to 
travel to Fort Benning, Georgia to undergo his second physical exam that year, to determine his 
fitness for continued active service and promotion. He proceeded to Fort Benning as directed and 
underwent the physical exam (annotated “promotion” on the first page) on November 27.345 
Interestingly, the exam revealed significantly improved numerical scores for hearing 
sensitivity, but the examining doctors still noted defective hearing in his left ear and physical 
damage to his eardrums. Just as in previous exams, his doctors assessed his hearing loss “not 
considered a disqualifying condition.” A medical board composed of three infantry colonels and 
two medical corps majors found him fit for continued active service and promotion. On 
December 11, 1934, the Secretary of War approved the board’s results, and on February 1, 
Moseley wrote McNair to inform him he would soon change duty stations, having made the 
colonel’s list (presumably to move McNair to a Colonel’s assignment pending promotion).346 
McNair remained in command of District “E” through April 1935, while awaiting arrival 
of his replacement, Colonel Thomas Osborne. During his final months with the CCC, McNair 
continued his busy travel schedule and maintained a huge administrative workload overseeing 
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more than thirty camps in two states. On March 14, 1935, a few days before he began the process 
of transferring responsibility for District “E” to Osborne, McNair received a letter from General 
Moseley regarding the establishment of educational programs in the CCC camps. Noting the 
Roosevelt administration’s emphasis on these programs, Moseley commended McNair for his 
achievements in District “E” and directed he send a copy of the letter to all his subordinate 
commanders, to ensure they sustained the CCC’s educational program after McNair’s 
departure.347 
Moseley also indicated his continued respect for McNair in his April 1935 efficiency 
report, in which he wrote the following “Brief General Assessment” of McNair: “An able, even-
tempered officer with outstanding talents. Possesses great tact in leading human beings. One of 
the very best field artillerymen in the Army.” Regarding his potential for service with civilians, 
Moseley wrote, “Ideally suited for duty with the civilian components. Colonel McNair was 
specially selected to command District “E”, Civilian Conservation Corps, containing thirty-four 
camps. In the performance of this duty he fully measured up to my expectations.”348 
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Rise to Prominence in the Late 1930s 
Due to the attention he gained for his excellent performance in key positions at the Field 
Artillery School and as a district commander (and periodically, acting corps area commander) 
serving with the Civilian Conservation Corps, McNair had developed throughout the early 1930s 
into one of the Army’s up and coming officers. His service with CCC District “E,” in particular, 
drew attention from senior officers in his branch, leading to his selection to serve as the 
executive officer to the Chief of Field Artillery – a position that exposed him to many senior 
commanders and gave him a taste of high-level officer leadership. His performance in the late 
1930s led to further progression in authority and responsibility, and participation in key 
innovative and organization efforts that led to his serving as s key individual in the 
modernization of the Army in the final years of the decade. 
Executive Officer to the Chief of Field Artillery, 1935-37 
McNair departed Camp Beauregard on April 20, 1935 enroute to his new assignment in 
the office of the Chief of Field Artillery in Washington, D.C. He soon found himself in one of 
the key positions in a high-level headquarters – Executive to the Chief of Field Artillery, 
Brigadier General Upton Birnie, Jr. Unlike an aide de camp, an executive essentially serves as 
the primary military assistant to the senior general officer in a headquarters, managing his 
calendar, keeping records, handling correspondence, and serving as the “gatekeeper” for people 
seeking to meet with the general. In addition to the heavy administrative burden associated with 
this position, McNair soon found his particular expertise with experimentation and testing of 
equipment innovations put to use again. He traveled to Aberdeen Proving Grounds in Maryland 
on May 17, 1935 “for the purpose of observing Field Artillery materiel and test of the Hotchkiss 
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25 m/m gun.” Also on May 17, with McNair on temporary duty in Maryland, notification arrived 
at the Office of the Chief of Field Artillery of his promotion to the permanent rank of Colonel. 
McNair executed the required Oath of Office on 20 May, with an effective date of rank of 1 May 
1935.349 
McNair returned to Aberdeen Proving Grounds in March 1936 to observe further field 
artillery materiel tests, but few records exist describing the other duties he performed while 
serving as the Executive to the Chief of Field Artillery. However, detailed records McNair kept 
in his personal files demonstrate the significant effort he expended learning about and studying 
the potential of an emerging technology, as demonstrated in an article in The Field Artillery 
Journal Article published in 1937 entitled, “And Now the Autogiro.” The article describes the 
potential for the autogiro, a hybrid aircraft combining the characteristics of the airplane (for 
speed) and the helicopter (for low speed takeoff and landing) to transform the practice of aerial 
observation of artillery fires. Unlike a helicopter, the autogiro relied on both a powered propeller 
and unpowered rotor blades for flight. Looking much like a typical airplane with a rotor system 
attached above the pilot and observer seats, the aircraft possessed significant advantages over a 
standard airplane – primarily due to the constant autorotation of the rotor blades, which enabled 
the autogiro to maintain flight at speeds as low as twenty to thirty knots. Any typical airplane at 
that time stalled at much higher airspeeds. Thus, the autogiro possessed obvious advantages over 
the balloon due to its maneuverability, enabling it to avoid enemy threats. However, it also 
offered significant advantages over the airplane, including the ability to take off from and land to 
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very short fields, and fly very low and slow, enabling artillery commanders to perform detailed 
aerial reconnaissance for citing batteries and aerial photographers to capture much clearer images 
than those taken in airplanes flying much faster.350 
The Field Artillery began evaluating the potential uses of autogiros in 1934, when it 
planned to purchase three airframes for evaluation – one for The Field Artillery School, one for 
The Infantry School, and one for The Cavalry School. Major Edwin P. Parker, Jr. described the 
autogiro’s potential for field artillery support in The Field Artillery Journal in 1934, while 
reminding his readers, “It must be borne in mind that the autogiro is in its infancy, and great 
development thereof is to be expected.” Parker wrote his short article about the Kellett KD-1, the 
model currently under evaluation by Army personnel, primarily to provide a brief description of 
the aircraft’s characteristics and describe its potential for replacing the observation balloon, 
which proved extremely vulnerable to enemy fire during the World War. Parker described the 
very short takeoff and near-vertical landing ability of the aircraft, its minimum airspeed that 
enabled a runner on the ground to keep up with it long enough to hand a bag to a courier in 
flight. He also described the aircraft’s ability to use wired communications when operating over 
a small area or radio at longer distances, and its potential for field artillery reconnaissance and 
observation.351 
Despite the potential Parker described, by 1935 the Army still had not procured any 
autogiros, although various tests continued. In its May-June, 1935 issue, the “Field Artillery 
Notes” section of The Field Artillery Journal describes the sixth annual Field Artillery dinner, 
which took place shortly after McNair’s arrival in Washington as the Executive to Brigadier 
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General Birnie. At the dinner, hosted by the McNairs and the Birnies and attended by 164 guests, 
the decorations included place cards with a hand-drawn illustration of children playing with 
various toys including a rifle, an artillery piece, a bridge section, and an autogiro. Later in this 
section of the journal, the reader learns, “For various reasons the purchase of autogyros [sic] 
anticipated in the FIELD ARTILLERY JOURNAL [sic] of July-August 1934 has not yet been 
made. It is hoped that these will be procured in the near future.” However, the notes described 
the ongoing testing, not just in America but also in France and Russia, including a demonstration 
at Bolling Field in Washington, D.C. for General Birnie “and numerous other officers.” General 
Birnie rode in an autogiro during this demonstration, and supported continued efforts to develop 
and procure the aircraft through the direct involvement of his new Executive.352 
McNair clearly took great pride in the various equipment tests he led and boards he 
presided over, since his notes and reports from these projects make up the majority of the 
personal papers he left behind. His work on the autogiro remains preserved in one of the largest 
of these records, detailing a lengthy period of research, including trips to visit the manufacturers 
of the Army’s autogiros, the Kellett Autogiro Corporation. The records also include 
correspondence with pilots and field artillerymen involved in testing earlier models, the results of 
later field tests, and many other letters providing information to McNair and commending him 
on his efforts.353 
McNair captured the results of more than six months’ research in his thirteen-page article 
“And Now the Autogiro,” published in the January-February 1937 issue of The Field Artillery 
Journal. This article focused on the latest autogiros in production – the Kellett YG-1 and YG-
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1A. The Army Air Corps had recently purchased one of each model, placing the aircraft and 
pilots at the ground forces’ disposal to conduct service tests. He began the article by describing 
the many technological advances since the World War, while pointing out their evolutionary 
nature. As McNair pointed out, the AEF employed an earlier version of almost every piece of the 
equipment the Army possessed in 1937. However, he described the autogiro as one of the few 
truly revolutionary technological advances available for military application, largely because of 
the same features Parker described in his 1934 Field Artillery Journal article. However, in every 
major performance category, the newer models demonstrated improved performance. They could 
fly as slow as sixteen knots without stalling, and hover over a point if facing a sixteen-knot 
headwind. They could land nearly vertically, with a forward roll of no more than fifty feet upon 
landing, and take off over a fifty-foot obstacle only 300 feet away.354 
McNair credited the invention and revolutionary characteristics of the autogiro to a 
Spanish engineer named Juan de la Cierva, who built the first operational prototype in 1920. 
Cierva sought to create a safer alternative to the traditional airplane, with its tendency to stall at 
low airspeeds, by making use of the autorotation capability of the autogiro’s rotor system. 
Ironically, as McNair pointed out, “at the age of forty-one and after bringing his brain-child 
through the most trying period of its development, he met death recently in a modern transport 
airplane.” However, other aeronautical pioneers continued Cierva’s work, including a Purdue 
alumnus named R. H. Prewitt, Chief Engineer of the Kellett Autogiro Corporation. By 1937, 
Prewitt had worked out the aerodynamic principles for the “jump take-off” – an initial vertical 
climb of 200 feet before beginning forward flight – although many credited this concept 
incorrectly to Cierva. While this capability remained under development, the autogiros of 1937 
offered a dramatically more versatile alternative to the airplane, and now that the Army finally 
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owned two of the aircraft, McNair sought to help his readers understand the potential they held 
for employment by the field artillery.355 
Perhaps because the autogiro looked so strange in comparison to the airplane, or perhaps 
simply because he found the technology fascinating, McNair provided his readers not only a 
description of the aircraft’s flight characteristics and potential for field artillery employment; he 
also wrote a detailed yet accessible explanation of the general aerodynamic principles of rotary 
wing aircraft. This remains a highly complex topic that still proves challenging to student 
helicopter pilots today. In particular, McNair focused on the concept of autorotation, the main 
characteristic that made the autogiro unique. 
Unlike the modern helicopter, which relies for normal flight on a powered rotor system, 
the autogiro pilot used a clutch to provide power to the rotor system prior to takeoff, releasing 
the clutch once the rotors reached the desired speed, thereby transferring engine power to the 
propeller. This gave the aircraft forward motion, which in turn maintained the spinning of the 
rotor system via autorotation and provided the lift necessary for flight. This mode of operation 
differs significantly from that of the modern helicopter, in which the pilot only relies on 
autorotation in an emergency involving the loss of engine power. As the helicopter descends 
unpowered, the upward airflow through the rotor system provides the energy to maintain the 
rotation of the blades – thus “autorotation” – as long as the aircraft retains sufficient forward 
velocity. As the helicopter approaches the ground, the pilot can use the kinetic energy in the 
spinning rotor system by changing the angle of the blades to create one brief, life-saving 
reduction in speed of descent, enabling a safe landing with little or no forward movement. This 
provides the helicopter its enhanced safety compared to an airplane, which must land at much 
higher forward velocity and therefore in a much longer and smoother field or airstrip. Due to the 




autogiro’s rotor design, its forward speed enabled the rotors to remain in a constant state of 
autorotation. This supplemented the power provided by the propeller, and kept the aircraft aloft 
at airspeeds well below those at which an airplane would stall. McNair used photos provided by 
Prewitt of a miniature model of a rotor and a standard desk fan to demonstrate the principles of 
rotor aerodynamics (in addition to complex and surprisingly modern-looking engineering 
drawings).356 
McNair also emphasized the autogiro’s distinct flight characteristics from those of the 
helicopter, another new form of aircraft in development at the time, despite their visual 
similarity. At the time of writing, the autogiro had advanced much further than the helicopter, 
which had not yet achieved any notable success. Helicopter prototypes at that time combined a 
propeller and a (powered) rotor system, so they looked similar to autogiros, even though they 
operated according to very different aerodynamic principles. However, McNair realized the 
helicopter also possessed potential, mentioning one engineer’s concept of a helicopter with no 
propeller, relying solely on a powered rotor system that the pilot could tilt forward to gain 
airspeed – a concept not yet developed into a prototype. Perhaps more importantly, McNair did 
not exaggerate the autogiro’s potential, despite what he saw as its revolutionary nature. Rather, 
he emphasized the need for further development: “Does the giro offer something worthwhile 
which the airplane has not? If the answer is yes – or even possibly yes – then the Federal 
government should put its might squarely behind this struggling infant, and push its 
development.” He ended on a cautionary note: “We must not forget, however, that the giro is 
only a boy, and we should neither expect nor demand that a boy do a man’s work.”357  
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Like the reports of many of his previous equipment tests and experiments, the detail and 
clarity of McNair’s article attracted a great deal of attention and earned him numerous accolades. 
Alexander Klemin of the Daniel Guggenheim School of Aeronautics called it “a splendid 
article,” and various business leaders and politicians commended both Birnie and McNair on the 
article’s publication. Prewitt wrote McNair a particularly gracious letter, congratulating him on 
his ability to communicate such a complicated topic with admirable detail and clarity, and stating 
that his article “warrants all the praise that anyone could give.” Prewitt also thanked McNair for 
mentioning him as the originator of the “jump-off” autogiro concept, and mentioned the Kellett 
Autogiro Corporation received an order for six more autogiros from the Army (model YG-1B) 
after publication of the article. Once again, McNair demonstrated his fine intellect, innovative 
spirit, and influence not just within the Field Artillery, but the Army and defense industry.358  
The cautionary note McNair included regarding the potential of the autogiro proved 
insightful. By the mid-1930s, Air Corps engineers determined the giro lacked sufficient power to 
lift a pilot, observer, and service radio into the air. However, they remained hopeful an aircraft 
that possessed greater power while still offering the benefit of the autogiro’s short takeoff and 
landing capability would emerge and offer practical military application. This led them to turn to 
abandon the autogiro in favor of the helicopter, with its powered rotor system, particularly after 
two Frenchmen, Louis Bréguet and Réne Dorland, achieved the first successful helicopter flight 
in 1935. The helicopter increased in reliability and power as engineers developed new models, 
and it soon replaced the autogiro as the most useful field artillery observation platform (along 
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with other future military applications). The autogiro quickly faded into obscurity, as did any 
recollection of McNair’s participation in the Army’s experiments with it.359 
Throughout McNair’s tour as the Executive to the Chief of Field Artillery, Major General 
Birnie rated him consistently superior, writing in his final efficiency report, “An officer of 
preeminently outstanding ability and high attainments; especially clear headed in thought and 
sound in judgment.” This final report, dated through December 31, 1936, preceded McNair’s 
promotion to the permanent rank of brigadier general, which the War Department announced on 
December 22. Having reverted from brigadier general to his permanent rank of major after the 
World War in 1919, McNair finally earned back his star, with an effective date of January 1, 
1937. Also on New Year’s Day, the War Department issued Special Orders No. 1, both 
announcing McNair’s promotion, and relieving him of duty in the Chief of Field Artillery’s 
office pending assignment in March 1937 as Commander, 2nd Field Artillery Brigade at Fort Sam 
Houston, Texas. McNair took the oath of office as a brigadier general on January 4, 1937, and 
promptly requested a leave of absence from January 10 to March 5, with permission to visit 
Cuba. McNair had made it over “the Hump” of senior officers who had bogged down promotions 
for more than fifteen years, rising in rank and authority rapidly since graduation from the Army 
War College in 1929. His hard work, competence, and noteworthy achievements had paid off, 
and he requested a well-deserved vacation, receiving approval from the War Department on 
January 3 for leave and travel to Cuba.360 
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Redesigning the Infantry Division, 1937-39 
Newly promoted Brigadier General McNair reported for duty at Fort Sam Houston on 
March 7, 1937 to take command of the 2nd Field Artillery Brigade. McNair’s assignment to the 
2nd Division represented a conscious decision to place him where the Army could once again 
make use of his particular experience and talent in unit organization and equipment testing. 
Concurrent with McNair’s notification of his imminent promotion and change of duty station, 
General Malin Craig, who had replaced General MacArthur as Army Chief of Staff on October 
2, 1935, decided to test the recommendations of the Modernization Board, formed in January 
1936 to examine the organization of the Army.361 
When Malin Craig, described by Russell Weigley as “a Pershing protégé,” took over as 
Army Chief of Staff, he immediately sought to correct what he saw as troubling flaws in Army 
plans, organization, and equipment. Many of Craig’s concerns revolved around mobilization 
issues McNair and his fellow students had studied at the War College, recommending solutions 
that the War Department lacked the resources to implement. While he struggled against similar 
budget limitations as his predecessor, and could not initially convince President Roosevelt to 
pressure Congress to fund an increase in the size of the Army’s ground forces, he did convince 
the President that the War Department possessed no real capability to execute its strategic plans, 
making them essentially theoretical in nature. Perhaps because of the increasingly tense 
international climate, the President supported some of Craig’s recommendations. For example, at 
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the urging of his G-4 and Deputy Chief of Staff, Craig recommended in October 1936 reducing 
spending on weapons research and eliminating any programs deemed unessential, arguing any 
useful innovations to come from such research would not appear in the form of actual fielded 
equipment for at least two years. Craig supported development of critical items, but with reduced 
funding for research and many competing programs, few would receive funding. For weapon 
systems deemed non-critical, Craig secured the president’s approval to redirect funds to buy the 
best currently available weapons instead.362  
As Army historian Mark Watson has written, “The dominant purpose, it is clear, was to 
get the existing Army re-equipped without further delay with the best equipment currently 
available. . . . Prolonged research undoubtedly would produce better weapons five years hence. It 
would not provide any immediate betterment of a force currently handicapped by obsolete 
weapons and, in some cases, possessing none at all.” Watson mentioned one shortfall in 
particular – “the lack of antitank weapons adapted to use against post-World War I armor.” 
Halting an Ordnance Department antitank weapon development program, the War Department 
staff instead supported the field forces’ request for the fielding of a weapon system as early as 
possible to fill an “imperative need.” This led to the Army’s purchase of a 37-mm gun of 
German design that Army arsenals could quickly replicate and produce. Thus, in the 1930s, just 
like today, currently fielded equipment represents the outcome of choices made years earlier.363 
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Much like his concerns about obsolete equipment, Craig believed the Army’s World War 
vintage organizations had failed to keep up with emerging technology and the resulting potential 
for a future war very different from the last one. This motivated his effort to reevaluate the 
organization of the Army, particularly the infantry division. This review of the infantry division 
organization represented the continuation of a debate that had raged on and off since the end of 
the World War. As historian John B. Wilson describes, “January 1929 marked the beginning of a 
ten-year struggle to reorganize the infantry division. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, General 
Parker, reported that European countries were developing armies that could trigger a war of 
greater velocity and intensity than anything previously known.” The major powers in Europe, 
each searching for a way to increase mobility and minimize losses in a future war, had already 
begun to employ increasingly sophisticated motorized and mechanized vehicles as a solution. 
While each arrived at different conclusions regarding the specifics, Great Britain, France, and 
Germany all reorganized their military units to exploit these new military technologies in the late 
1920s. In particular, Parker pointed out some European militaries had restructured their divisions 
into smaller, more maneuverable units, compensating through enhanced firepower and 
mobility.364  
Concurrent with its imminent acquisition of semiautomatic rifles and air-cooled machine 
guns, Parker believed the U.S. Army should make similar changes, starting by streamlining its 
cumbersome square infantry division – an idea considered but rejected after the World War. The 
2nd Division tested various forms of triangular divisions in 1929, but in the end Army Chief of 
Staff Summerall, perhaps due to his experience during the World War, saw no need to change 
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the square division structure.365 Therefore, the infantry division retained essentially the same 
structure it had employed during the World War for another six years, when new Army Chief of 
Staff General Malin Craig decided to revisit the issue. 
Noting the increasingly non-standardized organization of existing infantry divisions, all 
of which relied on a variety of foot, animal, and motor transport for mobility – none of which he 
deemed suitable for modern warfare – Craig polled senior commanders in 1935 for solutions. No 
consensus emerged, even among senior infantry branch leaders, so Craig formed the 
Modernization Board to make an objective assessment of the situation. The board, led by Major 
General John B. Hughes, War Department Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations), focused its 
efforts on a study of the infantry division, both to make the task manageable, and since the 
infantry division served as the cornerstone for the organization of all Army units. Hughes 
submitted the board’s report to Craig on July 30, 1936. It recommended abandoning the massive 
square division for a smaller and more versatile triangular division, but much like Parker’s 
efforts in 1929, the report attracted many dissenting opinions.366  
Upon reviewing the board’s recommendations, Craig directed a test of the Proposed 
Infantry Division (PID), both to determine the effectiveness of the triangular organization and 
quell dissent, and selected the 2nd Division to conduct the tests beginning in the fall of 1937. 
Thus, only three months after his arrival at Fort Sam Houston to command the 2nd Artillery 
Brigade, McNair found himself performing an additional duty, serving as the Chief of Staff of 
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the PID. In this role, he oversaw every aspect of the PID redesign, maneuvers and equipment 
tests, post-maneuver boards, and preparation of reports for the War Department.367 Once again, 
the Army needed someone with a talent for objective experimentation and innovation, and called 
on McNair, perhaps the most qualified officer for the job in the Army, due to his more than three 
decades of experience presiding over similar tests and experiments. 
The infantry division proposed by the 1936 board included three infantry regiments, each 
comprised of three rifle battalions. With all supporting units, including a single field artillery 
regiment of three 75mm battalions and one 105mm battalion, and the first divisional cavalry 
squadron since before the World War, the PID comprised only 13,512 men. More importantly, 
the triangular structure meant the division could easily reorganize into three independent 
regimental task forces, each with its own 75mm field artillery battalion. The division could 
allocate support from the larger howitzers, heavy machine guns and mortars, and various support 
elements to the task forces as the need arose. On paper, the triangular division also possessed 
adequate vehicles to motorize its troops fully; however, the Army lacked the resources to 
motorize all its divisions should it adopt the new organization, despite its congressionally capped 
personnel level that remained well below 200,000. In fact, the War Department had to arrange 
for the reallocation of adequate trucks and other vehicles from various units to 2nd Division to 
facilitate examination of the benefits of complete motorization of the division. Thus, in theory 
the division benefited from both greater agility and mobility, simplified logistics sustainability, 
and the ability to reorganize easily into regimental task forces when required. The PID 
organization tables reflected all these modifications, intended to enhance the infantry division’s 
capability to conduct modern warfare (still regularly referred to as “open warfare” by senior 
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Army officers). The War Department intended the PID tests to verify these advantages while 
determining what capabilities the division might have lost in the reorganization.368 
Recognizing that unit training, receipt of equipment, and consolidation of units to form 
the PID at Fort Sam Houston would require several months of preparation, the War Department 
issued its initial guidance in a memorandum dated March 26, 1937, directing 2nd Division to 
conduct the test in the fall of that year. A second memorandum, dated April 2, 1937 authorized 
2nd Division to coordinate directly with the various organizations that would provide additional 
personnel and equipment necessary to form the PID and facilitate the tests. In this memorandum, 
the War Department, through Headquarters, 8th Corps Area, placed responsibility for the tests 
“directly under [2nd Division] control.” However, the War Department issued guidance to all 
participating units for activities they should undertake pending conduct of the tests in the fall of 
1937. For example, the War Department directed the various branch schools to submit lists of 
questions and current issues they wanted the PID test to explore. The War Department also 
issued its own list of “Secondary Questions” in topic areas ranging from “Maneuverability,” 
“Fire Power,” and “Frontage” to “Ability to Sustain Combat” and “Command and Staff.”369  
McNair also received his first efficiency report since his promotion to the permanent rank 
of Brigadier General before the first PID test began. The report covered his first three months in 
brigade command, from March to June 1937. His rater, Major General Parsons, evaluated 
McNair superior overall, with excellent physical activity and endurance and superior knowledge 
of his profession. In the event of war, Parsons recommended McNair for duty as chief of staff of 
a corps or army, and, in an evaluation specific to reports on general officers, Parsons ranked 
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McNair second among the thirty general officers personally known to him. The 8th Corps Area 
commander, Major General H. J. Brees, concurred with Parson’s evaluation. Based on this report 
alone, Parsons and Brees obviously ranked McNair among the best general officers they had 
worked with, and selected him to serve in the critical role of chief of staff, PID due to his 
qualifications for the position.370 
Upon his assignment as PID chief of staff, McNair oversaw all aspects of the upcoming 
division test, as evidenced by his signature on almost every document generated by the division 
after the early spring. One of these, a memorandum he distributed on June 4, 1937, projected the 
tests taking place in six phases. These included (1) organization and preliminary training at home 
station; (2) training and tests of company and smaller units; (3) training and tests of battalions 
and regiments followed by movement of supporting units to Fort Sam Houston; (4) assembly of 
the division; (5) combat team tests; and (6) division tests. McNair projected phases four, five, 
and six taking place no earlier than September 1937. By July 13 McNair identified the date for 
the start of the fourth phase as September 15, 1937, and issued a tentative schedule with a more 
detailed breakdown of events in the final three phases, including the specific tests the PID would 
undergo during phases five and six, during the five weeks from October 11 through November 
15. These included strong attacks and defenses, envelopments, division counterattack in support 
of a corps defense, wide front advances to test the daily range of the motorized formations, night 
attacks, and pursuit operations. On September 3, McNair identified the umpires371 
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On September 20, McNair appointed a board of review comprising two infantry colonels, 
one infantry captain, and one field artillery captain, to develop a process they would oversee 
during the latter phases of testing to receive, standardize, and consolidate the test results. He also 
studied the many issues the branch schools (including the Leavenworth schools) and the 
supporting units sent the War Department in anticipation of the tests, using them to help develop 
appropriate scenarios and umpire rules. While far too numerous to list here, several common 
themes and a few particularly interesting comments deserve mention. Perhaps the most common 
concern, whether from a combat arms or support unit perspective, dealt with the consequences of 
mobilizing the infantry division, good and bad. Organizations wanted the tests to identify how 
far the division could move in a day, and with what limitations in terms of various support 
elements repositioning and preparing for combat operations after a long road march. Map 
maneuvers at Fort Leavenworth identified the potential for the division to move as much as 
seventy miles in a day and then conduct a deliberate attack or defense. However, they also found 
this rapid advance often led to units thinly dispersed over excessively large fronts, formation of a 
salient the enemy could exploit, and challenges for combat support and logistics units trying to 
maintain the same pace as the combat units.372  
Some of the more specific comments involved particular capabilities, limitations, and 
employment recommendations for specific units and types of equipment. For example, map 
maneuvers at Fort Leavenworth revealed significant difficulty keeping mortars supplied over 
long road marches preceding an attack. Since mortars served as the backup fire support weapon 
for attacking infantry outside the range of field artillery support, this posed a significant problem. 
The Infantry School at Fort Benning echoed this concern, while recommending use of light 
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machine guns primarily for support to attacking rifle squads, and .50-caliber machine guns for 
anti-motorized and anti-mechanized defense. The Field Artillery School also identified 
challenges keeping artillery in supply when supporting infantry formations conducting 
envelopments, indicating in both attacks after long marches and enveloping maneuvers, infantry 
would likely operate without field artillery or 81mm mortar support. The Coast Artillery 
School’s primary concerns revolved around motorized units’ vulnerability to mechanized and air 
attack when on the march, leading them to recommend movement by motor only at night. 
Finally, cavalry officers at Fort Leavenworth emphasized the proper employment of the 
reconnaissance squadron, highlighting their conviction that “Reconnaissance and security [are] 
its primary roles.” Therefore, they recommended equipping and employing the reconnaissance 
squadron in a manner that would prove unlikely to lead to prolonged fighting, discourage the unit 
from engaging in sustained combat, and ensure the squadron handed off the fight to infantry as 
soon as possible so the it could continue its reconnaissance mission.373 
The final phases of the PID test commenced in early October and ended in late November 
1937. In accordance with McNair’s directive of September 20, standardized reports of the 
various tests identified the scenarios undertaken, resulting friendly and enemy actions, and 
recommendations stemming from the observations of the participating units and umpires. 
Despite the widespread equipment shortages throughout the Army, the PID received the weapons 
that it needed to conduct the test from various Army units, or used suitable alternatives where 
necessary (i.e. the heavy artillery battery employed 155-mm howitzers since the 105mm 
                                                          
373 Various, "Observations, Questions, and Recommendations from Leavenworth and Branch 
Schools for PID Test of 1937," February-May 1937, National Archives and Records Administration, 
College Park, MD, RG 337, Entry 58C, Boxes 12-13. Some accounts name McNair as the primary 
advocate of equipping and employing cavalry primarily for its reconnaissance role, leading to an inability 
to engage in prolonged fighting, optimizing it instead to remain disengaged, avoid excessive losses, and 
maintain its focus on reconnaissance. However, the archival records show McNair and the 2nd Division 
received this advice from the Leavenworth faculty months before the first PID test took place. 
 
227 
remained in production, and tripod-mounted Browning Automatic Rifles (BARs) replaced 
shortages in .50-caliber machine guns. In addition, General Craig ordered augmentation of the 
division by antitank and antiaircraft artillery battalions and an observation squadron, to give it 
capabilities it would normally receive via reinforcement from the corps reserve, enabling a more 
realistic test (including evaluation of the organization of these non-divisional units). Therefore, 
in terms of organization, equipment, and execution, the test represented a valid and thorough 
examination of the capabilities of the PID, as reflected in the report that McNair provided to the 
War Department on February 24, 1938.374 
McNair organized the final report into four sections: three recommending changes in the 
PID, the antimechanized battalion, and the antiaircraft battalion, and a fourth section providing 
information specifically requested by the War Department. Seven appendixes contain the PID 
test data that elaborate on the findings and justify the division’s recommendations. Some 
highlights from the findings include recommendations to eliminate several positions and units, 
including the “infantry advisor” and the “commander of service troops” (both brigadier generals) 
and their staffs, the reconnaissance squadron, the machine gun battalion (including a machine 
gun company in each rifle battalion instead), the quartermaster service company, and the band. 
The report also included the recommendation to remove the 81mm mortars from the artillery 
regiment and place them directly under each infantry battalion commander, to reduce the size of 
the rifle and light machine gun squad to seven men, to reduce the size of the engineer 
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organization from a battalion to a company, all enabling reductions in transportation 
equipment.375 
While Parsons signed the report, McNair served as its primary author, and it bears the 
same stamp of quality and detail as his many previous such reports. His efforts during the first 
PID test earned McNair great respect, demonstrating his capability not just as a field 
artilleryman, but also as a general staff officer well versed in all aspects of Army doctrine, 
organization, and equipment issues. One can see this in the efficiency report McNair received 
just two weeks prior to publication of the final PID test report, in which Parsons once again rated 
him superior as a field artillery brigade commander and expert in his profession, and also rated 
him superior in the performance of his duties as chief of staff of the PID. Parsons ranked McNair 
second among the forty general officers he knew personally, based on interaction with McNair 
“every day” during the rating period, and wrote in the optional remarks section, “An officer of 
outstanding ability. He will go far in the Military Service if given the opportunity.” Malin Craig 
also recognized McNair’s exceptional contribution to the PID test with a letter of commendation 
that read, in part, “As you are aware, I consider the results of this test of great importance to the 
entire Army. You have personally contributed a great deal toward a correct reorganization of the 
Army. I wish to express to you my personal appreciation of your constant and untiring work and 
the splendid results thereof.”376  
McNair also underwent another annual physical exam on January 3, in the interim 
between the end of the PID test and submission of the test report. This physical revealed the 
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long-term nature of his loss of hearing, which had gradually worsened since first noted in 1908, 
the lack of potential treatment options, and his otherwise excellent health. The Surgeon General 
recommended a second inpatient medical exam, this time at Fort Sam Houston, which the War 
Department endorsed, probably because of the accelerated rate at which the condition had 
worsened in recent years. McNair underwent this exam from 31 January through 4 February. 
Weighing in at 151 pounds, with “few teeth missing” and “no dentures,” the examining doctors 
judged McNair physically fit, with no significant health problems other than his degraded 
hearing. In his final statement upon McNair’s discharge, the lead examining doctor, Lieutenant 
Colonel S. U. Marietta, noted the existence since 1908 of information on McNair’s hearing loss 
in his medical records. He also wrote in the clinical record that McNair remained “very frank 
about the condition. He states that the onset and progress has been so insidious that he scarcely 
recognizes it except when he compares his hearing now with a period of some years ago. He has 
no difficulty in using the telephone or in transacting the business incident to his duties except 
that, on occasions, he is impelled to request the repetition of remarks made to him. A further 
physical survey, including 6 ft. plate of chest, urine concentrations, blood picture, blood 
chemistry (urea and sugar) urine concentration test, and electrocardiogram was negative.”377 
Despite his otherwise excellent health, the surgeon general, upon receipt of this report, 
recommended further examination at Walter Reed Hospital, followed by a medical board to 
determine McNair’s fitness for continued active duty. At this point, the Army Chief of Staff 
intervened, seeing no need for yet another medical board given McNair’s demonstrated capacity 
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for excellent performance in a wide range of tasks despite his hearing loss. In short, common 
sense prevailed. Overruling the Surgeon General, Craig’s replacement as Chief of Staff, General 
George C. Marshall, refused to order another medical exam or board, and ordered issuance of a 
waiver for hearing loss, effective June 1939. McNair would no longer have to worry about a 
medical board or possible early retirement due to his hearing loss, since several of the most 
senior officers in the Army personally observed his ability to perform in a superior manner 
during the PID test, despite his condition. Later physicals merely noted his degraded hearing, 
although the surgeon general continued to include an endorsement that indicated the condition 
warranted a medical board, but this would not take place due to the Chief of Staff’s waiver.378 
Long before the conclusion of this final chapter in the long history of McNair’s service-
connected hearing loss, the War Department began its analysis of the PID test report, with some 
staff officers criticizing certain recommendations and suggesting changes. However, more 
troublesome opposition to the PID organization emerged even before 2nd Division completed the 
field tests. Major General George A. Lynch, Chief of Infantry, wrote the War Department in late 
1937, after observing a portion of the PID tests, to voice his objections to the proposed 
organization. These included the creation of machine gun companies, which separated the 
machine gun – a critical asset – from the direct control of the rifle battalions, and the inclusion of 
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signal detachments and mortar batteries in rifle battalions, which Lynch saw as a threat to unity 
of command. He also argued against the presence of a commander of service troops – a general 
officer – within the division, since it further complicated command and control. He pointed out 
the movement of supply trains remained a tactical matter, depending on the division’s combat 
situation. Therefore, the decision remained the division commander’s to make, not one he should 
delegate to a commander of service troops. Since logistics trains operated to the rear of combat 
units, Lynch saw no need to burden the division with their presence, or the division commander 
with a subordinate intended to control them. In short, Lynch proposed an even leaner division, 
resourced for fighting only, with corps organizations tailored to provide logistic support.379 
To address Lynch’s concerns, Craig appointed a committee to design a new division 
based on the results of the initial PID test. Craig chose Major General Fox Conner, Colonel 
George C. Marshall, and McNair to serve on this committee – men who all supported the idea of 
a leaner, triangular division and would make an objective assessment of the issues Lynch raised. 
However, the committee never convened due to General Conner taking early retirement for 
medical reasons.380 
Meanwhile, the War Department General Staff began to discuss its own modifications to 
the organization of the PID presented in the 2nd Division report. Unlike the comments received 
from Lynch and other senior infantrymen across the Army, who supported the idea of a leaner 
infantry division, differing only in the details of its modified organization and employment, the 
War Department General Staff resisted some of the streamlining. For example, they discussed 
retaining the “infantry advisor” and the “commander of service troops” and their staffs, and 
lowering the rank of the Chief of Staff to Colonel and relieving him of his duty as division 
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second-in-command. They also considered retaining a separate service company rather than 
consolidating the division’s service and headquarters companies, and allocating 81mm mortar 
companies to each infantry company, rather than keeping the mortars under battalion control as 
recommended in the PID test report. However, these discussions soon came to Parsons’ 
attention, provoking a preemptive rebuttal he wrote to General Craig on June 13, 1938. In this 
terse but respectful letter, Parsons wrote,  
I hear that the principle reasons for the changes recommended . . . are because of the effect on the 
National Guard; I know it well and appreciate its value in our plan of national defense, but I think 
it is a mistake to make major changes in an organization that has been built up as a result of a 
thorough field test because it might adversely affect the national Guard, and I am sure that the 
National Guard will neither expect nor ask that this be done.” 
Instead, Parsons noted all the senior National Guard officers he spoke to merely asked for 
adequate time to adjust their division organization to match the approved PID structure.381 
While the division organization proposed in the PID test report answered many of 
Lynch’s concerns, the main point of contention centered on the logistics capability within the 
division. Lynch advocated removing all logistics from the division and assigning service support 
responsibility to corps headquarters, allowing the division to streamline even further into an 
organization tailored purely for fighting. McNair’s report instead left some logistics capability in 
the division but proposed one even smaller than that originally designed by the 1936 
Modernization Board. Upon receipt of the PID test report, the Modernization Board reconvened 
to analyze it and the various responses it provoked. Soon, the board put forward a new division 
organization (designated the “Provisional 2nd Division” or P2D) that retained the triangular 
structure of the PID, but sought compromise between the many recommendations and concerns 
expressed by various schools and corps area headquarters across the Army. In doing so, the 
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board created a new division structure that satisfied no one, and worse, that overlooked 
recommendations made as the result of months of field tests and intense work within the 2nd 
Division in favor of the opinions of a few men reviewing the test results from an office in the 
War Department.382 
The new division organization the board proposed retained the band and a service 
company within each infantry regiment headquarters, and assigned a weapons company to each 
rifle battalion, armed with heavy mortars and machine guns, despite the PID test findings 
regarding the difficulty of keeping 81mm mortars supplied with ammunition when moved 
forward to support infantry attacks. The board did not assign the rifle battalion an antitank unit, 
believing the weapons companies’ .50-caliber machine guns and the regiment’s 37mm guns 
provided adequate antitank defense.383 It also reduced the size of the field artillery regiment 
based on command and control concerns expressed by various branch school and corps area 
commanders, even though the PID test showed no evidence of such command and control 
difficulties. The board also retained the two general officer advisers that the PID had found 
worse than useless, but removed them from the chain of command (apparently thinking this 
would mitigate the problems identified in the PID tests). The board also disregarded Lynch’s 
recommendations concerning logistics, redesigning the division’s supply system instead of 
assigning logistics responsibility to Army corps. They placed responsibility for ammunition 
resupply and baggage with the combat arms units, and eliminated the motor battalion in favor of 
a quartermaster battalion that combined transport and some maintenance capability (the division 
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would handle any repairs requiring three hours or less). Finally, the division retained 
responsibility for evacuating their sick and wounded to corps medical facilities.384 
Upon reviewing the board’s new division design, Craig realized it would attract criticism, 
and ordered a yearlong test, to begin in February 1939. After a brief two-month break serving 
solely as Commander, 2nd Field Artillery Brigade, McNair found himself once again performing 
the additional duty of division chief of staff, and taking the lead role in the preparations to test 
the newly proposed division organization. McNair planned for the second round of tests by 
developing a series of scenarios for the P2D headquarters to oversee, each describing the day’s 
timeline of events and the orders the division staff would issue to its subordinate units. Each 
day’s scenario comprised a detailed schedule, including descriptions of orders the headquarters 
would issue and missions the division would conduct – all focused on evaluating the division’s 
mobility, flexibility, and combat effectiveness. The scenarios reflect meticulous planning, 
including detailed movement rate calculations and timings for issuance of movement orders to 
coordinate the arrival of march columns originating from both Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and 
Camp Bullis (about thirty miles to the northwest), at the desired time and place and in the correct 
sequence. The scenarios also include plans for movement of divisional headquarters, timed to 
ensure the staff would complete movement and resume full function before each key event 
began. The scenarios considered reconnaissance plans and orders, supply and other logistics 
requirements, and command and control processes including the preparation and distribution of 
orders and overlays to facilitate coordination.385 
                                                          
384 Wilson, Maneuver and Firepower, 131-33. 
385 P2D Headquarters Staff, "File Folder: 322.13 Provisional 2nd Division - General," March 9, 
1939, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, RG 337, Entry 58C, Boxes 12-
13. This consolidated folder contains various correspondence between the War Department, 8th Corps 
Area Headquarters, and the P2D Headquarters; however, the majority of P2D test planning documents 
bear McNair’s signature. 
 
235 
While McNair conducted the vast majority of the planning, he did not participate in the 
actual P2D tests, although he did serve as Chief Umpire during the 3rd Army maneuvers that took 
place near San Antonio – his first experience in a field unit overseeing umpire duties since the 
academic instruction he received at the War College. Just prior to the beginning of the P2D test, 
scheduled for March 1939, the 2nd Division welcomed a new commander, Major General Walter 
Krueger, and learned McNair would leave the division for a new assignment on March 17. 
The previous month, General Craig selected McNair to succeed Brigadier General 
Charles M. Bundel as the commandant of Fort Leavenworth’s Command and General Staff 
School (CGSS). Increasing tensions in Europe had confirmed Craig’s conviction the Army must 
accelerate preparations for war. With the bulk of the hard work associated with redesigning the 
infantry division done, Craig’s deputy, Brigadier General George C. Marshall, advised he take 
the opportunity to assign McNair to Fort Leavenworth to improve the education programs there. 
Craig had significant concerns about the Leavenworth Schools’ readiness to support officer 
education, particularly with the potential for wartime mobilization rising, and after witnessing 
McNair’s capability and work ethic for the past two years, he knew no Regular Army officer 
who possessed stronger qualifications to accomplish the much-needed revitalization of CGSS. 
Brigadier General George C. Marshall, Craig’s Deputy Chief of Staff, wrote to McNair on 
February 23, 1939 to provide some insight regarding the War Department leadership’s 
expectations. Marshall wanted McNair to know that Secretary of War Woodring had expressed 
concern about the course, and believed “something should be done immediately to modernize the 
school methods of instruction.”386 Having served on the post-World War inaugural faculty, 
McNair would return as the Leavenworth Commandant, with the charter to prepare the school 
for the possibility of military mobilization. 
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McNair’s final efficiency report as Commander, 2nd Field Artillery Brigade and Chief of 
Staff, Provisional 2nd Division reflected the exceptional reputation he established during his time 
at Fort Sam Houston. The division commander, Major General F. W. Rowell, rated McNair 
superior in the performance of both his primary duties, and ranked him first out of seventeen 
brigadier generals Rowell knew personally. Brees, still commanding the 8th Corps Area, 
concurred with Rowell’s report, while ranking McNair fifth out of the forty-one general officers 
he knew. Each added a special indorsement to their report, congratulating McNair and 
commending him for, in Brees’ words, “your unflagging energy, your vision, the training you 
gave your umpires, and to your excellent executive and organizing ability. It gives me great 
pleasure to make my views of record.” Thus, not only did McNair develop an expertise unique 
among the Army in the intricacies of the U.S. Army infantry division’s organization, capabilities, 
and limitations, he also put his War College education in umpire procedures to practical use 
while serving as the chief umpire for the 3rd Army Maneuvers in the fall of 1938.387 McNair at 
this stage of his career epitomized the general staff officer – an officer who had not only risen to 
general officer rank, but also possessed a wealth of experience that transcended the narrow focus 
of his particular branch background. Thus, accounts that describe McNair at this stage of his 
career merely as a field artillery officer either ignore the breadth of his experience or display an 
ignorance of it. 
The P2D tests began in February 1939 as scheduled, but did not last a year as Craig 
envisioned, ending early due to Germany’s invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. 
Demonstrating the diverse range of opinions among senior Army officers regarding Army 
equipment, organization, and doctrine during this period of uncertainty and resource constraints, 
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Krueger expressed concern over many of the changes that resulted from the Modernization 
Board’s review of the first round of tests. He worried about the lack of robust logistics capability 
within the division, and believed the organization could only fight independently for forty-eight 
hours at its 1939 peace strength (the P2D had an authorized peace strength of 7,970, and a 
wartime strength of 11,485). Krueger did agree with the streamlining of the division in general, 
supporting the pooling of air, antiaircraft, and tank units at corps or higher echelons, although he 
believed it lacked adequate antitank capability. The division still relied on .50-caliber machine 
guns and 37mm antitank guns, and since funding to purchase existing models remained limited, 
and Craig freeze of most weapon development programs in 1936 remained in effect, no solution 
to this problem appeared imminent.388 
McNair did not participate directly in the final stages of the infantry division’s 
refinement, but he continued to monitor developments while serving as the commandant at Fort 
Leavenworth. A wholesale reorganization of the fundamental building block of the Army, sure to 
create debate and discord, also required updated doctrine. By assigning McNair to his new 
position at Leavenworth, Chief of Staff Craig placed him in an ideal position not only to 
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modernize the teaching methods at CGSS, but also to play a key role in bringing Army doctrine 
up to date, to account for recent changes in organization and fighting techniques.389 
Leavenworth Commandant, 1939-40 
General Craig, concerned about the need to update teaching methods at the Leavenworth 
schools, sought to prepare McNair for this aspect of his new assignment by providing him 
airplane transport to Barksdale, Langley, and Maxwell Fields en route to Fort Leavenworth. On 
this trip, Craig intended McNair to familiarize himself “as to the principles and theories being 
taught at the Air Corps Tactical School.” Shortly before his departure, McNair requested the 
addition of Fort Knox to his itinerary so that he could observe the newly created Mechanized 
Force as it conducted experiments with armored vehicles. Craig approved this request.390 
Marshall expounded on his intent for McNair’s assignment as CGSS commandant and 
the preparatory tour of other training installations in a letter he wrote to Brigadier General Asa L. 
Singleton on February 27, 1939. Marshall anticipated McNair would have only one day on his 
itinerary to spend with Singleton, who had served as commandant of the Infantry School at Fort 
Benning since July 1936, and Marshall wanted to ensure Singleton took maximum advantage of 
this opportunity. Marshall scripted the discussion by writing: 
I hope that in that brief time, you can give him a good idea of the practical tactics and techniques 
taught there. I think it very important to have brought to his attention any apparent differences 
between Benning tactical techniques and that at Leavenworth. For example, during my period, a 
Leavenworth Infantry battalion order would be two or three pages long, where a similar order at 
Benning would be less than a page in length. The same applied to G-2 summaries, supply details 
and so forth. The one was ponderous and cumbersome, while the other at least showed struggle 
towards simplicity. Benning used geological survey maps and Leavenworth was more inclined to 
the Gettysburg variety. Benning’s procedure suggested more of contact with soldiers and the soil, 
than did the Leavenworth procedure. I am writing you most informally to give you some idea as 
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to why McNair is being sent to Benning. Times have changed and maybe there is not the 
difference today that there was in my day. 
Marshall closed this letter like many he wrote to general officers late in his career: “Please treat 
all that I have said here as confidential.”391 
On March 4, 1939, with McNair still on his tour of training installations, Marshall wrote 
another letter to McNair in which he elaborated on his concerns about CGSS. Marshall believed 
that the course had adopted an overly rigid and laborious staff procedure, and in particular one 
not optimized to the nature of the forces on which the Army would rely in the event of 
mobilization for war. Believing the Army would have mere weeks, not months or years, to 
mobilize for a future war, Marshall worried Leavenworth improperly focused on training officers 
to lead the professional Regular Army, rather than preparing them to lead “partially trained 
troops” activated from the National Guard – not to mention a potential horde of untrained 
conscripts. Marshall believed 
Regular officers should be experts regarding every consideration involved in the training and the 
leadership of partially trained troops; they should be intimately familiar with the employment of 
organizations below war strength and lacking in artillery and similar components, as well as 
supply echelons. They should be most familiar with the technique involved in working on poor 
maps of the Geological small scale variety – rather than the Leavenworth fourth-year-of-a-war-
type. 
He based these views on three years’ experience working with National Guard units and his 
participation in two Army Maneuvers, which had left him “horrified by the methods taken by 
Regular officers in handling these partially trained troops.”392 
Marshall also lamented the “laborious stabilized command post technique and procedure” 
he regularly witnessed. He cited the frequency, length, and detail of orders, the number of highly 
detailed reports headquarters demanded from their subordinate units, and “the absurd amount of 
G-2 information supplied.” All this led Marshall to believe a “stabilized or siege warfare” 
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mentality still governed Regular Army officers’ views of warfare. Writing “Now, we know what 
kind of an army we are going to have on M-day, and we must presume that open warfare will be 
the rule rather than the exception,” Marshall wanted McNair to refocus CGSS on the tactics and 
leadership methods appropriate to lead inexperienced troops in that demanding environment.393 
This letter seems remarkable in retrospect. It preceded Germany’s invasion of Poland by 
almost five months but predicted the mobile nature of warfare that would result from 
motorization and mechanization of modern armies. It showed the lasting impact of the two 
generals’ AEF experience, both in the use of language Marshall knew McNair would understand 
(“open warfare” versus “stabilized or siege warfare”), and in the desire to avoid the mistakes the 
nation made in its preparations for and operations during the World War. Finally, it demonstrated 
that like McNair, Marshall continued to struggle intellectually with impact of the increasing 
technological sophistication of modern armies, and with the challenge of how to prepare the U.S. 
Army for modern warfare despite the limitations posed by the economic crisis and isolationist 
sentiment that had dominated America throughout most of the previous two decades. This letter, 
representative of the content of a long-term correspondence between Marshall and McNair, casts 
doubt on the idea that U.S. Army officers failed to foresee the changing nature of warfare and the 
impact motorization and mechanization would have in a future war. 
Upon the conclusion of McNair’s pre-assignment tour of training installations, he wrote 
Marshall to describe the great benefit he accrued from visiting the various installations and 
witnessing their current training systems and modernization efforts. Two months later, after 
Marshall learned of his selection to succeed General Craig as the Army chief of staff, he wrote to 
McNair: “You at the head of Leavenworth are one of the great satisfactions I have at the moment 
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in visualizing the responsibilities of the next couple of years.” As Stephen R. Taaffe noted, 
“Marshall had countless responsibilities as chief of staff, but he believed that his most significant 
and difficult task was recommending officers for the president to nominate as generals and 
assigning them to their posts.” Therefore, the fact that Marshall placed so much trust in McNair 
at this early stage in his rise to the highest position of responsibility in the Army speaks volumes 
about Marshall’s respect for McNair’s competence and character – traits Marshall valued above 
all others in an Army officer.394 
Russell Weigley has pointed out the irony that Marshall’s replacement of Craig as chief 
of staff in August 1939, while placing the ideal officer in this key position at a pivotal historical 
moment, obscured the significance of Craig’s influence on the Army’s preparedness for war. 
While the Army remained far from ready in 1939 to fight a war in modern conditions, it had 
made great strides under Malin Craig’s leadership. Craig oversaw a massive effort to update the 
organization of the infantry division, the first step in an overhaul of Army organization as a 
whole, and managed to equip units with the best weapon systems available at the time. Most of 
the Army’s limitations in 1939 stemmed from longstanding funding shortages and personnel 
caps. The infantry division’s two authorized strengths – one for peace and a much larger one for 
war – serves as just one example of these challenges. However, the Army did possess far more 
equipment, if somewhat dated, than before Craig’s tenure, and it benefited from a significant 
organizational modernization effort. Craig also accelerated the War Department’s study of the 
challenge of industrial mobilization, and led the Army to investigate the impact of motorization 
and mechanization, both in the officer education system and in unit field tests. Nevertheless, 
Marshall overshadows Craig in most historical accounts leading to various misunderstandings, 
including the belief that the Army’s reliance on suboptimal weapons (i.e. the 37mm antitank 
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gun) represented a choice officers made under Marshall’s tenure, rather than the downstream 
effects of Craig’s decision to halt most weapons development programs from 1936 to 1939.395 
McNair lived up to Marshall’s expectations as the Fort Leavenworth commandant. Upon 
his reassignment, he realized he faced a significant challenge. He had to oversee modification of 
the curriculum to one that prepared the minds of Leavenworth graduates for the changing reality 
of contemporary warfare, while preparing for the likelihood of increased demand for graduates 
as war loomed on the horizon. In a graduation address a few months after his arrival, the new 
commandant anticipated the changes made necessary by the demands of modern warfare, 
pointing out that the graduating class had learned “applicatory methods” to solve “concrete 
cases.” He warned them that “you have applied principles and, in many cases, definite 
procedures . . . it may be possible that Leavenworth was wrong.” Furthermore, “changes in 
organization, armament, and transportation are ahead. Aviation is coming into the picture more 
and more, and leading us to no one knows just what and where.” He admonished the graduating 
class, “Do not use horse-and-buggy methods in a motorized age.”396 As these comments reveal, 
the applicatory method might have suffered from imperfections, but McNair recognized them, 
and encouraged Leavenworth graduates to avoid applying the principles they learned there 
blindly, instead adapting them to the situation in which they found themselves. 
Thus, McNair arrived at Leavenworth well aware of both the benefits and the flaws in the 
school’s applicatory method. However, some historians take Leavenworth to task for its use of 
the applicatory method, failing to recognize the value of teaching principles of war and 
inculcating doctrine in establishing a solid foundation and common language among mid-grade 
Army officers. In one recent critique of the U.S. Army’s officer education system, Jörg Muth has 
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attempted to prove that the German officer education system produced better combat leaders. 
Muth claimed the Americans tried but failed during the interwar years to create an officer 
education system based on that of the Prussian (later the German) military, hoping to replicate 
their exceptional combat performance during the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars. In 
Muth’s words, “The U.S. Army’s professional educational system produced . . . an average 
officer who knew the basics of his trade in theory because he had run through a number of 
schools that had taught him that. He generally longed for doctrine and prepared solutions and 
tried to ‘manage’ rather than command. In stark contrast to the German Army, mavericks were 
not sought or fostered.”397 
Muth sought to establish the inferiority of the American officer corps’ “command 
culture” to that of the Germans through a comparative analysis of each army’s interwar 
education system. He described “command culture” as something like “the ‘corporate identity’ 
of an army.” Muth used the term to account for factors like “how an officer considers himself to 
be in command, i.e., does he command as a visible person close to the action or rather through 
orders by his staff from his command post?” Further, he saw “command culture” as the driving 
force that determines how an officer “tackles the turmoil and chaos of battle and war – whether 
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and contrary to the idea of mission orders, both in the early twentieth century and the twenty-first. 
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he tries to make sense of it by the application of doctrine or rather utilizes the pandemonium to 
make bold moves.”398  
Muth’s explication of his research exhibits significant bias, adding him to the many, often 
American, historians who applauded combat performance among the German officer corps, 
despite the fact that objective assessments revealed their performance as unworthy of such 
admiration.399 For example, in his expansive body of work on the operational history of the 
German military, Robert Citino offers an impartial examination of other historians’ assessments 
of the German officer corps’ “command culture,” that Muth so admires. Citino reveals the 
inherent flaws in this “command culture,” which Muth ascribes largely to the German tradition 
of Auftragstaktik. Muth argued historians and military practitioners routinely misunderstand 
Auftragstaktik, “as a technique to issue orders, while in fact it is a command philosophy. The 
basic concept of Auftragstaktik means that there is direction by the superior but no tight control.” 
Muth illustrated the concept with an example of the different ways in which an American and a 
German officer’s instruction would prepare them to lead a tactical action, concluding that, 
“Because of his training, a German officer simply did not [sic] ‘not require detailed 
instruction.’”400  
By contrast, Citino demonstrated that this conception of Auftragstaktik, as reimagined by 
Muth and many other admirers of the Prussian-German tradition, “is completely mythological. 
The Germans hardly ever used the term when discussing issues of command. Rather, they spoke 
of ‘the independence of subordinate commanders,’ which is a very different thing.” In essence, 
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as Citino made clear in The German Way of War, “Operational-level German commanders 
(corps and above) saw themselves, and were recognized by the General Staff, as absolutely 
independent in spirit and behavior; they were free agents while on campaign.” Demonstrating his 
detailed understanding of German culture, resulting from objective and detailed research, Citino 
explained the roots of this thinking: 
It was a view tied closely to Old Prussia’s social system, especially the distinct social contract 
between the king and the Junker nobility. They swore fealty to him and served him, typically in 
war but also in the civil service. In return, he allowed them near total dominance over the serfs, 
and later the peasants, on their domains. That arrangement extended to the general’s relationship 
with the troops under his command, as well. Although they were not his property, they were 
bound to obey him, and he could launch them on any operation that he saw fit. For the king (or 
his deputy, or the chief of the General Staff) to intervene in a detailed way in the military 
operations of his subordinate would have been to violate this arrangement and to call into 
question the sovereignty of the Prussian nobility.401 
This reveals the true cultural origin and meaning of Auftragstaktik, an understanding surprisingly 
lacking in Muth’s analysis. His fundamental misunderstanding of a German cultural norm he 
used as a foundation for his argument led Muth to the equally flawed conclusion that the German 
interwar officer education system created better leaders, imbued with a superior “command 
culture” than their American counterparts. 
In addition to clarifying the true meaning of Auftragstaktik, Citino systematically 
dismantled the myth that this cultural trait led the Germans to develop a system of command 
superior to that of their various enemies. He described the chaos, confusion, and unnecessarily 
high casualty rates in Prussia’s wars against Austria and France in the nineteenth century, caused 
by commanders executing hasty attacks without gaining approval from higher headquarters or 
even coordinating their actions with adjacent units. He also demonstrated that the German school 
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system taught this same flawed system of command after the World War, casting doubt on 
Muth’s contention that America’s officer education system of the 1920s and 1930s produced 
officers inferior to those educated in the German system. Books like Command Culture fit within 
a historical tradition that a growing number of historians like Citino are diligently working to 
overturn.402  
Other recent works add weight to an opposing view of such timeworn misrepresentations 
of the early twentieth-century U.S. Army’s officer education system. As mentioned above, Peter 
Schifferle demonstrated the essential role the Leavenworth schools played in maintaining the 
preparedness of the interwar U.S. Army, while Michael Matheny emphasized its role in the 
development of American operational art. These new histories make great strides in shattering 
the myth of a flawed American officer education system and the mediocre generals it supposedly 
produced.  
Schifferle’s account pointed out key gaps in the education officers received at 
Leavenworth in the 1920s and 1930s, particularly the lack of focus on logistics and Army Air 
Forces. Further, he claimed flawed mobilization estimates exaggerated these problems because 
they “grossly underestimated the need for large headquarters to form, train, deploy, and sustain 
ground forces, grossly underestimated the needs of service forces, and nearly completely failed 
to understand the needs of the burgeoning army air forces for senior officers and staffs.”403 
However, Schifferle argued out the school’s contributions far outweighed its shortcomings. It 
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benefited from a particularly talented faculty, mostly selected from among the top graduates of 
each class, who served a tour with a field unit and then returned to Leavenworth to teach. Many 
of these officers also possessed experience serving with the AEF during World War I. The 
school provided many officers during this period their only opportunity to study large-unit 
operations, even if funding constraints prevented field maneuvers and limited this instruction to 
the classroom. Most importantly, 
Although students were not always encouraged to be innovative, student solutions that did not 
mimic the instructors’ rote answers were possible and did not necessarily result in a lower grade. 
What every graduating class gained at Leavenworth were not cutting-edge technological 
advances or new, doctrine-shaking ideas about combat. They gained the three essential elements 
of the Leavenworth educational system: skills in problem solving, the principles and techniques 
of handling large formations in combat, and, of inestimable value, the confidence that they could 
manage these large formation command and staff tasks that had so greatly challenged officers in 
the AEF.404 
Matheny pointed out that many of the men who attended the staff school at Leavenworth 
went on to graduate from the War College, which produced by 1939 the vast majority of the 
officers who served as the Army’s most senior commanders in the 1940s. Graduates of the AWC 
also practiced large formation operations through map maneuvers and command post exercises, 
and filled some of the gaps left in their military education by Leavenworth. Matheny argued, 
“The lessons of World War I, as distilled in the curriculum of the War College in the twenties, 
continued to be studied and taught into the thirties. The emphasis on logistics remained evident 
in virtually all of the exercises and map maneuvers. The scale, scope, and detail in campaign 
planning became more refined and more sophisticated, particularly as war clouds gathered at the 
end of the decade. More than anything else, the specificity of war planning . . . helped to develop 
meaningful and modern solutions to problems in operational art.”405  
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In the end, the rapid acceleration of America’s preparation for war had an unforeseeable 
impact on McNair’s efforts at Leavenworth. It arose from the curtailment of his assignment there 
to just one year and the decision to abbreviate the course near the end of his tour as commandant. 
Rather than revising the curriculum of the existing one-year course to bring it more in line with 
the methods Marshall and McNair discussed, events led the War Department to direct creation of 
a significantly abbreviated course, in hopes it could produce the number of graduates necessary 
to support large-scale mobilization should the need arise. Nevertheless, McNair did not merely 
lead the reorganization of CGSS into an short course, he also made great strides in updating the 
teaching methods and grading system employed by the faculty, and contributing to the Army’s 
ongoing modernization efforts.406 
For example, upon McNair’s arrival at Leavenworth, the Army still operated based on a 
core doctrine developed by assessing the AEF’s performance during the World War, which 
several post-war boards judged as generally adequate and based on a valid doctrine. This led to 
publication of the 1923 Field Service Regulations (FSR), a document that served as the Army’s 
overarching operational doctrine, on which it based all other doctrine and procedures. This 
manual governed Army operations for over a decade, and despite various efforts to rewrite the 
Army’s core doctrine throughout the intervening years, the updated FSR it remained unapproved 
and in a state of flux upon McNair’s arrival at Fort Leavenworth.407 
As Walter Kretchik has argued, the 1923 FSR grew increasingly outdated as 
technological and organizational change took hold in the Army throughout the 1920s and 1930s. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
remained key topics throughout the 1930s, preparing the officers bound for senior leadership far better 
than Leavenworth for those aspects of the conduct of operational art by large formations. 
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The 1923 manual, fundamentally unchanged from its 1914 predecessor, stressed mobile 
offensive operations – open warfare – above all else, although it did add some specificity to the 
concept by defining tactical actions like meeting engagements and attacks against stabilized 
fronts. As seen in the 1929 curriculum of the Army War College, the year McNair and Dwight 
D. Eisenhower graduated, students analyzed both their own doctrine and that of other armies as 
they reviewed and suggested changes to existing war plans that anticipated many possible 
scenarios that might lead to war with other nations. Nevertheless, halfhearted congressional 
implementation of the 1920 National Defense Act meant the Army lacked the resources to effect 
change based on the insights gained from lectures and practical exercises at the War College or 
the vibrant discourse that took place in the various professional branch journals like The Field 
Artillery Journal.408 
While doctrine writers incorporated other changes in the 1923 FSR based on the practical 
and theoretical review of the World War’s lessons the Army undertook after the war, Kretchik 
describes the most significant feature of the manual. It served as the “intellectual core of the 
Army,” and the tool by which “the War Department now shaped ideas contained within the 
service’s principal manual, while also holding sway over the manuals affiliated with each branch 
of the service. Through doctrine, the War Department had furthered its authority over the service 
as a whole. Yet, without a war to test it in battle, the 1923 FSR was obsolete by the mid-1930s.” 
In 1939, the Army remained undermanned, relied on aging or obsolete equipment, and adopted 
new doctrine and operational concepts slowly in comparison to the major European armies, even 
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though many officers in Army schools and operational assignments studied these ideas, and 
incorporated them into U.S. Army discourse. Only Japan lagged behind America in the major 
powers’ mechanization efforts, and America’s first experiment with a mechanized force ended in 
failure after only a few months, serving only “to demonstrate that the Army lacked mechanized 
forces.” Even in the development of infantry, the U.S. Army failed to learn from its European 
counterparts’ experiments with machine guns and armor support, and was the last to adopt the 
triangular division structure, in 1939.409 
This fundamental change in organizational structure formed the main catalyst for the 
eventual approval of a new FSR in 1939. While various efforts took place beginning in the late 
1920s to update the doctrine, they failed to result in a new FSR, although they did lead to 
creation of a series of supporting manuals. However, lack of consensus on these manuals only 
added confusion to the effort to update Army doctrine. Between 1935 and 1939, the War 
Department stepped up efforts to update the official doctrine in the FSR and gain approval for the 
unofficial doctrine contained in the supporting manuals, which had drawn much criticism since 
their creation, in part due to their early foundation in French doctrine. By 1937, the War 
Department staffed an updated draft FSR, broken down into three volumes (Operations, 
Administration, and Large Formations), but, in Walter Kretchik’s words,  
The responses ranged from detailed analyses to total apathy. . . . The drafts eventually made their 
way into the hands of Brigadier General Lesley J McNair . . . . McNair and his staff [at CGSS] 
painstakingly reviewed everything chapter by chapter. McNair was involved to the point where 
he authored many changes himself. His personal comments also took shape in a formal reply to 
the War Department. The general staff adopted most of his ideas.  
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Thus, the man individually most responsible for adoption of the triangular division also led the 
final push to develop a doctrine to bring the Army up to date with the technological and 
organizational changes it had undergone over the preceding decades. He also did so from the 
ideal position – as commandant at CGSS McNair could not only monitor ongoing developments 
in the organization of the triangular infantry division and contribute to the Army’s new 
operational doctrine, he could also ensure the Leavenworth curriculum covered the Army’s latest 
doctrine and unit organization.410 
After only two months in his new position, Marshall wrote to McNair on August 7, 1939 
to inform him of the imminent approval of the FSR. He also lauded McNair on the positive effect 
he had already achieved as commandant: “I hear on every hand the most flattering comments 
regarding your effect on Leavenworth. You apparently – to use a hackneyed word – have 
vitalized the place and yet in a most harmonious manner.”411 
In his recent study of U.S. Army doctrine, Kretchik observed that, “these draft manuals 
were subjected to far more scrutiny than any previous FSR.” However, he pointed out the 
process of buy-in among the War Department staff, Army schools, and operational units made 
for a slow, but inclusive process. Finally, in September 1939 George C. Marshall approved the 
new doctrine, while putting in place a fundamental change in the organization of doctrine by 
dividing the 1939 FSR into three Field Manuals (FMs), FM 100-5, Operations, FM 100-10, 
Administration, and FM 100-15, Large Units. This subdivision of the Army’s core doctrine 
recognized the significant differences in the three functions the FMs described warranted 
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separate doctrine, while meaning the Army’s overarching doctrine now existed in the form of an 
FM (FM 100-5) rather than the FSR.412 
Perhaps most significantly, the timing of the approval of this new doctrine, and of the 
leadership changes that preceded it, cannot represent mere chance. McNair’s service first as chief 
of staff of 2nd Division overseeing the field tests of the triangular division, and then his 
assignment as Leavenworth commandant – followed shortly thereafter by Marshall’s selection as 
chief of staff – contributed directly to a comprehensive overhaul of Army organization and 
doctrine just as a major European war began with Germany’s invasion of Poland. These men, 
recognized as key innovators, led the effort to wrest the U.S. Army from its resource-constrained 
torpor and develop into a modern Army on par with the European ones that had left it behind in 
the 1920s and 1930s. 
However, approval of the 1939 FSR did not indicate the achievement of either consensus 
or consistency in U.S. Army doctrine. The new doctrine met considerable criticism from field 
units, who received the tentative FSR shortly after its approval, with guidance from Marshall 
directing commanders of large units to provide feedback on its contents. Criticism ranged from 
complaints about the review process to debates over branch-specific roles, missions, and 
procedures. The Army Air Corps rejected the manual because it did not identify them as an 
independent force, a debate raging on well into its second decade. The 1939 FSR did contain 
more similarities with its 1923 predecessor than differences, still highlighting the primacy of the 
infantry and relegating the other arms to support roles when many believed they could 
accomplish more if employed differently. Minor procedural differences did reflect new thinking 
based on reorganization of the infantry division and increased motorization. Nevertheless, the 
new doctrine begged the question why the Army had not learned more from its study, 
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particularly at the Army War College, of military developments in other countries, or sought 
more innovative ways to exploit the potential of mechanization and air power. In other ways, the 
doctrine reflected the inconsistency in views among the Army itself, such as the confusing 
descriptions of air power’s role, at once emphasizing the need for air-ground coordination while 
providing no guidance describing how units would employ close air support.413 
Kretchik argued another more fundamental reason explained the lack of support for the 
new doctrine. As the Army’s keystone doctrinal publication, in theory the FSR should have 
served as the guiding manual for the subordinate doctrine of the various arms. However, service 
schools still developed the tactics their own branches would employ, and the War Department 
did not enforce a review and approval process to ensure this doctrine conformed to the 
overarching concepts described in the FSR. Therefore, the arms and services could formally 
object to – or simply ignore – the War Department-issued doctrine and continue developing the 
methods they believed appropriate, leading to a divergence of views that publication of a new 
FSR could do little to curtail. In short, “Given differing priorities within the War Department and 
the schools, the various doctrinal manuals were not ‘nested’ with FM 100-5. The result was a 
keystone doctrine that failed to integrate the needs and missions of branch schools.”414  
Odom provided an assessment similar to Kretchik’s, pointing out that officer attendance 
at interwar military schools and the vibrant discourse in interwar branch journals refutes 
accusations of intellectual stagnation among the interwar Regular Army. Therefore, Odom also 
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concluded the lack of a system for developing doctrine represented the real problem.415 
Regardless, the new doctrine represented positive steps in updating a sixteen-year old FSR and in 
bringing Army doctrine more in line with organizational changes and technological advances 
since the World War. However, it took the Army’s overall rejection of the 1939 FSR, followed 
by Germany’s rapid and successful invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, to motivate true 
change in U.S. Army doctrine. Marshall once again called on McNair and his faculty to oversee 
the doctrinal update, setting January 1, 1941 as the due date for a new draft.416 
Much as he had done in his previous assignments, McNair achieved a great deal in a 
short period and his efforts benefited not only his unit, but also the entire Army. As part of his 
vitalizing the college faculty, he ordered “studies of instructional methods, grading and 
evaluation, and student satisfaction.” He used the results of surveys and input from the faculty to 
reverse a change in the grading system instituted by Brigadier General Edward King (with the 
approval of the War Department) in the late 1920s. Concerned about low student morale caused 
by the high-stress environment of competition for top-fifty percent class ranking (the key to 
selection for Army War College Attendance) and honor or distinguished graduate recognition 
(meaningless other than providing the student a sense of self-satisfaction), King dramatically 
changed the grading and evaluation systems. He eliminated quartile grade reports, adopting a 
pass/fail grading system instead, and gained War Department approval to provide end-of-course 
evaluations that rated students “superior,” “above average,” “average,” “below average,” or 
“marginal.” While the fifty percent cut still applied when selecting officers to attend the War 
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College, King believed this change significantly improved student morale, by rating students’ 
performance against a school standard, rather than against each other.417 
King may also have made these changes in reaction to critiques of the earlier grading 
system, adopted shortly after the war and much criticized in military journals and in the diaries 
and letters of many graduates. However, as Peter Schifferle reveals, some officers welcomed the 
competition, and even thrived in the stressful environment caused by quarterly grade reports and 
jockeying for class standing. When McNair surveyed the 1939-40 class, twenty-six percent of 
students requested more “pay problems” (graded practical exercises that applied to the total 
points attainable in the course and determined class standing), twenty-three percent responded 
the course should include fewer, and fifty-one percent judged the number about right. Ninety-
eight percent of students, when asked if the instructors graded the pay problems fairly and well, 
answered “yes.” Ninety-nine percent of students objected to peer evaluations without faculty 
supervision, and ninety-seven percent judged pay problems “fair” (as opposed to “unfair”) in 
measuring students’ ability to apply what they had learned. Based on these results, McNair 
recommended a return to the grading system King had replaced, but the following year he 
proposed abandoning the laborious tabulation of percentage grades in favor of a less laborious 
system in which students would receive a handful of letter grades at various stages of the course. 
However, the rapid pace of change as the nation assumed a mobilization footing delayed 
adoption of McNair’s letter-grading recommendation.418 
As McNair instituted change and generally raised the level of activity at CGSS, he also 
continued to develop the vital skills needed in a general officer. His role as CGSS commandant 
and post commander required him to interact with local community leaders, visiting dignitaries 
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from foreign armies, and particularly the media, who sensed the increasing pace of Army 
preparations for mobilization and sought any information they could get, particularly from senior 
leaders like McNair.419 
By late summer 1939, the pace of War Department preparations for mobilization 
accelerated to the point that senior Army leaders began to realize CGSS must prepare to produce 
more graduates than it could with its current one-year curriculum. In addition, the school needed 
to tailor the curriculum for the many National Guard officers expected to attend in preparation 
for mobilization, along with the many reserve officers who had received no military training 
since completing ROTC. Further, concurrent with changes enabling CGSS to increase the 
number of graduates, the curriculum required modification to prepare those graduates for the 
particular challenges of transforming mobilized Guardsmen and civilians into combat-ready 
military personnel. Marshall first addressed this topic with McNair in a letter dated August 16, 
1939:  
There is also another matter I want to suggest to you. That is the great advantage which 
would result from a shortening of the course at Leavenworth for National Guard and 
Reserve officers. It is always very difficult to get the type of man we want when he has to 
give up his business for three months. Confidentially, under the present system at 
Leavenworth, at Benning, and at other schools, a three months’ course is too apt to 
produce what might be termed ‘bread-ticket’ people. I know that your instructors will say 
that three months is the minimum time in which a satisfactory course of study can be 
given. Confidentially, for your eye alone, I’ll bet I could do everything they do and only 
take two months to do it in, if you wipe out certain unimportant details, and if the 
preparatory material sent in advance is carefully arranged toward the desired end.420 
McNair’s ongoing correspondence with Marshall and many initiatives to improve CGSS placed 
the course on a path toward preparedness for mobilization.  
The War Department’s announcement of a Protective Mobilization Period in the spring of 
1940, prompted by Germany’s defeat of Poland in the fall of 1939 and given new emphasis by 
                                                          
419 McNair Papers, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 
420 Bland, ed. Vol. 2, Marshall: "We Cannot Delay", 36-37; emphasis in the original. 
 
257 
their quick victory over France the following spring, finally compelled the War Department 
leadership to direct the implementation of an abbreviated CGSS. This decision required the early 
graduation of the 1940 class (shortened by two months), and the creation of a ten-week version 
of CGSS to maximize the number of officers who could attend the course (both by shortening the 
course and more than tripling class size). This generated much debate and consternation among 
the faculty. Fortunately, McNair had prepared Fort Leavenworth and CGSS for this possibility, 
and led the faculty through the transition effectively and with a minimum of disruption in 
training. McNair’s reorganization of the curriculum by staff section simplified the process of 
shortening the course, since officers could take only those portions of the course that taught skills 
unique to their area of specialty. Undoubtedly, the abbreviated course lacked the 
comprehensiveness of the full-year version, and officers who had attended the full-year version 
felt prepared to assume any general staff duties – not just those related to a specific staff 
function. Nevertheless, the course proved far more effective due to the energy and focus McNair 
brought to the college than it would have had Marshall not foreseen the need to assign a first-rate 
officer to Fort Leavenworth the previous year, to update the school’s curriculum and teaching 
methods.421 
Significant obstacles still stood in the way of forming a well-trained and properly 
equipped Army guided by an internally consistent doctrine. The abbreviation of CGSS limited 
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Marshall’s ability to address one of his particular concerns. He remained convinced the Army 
Air Corps (AAC) could not provide effective aerial support to ground forces unless its officers 
thoroughly understood land operations. Marshall wrote to McNair on January 24, 1940, after 
visiting the western maneuvers and the Air Corps Tactical School, to describe measures he 
intended to take to resolve this problem:  
I was again impressed with the importance of developing every means to give the Air Corps an 
understanding of the ground army. I completed the tentative arrangements while en route to have 
the class of 300 flying cadets who finish at Kelly Field in the first of April attached for six weeks 
to the headquarters of companies, batteries, battalions and regiments of all the troops which are to 
participate in [future large-scale] maneuvers.  
Marshall also mentioned “trying to make a similar arrangement for the class at the Air Corps 
Tactical School,” and seeking to modify the future AAC officer’s career path so they served at 
least one year in a large unit of the ground forces before beginning service in the AAC. With the 
basic structure of the triangular infantry division worked out, reports of German combined arms 
effectiveness in Poland made settling the dispute over air power’s support to ground forces one 
of the highest priority issues the Army faced.422 
Beginning in the 1920s the AAC had increasingly sought independence from the ground 
forces, which it believed did not understand or support the full development of air power’s 
potential. A significant divergence took place in the late 1930s, when the AAC abandoned the 
development of ground support aircraft entirely. It had experimented with such aircraft for most 
of the decade, purchasing 156 single-engine attack aircraft between 1932 and 1936 designed with 
weapons ideal for the support of ground forces. However, the AAC began in 1939 to phase out 
single-engine ground support aircraft in favor of twin-engine light bombers, even as Germany 
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prepared to use ground support aviation as an integral element of its combined arms team with 
great success in its upcoming campaigns in Poland and France.423  
Marshall saw the divergence of ground force and air corps views firsthand in his 
interactions with leaders at the maneuvers and schools he visited, prompting him to seek these 
changes in AAC officer career management to help them understand their role in supporting the 
ground forces.424 Unfortunately, the abbreviation of CGSS and acceleration of the mobilization 
effort a few months later prevented implementation of Marshall’s initiatives, and U.S. Army 
doctrine continued to describe a significant ground support role for the AAC that it had no 
intention or capability to provide.425 As Richard Muller points out in Military Innovation in the 
Interwar Period,  
while the development of the medium bomber was in many ways a successful and worthwhile 
endeavor, it did little to provide reliable air support to the ground forces. Proponents of attack 
aviation embraced the broader definition of their mission [twin-engine aircraft like the Curtiss A-
10 and the Douglas A-20 ‘were less suited for close air support than for missions such as deep 
interdiction and attacks on enemy airfields] as a means of preserving attack’s distinct identity. 
This development coincided with the emphasis on the long-range bomber and the air superiority 
mission within the GHQ Air Force.426 
Marshall had similar concerns about the lack of progress in the development of both 
armor and antitank defense capability. Chief of Staff MacArthur had disbanded the experimental 
Mechanized Force in 1931, after only one year in existence, to allay fears among the infantry and 
cavalry that armor might gain autonomy as a separate and coequal arm. Therefore, throughout 
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the 1930s the infantry and cavalry each independently experimented with armor (which the 
cavalry called “combat cars” to circumvent the 1920 NDA’s provision that infantry retained full 
control over tank development). Making matters worse, the Chief of Ordnance retained authority 
over technical design and production, meaning either branch could request certain design 
specifications in future tank or combat cars, but Ordnance could modify these specifications as 
they saw fit before producing and delivering the new prototypes. Therefore, by 1939 there still 
existed no consensus either on the role of the tank or on its optimal design, although the infantry 
and cavalry did agree on one issue – American tanks’ primary mission would not involve direct 
engagement of enemy tanks. The former viewed the tank as an infantry support vehicle, while 
the latter viewed the combat car as a system that enabled the cavalry to conduct its traditional 
missions of reconnaissance, pursuit, envelopment, and exploitation on the modern battlefield. 
They did agree on one thing – the Army should develop light, fast tanks – although to serve very 
different purposes, none of which involved direct combat with enemy tanks.427 
This meant the ground forces needed an effective means of antitank defense, but the 
Army had made even less progress by 1940 in this area than it had in tank development. In fact, 
the triangular division possessed only sixty 37-mm guns – its only antitank weapon other than 
the .50-caliber machine gun – drawn from the pool of German 1936-model guns reproduced in 
1937. The Chief of Infantry, the proponent for antitank development, had completely neglected 
this responsibility, while the Field Artillery, whose units possessed forty percent of the Army’s 
antitank weapons, devoted only six pages to mechanized defense in its basic instructional 
manual. The antiaircraft artillery also refused adopt the antitank role as one of its assigned 
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missions, even though it possessed weapons with far greater potential to fulfill that role than the 
37-mm. 
Therefore, during his tour at Fort Leavenworth McNair remained one of the few Army 
officers devoting significant intellectual effort to this capability shortfall, perhaps due to his 
involvement in the PID tests, when he convinced the War Department that the redesigned 
division’s infantry regiments required antitank companies. Upon his assignment as commandant 
at Fort Leavenworth, McNair directed a faculty review of antitank methods, which led to the 
publication of Antimechanized Defense (Tentative) in 1939, an instructional manual that filled a 
gap in the CGSS curriculum. This study also formed the basis of McNair’s thinking in 1940 
regarding antitank defense.428  
As Peter Schifferle described in America’s School for War, in just over a year as 
commandant, McNair 
set Leavenworth on the road to a wartime instruction system. McNair changed the basic system of 
instruction from exposure to command and general staff concepts to a focus on staff skills. This 
focused system of instruction had been the hallmark of Langres, which McNair understood from 
his service in the . . . AEF headquarters. And, because McNair had also been a member of the 
inaugural faculty in 1919-1920, discussions about the form of instruction at Langres were 
undoubtedly one of the topics debated among the instructors. After mobilization, McNair’s 
consultations with the War Department, coupled with the mobilization of National Guard 
divisions, resulted in combining the regular army course with the reserve component courses, 
shortening the course length to nine weeks, and organizing students and instruction by specific 
staff section. By the time of McNair’s departure in October 1940, the system for the first special 
course was in place.429 
McNair met Marshall’s expectations as commandant, placing Leavenworth on a war footing 
while revitalizing the faculty, updating instructional and grading methods, refocusing the 
curriculum on development of staff skills and logically organizing the faculty by general staff 
section, and quickly establishing an abbreviated course when the need arose. Nevertheless, the 
secondary literature – when it mentions McNair at all – remains dominated by oversimplified, 
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highly critical, and unsubstantiated assertions like that of David E. Johnson, who concluded in 
Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers that in his year at Fort Leavenworth, “McNair accomplished 
little.”430 
In the summer of 1940 Marshall called once again on McNair, this time to report to a new 
headquarters forming in Washington to oversee the Army’s rapidly accelerating efforts to 
prepare for war. McNair’s imminent reassignment meant he could not see the revision of the FSR 
through to the end. However, Germany’s defeat of France in the spring of 1940 proved the 
effectiveness of its combined arms tactics against even a first-rate opponent, prompting Marshall 
to call for more extreme measures to modernize the Army. He approved on June 6, 1940 a plan 
to consolidate all armor development under a new organization, the experimental Armored Force 
led by Brigadier General Adna R. Chaffee (a cavalry officer), hoping to overcome the continued 
divergence of views regarding tank design and employment between the infantry and cavalry. He 
also directed McNair to plan for a series of army-level maneuvers in 1941 to test the updated 
version of the FSR he expected to approve early that year, to evaluate the true potential of 
mechanization and test the integration of air power into the combined arms team. While McNair 
departed Leavenworth before completion of the new draft FSR, he continued to contribute to its 
development as part of the Army’s modernization process in his new assignment, continuing 
along the trajectory begun during his key role in the reorganization of the infantry division in 
1937-38.431 
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McNair’s efficiency reports from his year as commandant at Fort Leavenworth reflect not 
only the continuation of his exceptional performance, but also the high level of responsibility he 
had reached, with a corps area commander rating his performance as post commander, and the 
Army chief of staff rating him as CGSS commandant. His first report only covered the period 
from April 6 to July 1 1939, but he still received “superior” ratings in all categories from Malin 
Craig, who ranked him second out of forty-six brigadier generals he knew. Craig judged McNair 
qualified for corps command in the event of war, despite his hearing loss (which he did not even 
mention on the efficiency report), and described him as “A superior officer of superior value to 
the service.” His rater, Major General P. P. Bishop, commander of the Seventh Corps Area, 
ranked McNair fifth out of the thirty-one brigadier generals he knew at the time of this first 
report, and he, like Craig, ranked McNair superior in all areas, and recommended him for 
division or corps command in combat.432  
McNair’s final efficiency report, covering the period July 2, 1939 to July 1, 1940, 
demonstrates how much his accomplishments at Leavenworth increased his already high 
reputation. By this point, War Department policy waived efficiency reports for officers directly 
supervised by the Army chief of staff. However, Bishop, the corps area commander, rated 
McNair’s performance as post commander in a report in which he now ranked McNair first 
among all brigadier generals he knew. This fit a longstanding pattern of superior performance in 
a wide variety of extremely demanding positions, and set McNair apart as one of the Army’s 
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most capable officers, destined to serve in positions of even greater responsibility as events in 
Europe unfolded.433 
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Mobilizing the Army 
Having accomplished a major transformation of CGSS and, continuing to influence the 
modernization of U.S. Army doctrine, organization, and equipment, McNair departed Fort 
Leavenworth for his new duties in Washington, D.C., where he reported for duty on August 3, 
1940. In ways strikingly similar to 1917, America found itself far from prepared in 1940 to 
engage in the rapidly accelerating European war. While the Regular Army had attempted 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s to modernize in step with developments in military theory and 
technology, it mostly succeeded only in the intellectual development of the Regular Army officer 
corps, for the Army’s leaders found their hands once again tied by personnel and budget 
constraints until a crisis emerged. This observation highlights both the most significant similarity 
and the most notable difference in America’s readiness to mobilize before the two World Wars.  
While some historians have placed a great deal of blame on branch bias and doctrinal 
debates for the Army’s low level of readiness before both wars, one must balance the 
significance of those issues with that of America’s failure to prepare for industrial mobilization 
to arrive at a complete understanding of the obstacles the nation faced. America’s isolationist 
stance led it to focus in the period before each war on defense of the nation from attack, rather 
than major expeditionary military operations. This resulted in the lack of a system of organized 
reserves to augment the small Regular Army, and a flat-footed industrial stance that drastically 
slowed the mobilization process before both wars. These issues would have limited the readiness 
of even the most well-trained and equipped military force, particularly given America’s tradition 
of maintaining a small Regular Army in times of peace. Nevertheless, most histories of the 
World Wars – even those that recognized these issues – tended to emphasize military 
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organization, doctrine, and training as reasons for challenges in mobilizing and preparing to 
fight.  
These unquestionably represent significant issues, but they pale in comparison to the lack 
of preparation to mobilize, deploy, and sustain a large-scale military force. The major difference 
in the U.S. Army’s preparedness for World War II – the significant improvements in the officer 
education system during the interwar period – gave the Army a pool of highly trained and 
professional officers to shoulder the burden of Army training, organization, and doctrine 
development. This facilitated a more effective mobilization process in 1940-41; however, 
intellectual preparation can only go so far if a nation must build a modern army out of masses of 
untrained recruits formed around a tiny core of Regular Army personnel, and call upon industry 
to provide rapidly the means to equip and sustain that force. 
The fall of France made England, the European nation with which America held the 
closest affinity, Germany’s most likely next target. This forced the U.S. Government to 
acknowledge it must begin preparations to engage to some degree in this new war. Once again, 
the government raced to make up for lost time. The Roosevelt administration authorized 
protective mobilization while facing public resistance to American involvement in the war. In the 
midst of this turmoil, senior Army leaders focused on those things they could control – Army 
organization, doctrine, and training. They identified Lesley McNair as one of the men most 
capable of helping lead the Army’s mobilization. Given the centrality of his role in this process, 
histories of the Second World War have often mentioned McNair’s efforts. However, these 
histories have tended to focus on matters within the Army’s, and presumably McNair’s scope of 
responsibility and control, while neglecting the significance of the mobilization challenges the 
Army faced but lacked the ability to influence.  
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As described above, McNair served in all of America’s major military conflicts after his 
graduation from West Point in 1904, and he played a key role in several of the U.S. Army’s most 
important peacetime innovation efforts. However, he rarely appears in studies of the pre-1940 
Army, probably due to the lack of any detailed analysis of his long career, the records of which 
remained mostly unexplored, filed away in various archives. McNair emerged from this 
obscurity due to the convergence of his rise to senior leadership in the Army, and America’s 
imminent involvement the rapidly growing conflict in Europe and a potential conflict with Japan 
as well. However, the lack of detailed research about his early career meant these histories could 
only offer superficial analyses of McNair’s qualifications for and performance in the wartime 
positions he held. 
The inadequate scholarly assessment of the previous thirty-six years of McNair’s career, 
combined with the failure to acknowledge the extent of the nation’s industrial mobilization 
challenges, has resulted in a historical record that paints a somewhat one-sided picture of both 
McNair’s efforts and the WWII Army’s fighting ability. One sees this most often in the vast 
profusion of studies of U.S. military effectiveness that began to appear in the early 1990s, as the 
Department of Defense (DOD) began to pursue a transformation program intended to streamline 
and modernize the U.S. military. The Army found itself a particular target of this modernization 
program due to the perception that its units relied too much on heavy equipment, making them 
slow to deploy. The Army initially proved reluctant to embrace the DOD Transformation effort. 
Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki finally endorsed Transformation in 1999, perhaps because he 
realized the Army risked growing irrelevant in the perception of key leaders in DOD and the 
federal government.434  
                                                          




In keeping with the DOD program’s central tenets, Shinseki sought through “Army 
Transformation” to maintain relevance in a rapidly changing joint force by leveraging 
technology to create a leaner, more readily deployable, yet increasingly lethal Army. Debates 
regarding the feasibility of Army Transformation, a modernization program largely based on the 
advertised potential of technologies not yet fielded or even developed fully, led to a profusion of 
new histories, articles, government research projects, and other studies of organizational change 
and Army effectiveness. Many of these works included historical analyses of the two decade-
long interwar period between the end of World War I and beginning of World War II as case 
studies for comparison to the current initiatives. This led to the publication of many critical 
analyses of the combat effectiveness of the U.S. Army that fought World War II, and of the 
Army’s modernization efforts during the interwar period. Taken as a whole, authors often 
presented that period as comparable to the Army Transformation era and the likely effectiveness 
of the Army it would produce.435 Given his role in the mobilization and training of the Army that 
fought World War II, McNair often featured in these studies, although they rarely exhibited 
thorough research of his career before 1940. Instead, most of these studies merely presented 
snapshots of McNair’s actions during the period from 1940-44, identifying their supposed causal 
linkage to Army effectiveness, while lacking the historical context necessary to enable the reader 
to evaluate them critically. 
Many of the analyses of “Army Transformation” that appeared near the turn of the 
century not only sought to identify similarities in the Army’s interwar modernization efforts to 
support their views – they also often embraced the accepted wisdom embodied in the existing 
literature on the U.S. Army in World War II. These works selectively referenced the historical 
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record to support critiques of specific topics related to Army Transformation. Because of 
McNair’s important role in Army organization and mobilization training after 1940, he offered 
name recognition value and frequently served as a target for the perceived shortcomings of the 
rapidly expanding Army of 1940, and its often-criticized effectiveness in the coming years.436 In 
an effort to support critiques of Army Transformation, many studies simply oversimplified or 
misrepresented the historical record, or accepted decades-old analyses as objective fact. 
The following analysis, which due to space limitations cannot provide a comprehensive 
narrative of America’s involvement in World War II, or even most aspects of McNair’s role in 
that global conflict, seeks to restore balance to historical understanding of McNair’s efforts to 
prepare the U.S. Army for war by acknowledging both McNair’s missteps and his achievements. 
Balancing military analysis of McNair’s performance with the effects of isolationist national 
policy and slow industrial mobilization illustrates many of the misperceptions that still exist in 
the accepted wisdom concerning U.S. Army effectiveness during the war. An increasing number 
of historians, many cited here, are working to overturn this flawed narrative. This study seeks to 
add weight to this body of work while increasing modern historical understanding of Lesley 
McNair’s particular contributions.  
Chief of Staff, General Headquarters, 1940-1942 
On August 3, 1940, McNair reported to Washington to serve as Chief of Staff, General 
Headquarters (GHQ). The War Department activated GHQ on July 26 to facilitate a rapid and 
effective mobilization process by taking responsibility for the organization, training, and 
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equipping of all field forces within the continental United States. Originally conceived in the 
aftermath of World War I, the War Department consciously modeled GHQ after General 
Pershing’s AEF staff. Upon its formation in 1940, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson appointed 
George C. Marshall GHQ commander, a position that included the title Commanding General, 
Field Forces (although the president retained responsibility for selection of an expeditionary 
force commander, should the need arise). Recognizing the challenge of serving simultaneously 
as Army Chief of Staff and GHQ commander, Marshall selected McNair to serve as Chief of 
Staff of GHQ and initially gave GHQ responsibility for training the Field Forces – a role 
Pershing had performed when preparing the AEF for war twenty years earlier. McNair 
established GHQ headquarters at the Army War College, enjoying both geographic distance and 
relative autonomy from the War Department General Staff and Marshall, who, according to the 
Army’s official history, “freely delegated authority over training to General McNair.”437  
The official history recorded the fact that Marshall did not visit GHQ headquarters 
(located at the former home of the Army War College) until early 1941, more than six months 
after its formation, but it also documented the frequent and detailed correspondence between 
Marshall and McNair. A review of this correspondence reveals McNair sought Marshall’s 
approval before he made any significant decisions, and frequently received unsolicited guidance 
from Marshall regarding the conduct of his duties at GHQ, much of which dealt with relatively 
minor issues – ones Marshall would have left for McNair to handle had he intended to give him 
the full autonomy some historians suggest. 438  
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For example, on August 16, 1939, Marshall wrote to McNair to express his concerns 
about McNair’s recommended replacements for departing CGSS instructors: 
In looking over your recommendations for replacements of instructors I notice the names of 
former instructors included in the list. I have no intention of reneging on my assurance that you 
would be given a free hand in the solution of your problems, but I do want to call your attention 
to the fact that to recall an officer as an instructor, and not to a conspicuous key position, does 
serve to penalize the individual, and what seems to me of more importance, does further the 
continuation of old non-realistic methods to which there seems to be so much current objection. I 
suggest that it would be a good idea, and fairer to the officers, to ascertain informally whether 
they desire the re-detail.439 
This letter demonstrates that despite his chaotic schedule and wide range of responsibilities, 
Marshall made time to review and comment on even minor administrative issues that fell under 
McNair’s jurisdiction. Further, in 1939, just as is the case today, a wise officer understood one 
does not disregard lightly a suggestion from the Army Chief of Staff, and Marshall’s 
correspondence with McNair included many more letters like the one above. This 
correspondence demonstrates that Marshall regularly intervened in matters within McNair’s area 
of responsibility, and McNair, ever the loyal subordinate, followed Marshall’s orders or advice, 
even regarding relatively insignificant matters.440 
McNair’s autonomy and influence also decreased as events unfolded over the coming 
years. Other organizations took on responsibility for various aspects of the mobilization process 
that directly affected McNair’s training duties. For example, the War Department G-4 logistics 
section retained authority over corps area commanders with respect to logistical matters, limiting 
GHQ’s control over the billeting, equipping, and supply of mobilizing units about to undergo 
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induction training. Even after the formation of GHQ, the War Department continued to serve as 
Marshall’s primary staff, and in this role Marshall’s staff adjudicated differences of opinion 
between GHQ, military and civilian mobilization leaders, and later, deployed unit 
commanders.441 Therefore, McNair represented only one voice, albeit a familiar and powerful 
one, in a cacophony of views espoused by individuals and organizations attempting to influence 
Marshall’s decisions regarding the Army’s mobilization process.442  
Shortly after assuming his new role at GHQ, McNair made a proposal to streamline 
mobilization efforts by establishing unity of command over the four field armies and eight corps 
areas. McNair’s proposal involved viewing the Zone of Interior as a theater of operations, with 
corps area headquarters taking over responsibility for all administrative functions, thereby 
freeing up armies, corps, and divisions to focus on organizing, training, and administering troop 
units. This would remove the field armies from the control of corps area commanders and place 
them under the direct command of GHQ, with the goal, in McNair’s words, of developing “the 
field forces into a unified whole – GHQ troops and four armies – free to move strategically and 
capable of prompt and effective tactical action. Thus it would be possible to move an army when 
and where directed by a simple order.” However, even though Marshall initially supported 
McNair’s proposal, and it fit GHQ’s role in existing war plans, members of the War Department 
General Staff resisted the proposal, and Marshall heeded their advice.443 
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This left McNair subject to constraints imposed on him by Marshall’s staff, who often 
favored the branch-specific views of various Army leaders and school commandants. McNair 
also frequently struggled with GHQ’s subordinate commanders being distracted from their 
primary mission of unit training because they remained under corps area control. That forced 
them to deal with administrative matters senior corps area representatives would have handled if 
GHQ exercised unity of command. The War Department also ensured that unit commanders 
understood the limits placed on GHQ’s authority once it abandoned the concept of GHQ as a 
theater command responsible for the Zone of the Interior. As described in the Army’s official 
history,  
In December 1940 the War Department found it necessary to remind the commanders of units 
placed under GHQ for training that only those communications which dealt with training should 
pass through the Chief of Staff, GHQ. ‘In the past,’ the letter ran, ‘the Chief of Staff has exercised 
his functions as commander of the Field Forces through the War Department. GHQ is the agency 
through which he would exercise command over such forces in an emergency. For the present, 
however, the recently formed GHQ will be concerned only with the direction and supervision of 
training of the Field Forces, exclusive of overseas garrisons. The War Department will continue 
to be the agency through which command, except for training, will be exercised.’444 
Marshall gave due consideration to McNair’s advice, which he clearly respected and valued, but 
he limited his authority significantly, weighed McNair’s advice in contrast to often conflicting 
advice from his staff at the War Department, and always retained the final decision. While 
Marshall did delegate responsibility for mobilization training to McNair, realizing he could not 
alone effectively accomplish the responsibilities of both Army chief of staff and GHQ 
commander, accounts that state or imply McNair enjoyed complete freedom of action 
misrepresent the actual situation. McNair enjoyed only limited authority from the start, and 
watched it dwindle over time. Further, as Stephen Taaffe has pointed out, “once the army began 
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deploying overseas . . . Marshall more and more relied upon the suggestions of various American 
theater commanders.”445 
U.S. Army personnel policy, equipment, and doctrine, the concepts of streamlining, 
pooling, and task organization that McNair championed throughout his career, and the central 
elements of his training philosophy generated fierce debate among senior Army leaders 
throughout the mobilization period.446 The following analysis focuses on these primary issues, 
analyzing them first from the perspective of the challenges McNair faced at GHQ between 1940-
42, and then evaluating how effectively McNair and his staff overcame these challenges during 
his tenure as Commander, Army Ground Forces from 1942-44. This analysis sheds new light on 
both McNair’s achievements and missteps, all of which took place under the pressure of the 
many constraints that limited his ability to prepare the Army for war. It also offers a balanced 
assessment of his efforts and those of his peers by facilitating a reevaluation of the performance 
of American troops once they engaged in combat operations. This reevaluation supports the 
growing awareness that the Army did not enjoy success during WWII due solely to materiel 
superiority over its adversaries. Instead, the Army achieved remarkable combat effectiveness 
given the many challenges it faced in mobilizing for war. That achievement largely resulted from 
the effective training units underwent before deployment, and the resulting foundation in sound 
doctrine that served as the basis for their adaptation to the realities of combat. 
McNair approached his new responsibilities at GHQ with the energy and determination 
Marshall had come to expect, setting high expectations for himself while working tirelessly to 
streamline mobilization procedures to support the exponential growth of the Army. McNair 
faced an enormous task upon his arrival at GHQ on August 3, 1940, beginning with his 
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observation over the next few months of the maneuvers conducted by the First Army and the 
newly formed Armored Force under Brigadier General Adna R. Chaffee. McNair noted 
numerous individual and unit-level training deficiencies during these maneuvers. This impressed 
upon him the difficulty he would face preparing the Regular Army for the stress of combat while 
inculcating in them the Army’s latest doctrine and organization and preparing them to oversee 
the training of recently mobilized National Guard personnel and raw recruits. McNair’s 
observations of these maneuvers served as the foundation for his plans for a series of large-scale 
maneuvers scheduled to take place in 1941.447 
Upon the formation of GHQ, the Field Forces comprised fewer than 200,000 personnel, 
including eight infantry divisions, one division of armor, and slightly more than one division of 
cavalry, all understrength and each marginally trained and equipped. Just one year later, the 
Army had grown in size to 1,400,000 officers and soldiers. Despite the resulting magnitude of 
GHQ’s responsibilities, McNair remained determined to keep his staff small. GHQ initially 
comprised only seven officers, augmented previous members of the War College faculty. His 
staff grew to only sixty-four officers in its first year of existence, even though the War 
Department authorized 156 and added in July 1941 responsibility for planning and command of 
military operations in the event of an attack against the United States.448  
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This partly reflected McNair’s belief in keeping staffs small and efficient, rather than 
allowing bloat and bureaucracy to limit their effectiveness and keep talented officers on staffs 
when they could contribute far more in command positions. However, it also resulted from the 
clamor for commanders and staff officers for newly formed units, many of whom came from the 
War Department General Staff and other staffs and schools. This limited the pool of officers 
from which to draw on to increase the size of the GHQ staff, even had McNair desired such an 
increase. This also meant many of the officers who developed and understood existing war plans 
left their staff positions just as the time approached to put them in practice. Marshall’s policy of 
placing youthful officers in important positions, which led him to assign only officers below fifty 
years of age to GHQ, did help McNair keep his staff small by ensuring its members possessed 
high energy and innovative minds.449 Nevertheless, the GHQ staff found itself increasingly 
overstretched by its growing responsibilities.450 In the midst of these transitions, Marshall 
recommended McNair’s promotion to the temporary rank of major general, which occurred on 
December 1, 1940, commensurate with his increased level of responsibility.451 
One of the first officers assigned to GHQ, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Clark, arrived in 
Washington shortly after the headquarters’ formation, only to discover McNair had already 
departed Washington to observe units conducting field training. As Ely Kahn noted, although 
“sometimes called the most intellectual of generals, McNair preferred being in the field to sitting 
at a desk.” Finding air transport of his own, Clark tracked McNair down at Pine Camp, New 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Greenfield, "Memorandum of Conversations with Maj. Gen. Harry J. Malony, Hq 94th Division," 10 
January 1944, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, RG 319, Box 123. 
449 McNair disdained large staffs and the inertia their administrative requirements caused; see 
Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, 12; Kahn, McNair, 
Educator of an Army, 21. 
450 Greenfield, Palmer, and Wiley, The Organization of Ground Combat Troops, 26-30. 
451 War Department Adjutant General, "Promotion Orders and Oath of Office for Promotion to 
Major General (Temporary)," December 1, 1940, McNair Papers, National Archives and Records 
Administration, St. Louis, MO. 
 
277 
York observing the First Army conducting maneuvers. As McNair’s G-3 Operations Officer, and 
later his Executive Officer, Clark enjoyed a degree of access to McNair that far exceeded that of 
most GHQ staff officers. Therefore, he observed McNair’s highly respected work ethic and 
dedication to duty first hand, flying over 80,000 miles with him in just one year to observe unit 
training and oversee GHQ maneuvers across the continental United States. This lengthy and 
near-continuous exposure to McNair led Clark to hold him in such high regard that he termed 
him in his autobiography published ten years later as “one of the most brilliant, selfless and 
devoted soldiers” he had ever encountered.452  
Mark Clark also soon learned that McNair suffered significant hearing loss, probably 
resulting from his decades of service in the field artillery. While McNair made up for this 
disability in part by reading lips, it did create challenges for him. He generally disliked attending 
large conferences – a responsibility he increasingly delegated to his subordinates – and he 
preferred to do most of his work alone, interacting with only a few trusted agents on his staff to 
whom he delegated the responsibility of overseeing day-to-day operations. His hearing loss also 
appears to have been a factor in his being passed over for field command during the war.453 
Nevertheless, Marshall recognized the immensity of the tasks he had assigned to McNair, and 
praised the skill and determination with which McNair and his staff sought to accomplish them. 
Writing to Lieutenant General Charles D. Herron on October 29, 1940, Marshall admitted: 
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“McNair has taken a considerable load off my shoulders, but is having a pretty hard time 
himself. He has a ten-passenger plane and he and his staff are on the go almost constantly.”454 
John T. Whitaker wrote a series of articles profiling several of the Army’s most senior 
officers for the Saturday Evening Post, entitled “These are the Generals,” later compiled and 
published as a book. In his piece on McNair, Whitaker provided insight into McNair’s character 
and work ethic during these early days overseeing Army mobilization training at GHQ. While 
long, the following passage deserves repeating for the insight Whitaker provided regarding the 
personality and work habits of the rather enigmatic McNair: 
That is why the mild-mannered general with the blue eyes and sandy hair is hell on "metallic 
generals." A "metallic general" is described as a gentleman who has silver in his hair, gold in his 
teeth and lead in his pants. McNair is the man who turns them in for scrap. If you have a son or 
husband in uniform, you may owe his welfare or even his survival to "Whitey" McNair. "It's plain 
murder," says the general, "to send boys into battle under incompetent officers. You can't live 
with your conscience and you can't win that way." Nevertheless, McNair claims that he has never 
sacked an officer without giving him a chance to make good elsewhere. The general can be so 
ruthless in making and breaking careers only because the word "favoritism " is not in his 
vocabulary. He has scrapped personal friends and at least one West Point classmate. On his own 
staff there is only one officer whom he has known or leaned on before—Brig. Gen. John M. 
Lentz, from the artillery, which is McNair's own service. Unlike other ranking generals, McNair 
did not ask for individual officers he had known and liked. He asked the engineers, artillery. 
Signal Corps, and the like, to send him officers with certain qualifications. The qualifications are 
purely military. McNair doesn't care about an officer's bridge game or his wife's social 
connections. He has told his own wife that during this war they can accept exactly one dinner 
engagement a month. "And just think," she says with a rueful smile," of the wonderful invitations 
pouring in. I refuse them all. The general works every night. He is true to Elsie." "Elsie" is the 
name the McNairs have given the L. C. Smith typewriter which rests on a packing case beside the 
general's bed. He pecks away long after taps.455 
Perhaps McNair’s consistently long workdays explain the lack of personal letters or diaries in the 
historical record. One must rely on accounts like Whitaker’s and Khan’s accounts, or interviews 
of officers who served with McNair, to gain an understanding of his personal views and the way 
he interacted with his staff. Fortunately, many archival records, some seemingly previously 
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neglected or unknown, reveal much about McNair that historians might otherwise never have 
had a chance to learn.456 
One of McNair’s most significant responsibilities upon his arrival at GHQ consisted of 
planning the army-level maneuvers scheduled to take place throughout 1941. Marshall and 
McNair intended these maneuvers to increase the proficiency of Regular Army personnel 
conducting large unit operations, to test the updated FSR and the experimental armored and 
mechanized cavalry divisions, and to prepare the Regular Army to train the many National 
Guard units and conscripts that would mobilize over the coming months. However, the Army 
lacked previous experience conducting such large-scale maneuvers and that caused, their 
planning to be particularly challenging. 
As historian Christopher Gabel described in his preeminent work, The U.S. Army GHQ 
Maneuvers of 1941, most European armies possessed a long tradition of conducting large-scale 
maneuvers. Gabel cited Frederick the Great as a particularly relevant example, since he enjoyed 
a significant advantage at the Battle of Leuthen, although heavily outnumbered, because he had 
previously used the same ground for his annual maneuvers. By contrast, the U.S. Army had no 
such tradition, mostly because it rarely possessed an active duty force large enough to warrant 
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maneuvers, and those it had conducted in the past never reached the scale of those planned for 
1941.457 
Remembering the AEF’s costly frontal attacks and difficulty conducting the open warfare 
Pershing envisioned, Marshall and McNair intended to prepare the Army in advance for the 
possibility of another war – one they expected to take place primarily under open warfare 
conditions due to the significant technological advances of the previous two decades. Congress 
authorized funds for the “Protective Mobilization Period” after Germany invaded Poland in the 
fall of 1939, and increased funding even more upon Germany’s victories in France, Holland, 
Denmark, and Norway the following spring. This resulted in an eightfold increase in the size of 
the Army, which grew to a force of 1,200,000 by late 1941. This enabled the War Department to 
field thirty-three divisions, providing the units needed to conduct large-scale maneuvers. 
However, as Christopher Gabel pointed out, “The Army that had once had the time to modernize 
but not the money now had the money but not the time.”458 The 1941 maneuvers revealed the 
impact of these time constraints in areas including individual soldier skills, leader proficiency, 
weapons development and availability, and gaps between doctrine and practice resulting from 
various unresolved debates.459 
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Between 1940 and mid-1941 key military and political leaders began to see flaws in the 
nation’s primary strategy for a modern war that added to the complexity of the mobilization 
problem and drastically slowed down the process. This strategy, developed and refined over the 
previous two decades and encapsulated in War Plan Orange, envisioned a Japanese attack on 
U.S. territories in the Pacific or against the U.S. West Coast, requiring a response primarily by 
naval forces with the main effort in the Pacific. As Jim Lacey described in Keep from all 
Thoughtful Men – a book that seeks to overturn the accepted wisdom regarding military and 
industrial strategic planning prior to World War II – War Plan Orange did not fit the actual 
situation in which America found itself in 1940. After Germany defeated Poland in 1939 and 
France in 1940, American strategic planners anticipated Germany would next set its sights on 
Great Britain. This made Europe and the Atlantic a far more significant strategic concern than 
the Pacific. Both General Marshall and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold R. Stark 
grasped the inapplicability of War Plan Orange to the current situation, and realized the defeat of 
Great Britain by Germany would leave the United States in an extremely vulnerable strategic 
situation.460 
By June 1940, Marshall observed at a strategic planning conference, “Are we not forced 
into reframing our naval policy, into one that is purely defensive in the Pacific, with the main 
effort in the Atlantic?” This matched Stark’s viewpoint, and by November he sent a plan to 
Marshall, who concurred and forwarded it to the president, recommending this adjustment in 
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national strategy, to which President Roosevelt gave his tacit approval. This new plan, known as 
Plan Dog and later integrated into the Navy and Joint Rainbow 5 Plan, included one particularly 
relevant insight – defeat of Germany would require, in Stark’s words, “military success on 
shore.” This led to the logical conclusion that, since Great Britain did not possess the strength to 
defeat Germany on land, ultimate victory would require the intervention of U.S. ground 
forces.461  
This shift made decades of strategic war planning obsolete and also highlighted the fact 
that existing strategic plans lacked a realistic analysis of the demands the military would place on 
industry if called upon to mobilize and deploy forces to fight a war with the main effort in 
Europe. Therefore, America did not merely have to change its military strategy – a challenging 
task but one that at least had the rainbow plans to build upon. Instead, American strategists faced 
the far greater challenge of creating an integrated industrial mobilization plan based on an 
unanticipated strategic situation. Without such a plan, industrial leaders could not develop plans 
to equip and supply the Army, or even project how soon the Army could feasibly begin to 
undertake ground combat operations in Europe if necessary. Michael Matheny highlighted the 
increased emphasis on logistics considerations in the Army War College curriculum throughout 
the 1920s and 1930s, and made a strong case for the resulting improvement in senior military 
leaders’ appreciation for the importance of logistics in the execution of campaigns – a key 
element of operational art. However, Lacey argued Army War College instruction of future 
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senior Army leaders did little to prepare civilian industrial leaders for the actual requirements the 
military would place on them in time of war.462  
Even the Industrial Staff College, founded in 1924, failed to prepare the nation for the 
industrial mobilization required to support possible future offensive operations, despite 
graduating over 1,000 senior officers by 1941. James Lacey has argued both schools failed in 
this mission for a common reason: their instruction rested on the assumption the nation would 
implement the Industrial Mobilization Plan (IMP) developed after World War I (WWI) and 
updated periodically ever since. The IMP placed all responsibility for leading the nation’s 
industrial mobilization effort in military officers’ hands. When the time came to begin industrial 
mobilization, President Roosevelt scrapped the IMP, primarily because he refused to consider 
placing such responsibility in the hands of military officers, rather than the civilian leaders of 
U.S. industry and economic development. Therefore, when protective mobilization began in 
1940, the Army struggled to create a proficient and well-equipped expeditionary military force in 
the absence of a feasible national strategy or industrial mobilization plan – a shortfall 
unrecognized for months, and one that delayed Army readiness significantly. 
The Army’s rapid expansion in the absence of a viable national strategy created 
innumerable difficulties for those military personnel tasked with the various requirements 
associated with military mobilization. As McNair’s Army War College experience demonstrates, 
officers during the interwar period prepared, reviewed, and updated a wide range of war plans 
annually, and War College students reviewed these plans, identifying shortfalls and 
recommending remedies, such as implementing an organized reserve system to augment the 
Regular Army in a crisis. Nevertheless, in 1940 America still lacked a federal organized reserve 
(beyond a list of ROTC graduates who had received no mandatory training since graduation), 
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relying instead on an inconsistently trained and organized National Guard – the same situation 
that existed when McNair graduated from the War College in 1929. 
The first step the nation undertook to increase the size of the Army, the Selective 
Training and Service Act of 1940, proved a sub-optimal solution to these challenges. The act 
required counties and parishes to create local draft boards, where local leaders would decide 
where individuals could best serve the nation – whether in the Army, or through service in 
industry, agriculture, or other non-military activities. The act required all male citizens and aliens 
between the ages of 21 and 36 to register for the draft, but depending on their classification, 
determined by local boards to fill quotas set by the services, men received deferments from 
military service based on occupational status, dependents, legal restrictions, or any condition that 
made them unfit for service. Since no opportunity for service in an organized reserve existed, 
many men who might have possessed excellent potential for military service had instead worked 
to develop a civilian skill now considered indispensable to the mobilization effort. With no 
guidance from the federal government for prioritizing these skills, local draft boards could only 
subjectively weigh potential for military service against the criticality of any particular civilian 
skill. This severely limited the Army’s ability to influence the quality of men inducted into 
military service. The act also allowed individuals to bypass selective service by volunteering for 
a military enlistment, but again set no clear standards for implementing the policy, forcing some 
local draft boards to meet their selective service quotas by enlisting men from deferred 
classes.463 
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In addition to causing local variances in the classification levels of men selected for the 
draft, selective service policy also empowered local draft boards, not military leaders, to decide 
whether each potential inductee could best serve the nation by remaining in his civilian job or 
serving in the military. Given the lack of a viable national strategy or industrial mobilization 
plan, the local boards lacked any coherent national guidance for making these decisions. Making 
matters worse, individuals could bypass the normal inductee placement process by volunteering 
for service in a specific arm or specialty, and few volunteered for service in the combat arms – 
particularly the infantry. This made the pool of selectees from which to choose ground combat 
troops much smaller than it might have been, resulting in the combat arms receiving significantly 
lower-quality recruits than the service forces and the Army Air Corps.464 
The small pool of Regular Army officers who had studied and prepared for modern war 
recognized that the increasingly complex, mobile form of combat they were likely to experience 
in a future war required not only physical strength and endurance, but also high mental capacity. 
As Army historian Robert Palmer noted in one post-war report,  
The wits, skill, and stamina of semi-isolated riflemen and small-unit commanders determined not 
only individual survival on the battlefield but also the outcome of the battle itself. These facts 
were increasingly appreciated as the war proceeded. They were realized, however, from the 
beginning. . . . It was therefore desirable to select a high grade of manpower for combat units.  
The Selective Service and Training Act of 1940 did not include provisions that resulted in the 
placement of the highest quality men in ground combat units. Instead,  
The net result was that men having established trades or businesses in civilian life tended to be 
assigned to the noncombat elements of the Army. The problem of technical training in the Army 
was thereby simplified. The problem of tactical and combat training was rendered more difficult.  
Ironically, even relatively simple trades that the Army could have taught new recruits quickly 
qualified for the purposes of exclusion from the draft, while the skills required of an infantryman 
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required far more training, in addition to advanced physical and mental abilities, that the typical 
low-quality infantry recruit rarely possessed. Therefore, the implementation of the Selective 
Training and Service Act significantly added to the challenges McNair already faced in planning 
and conducting mobilization training of new recruits and units in a rapidly expanding Army.465  
As the GHQ Chief of Staff, McNair observed the performance of officers aspiring to 
division and corps command at the 1940 and 1941 maneuvers. This enabled him to serve as the 
principal advisor to General Marshall on the selection of combat commanders. Both McNair and 
Marshall possessed strong opinions, very similar to General Pershing’s when he commanded the 
AEF, regarding the qualities necessary to make an officer suitable for division command. They 
usually only saw these qualities in Regular Army officers, and they agreed the officer corps as a 
whole consisted of many officers too old to command troops in combat.466 
The shortage of trained and capable officers represented one of the Army’s most 
significant mobilization challenges. By late 1941, McNair had only observed two National Guard 
colonels he recommended for promotion, and recommended these officers only reluctantly, 
writing to Marshall on 24 October 1941, “I fail to see the wisdom of promotions such as these 
when one ponders the welfare of the Country and of the troops commanded. I believe that a 
citizen officer in general should be content to reach the highly respected grade of colonel, and 
that the high command should be by selected professional soldiers.”467 
Accompanying General Marshall to a meeting with Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson 
on October 27, 1941 McNair described to Secretary Stimson the stark contrast between the 
capabilities of Regular Army officers and National Guard officers – a situation nearly identical to 
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the one Pershing faced when mobilizing the AEF. Partly due to their education during the 
interwar period at Fort Leavenworth and, for some, at the Army War College, Regular Army 
officers proved far more capable than those in the National Guard did, leading McNair to 
recommend in 1940 a wholesale demobilization of the National Guard. Marshall and Stimson 
knew such a decision would lead to disastrous political backlash, but Marshall had also 
witnessed the excessive time and effort GHQ expended attempting to bring National Guard 
commanders up to Regular Army standards, detracting from the overall training of their 
divisions. Marshall therefore sought a compromise solution that prioritized collective training 
over the careers of individual officers but minimized political repercussions. He advised Stimson 
to retain the National Guard as an organization, while supporting McNair’s recommendations to 
relieve all but two of the senior National Guard commanders after their initial unit mobilization 
training, replacing them with younger and more capable Regular Army officers.468 
This effort to ensure officers with the appropriate youthful vigor led combat formations 
applied not only to the National Guard, but also to the Regular Army. As Stephen R. Taaffe 
pointed out,  
Marshall looked at an officer’s age when making promotions and assignments, especially for 
combat commands. Marshall’s World War One experiences convinced him [like McNair] that 
leading soldiers in combat was a job for younger men because they had the necessary energy, 
stamina, and vigor. When he became chief of staff, Marshall was dismayed that elderly officers 
past their prime led so many field armies, corps, and divisions. To rectify this, in 1940 a new War 
Department policy limited the maximum age of officers serving with troops to sixty-two for 
major generals and sixty for brigadier generals. Marshall applied this new rule in a tenacious and 
cold-blooded campaign to supplant overage officers with younger men in their fifties and even 
forties. 
Marshall did attempt to consider officers’ feelings when making these decisions, many of whom 
felt slighted because they missed an opportunity to lead soldiers in combat after a long period of 
often-tedious peacetime service. Nevertheless, age remained one of Marshall’s top 
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considerations in selecting officers for troop command, and McNair recommended only officers 
who met Marshall’s age limits and possessed youthful vigor for combat command, despite 
resistance from both the War Department and senior commanders who petitioned to retain 
subordinates who exceeded age limits. When necessary, Marshall bluntly and definitively 
asserted his authority to include age as a criterion for selecting generals for troop command. As 
Taaffe pointed out, “on one occasion he bluntly told a group of officers, ‘All four of you are too 
old to command divisions in combat.’”469 
The relief of elderly officers in favor of their more energetic subordinates, and the 
mobilization training these officers received improved the overall quality of the officer corps. 
However, the rapid expansion of the Army made it impossible to place a well-trained and 
experienced officer in every key leadership position; rather, inexperienced officers consistently 
outnumbered experienced officers, and many of these young officers shared little more 
enthusiasm for combat than the soldiers they would lead. 
In addition to the Selective Training and Service Act, other factors led to problems 
acquiring high-quality enlisted personnel for service in the ground forces. Soon after the end of 
the World War, as rapid demobilization gutted the Regular Army, the War Department found 
itself forced to relax physical and mental recruitment standards to attract enough new soldiers to 
maintain the Regular Army’s personnel strength, even at its severely reduced interwar low. Few 
men wanted to experience another war like the one that had just ended, leading to widespread 
reluctance to serve in either the Regular Army or the National Guard. Combined with America’s 
tradition of maintaining a large Army only in time of war, and generally low regard for military 
service as a career, this led the Army to reduce quality standards significantly after the war.470 
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From 1919 to 1926, volunteer recruits did not have to pass any form of intelligence 
testing, and by 1927, a man only had to achieve a ten-year-old intelligence level on entrance tests 
to pass (and the recruiter could even waive this requirement). The onset of the Great Depression 
increased the number of volunteers, allowing for greater selectivity, but by 1932 a man still only 
had to demonstrate an eighth grade intelligence, and due to widespread food shortages recruits 
could weigh several pounds less in each height range than those volunteering in the 1920s. 
Perhaps most troubling, President Roosevelt’s Depression-era proposal to cut 2,000 officers from 
the Regular Army prompted Chief of Staff Douglas MacArthur to opine of all the personnel 
authorized in the 1920 NDA, the government should cut officers last, since each “would be 
worth a thousand men at the beginning of a war. They are the only ones who can take this 
heterogeneous mass and make of it a homogeneous fighting group.” This comment reflected the 
generally lower concern in the Army over enlisted quality than that of officers during the 
interwar years.471 
The Army also considered non-commissioned officer quality relatively unimportant, 
since new recruits would overwhelm their numbers in the event of a rapid Army expansion in 
time of war. Therefore, after twenty years of relaxed or no physical and intelligence standards for 
new recruits, when the government finally began a peacetime draft in September 1940 it actually 
reduced standards for new recruits. Induction policy lowered the existing height restriction from 
sixty-four to sixty inches, while implementing a new mental test, the Army General 
Classification Test (AGCT) that tested general mental powers or ability to learn – intended to 
provide a good indication whether a recruit would succeed in Army training. As historian Steve 
Lauer argued, “acceptance of low quality standards in the enlisted ranks, including the infantry, 
was the key condition of the period . . . . As long [as] their officers were well trained and highly 




motivated to lead them, the American fighting man possessed an almost mystical quality of 
endurance and fortitude in battle.”472 Ultimately, the relaxation of physical standards necessary 
to enable rapid Army expansion, mental aptitude tests that classified men according to their 
potential as learners, and the decision to exempt from the draft men deemed to possess skills 
essential to industry resulted in intense competition for mentally and physically high-rated 
recruits – a competition that had the greatest impact on the infantry. 
The Army also still relied on equipment deficient in both quality and quantity. As 
described above, Army Chief of Staff Craig realized in 1936 that it would take at least two years 
to develop, test, and field a new weapons system. His decision to freeze development programs 
in 1936 enabled him to use the limited funds Congress allocated to the Army primarily to reequip 
the small Regular Army – in which many units still relied on World War vintage weapons (or, if 
those on hand were no longer serviceable, none at all). Had the Army found itself at war in 1937 
or 1938 Craig might have appeared prescient. Instead, his decision meant the Army in 1940 still 
employed the same weapons systems it purchased in 1937 – most simply remanufactured 
versions of even older weapons. Even given the time afforded by the Protective Mobilization 
Period, soldiers had to rely on outdated or even simulated weapons for mobilization training, 
particularly since industrial leaders had to develop a comprehensive mobilization plan before 
they could begin new weapon development programs. Therefore, fielding of new weapons took 
well over two years to complete.   
Several issues added to the basic problem of limited time the Army faced in its effort to 
replace obsolescent weapons now that Congress finally started to appropriate additional funds. 
Throughout 1940 and most of 1941 those funds remained limited because, as mentioned above, 
the president still maintained the position that he intended to keep America out of the war. 
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Therefore, Congress appropriated only enough funds to create a defense force, and those funds 
had to pay not only for new recruits and weapons, but also for infrastructure upgrades such as 
barracks, dining halls, parade grounds, and training facilities. Therefore, weapons still received 
funding on priority basis, and none made it through the complex development and fielding 
process as quickly as desired.  
As Jim Lacey argued, “although by early 1941 the United States had cast a new strategic 
conception of how it would fight a future global war, the planners had yet to match that strategy 
against national resources and capabilities.”473 When President Roosevelt finally requested 
information regarding the industrial requirements necessary to support offensive operations in 
July 1941, the Army could still only provide industrial planners extremely vague information – 
rough numbers of military personnel, with no numbers of specific types of equipment the U.S. 
Army would employ and no details regarding the enemy it would face. This made detailed 
production planning for munitions and equipment impossible. As late as early 1942, production 
experts still only expected initially to support an army of two million personnel, which would 
increase in size according to a rough estimate of annual growth.474  
This forced the economists and leaders of industry who actually facilitated the nation’s 
industrial mobilization to project the amount of munitions and equipment necessary to field new 
units and replace combat losses based purely on their own best guess. Army officers proved 
unable or reluctant, after decades of operating in a climate of extremely limited funds, to provide 
accurate projections of equipment requirements. For example, in 1940 a leader of civilian 
production sought projections of textile requirements from the military. One of his 
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manufacturers, Robert Stevens, asked a military procurement officer how many parachutes he 
thought the Army would require during the war. The officer told him 9,000 would suffice – an 
estimate Stevens increased to 200,000. When the procurement officer asked him to defend this 
seemingly excessive number, Stevens replied, “The President wants to build 50,000 planes and 
they will have an average crew size of four. I simply multiplied.”475 
Therefore, McNair not only faced the challenge of training ground forces made up of the 
lowest-quality subset of the Army’s pool of new recruits, he also was forced to rely on outdated 
equipment as he attempted to train them to fight in accordance with the latest doctrine. After a 
long interwar period in which limited funds and interbranch rivalries hamstrung Army 
modernization efforts, the Army began to prepare for war with mostly obsolete or overmatched 
equipment, and no hope of receiving updated models any time soon. Further, the lack of a 
strategy appropriate to the situation or an industrial mobilization plan to support it served to 
exacerbate the interwar haggling so often identified as the cause of most of the WWII Army’s 
challenges, and proved during the mobilization period the most significant impediment to 
preparing for war. 
Doctrine also matured slowly as the Army began to mobilize. Debate over the update of 
the 1939 FSR meant its replacement did not gain War Department approval until May 1941. 
Therefore, the 1939 doctrine guided mobilization training during most of the Protective 
Mobilization Period.476 Perhaps this explains why Odom devoted only two pages in After the 
Trenches to the 1941 FSR. However, while the units participating in maneuvers in 1940 and 
1941 either had not yet seen the final approved 1941 FSR or lacked adequate time to study it 
before the maneuvers, the manual’s publication in May, 1941 preceded the mobilization of most 
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of the Army’s divisions. In addition, the manual’s longevity (it remained in effect until 
publication of the next FSR on June 14, 1944) provided doctrinal stability for most of the war. 
Even of those units that conducted maneuvers before its publication, most had several months to 
study the new doctrine before they had to apply it in combat. Further, as Odom described,  
German victories in 1939 and 1940 ended much of the debate over methods of war. With the 
blueprint of modern war provided by German operations, the army raced to revise its doctrine. . . . 
The army published FSR 1941 based on information received from the world’s battlefields and its 
own growing experience with large-scale exercises. The new manual was a vast improvement 
over its predecessor if only because it more accurately reflected current technological capabilities 
and represented a truly revised doctrine. The new, battle-tested prescriptions for successful 
combat erased doubts about trends in modern warfare and swelled the new manual to twice the 
size of its predecessor. The biggest difference between the 1939 and 1941 editions was in 
emphasis on armored and air operations. Use of air and tanks, as well as means for antitank and 
antiaircraft defense, dominated the work. Fire superiority, previously a function of infantry-
artillery cooperation alone, now hinged on integration of combat aviation and tanks into the 
partnership. 
Nevertheless, after describing the manual’s qualities, Odom made clear why he devoted such a 
small section of his conclusion to it.477  
In After the Trenches, Odom focused on the doctrinal development challenges the Army 
faced during the interwar period, and, as he pointed out, “ultimately, the North African 
battlefield exposed the shortcomings of the army’s crash course in modern warfare.” While he 
admitted, “the army would learn from its defeats, and eventually emerge from World War II as 
the most skilled and powerful fighting force of the war,” he emphasized “the price exacted in 
soldiers’ blood for neglect of peacetime training, equipment modernization, and doctrine 
development.” This led to a somewhat unbalanced emphasis on the longevity of the 1923 
doctrine and the ill effects Odom attributed to it and its marginally updated 1939 successor, 
while relegating the 1941 doctrine, which guided the Army’s efforts through most of the war, to 
a mere afterthought in his analysis.478  
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Walter Kretchik described the 1941 manual as “the combined product of the 1939 
version, service criticism, German Blitzkrieg, and lessons taken from the Louisiana Maneuvers.” 
He identified significant changes from the 1939 to the 1941 versions of the manual, although 
both emphasized offensive, combined arms warfare. For example, the 1941 manual described 
two forms of the attack: envelopments and penetrations, breaking envelopments down into three 
types – single and double envelopments, and turning movements. Both envelopments and 
penetrations sought the ultimate goal of striking enemy rear areas, creating disruption, and 
exploiting the breakdown in enemy cohesion through pursuit operations. The new doctrine also 
continued to describe a close air support role for Army Air Forces (AAF), a separate and 
complementary mission to interdiction of enemy air power. The doctrine acknowledged airpower 
by itself would not prove decisive, but did describe air support of ground forces as an important 
source of firepower in mobile warfare.479  
By contrast, Peter Schifferle argued the 1941 manual did not reflect a significant degree 
of change, but instead “maintained the basic conceptualization of war found in the 1923 and 
1939 FSRs.” Schifferle did describe the numerous additions to the manual that incorporated the 
various aspects of branch doctrine previously at odds with or ignored by the FSR. For example, 
Schifferle pointed out the new manual covered the different types of divisions (infantry, cavalry, 
motorized, and armored), and various types of operations not previously described in the FSR, 
such as combat in woods or towns, operations in harsh terrain like jungles and deserts, static and 
mobile (retrograde) defensive operations, and many others.480 Thus, both Schifferle and Kretchik 
recognized the additional detail contained in the 1941 FSR (FM 100-5, Operations) and the 
manual’s attempt to resolve branch and service discrepancies with overarching Army operational 
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doctrine, even if they did not agree regarding the degree of change from one manual to the 
next.481 
While Kretchik’s and Schifferle’s assessments of the 1941 doctrine stand out as 
exceptions in a large body of overwhelmingly negative analyses, most accounts of the Army’s 
mobilization efforts and combat effectiveness have shared an overemphasis on the failings of the 
Army’s modernization efforts during the interwar period. This stems from the work of a 
generation of historians who developed a narrative that credited American success to materiel 
superiority rather than fighting prowess. This remarkably resilient narrative implies that the 
relatively inept Americans simply adapted upon encountering the tactical expertise of the 
German Army, learning to fight just well enough to achieve success by relying on the nation’s 
overwhelming materiel superiority. The preceding analysis seeks to demonstrate the flaws in this 
narrative by demonstrating the nation was no better prepared in terms of strategy or industry than 
in its fighting prowess as it faced the prospect of war in 1940-41. In fact, in many ways the Army 
proved more ready than the nation for war, due to its effective interwar officer education system 
and the vibrant discourse that took place in military schools and journals. By contrast, industry 
leaders, handed responsibility for the IMP without warning, confronted Protective Mobilization 
flat-footed, and lagged behind the Army’s tactical and operational training for several years, 
struggling to create merely adequate weapon systems in time to meet the Army’s needs. The 
demands caused by the breakneck pace of industrial effort upon the nation’s awakening in 1940 
also highlight limitations that make the materiel superiority narrative difficult to defend. America 
hardly possessed a limitless pool of personnel, shipping, or production capacity – factors that all 
had a far greater effect on America’s attempt to mobilize for war than Army doctrine and 
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training. As the industrial base struggled, the U.S. Army learned to fight effectively by building 
on a solid foundation of individual and unit mobilization training and sound doctrine that 
accounted for lessons learned from German success in Europe and American large-unit 
maneuvers at home.482 
Throughout McNair’s two years as Chief of Staff of GHQ, he worked to train a rapidly 
expanding Army in the midst of these industrial mobilization challenges. Adding to these 
difficulties, Army equipment, doctrine, and training remained matters of heated debate 
throughout the mobilization period and beyond. McNair’s efforts to lead the Army’s 
development of a concept for antitank defense provides a particularly relevant example of the 
difficulties he faced attempting to prepare the Army to deal with the realities of modern warfare, 
since many historians now view McNair as the main proponent of antitank guns and tank 
destroyers. This had led many to single him out for criticism on this issue – some warranted, 
some not.483  
McNair believed that guns, not tanks, should serve as the primary means of defense 
against enemy tanks. He supported this conviction on several grounds, generalizable as 
efficiency and effectiveness. However, most histories that describe McNair’s support of the 
antitank gun as the best defense against the tank distill a long and complex debate into a greatly 
oversimplified anecdote. A few examples of the details of this debate rarely described in modern 
accounts should suffice to demonstrate this point. 
                                                          
482 For just a few examples of the works that created and maintain this interpretation, see 
Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants; Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army 
Peformance, 1939-1945 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982); Max Hastings, Overlord: D-Day, June 
6, 1944 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984); and John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1990). 
483 The antitank defense issue provides a particularly useful example of the misrepresentation of 
McNair’s views and actions in many historical accounts, and shares much in common with other matters 
of controversy that have made him the target of criticism. Therefore, the following provides a detailed 
analysis of the issue of antitank defense, while more briefly covering other issues due to space limitations.  
 
297 
One commonly encounters assertions that McNair based his concept of antitank defense 
on a flawed view of modern mechanized warfare. For example, Chris Gabel identified McNair in 
The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941 as one of the few Army officers who worked on the 
question of antitank defense throughout the 1930s, receiving “little encouragement from his 
superiors.” Research confirms few Army officers devoted significant intellectual effort to the 
question of antitank defense before 1940. However, McNair wrote a letter to a Field Artillery 
officer in the Missouri Reserves in June 1940, responding to that officer’s own detailed study of 
existing antitank gun capabilities and limitations. McNair noted his superiors in the Office of the 
Chief of Field Artillery tasked him in 1936 to “draw up the initial study which has resulted in the 
present 37-mm antitank gun.” Therefore, McNair may have initially studied antitank defense 
purely out of professional curiosity, but his superiors formalized his role upon Malin Craig’s 
cancellation of the antitank gun development program in 1936. McNair also pointed out in this 
memo, “this gun [the 37-mm eventually adopted and still in use in 1940, merely a copy of a 
German model] is not what I proposed, in that it has insufficient muzzle velocity and its sighting 
apparatus is too crude for effective firing.”484  
This illustrates, as some historians including Chris Gabel have pointed out, that in 1940 
McNair supported an antitank concept, while recognizing the deficiencies in existing antitank 
weapons. It also shows that McNair’s work on an antitank gun serves as another example of a 
test or experiment senior Army leaders assigned to McNair due to his record of diligence and 
merit in such work. It also highlights the significance of the delayed development of a realistic 
strategy and industrial mobilization plan – factors that drastically slowed down production of 
many new weapons or forced the Army to rely on a single, “good enough” model where faster 
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production and shipping capability might have allowed for fielding of progressively better 
weapons. Therefore, contrary to the many histories that imply McNair failed to recognize the 
flaws of the 37-mm gun, research shows McNair provided specific criticisms in this memo and 
many others of not only the 37-mm gun, but also the other guns available in 1940 to both the 
U.S. and the British Army for potential employment as antitank weapons. Therefore, he focused 
on organizing and training the Army to employ a viable antitank concept, understanding the 
limitations of the weapons currently available and seeking to minimize them, while counting on 
industry and Army Ordnance to provide improved models in time to equip Army divisions 
before they engaged in combat.  
McNair emphasized that an effective antitank gun must possess a flat trajectory to 
improve its odds of scoring a hit (since a flat trajectory allows for error in range as long as firing 
azimuth is accurate), and high muzzle velocity combined with the proper ammunition to ensure it 
penetrated the armor it hit. No existing American or British antitank gun could hit and penetrate 
modern German armor reliably and at an acceptable range in 1940. McNair specifically cited the 
inadequacy of European antitank guns during the 1939 and 1940 offensives to demonstrate the 
need for a more powerful gun to defeat German tanks. However, McNair emphasized antitank 
guns possessed many advantages in principle, beyond simply their low cost relative to tanks. He 
pointed out the ease with which crews could conceal and cover their guns, giving them a 
significant defensive advantage over exposed tanks. He emphasized their ease of mobility, 
demonstrated in tests that showed a trained crew could unhook a gun and fire an initial aimed 
round within 10-20 seconds, depending on the type of vehicle towing the gun. He also 
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highlighted their ability to create layered, combined arms belts to defend a position against tanks 
from all sides, and to operate effectively on the offense as well, or act as mobile reserves.485 
McNair’s work on antitank defense in the 1930s culminated in the study he authored 
while serving as Commandant at Fort Leavenworth entitled Antimechanized Defense (Tentative), 
May 22, 1939 – a manual that reflected McNair’s views on modern mechanized warfare and 
antitank defense in 1939, which remained consistent from then on. Gabel argued that the most 
fundamental concept in this study “was the inaccurate notion that armored forces equated to 
massed tanks (as opposed to combined arms task forces) and that antitank guns should likewise 
be pooled in order to defeat them.” This interpretation has appeared so frequently in the 
subsequent secondary literature that it equates to accepted wisdom regarding McNair’s vision of 
modern mechanized warfare. For example, Harold R. Winton, writing fifteen years later in Corps 
Commanders of the Bulge, argued, “McNair proved to be incorrect: combined arms of infantry, 
artillery, and tanks were the norm, not the exception.”486  
It seems unlikely that a man known for his long record of championing the importance of 
combined arms warfare would assume the enemy would not also employ combined arms in a 
future war. His views on combined arms remained consistent from his post-WWI views on 
improving artillery support to the infantry by task organizing mobile artillery and spotters with 
front line infantry units. In fact, a close read of Antimechanized Defense does not reveal a view 
of modern warfare dominated by massed, independent formations of tanks conducting individual 
missions. Rather, the manual describes employment of tanks much like that actually observed in 
the German campaigns against Poland and France, with tanks operating primarily as elements of 
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combined arms teams, and occasionally as independent formations to exploit their speed and 
mobility. The manual consists of seven chapters – the first titled “General” followed by six 
describing employment of antitank units in various scenarios (during the advance, halts, the 
development, the defense, retrograde movements, and offensive operations). McNair described 
his concept of modern mechanized warfare, and his specific concept of tank employment, in the 
various sections of Chapter 1.487  
In the section titled “Types of Interference to be Expected from Tanks,” the manual lists: 
scout vehicles and armored cars “bent on reconnaissance” which might also harass or delay 
friendly elements upon contact; “the operations of well organized tank units” conducting 
delaying actions, independent attacks, or attacks “in conjunction with organized attacks by 
elements of all arms”; and tanks seeking surprise by launching attacks under cover of smoke or 
fog.488 This does not seem to predict employment tanks only in massed, independent formations. 
Further, historians have emphasized McNair’s arguments regarding the economic advantage 
provided by using guns to defeat tanks, but the manual listed the gun as only one of four 
different weapons available as “Positive Measures of Defense”: antitank guns, tank mines, tanks, 
and aviation. The manual also identified the potential employment of artillery, antiaircraft 
weapons, small arms firing armor-piercing ammunition, and various weapons like hand grenade 
clusters and other “track-throwing devices” to serve a defensive role against tanks.489 In short, 
Antimechanized Defense presents a reasonably accurate prediction of the future employment of 
tanks, and a logical summary of the various means of defense against them.490 
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The rest of Antimechanized Defense merely described various schemes for use of antitank 
defenses against the three forms of attack described in the first chapter. Nothing in these later 
chapters indicated a belief that tanks would only fight in independent masses, would never seek 
out combat against enemy tanks, or would not serve as effective weapon systems to defend 
against enemy tanks. The document did highlight the specific capabilities of tanks that made 
them a unique threat on a modern battlefield characterized by open warfare. For example, the 
document highlighted the tank’s speed and mobility which, when combined with the lack of a 
stabilized front, increased the need to ensure protection of flanks and rear areas against armored 
attacks. However, nowhere did the document present this threat as the sole manner in which a 
future enemy would employ its tanks, or argue massed, independent antitank guns represented 
the best form of defense against them. Thus, at least in the case of Antimechanized Defense, it 
appears secondary sources have ascribed views to McNair that he did not necessarily hold, 
presenting them as mistaken predictions regarding the nature of modern warfare.  
By comparison, anonymous faculty at the Leavenworth Schools published in 1936 a 
document entitled Principles of Strategy for an Independent Corps or Army in a Theater of 
Operations. Michael Matheny pointed out that this document emphasized the criticality of 
achieving overwhelming mass at the decisive point to achieve victory through annihilation, 
achieved in the age of mechanization, radios, and improved road networks by employing wide 
envelopments. While contemporary Soviet writings emphasized deep battle beginning with 
penetrations of the enemy’s line, German and British theorists, like the authors of Principles of 
Strategy, emphasized the wide envelopment. This text demonstrates both a familiarity with 
European ideas of modern warfare, and an emphasis on the unique capabilities of the tank not 
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only attributable to authors other than McNair (since it predates his arrival at Leavenworth by 
three years), but also more extreme than those he described in Antimechanized Defense.491 
Interestingly, the self-propelled gun or tank destroyer has come to represent in historical 
memory McNair’s flawed views of modern war and his irrational support of flawed concepts of 
antitank defense. However, as historian Harry Yeide pointed out in The Tank Killers: A History 
of America’s World War II Tank Destroyer Force, McNair initially opposed the idea of self-
propelled guns, believing towed guns would prove easier to conceal and less vulnerable to 
enemy fire. However, by May 1941 the Army had made no significant progress on the issue of 
antitank defense, largely because differing views between the branches led to inertia. Finally, the 
statement forced General Marshall to take matters into his own hands. This resulted in the 
Army’s development of antitank weapons and doctrine based not only on McNair’s ideas, but 
also on Marshall’s preference for self-propelled guns, and organizational decisions Marshall 
made from necessity simply to break the deadlock.492 
On May 14, Marshall ordered the War Department G-3 division to study the issue, 
writing, “one of our urgent needs is for the development, organization and immediate action on 
the subject of defense against armored forces, to include an offensive weapon and organization 
to combat these forces.” Alluding to the inertia caused by the ongoing interbranch debate, 
Marshall wrote, “at the risk of placing G-3 in the operating field, I believe that for the solution of 
this problem you should take energetic and positive steps to push this matter as fast as humanly 
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possible.” He also emphasized that the matter must remain a War Department responsibility, 
writing, “I do not want the question of another branch or arm brought up at this time.” Instead, 
Marshall wanted his G-3 to organize a section within his division focused on  
thinking and planning on improved methods of warfare. Our organization and methods should not 
lag behind developments abroad. You should organize in your division a small planning and 
exploring branch, composed of visionary officers, with nothing else to do but think out 
improvements in methods of warfare, study developments abroad and tackle such unsolved 
problems as measures against armored force action, night bombardment, march protection and the 
like. Such a group should be divorced of all current matters and should work closely with the 
National Defense Research Committee, Inventor’s Council, G-2 and the development people in 
G-4. 
This memo serves as a vital document for understanding not only GHQ’s role in relationship to 
that of the War Department, but also the fact that association of the Army’s WWII antitank 
doctrine and weapon systems purely with McNair’s name grossly oversimplifies the process and 
exaggerates McNair’s control over it.493 It demonstrates that McNair, although responsible for 
training the Army, did not make decisions; like any staff officer, he made recommendations. 
Marshall decided, based on the recommendations of McNair and many other officers, and on his 
own observations. Once Marshall made a decision, McNair did his utmost to carry it out, 
whether or not Marshall followed his recommendation.494 
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During the same month that Marshall sent the above memo to the War Department G-3, 
an article appeared in the Field Artillery Journal (and the Infantry Journal) that added 
significantly to the discourse on German armor operations and highlighted the need to find a 
method to combat the threat posed by modern tanks. The article, simply titled “Antitank 
Defense,” by Major Albert C. Wedemeyer, received a resounding endorsement from the editors 
of the Field Artillery Journal, due to Wedemeyer’s two years as a student at the German 
Kriegsakademie followed by two years working as an instructor at the Infantry School, which 
they argued gave him “unusual opportunities for securing data on antitank employment.” 
Wedemeyer provided a description of tank employment very similar to McNair’s in 
Antimechanized Defense. In particular, he pointed out the employment of German tanks both as 
members of powerful combined arms teams and as a “tank mass” used to penetrate enemy 
defenses and exploit their mobility to continue the attack in depth against rear areas, supported 
by aerial bombardment once beyond the range of supporting field artillery. The Germans went to 
great lengths to achieve surprise by disguising the intended point of attack, and preceded the 
commitment of the tank mass with massive preparatory fires (high explosive and smoke) to 
neutralize static antitank defenses. Therefore, Wedemeyer argued an effective defensive scheme 
would require, in addition to towed antitank guns, mines, artillery, and medium tanks, a highly 
mobile “tank chaser,” pooled at G.H.Q. to provide a flexible and mobile antitank reserve for use 
defeating enemy tank masses as needed.495 
Wedemeyer’s “Antitank Defense” included a photograph of an early German “tank 
chaser” that illustrated that American thinking regarding antitank defense differed from that of 
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Germany less than some suppose. This tracked vehicle, adapted from a captured British Bren 
machine gun carrier, had an open turret, thin armor, and an approximately 47-mm antitank gun. 
Taken together, Marshall’s memo and Wedemeyer’s article provide useful insight into the 
foundation on which the War Department built American antitank doctrine and equipment, a 
responsibility the G-3 assigned to Lieutenant Colonel Andrew D. Bruce, head of the new G-3 
planning branch, formed the day after receipt of Marshall’s memo. Bruce led a conference on 
antitank defense eleven days later, leading to a War Department order issued on June 24, 1941 
directing activation of an antitank battalion in each division in time to participate in the 
upcoming GHQ maneuvers. This gave the triangular division both a divisional antitank battalion 
and antitank companies in each regiment, as McNair originally envisioned and described in 
Antitank Defense. However, not all mobilizing divisions could adopt this structure since the 
National Guard had not yet reorganized to the triangular structure. This resulted in a variety of 
antitank unit arrangements among divisions participating in the maneuvers later that year.496  
Despite the lack of standardization among Regular Army and National Guard divisions in 
1940-41, the overarching concepts of streamlining, pooling, and task organization guided their 
organization and employment. Another concept often attributed as a McNair preference forced 
upon the Army, these basic concepts had been in place for several years, and served as 
foundational concepts in the initial development and refinement of both the triangular infantry 
division and the armored division.  
As described above, the ability to quickly and logically task organize infantry divisions 
into combined arms Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs), and armored divisions into combined 
arms Combat Commands (CCA, CCB, etc.), served as a fundamental organizing principle 
driving the structure of the new divisions. Additionally, keeping the division lean and 
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maneuverable by pooling larger specialized units (armor, antiaircraft, and antitank in particular) 
proved just as important as the number and type of organic units in enabling the triangular 
division to task organize quickly and effectively. The pooling of transportation assets (like the 
venerable 2-1/2 ton truck) provided non-mechanized elements of the Army motor transport when 
needed, while keeping their core organization light and freeing them of fueling and maintenance 
responsibilities. As Christopher Gabel argued, “the policy of ‘streamlining and pooling’ . . . 
underlay the U.S. Army’s organization for World War II.” Therefore, it seems only natural 
McNair supported these concepts, but works that imply McNair invented them or possessed the 
authority to dictate their implementation misrepresent the truth. Given his involvement in the 
provisional division tests and his desire, shared by Marshall, to optimize the Army for open 
warfare based on their World War I experience, it seems reasonable he would support these 
ideas. However, it remains important to keep McNair’s true level of authority in mind when 
assessing his actions as GHQ Chief of Staff.497 
McNair routinely emphasized the need for efficiency, and he did not support the creation 
of a “type” (uniquely organized) armored corps. He did support the pooling of large numbers of 
tanks in GHQ tank battalions, but this did not simply represent the outcome of interbranch 
debates between the cavalry and infantry, or a decision to relegate the GHQ tank battalions to a 
role involving only massed, independent attacks against enemy rear areas as historian David 
Johnson suggested.498 Rather, McNair supported pooling key assets both to keep the division 
lean, mobile, and easy to task organize, and to maintain a large reserve of additional assets to 
reinforce divisions’ combined arms teams at decisive points on the battlefield. Even Russell 
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Weigley, one of the most critical analysts of the WWII Army and earliest standard-bearers of the 
“materiel superiority” narrative, admitted: 
Perhaps McNair pruned the standard division too much [note Weigley, too, implies McNair 
possessed the authority to make such decisions on his own], since tank and engineer and other 
supporting troops beyond those called for in the T/O&E’s [Tables of Organization and 
Equipment] had to be attached more or less permanently. But McNair’s pooling system made 
such attachments possible with a minimum of difficulty. The shaping of the standard infantry 
division, before there could be much American combat experience on which to draw, was a 
notable achievement of American military organization.499  
One must also consider the fact that efficiency represented a real and constant priority 
that significantly influenced the Army’s efforts to prepare for war. While many historians have 
concluded America’s soldiers went to war with inadequate equipment and misguided training 
due to a flawed view of future war, making up for these deficiencies through improvisation and 
materiel superiority, this fails to recognize the necessity of McNair’s emphasis on streamlining 
and pooling. Even in 1940-41 American planners realized if the president committed U.S. forces 
to combat overseas they would have to maintain lines of communication and logistics support 
over vast distances and across oceans, conduct numerous amphibious assaults to establish 
beachheads, and maintain a steady flow of equipment, repair parts, and personnel replacements 
or new divisions as combat losses mounted. As described above, as early as the implementation 
of the Protective Mobilization Plan and Selective Service, planners realized the nation must 
balance the demands of the military and industry – even America’s personnel and industrial 
capacity had limits, which posed an even greater constraint once Lend/Lease took effect. In 
short, efficiency mattered, not as an abstract concept but a real constraint on America’s 
mobilization for and sustainment of an overseas war effort. 
Many topics of debate slowed the process of doctrinal development and limited 
cooperation between the Army’s various arms and branches. Just as significantly, the nation’s 
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failure to prepare for industrial mobilization meant the Army lacked equipment on par with many 
of the great powers well after the initiation of the Protective Mobilization Period. Nevertheless, 
McNair set out to train the rapidly expanding Army for war by developing an aggressive training 
plan intended to achieve large-unit collective proficiency in 1941. This plan reflected McNair’s 
basic training philosophy that emphasized tough, realistic training. Peter R. Faber described 
McNair’s training scheme in American National Biography:  
The standardized phases included fundamentals, small unit operations, combined arms, and lastly, 
corps and army maneuvers. By adopting this gradualist approach, McNair not only promoted 
efficiency, he also trained combatants to perform a variety of tasks and therefore protected the 
U.S. Army from overspecialization. Lastly and perhaps most importantly, McNair introduced 
realistic training into the American Military. He used live ammunition (more than 240,000 tons) 
in combat education; he turned mere obstacle courses into mock battlefields; he organized 
twenty-seven large-scale maneuvers in the United States, one of which involved 1.5 million 
people; he used the 180,000-square-mile Desert Training Center in California and Arizona to 
simulate theater-level warfare; and he demanded ‘free’ maneuvers, in which local commanders 
had to solve battlefield problems with little or no guidance from superiors.500 
As Faber pointed out, the training reforms McNair instituted have remained core principles of 
the U.S. Army’s combat training methodology to the present. It is remarkable that he managed to 
establish these enduring principles while shouldering the burden of transforming the small and 
unevenly trained Army of 1940 and the masses of National Guardsmen and conscripts that 
swelled its ranks into a combat ready force. Even as he managed these massive responsibilities, 
McNair remained committed to keeping his staff small, and never even employing the traditional 
services of an aide-de-camp.501 
McNair and his seven-man GHQ staff began this process by assessing the state of Army 
training based on their observation of the August maneuvers of 1940. McNair delivered this 
assessment in the form of a draft letter to the army commanders to General Marshall on 
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September 5, 1940. Marshall directed his staff to publish GHQ’s findings on January 7, 1941, 
summarizing the observed training deficiencies in ten general points: 
1. Obviously deficient training of small units and in minor tactics. 
2. Faulty employment of the infantry division and of its combat teams. 
3. Failure fully to appreciate the purpose of motor vehicles and exploit their capabilities. 
4. Inadequate reconnaissance and lack of contact between adjacent units. 
5. Inadequate support of infantry by division artillery. 
6. Faulty signal communications. 
7. Too passive employment of antitank guns. 
8. Improper employment of horse cavalry. 
9. Neglect of ammunition supply and evacuation of wounded. 
10. Unreal situations due to faulty umpiring. 
 
Official historians Greenfield and Palmer stated all but points eight and nine proved enduring 
challenges in the training of Army ground combat troops. National Guard observers at the 1940 
maneuvers not only concurred with these deficiencies in their divisions’ training readiness, but 
also noted other challenges, including shortages of qualified staff officers and commanders, and 
deficiencies in individual training that would delay the effectiveness of unit training.502  
McNair and his staff developed a training plan for 1941 focused on correcting these 
deficiencies and distributed it to the four field army commanders on January 15, 1941. This 
schedule reflected McNair’s training philosophy, allowing individual and small-unit training to 
take place in a distributed fashion, building up to corps maneuvers as the final phase of 
independent unit training before the armies and corps participated in one of several GHQ-level 
maneuvers (army vs. army or corps vs. corps/army). The initial target date of August 1941 for 
completion of the training plan and combat certification of the Protective Mobilization Army 
proved overly optimistic. This led GHQ to allocate more time for training at the individual and 
unit level, rescheduling the first GHQ maneuver to begin in September and the final maneuver to 
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end in November, ensuring all nine Army corps completed unit training and participated in GHQ 
maneuvers in 1941.503 
Given the overall supervisory role McNair would fulfill at the maneuvers, Marshall 
recommended McNair for promotion to the temporary rank of lieutenant general on May 28, 
1941 in a memorandum to Secretary of War Stimson. Marshall noted the scope and difficulty of 
McNair’s role at GHQ, pointing out he had flown 43,000 miles in less than a year in the conduct 
of his duties, and regularly interacted with five lieutenant generals and thirty-five major generals. 
He also noted McNair’s involvement with the “critical and delicate matter of relief or re-
classification of high ranking officers, as a result of training inspections and of the coming 
maneuvers.” Marshall closed the memorandum by observing,  
General McNair has one of the best minds in the Army. He is conspicuous for loyalty, modesty 
and soldierly qualities. He should have greater prestige for his arduous and highly responsible 
duties of the coming months, especially since I am being held rather closely to Washington. 
Therefore I urge his immediate advancement to the temporary grade of Lieutenant General.504 
McNair received notification from the Adjutant General in a memorandum of June 21, 1941 that 
President Roosevelt approved his promotion, effective June 9, 1941. McNair took the oath of 
office one week later.505 
While some historians have criticized McNair’s hands-on role in the planning of the 
GHQ maneuvers, Christopher Gabel identified the most logical reason for his direct 
involvement: “given the smallness of the GHQ staff (only twenty-nine officers and sixty-four 
enlisted men as of June 1941), General McNair himself became closely involved with the myriad 
details of organizing the maneuvers.”506 However, this explains only part of the reason, and 
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many historians have questioned McNair’s level of involvement. For example, Chris Prigge 
wrote in his recent dissertation on U.S. Armored Cavalry Regiments, “Lesley McNair directly 
supervised and participated in writing the Umpire Manual, and it reflected his interest in 
stopping tanks and faith in antitank guns.” Prigge went on to repeat the frequent criticisms of the 
seemingly biased rules in the Umpire Manual that credited kills to existing antitank guns well 
beyond their effective ranges, while only allowing tanks to destroy antitank guns by overrunning 
them – something very difficult to accomplish given the gun’s standoff advantage. However, 
Prigge failed to mention that by the time of the maneuvers, development of the Army’s antitank 
weapons systems fell under the supervision of the War Department G-3, and reflected not only 
McNair’s, but also Marshall’s ideas on antitank defense, which did not match those of 
McNair.507 
Neither did Prigge mention McNair’s extensive experience with umpire procedures, 
dating back to his Army War College education, his experience as the senior umpire at the Third 
Army maneuvers in 1939, and his observation and critical analysis of the 1940 maneuvers. 
Finally, Prigge, like many of McNair’s critics, implied McNair wrote the rules for tank versus 
antitank engagements based on either bias or an unfounded belief that existing antitank weapons 
possessed capabilities that Ordnance Branch tests proved they lacked. In fact, McNair 
acknowledged the limitations of the 37-mm antitank gun, pointing out it lacked essential features 
for effective aiming and firing, and could not penetrate modern armor at acceptable distances. 
The Ordnance Department fielded many pieces of equipment just prior to the 1941 maneuvers, 
but the next generation of antitank guns remained in development well after their conclusion. 
Therefore, McNair had to develop a set of rules that reflected the anticipated capabilities of the 
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antitank weapons that the War Department expected Ordnance to develop; he never expected the 
Army to enter combat overseas relying on the 37-mm gun.508 
No other Army officer possessed stronger qualifications than McNair to oversee the 
writing of the Umpire Manual. Neither did McNair intentionally favor antitank guns out of 
personal bias or ignorance of existing weapons’ limitations. Instead, McNair simply encountered 
a difficult situation, and he did the best he could do deal with it. Preparation of the Umpire 
Manual, which GHQ distributed to the field armies in February 1941, required him to develop 
rules to adjudicate engagements between units using weapons systems that remained either in 
production or, in the case of new antitank guns and tank destroyers, in a preliminary design 
phase. This has proven a challenge for Army leaders throughout time who work to prepare the 
army of the present for the war of the future. 
The 1941 GHQ maneuvers in Louisiana and the Carolinas served as an immensely 
valuable training event for the U.S. Army. McNair and his small staff planned and oversaw these 
epochal maneuvers, providing the Protective Mobilization Plan Army with invaluable experience 
in combined arms fighting, while enabling the War Department to test new doctrine and 
equipment, and identify issues the Army still needed to resolve. The above analysis focuses on 
two particular issues commonly identified with McNair, examining antitank defense and the 
maneuver Umpire Manual, largely to enable an in-depth analysis of McNair’s actions lacking in 
many other histories of the period. However, much of the emphasis on antitank defense stems 
from the fact that the tank – antitank debate remained in 1941 perhaps the most hotly contested 
issue of Army doctrine and equipment. As Christopher Gabel pointed out, “McNair summarized 
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the upcoming Louisiana maneuver as being ‘. . . a test of tank warfare and antitank defense . . . 
we are definitely out to see . . . if and how we can crush a modern tank offensive.’” During the 
lull between the Louisiana maneuvers and the Carolina maneuvers that took place later that year, 
this question remained unanswered, but McNair’s and Marshall’s faith in the antitank gun and 
tank destroyer remained unshaken even though modernized weapon systems remained in 
development.509  
However, commanders employed antitank weapons more aggressively in the Carolina 
maneuvers, leading to greater success against armored forces and seeming to Marshall, McNair, 
and members of the War Department G-3 to vindicate the weapons and justify their continued 
development. Despite the protests of Major General Jacob Devers, the new chief of the Armored 
Force who blamed armor’s poor performance in the later maneuvers on biased umpire rules, 
antitank development accelerated after the maneuvers. Bruce’s Special Planning Branch of the 
War Department G-3 recommended creation of a massive independent antitank arm of 220 
battalions, but GHQ disagreed with various aspects of Bruce’s proposal, prompting Marshall to 
hold an antitank conference on October 7, 1941 to resolve the remaining issues and set this 
aggressive plan in motion. The participants, including McNair and Clark, agreed the War 
Department should establish a separate force of GHQ antitank battalions.510  
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On November 27, 1941, the War Department issued an order activating the Tank 
Destroyer Tactical and Firing Center at Fort Meade, Maryland and a Tank Destroyer Board, 
placing both under the command of Colonel Bruce and giving him the initial task of activating 
fifty-three new GHQ antitank battalions. Another War Department order of December 3, 1941 
more firmly established the independence of antitank units, redesignated “tank destroyer 
battalions,” and ordering the inactivation of antitank units in cavalry divisions and field artillery 
battalions. Further, this order required infantry divisions to drop the name “infantry” from their 
antitank battalions and renumber them, although allowing them to retain the units as divisional 
tank destroyer battalions. Despite later criticism of the tank destroyer concept, the official history 
concluded the War Department shared GHQ’s ideas concerning antitank policy in late 1941, and 
had developed “an organization well fitted to meet future demands.”511  
Many other issues remained unresolved after the maneuvers, including the role of Army 
air forces (particularly close air support and independence of air units from ground force 
commanders), the ability to train for combined arms operations in the midst of ongoing branch 
disputes, and lengthy delays in fielding of updated weapon systems. Further, the difficulty of 
adjudicating air-ground and artillery attacks during the maneuvers left the effectiveness of these 
key sources of fire support open for debate. While the War Department, GHQ, and the Army’s 
various branches and arms worked to resolve these issues, the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on 
December 7, 1941 prompting America to declare war on Japan, and Germany to follow suit by 
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declaring war on America. This led to a dramatic increase in the rate of mobilization, and a shift 
in the focus of planning from continental defense to expeditionary operations overseas. 
The sudden strategic shift prompted by the declaration of war highlighted not only the 
continued limits on GHQ’s authority, but also a more general need to improve War Department 
organization. As described above, ever since its formation in the summer of 1940, GHQ had 
shouldered a broad range of responsibilities while lacking the authority to make any decisions of 
significance. Instead, General Marshall retained ultimate authority, and despite his trust in 
McNair, never granted him the degree of autonomy or authority implied in many histories. 
Further, Marshall retained a full War Department General Staff, even after adding war planning 
to the list of GHQ’s missions. After receiving McNair’s July 1941 memo requesting the 
enlargement of GHQ’s authority commensurate with its responsibilities, Marshall formed a 
board consisting of representatives from GHQ and the five divisions of the War Department 
General Staff, and the Chief of the Army Air Forces. This board determined that only a complete 
reorganization of the War Department would resolve the issue, and planning throughout the 
remainder of the year led to the reorganization of 1942 that, among other changes, elevated 
McNair once again in rank and responsibility.512 
                                                          




Training the Army Ground Forces to Fight World War II 
The massive reorganization of March 8, 1942 eliminated GHQ, forming instead three 
functional headquarters subordinate to the War Department – the Army Ground Forces (AGF), 
Army Air Forces (AAF), and Army Service Forces (ASF). Command of the AGF went to 
McNair and with it the task of expanding the ground forces from their current strength of 
780,000 officers and men to more than 2.2 million total personnel by July 1943. McNair’s duties 
grew significantly upon the formation of the AGF, encompassing all boards, schools, training 
centers and camps, and special activities having to do with the combat arms. The commanders of 
the other functional headquarters – Brehon Somervell of the Services of Supply (SOS), later 
renamed the Army Service Forces (ASF), and Henry H. “Hap” Arnold of the Army Air Forces 
(AAF) – held (or in Somervell’s case, would soon hold) the same rank as Lieutenant General 
McNair, emphasizing their (at least theoretical) equivalent level of authority.513 
Upon disbanding GHQ, the reorganization gave overall command and control of all 
theaters of operations including the four continental defense commands to the War Department 
General Staff, while delegating responsibility for Zone of Interior functions to the new functional 
headquarters. Therefore, in his new role as AGF commander McNair took direct responsibility 
for the four traditional ground force arms (infantry, artillery, cavalry, and coast artillery), which 
no longer had their own chiefs. The newly formed combat arms – armored, tank destroyer, and 
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antiaircraft artillery – also fell under McNair’s command, but in accordance with the 
reorganization, they either remained or became distinct commands, simply consolidated under 
AGF rather than falling under one or more of the four traditional arms. Somervell’s headquarters 
took control of the technical services and the two combat support services – the Engineers and 
the Signal Corps, along with several other non-supply related Army functions. Arnold’s AAF 
controlled all air force functions in the Zone of Interior.514 
This reorganization failed to achieve its primary goal of improving Army command 
structure and function, largely due to self-interest, competition for resources, and struggles for 
independence among the various organizations and their staffs. The War Department 
implemented this major reorganization largely to resolve the issues that had plagued GHQ and its 
relationship with Marshall’s staff, as recorded in the official history: 
By these changes the War Department sought to relieve the General Staff and its Chief of 
operative and detailed administrative duties in order to set them free to devote themselves to 
planning and over-all supervision. This purpose had also been one of the main objectives of 
GHQ, but had not been fully realized largely because the powers delegated were insufficient.515 
However, similar problems plagued the new arrangement, and new ones emerged that 
significantly increased friction within the War Department. 
Establishment of the new functional commands did not lead to resolution of the many 
contentious issues that had hindered cooperation among Army’s various arms, branches, and 
services over the preceding years. Rather, the different approach each commander took in 
forming his staff and exercising power only further limited cooperation both within the War 
Department and among the various elements of the combined arms team, which mobilized under 
the supervision of three separate organizations, even though they would have to operate as an 
integrated force upon deployment. This new arrangement, intended to streamline the War 
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Department functions, instead created “stovepipes” that violated the traditional principle of unity 
of effort.  
Foreshadowing the competitive relationship that emerged among the three functional 
commanders, Secretary of War Stimson told the press on March 5, 1943, three days before the 
reorganization took effect, that it would “create an organization to fight this war and not any past 
or obsolete wars.” Stimson emphasized that, “the second objective was to give to the Air Corps 
its proper place, to recognize that this war is largely an air war and to put the Air Corps to proper 
relation to the function it will fill.”516 Further complicating matters, the onset of American 
combat operations overseas added the voices of many theater, army group, army, and naval 
commanders to the din, and given their proximity to the front, their advice carried more weight 
than that of any staff officer.  
The official history acknowledged in The Organization of Ground Combat Troops that 
the Army Air Forces “took the lead and applied the drive” that made the contemplated 
reorganization a reality, largely because the authority delegated to GHQ under the previous 
organization had overlapped the authority “the Air Forces had gained as an autonomous entity on 
20 June 1941.” This explains why the Air Forces had joined those who opposed the expansion of 
GHQ’s power to that of a true theater command over the Zone of the Interior, and why they 
strongly supported the reorganization of 1942, which clearly delineated the authority of each 
command, thereby protecting the Air Forces’ independence and increasing their power.517 
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Army historian Kent Roberts Greenfield’s interview of Major General Harry Malony, 
conducted while Malony served as commander of the 94th Division on January 10, 1944, 
provides an insider’s view of the perceptions at GHQ headquarters regarding the reorganization 
of 1942. Malony served as the GHQ Deputy Chief of Staff and oversaw the headquarters’ 
operational and planning functions before returning to the War Department General Staff after 
the March 1942 reorganization. In his interview with Greenfield, Malony highlighted the 
challenges created by the lack of a realistic strategy or industrial mobilization plan in 1940. 
Malony argued that this violated the principle that all planning must start with an assessment of 
means available. To illustrate his point, Malony described a brief meeting he had with Mr. Harry 
Hopkins in England in 1940, during which they discussed resources required for the ongoing 
mobilization effort. When Hopkins asked Malony what primary things America needed to wage 
war, Malony replied simply, “personnel and materiel.”518 This reflected a significantly different 
view than that found in many histories of the American war effort during WWII that argued 
faulty training, doctrine, leadership, and inadequate equipment posed the main challenges to the 
U.S. Army during the war, while asserting the almost limitless personnel and materiel resources 
America possessed explain the real reason for the Army’s success. 
Malony also stated that upon the reorganization of 1942, when he served as Deputy Chief 
of Staff of the War Department Operations Division (OPD), OPD made no effort to adopt or 
glean lessons from the planning process GHQ put in place during the second half of 1941, when 
Malony headed GHQ’s operational planning section. Neither did the War Department move 
GHQ’s operations section personnel to the War Department to form the core of the new OPD – 
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something Malony believed would have significantly improved the division’s effectiveness. He 
argued, “the War Department should have utilized the valuable experience of GHQ in setting up 
the OPD. This transition threw the defense commanders into great confusion.” Malony saw this 
as an unnecessary problem given the highly effective planning process that GHQ had developed, 
and OPD could have adopted and built upon.519 
Malony stated OPD’s reluctance to embrace GHQ personnel or procedures probably 
resulted from frustration within the War Department General Staff caused by the expansion of 
GHQ’s authority in 1941, which resulted, according to Maloney, in the staff believing it “had 
virtually lost the power it was supposed to exercise. The GS [General Staff] Divisions were 
‘dead on the vine.’ Yet they refused to relinquish the right to interfere.” Malony saw little 
difference in the reorganization of 1942: “That is the situation now. Look at WD G-1: it plays 
around with replacements. . . . What does G-3 do? OPD directs operations; AGF directs training. 
Who is G-4? Gen. Somervell.”520 Malony said he believed the solution would have been to 
expand GHQ’s power in 1941 by making “a little man Commander in Chief of the Field Forces” 
[Greenfield’s handwritten notes on the interview transcript indicate Malony referred here to 
General McNair]. Even after Marshall refused to take this step his staff continued to complain 
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about its loss of authority – regarding which, Malony observed, “it was ridiculous to say that the 
interposition of GHQ was interfering with effective action. The WDGS was dead and didn’t 
know it. It had no conception of the demands of the war we were about to wage.”521 
The reorganization of 1942 appears to have had as much to do with the desire to 
reestablish centralized control at the War Department as it did with achieving the goal of clearly 
dividing Zone of Interior responsibility between AGF, AAF, and ASF. The reorganization failed 
on both counts. Responsibilities overlapped significantly between the three functional 
commands, leading to continued debate over matters long in contention, only made worse by the 
“stovepipe” nature of the new arrangement. War Department staff officers had to contend with 
and attempt to coordinate the frequent recommendations and requests from these three 
subordinate commands within the Zone of the Interior, where before they had only GHQ to 
coordinate (and argue) with.  
The official history recorded the haphazard process by which the War Department 
attempted to centralize operational control: 
In the reorganization as announced no explicit provision was made for centralized control of 
operations in widely scattered theaters, specifically, for ‘an executive group’ within the War 
Department which ‘would in reality be a command section.’ The absorption of the operational 
element of GHQ into the War Department as a means of meeting this need had been rejected and 
the officers composing that element in GHQ were not utilized to form a new group in the War 
Department. But a new group was formed in WPD [War Plans Division], which, under its later 
title of Operations Division, became, in effect, the command post of General Marshall in 
Washington. GHQ, in its executive activities, had forecast and confirmed the need for such an 
agency, but was not made that agency. It is evident from the foregoing study that the motives and 
circumstances that led to its rejection were complex. They included organizational and personal 
interests and rivalries which inevitably attend the development of a new and forceful 
institution.522 
The reorganization of 1942 simply created two new power brokers in the Zone of the Interior –
Arnold and Somervell – to compete with McNair for preeminence in the various areas of overlap 
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between their functional responsibilities. Each of these men proved more ambitious and clever 
than McNair in the power politics that ensued. Further, numerous problems stemmed from the 
War Department’s failure to establish centralized command and control over the various combat 
theaters, relying on the informal appointment of that role to OPD (purely as a staff oversight 
function rather than a formalized source of centralized control with the requisite authority to 
establish true unity of command). 
The reorganization also led to several areas of conflict between AGF, ASF, and AAF that 
McNair simply chose not to engage in – or only slowly recognized and pointed out to Marshall 
and his staff with limited results. As a rule, McNair simply followed orders and tried to 
accomplish his mission as efficiently and effectively as possible, and he assumed (perhaps 
naively) that Arnold and Somervell would do the same. McNair’s lack of interest in publicity and 
sincere willingness to get the job done without caring who got the credit significantly 
disadvantaged him in the competition that emerged between the three functional commands. An 
interview Greenfield conducted with AGF Chief of Staff Major General James G. Christiansen 
on February 7, 1945 provides excellent insight into this particular aspect of the challenges the 
reorganization caused for McNair.  
During this interview, Greenfield pointed out that some critics argued the Army’s 
inferiority in tanks stemmed from the reorganization of the War Department, because it placed 
responsibility for armor training with the AGF, while the ASF retained oversight of the technical 
aspects of armor development. He then mentioned the provision in the reorganization that 
granted control to the AAF over technical air support services and aircraft procurement, which 
led to improvements in the production of new aircraft and sustainment of the existing Air Forces. 
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Greenfield asked how the failure to grant the same authorities to the AGF affected its challenges 
procuring new combat equipment. Christiansen replied,  
our position with relation to the technical services goes back to General McNair’s decision when 
he organized the Special Staff of this headquarters. He decided to set up the Special Staff 
Sections solely for training purposes, leaving the initiative in developing equipment to the 
technical services. His object was economy of personnel. He refused to duplicate services that 
already existed, and believed that they must be trusted in this war, whatever the ideal set-up might 
prove to be. This decision may have been a mistake but it was rooted in his conviction that the 
enemy could be beaten only by the application of superior combat power when and where 
needed. With limited shipping and limited available manpower, this would, he believed, be 
possible for us only by the strictest economy in the services. . . . It was the principle behind his 
proposal, early in the war, to divide the total manpower available to the ground forces by 35,000 
per division and plan accordingly. It was not followed, and we have gone to 80,000 per division. 
At the time of Anzio he pointed out that we were stopped dead by the 100,000 combat troops 
whom the Germans could put opposite our 100,000 combat troops. We had 500 - 600,000 [more 
troops] behind them; with 20,000 of these we could break the deadlock and go wherever we 
wanted, with lighter losses than we were suffering by attrition – the losses which our 
overwhelming support was designed to minimize. But we could not gain the superiority required 
because our troops were frozen into overhead and services.523 
This observation reveals many challenges American ground troops faced in fighting the 
war.  
Two memos containing extracts from the observations of Major General George S. 
Patton, prepared on August 4, 1943 by Major General Thomas T. Handy, Chief of OPD, confirm 
the excess overhead Christiansen mentioned in his interview with Greenfield. Handy quoted 
Patton,  
it seems to me that perhaps we have an exaggerated idea of the proportion of SOS [ASF] troops 
to combat troops. There is a tendency for the SOS to work on the eight-hour day principle. While 
this is o.k. in quiet sectors, in emergencies they should work 24 hours a day as do the combat 
troops. 
Curiously, Handy prepared two versions of the memo – one addressed to all three functional 
commanders, and the other only to Arnold. These memos are identical except that the above 
paragraph only appears in the memo addressed to Arnold alone. One can only wonder why 
Handy prepared two different versions of this memo. Regardless, the paragraph above 
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demonstrates that at least one combat commander shared Christiansen’s (and McNair’s) concern 
over the excess number of service troops relative to combat troops.524 Nevertheless, histories of 
WWII often attributed the AGF’s primary challenges to poor decisions McNair made, without 
considering the organization of the various agencies responsible for industrial mobilization, the 
authority of their military and civilian leaders, or the decreased efficiency of the War Department 
resulting from the reorganization of 1942. 
Historian James Lacey exposed many long-overlooked flaws in America’s industrial 
mobilization for WWII, and the many myths that resulted from historians’ failure to recognize 
these flaws until recently. After dismantling the Wedemeyer myth and exposing the “Real 
Victory Program,” Lacey described the development of the “Production Victory Program,” 
revealing the striking similarities between the flawed industrial mobilization efforts preceding 
WWI and WWII. As mentioned above, in 1940 President Roosevelt scrapped the longstanding 
Industrial Mobilization Plan, refusing to entrust America’s wartime civilian economy to military 
planners. As President Wilson and Secretary of War Baker had done in 1917, President 
Roosevelt created various boards and committees to coordinate the military’s strategic plans and 
industry’s production capacity. However, with basic American military strategy not agreed upon 
until early 1941, Lacey pointed out “the planners had yet to match that strategy against national 
resources and capabilities.” Frequent requests from civilian production chiefs for military 
requirements finally prompted Roosevelt to direct Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary of the 
Navy Knox on July 9, 1941 to “explore the munitions and mechanical equipment of all types 
which in your opinion would be required to exceed by an appropriate amount that available to 
our potential enemies.” Thus, Roosevelt did not ask until the summer of 1941 for a coordinated 
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civil-military plan that addressed the nation’s requirements to conduct offensive operations, 
rather than simply its needs to defend the United States.525  
One of the first products of this effort, involving planners within the United States and 
their potential allies, according to Lacey, “were not flattering to the United States. With 2.5 times 
the combined population of Britain and Canada, America’s installed munitions production 
capacity was lagging far behind its ultimate potential and what the other two nations were 
producing. The stark numbers clearly demonstrated that the United States was a long way from 
being the ‘arsenal of democracy’.”526 Lacey also revealed that by late 1941, initial plans existed 
that described the industrial requirements to support an 8-million person American Army, and 
the manner in which the military would employ that combat equipment, but it still remained an 
open question when industry could actually provide that equipment. Two economists, Robert 
Nathan and Simon Kuznets, provided an answer to that question in November 1941 that “led to 
some of the fiercest and nastiest military-civilian debates of the war.” In short, Nathan and 
Kuznets found that production of the required materiel by the fall of 1943, including Lend-Lease 
projections, would require America increase its expenditures on the defense program by over 
200%, requiring both a massive increase in Gross Domestic Production (GDP) and commitment 
of half the target GDP to defense spending to meet its production goals.527 
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Civilian industry leaders also could not meet the military’s production requirements 
without accurate estimates of the military’s requirements – something Lacey revealed the 
military could never provide with any reliability. The military still suffered from the same 
unclear relationship that had long existed between the combat personnel who employed military 
equipment and the Ordnance personnel who designed and procured that equipment, and the same 
lack of unity of effort or oversight in a single agency or individual over the various organizations 
involved in military industrial production. In his usual manner, President Roosevelt attempted to 
resolve the impasse by forming committees and boards of men who did not see eye-to-eye or 
even work well together (or, in Lacey’s words, “chosen with typical political astuteness by 
Roosevelt”), believing lack of consensus led to original thought and insightful solutions.528 
However, the dysfunctional process Lacey described casts doubt on the effectiveness of this 
practice. It also identifies one key military individual as primarily responsible for the military’s 
inadequate, even counterproductive contribution to the process: Lieutenant General Brehon 
Somervell, Commander of the ASF.  
Referencing the minutes of the many boards responsible for various aspects of industrial 
mobilization, Lacey recognized an ongoing trend between November 1941 and the fall of 1942 
in which the military consistently questioned the civilians’ production estimates and economic 
analyses, while insisting on unrealistic materiel production quantities. Lacey highlighted the 
October 6, 1942 War Production Board meeting to demonstrate the severity of the civilian 
industrialists’ frustration with Somervell by this point in the war. All parties arrived at the 
meeting already in intense disagreement regarding the feasibility of the 1942 and 1943 
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production plans, about which Somervell remained far more optimistic than the civilian 
industrialists and economists. Somervell had consistently criticized the civilians’ reports and 
estimates before the meeting, and he continued to do so once it began. The civilians provided 
detailed production and economic analyses that showed American industry and GDP simply 
could not support the military requirements provided by the Joint Chiefs for 1942 and 1943. At a 
seeming impasse, it appeared the meeting might end still having failed to resolve these issues. 
Somervell and Under Secretary of War Robert Patterson refused to support the civilians’ 
recommendation for formation of a new production-strategy board, asserting they saw no need 
for civilians to concern themselves with strategy. Instead, they insisted the civilians should focus 
on finding ways to meet military requirements, rather than questioning their feasibility.529  
At this point Leon Henderson, head of the Office of Price Administration (OPA), finally 
lost his patience with Somervell, who continued to insist the figure Nathan set at the nation’s 
maximum productive effort in munitions, construction, and other military expenditures, was 
insufficient for the conduct of the war. Lacey recounted, 
‘The amount in question, 90 billion dollars, was interesting,’ said Henderson, ‘because it 
exceeded by far the value of our entire national product both for 1933 and 1934.’ Then, as if a 
great light were dawning, he said, in substance, ‘Maybe if we can’t wage a war on 90 billions, we 
ought to get rid of our present Joint Chiefs, and find some who can.’530 
This brought the meeting to dead silence. According to Lacey’s narrative, this pause, “allowed 
Henderson to turn to Somervell and proceed to make the most violent personal attack ever heard 
in a meeting of the WPB.” Henderson stated that, “he found himself disgusted with Somervell’s 
repeated obstinacy, overbearing manner, and ignorance of production problems. He stated flatly 
his belief that Somervell had always padded his requirements, and that the general had no idea of 
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the disastrous implications of infeasible goals.”531 This last point highlights the central issue with 
the entire war production process. In a planning effort based on flawed assumptions and 
unrealistic requirements, leaders lack the ability to make informed prioritization decisions. 
Given the longstanding dysfunction associated with the production planning effort, 
President Roosevelt had simply continued to insist the industrialists meet military production 
goals that the nation’s economy could not support, while simultaneously refusing to impose 
significant sacrifice on the American people. In fact, Lacey argued:  
The myth that in the pursuit of total victory the American people sacrificed so that consumer 
production facilities could convert to war production is demonstrably untrue. Consumer spending 
in America went up (as a percent of GDP) every year of the war, and virtually all wartime 
munitions production can be accounted for by GDP growth and not by limitations placed on 
consumer production.532 
In fact, as Paul A. C. Koistinen revealed in Arsenal of World War II: The Political Economy of 
American Warfare, 1940-1945, civilian production companies began hoarding essential raw 
materials needed for the mobilization effort to support their increased output of consumer 
durables. Koistinen highlighted “between April and May 1941 – within months of Pearl Harbor – 
automobile output had grown by 27 percent over the same months in 1940, and that pattern was 
continuing. This situation was breaking down the entire priority system.”533 
The blowup at the October 6, 1942 WPB meeting finally led to the realization that 
America’s military strategy required major revision among most members of the board – only 
Somervell remained unconvinced obstinate in his conviction the civilians must find a way to 
meet military production demands. To break the impasse, Nelson formed the Production 
Executive Committee (PEC), placing Charles E. Wilson of the General Electric Corporation in 
charge of the committee and charging him with the responsibility of perfecting production 
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schedules. Nelson formed this new committee specifically to backpedal from the cooperative 
spirit in which the WPB had theoretically operated, realizing Wilson, described by historian John 
Kennedy Ohl as “a crackerjack production man . . . who was thought to be sympathetic to the 
civilian outlook,” would reassert civilian control over the production process.” In essence, this 
represented a reversal of the original WPB arrangement in which the military determined 
requirements and the civilians found ways to accomplish them.534  
By November 1942, Somervell recognized the implications of Nelson’s actions and 
engaged directly in conflict with Wilson, attempting to retain military control over development 
of production requirements. At this point, even navy and Maritime Commission representatives 
had accepted the need to turn over production requirements and scheduling to the civilians; only 
Somervell remained in opposition. This led to further debate, prompting President Roosevelt to 
invite Nelson to the White House to hear the WPB’s case, which Nelson summed up as the need 
for “proper, orderly scheduling.” Roosevelt offered to help, but Nelson declined, asking only that 
the President not help “the other fellow” [Somervell]. From this point on, Nelson dealt directly 
with Secretary of War Stimson, enabling him to bypassing Somervell, who remained belligerent 
even after Roosevelt called a meeting between Nelson, Stimson, and Secretary of the Navy Frank 
Knox directing them to work together to quickly resolve the production debate. Ohl argued 
Somervell’s futile attempts to influence the negotiations between Nelson and Stimson suggest 
“that, if Roosevelt and Stimson had not entered the picture, there probably would not have been 
an agreement at all.”535 
After months of bureaucratic squabbling, the civilians had finally gotten through to the 
military leaders – and President Roosevelt – that America had been pursuing an infeasible troop 
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basis and military strategy. This led to two significant military consequences. First, the Joint 
Chiefs reduced spending projections for 1943 by $12 billion, $3 billion of which came from the 
Navy, and $9 billion from the Army (all from the Ground Forces – further demonstrating the 
War Department’s prioritization of AAF and ASF over AGF requirements throughout the 
industrial mobilization process).536 Further, it led to the realization among senior American 
military leaders in early 1943 that America could not pursue a cross channel attack that summer 
even if Britain supported one.  
Lacey devoted particular attention to this second point, because it shatters another 
longstanding myth in the standard narrative of WWII: 
Sometime between Torch and the Casablanca Conference, however, Marshall abandoned his 
single-minded crusade for a second front in 1943 and supported a major post-Torch diversion of 
resources to further Mediterranean operations. In this, too, the remainder of the Joint Chiefs 
joined him. The Americans were not overawed or overwhelmed by superior British negotiating 
skills or staff procedures, as historians have often suggested they were. Rather, they had simply 
changed their minds about the wisdom of a major 1943 invasion, though they do appear to have 
been more than a bit reticent about announcing their change of heart and thereby admitting that 
British strategists had been right from the beginning. 
Lacey argued it was not simply the realization after the amphibious landings of Operation 
TORCH that a cross-channel invasion would present far greater challenges than previously 
assumed (illustrated by Eisenhower’s doubling his estimate for the number of divisions he would 
require to accomplish the invasion) that led to Marshall’s change of heart. Rather, the Joint 
Chiefs’ admission that the civilian industrialists had finally convinced them they had pursued for 
nearly a year highly unrealistic goals for military materiel production proved just as instrumental 
in changing Marshall’s mind. Lacey provided numerous examples from the transcripts of the 
Casablanca Conference where Marshall’s acquiescence to or lack of comment on British 
demands indicate he did not in fact arrive determined to fight for a 1943 invasion of France.537  
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Lacey concluded his analysis of the “Victory Production Plan” debate by answering the 
question why Marshall changed his mind about the timing of an Allied amphibious invasion of 
mainland Europe. Lacey argued once the industrialists had made it clear he would not have the 
size force originally anticipated for the summer of 1943 until a year later, “the decision was 
made for him.” Further, Lacey argued, “the blame must fall squarely on Somervell’s 
shoulders.”538 Koistinen arrived at similar conclusions regarding Somervell’s intransigence 
through the spring of 1943, but failed to grasp just how severely Somervell disrupted the 
mobilization process. Referring to Somervell as Marshall’s “attack dog,” Koistinen recounted 
Marshall’s postwar statement regarding Somervell’s ambition, in which he acknowledged, “of 
course I had to fight Somervell down or he would have taken the whole damn staff,” and that the 
desire to avoid “any future development of a man like General Somervell” played a key role in 
postwar reorganization. However, Koistinen also quoted Marshall’s conclusion that, “if I went 
into control in another war, I would start looking for another General Somervell the very first 
thing I did,” leaving the reader with a much more positive interpretation of Somervell’s 
participation in the mobilization process than Lacey did.539 
The implications of the haphazard progress of industrial mobilization regarding the 
analysis of McNair’s role as AGF commander extend far beyond determination of the date when 
the Allies could first attempt a cross-channel invasion. In short, during a period when the AGF, 
AAF, and ASF commanders should have worked closely together to arrive at a feasible, 
integrated, and unanimously supported plan to support the mobilization effort, Somervell 
consistently hindered McNair’s efforts to mobilize and equip ground forces. Along with the 
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various squabbles described below, Somervell’s stubborn refusal to listen to the industrial 
mobilization experts or give them realistic military materiel requirements delayed the entire 
process of producing necessary weapons systems to mobilize, train, equip, and deploy AGF 
units. Further, Somervell’s refusal to accept the sound advice from industrialists and economists 
meant the Army not only pursued an unrealistic mobilization plan for over a year; it also made 
many military leaders doubt the significance of shipping shortages and other limitations that 
McNair clearly understood from the start. This understanding, probably based on McNair’s 
experience with the mobilization along the Mexican border and prior to the First World War, led 
him to design the Ground Forces for both efficiency and effectiveness – a conviction for which 
he drew criticism from combat commanders during the war and military historians ever since. 
Commander, Army Ground Forces, 1942-1944 
McNair’s emphasis on efficiency through streamlining, pooling, and task organization 
did not merely apply to his thoughts on ground forces organization – he also emphasized 
efficiency in staff and services (in other words, limiting “overhead” or non-combat personnel).540 
He therefore continued to rely on a small staff, for the same reason that he believed the ground 
forces should keep overhead to a minimum. McNair also did not possess the nature of an empire-
builder. He kept his staff far smaller than that of the War Department or the other two functional 
headquarters, and he remained the loyal follower even as Arnold and Somervell competed to 
exert ever-increasing influence over Marshall while building ever larger and more powerful 
staffs. He even refused to join the mass movement of staff personnel to the newly opened 
Pentagon, preferring to keep his “intimate” staff at the Army War College, in part because, 
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unlike Washington, the grounds retained a distinctly military atmosphere. While this may 
indicate a certain naiveté, McNair simply did not desire to engage in such power struggles.541  
The Equipment Review Board (or Cook Board, presided over by Major General Gilbert 
R. Cook) found numerous flaws after the war in the Army’s weapons development process. The 
board included a cover letter with its various reports on specific equipment types that addressed 
several points related to this topic.542 For example, the board found that effective peacetime 
weapons development required that 
a weapon or a piece of equipment should be developed for a specific purpose and must represent 
the best possible solution to the needs of the user.” [This meant] “the user who is to fight the 
weapon in the combat zone must completely control the development of the weapon he is to 
employ. The complete and sole objective of the development agency must be to reflect the needs 
of the user. . . . Neither a development agency nor a using agency should at the same time, be a 
procurement agency.” 
These findings led the board to recommend integration of effort under a “unified Department of 
National Defense,” with “responsibility for the development of all army ground force weapons 
and materiel . . . assigned directly to Army Ground Forces.”543 During World War II, AGF 
lacked this authority. 
This presents a striking parallel to post-WWI debates regarding equipment procurement 
organizations and authorities. Secretary of War Baker had highlighted this very issue in his 
testimony before the House Committee on Military Affairs in 1919, stating that the Ordnance 
Department “makes what the other soldiers use and you have a controversy in the Army all the 
time between the user of the weapon and the maker of the weapon. The user says that ‘The man 
that makes it is a manufacturer and he knows nothing about what I am going to do with it and 
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therefore he must make it the way I want it.’ The manufacturer on the other hand says, ‘These 
fellows in the field have no technical knowledge; they do not know a good weapon; my duty is to 
give them a good weapon.” Nevertheless, after WWI military traditionalists failed to adopt a 
streamlined, modernized command system, leading to various inefficiencies including the 
existence of precisely the same friction between Ordnance and the AGF during both World 
Wars.544  
Upon his retirement in 1930, General Summerall had predicted the continuing problems 
that would result from the failure to resolve this issue. Summerall warned, as paraphrased by 
historian Daniel Beaver, “the failure to consolidate command and control of supply and logistics 
under the chief of staff in the 1920 legislation [the 1920 NDA] would bring difficulties similar to 
those encountered in 1917 and 1918.” Instead, as Beaver explained, “The National Defense Act 
placed responsibility for procurement planning and industrial mobilization in the office of the 
assistant secretary of war and responsibility for military planning in the office of the chief of 
staff. Limited interwar funding or a specific military threat combined with the purely 
consultative relationship between the procurement and mobilization planners and the war 
planners left the Army and the civilian industrialists no better prepared for World War II than 
they had been in 1917.545 
The reorganization of March 1942 elevated McNair to his highest level of responsibility 
during the war, but if anything, at AGF he possessed even less ability to influence key decisions 
than he had as GHQ Chief of Staff. He certainly lacked any ability to break the logjam between 
military war planners and leaders in the military and civilian sector responsible for industrial 
mobilization. McNair remained an influential figure, but his scope of authority and responsibility 
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remained limited, and many of his achievements have gone unrecognized in histories of the war, 
which tended instead to identify McNair as the target of blame for various deficiencies they 
sought to demonstrate in the Army’s combat effectiveness. The following analysis describes how 
the Army recognized and overcame several key difficulties that hindered its mobilization and 
entry into combat, demonstrating that it achieved success not through materiel superiority, but by 
learning how to fight in accordance with the operational doctrine and organizational principles 
developed during the interwar period – efforts in which McNair played a significant role. The 
vitality of the discourse in the 1920s and 1930s refutes the myth that inactivity and stagnation 
defined the Army’s interwar years, even if this vibrant intellectual activity took place mostly in 
the officer education system and various branch journals. The absence of adequate funds to pay 
for the large army, organized reserve system, and modern equipment that made Germany such a 
formidable military power by 1939 delayed the U.S. Army’s ability to achieve parity on the 
battlefield. Nevertheless, its foundation of clear doctrine and extensive unit mobilization training 
enabled the Army to overcome the initial shock new units experienced in combat and evolve as a 
highly effective fighting force. 
The analysis that follows revisits the same themes discussed in the previous chapter to 
describe how McNair, as AGF Commander, dealt with the issues he had faced during his tenure 
as GHQ Chief of Staff. This highlights the continuities in McNair’s efforts to prepare the ground 
forces for war before 1942, and his efforts to improve their fighting effectiveness once 
committed to combat during the period of rapid Army expansion from 1942-1944. McNair’s 
actions during this period reveal that his ideas not only represented a continuation of the 
evolution in his thinking in the 1920s and 1930s – they also served as the foundation for the 
successful fighting techniques that enabled the U.S. Army to prevail on the WWII battlefield.  
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The Army doctrine and organization McNair helped develop before the war proved quite 
effective in practice with a reasonable amount of learning and adaptation, as demonstrated by the 
stability of organizations like the triangular division and the longevity of the 1941 FSR (FM 100-
5, Operations). This seems particularly remarkable given the fact that progressive mobilization 
and deployment of new divisions after 1942, combined with reliance on an individual 
replacement system, meant that the forces that fought each successive campaign included a 
significant percentage of units entering combat for the first time. These units typically entered 
(or reentered) combat after receiving individual replacements to bring them up to strength, 
relying on many troops that had received minimal and poorly standardized individual training. 
Nevertheless, the overall quality of the system of doctrine, organization, and unit training 
McNair helped developed before the war and oversaw during mobilization helped these units 
achieve success against professional, combat-hardened military forces in one campaign after 
another. 
Additionally, this admittedly brief survey of McNair’s service as AGF Commander 
builds on the preceding analysis of McNair’s early career to demonstrate the stability of the 
fundamental views and innovative spirit he pursued throughout the thirty-five years preceding 
the start of World War II. McNair’s career-long efforts, guided by several fundamental 
characteristics, enabled the U.S. Army to overcome key deficiencies in organization, doctrine, 
and policy to mature from 1940-42 into an effective fighting force – despite often working 
against strong institutional resistance. Finally, it reveals a continuation of the trend seen in many 
histories that have mentioned McNair’s service at GHQ and AGF of placing blame on McNair 
for problems he lacked the authority to resolve, or failing to balance criticism of his flaws with a 
fair assessment of his achievements. 
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This analysis not only sheds new light on McNair’s achievements and missteps, it 
provides further support to the growing body of work that challenges the standard narrative many 
historians have embraced as accepted wisdom that criticizes the combat effectiveness of 
American combat troops throughout the war. The U.S. Army did not succeed during WWII due 
to overwhelming personnel or materiel superiority. In fact, historians have long overstated the 
nation’s advantages in this area. America certainly possessed vast resources, but was almost 
completely unprepared to apply them to a war effort in 1940, when the threat Germany posed to 
Great Britain finally forced the nation’s leaders to realize they must begin mobilization. The U.S. 
Army also did not succeed due to a Western democratic tradition or American exceptionalism 
that gave it moral superiority over its opponents. Rather, the Army learned to fight by employing 
methods developed and firmly entrenched in the psyche of the Regular Army personnel who 
served during the interwar period, and passed on from these Regulars to new recruits through the 
most effective unit mobilization training the U.S. Army had ever undergone.546 
The initial challenges the Army faced should not serve as an indictment of McNair’s 
efforts to prepare the Army for World War II. Instead, they reflect realities stemming from 
America’s lack of preparedness for war, which forced the nation to mobilize hastily after a 
lengthy period of peace, in which significant fiscal constraints prevented the Army from 
exploiting its intellectual development with a viable modernization effort. Even after 
mobilization began, McNair’s power remained far more limited than many historians have 
implied, although his name recognition value ensured he featured in many of their critiques of 
the U.S. Army’s performance during the war. Ultimately, McNair and his colleagues could not 
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solve many of the problems the Army struggled with during the interwar years and the 
mobilization period until combat experience enabled them to find answers to the many questions 
debated throughout the interwar period. This led some critics to question the competence and 
boldness of the Army’s officer corps. 
In his comparison of German and U.S. Army performance during the war, Fighting 
Power, Martin van Creveld argued, “the American officer corps of World War II was less than 
mediocre.” While Creveld qualified this assessment by pointing out the challenge presented by 
time pressure during the hasty mobilization of U.S. Army divisions, Creveld’s assertion that 
“between them and their German opposite numbers there simply is no comparison possible” 
seems unjustifiably oversimplified. Creveld’s comparative analysis appears biased by an 
excessive admiration of German tactical prowess, and an uninformed acceptance of the 
American materiel superiority myth that, in Creveld’s view, explains the U.S. Army’s eventual 
success in combat.547 Fighting Power serves as a perfect example of the result of what historian 
William J. Astore referred to as “A Case of Wehrmacht Penis Envy.”548 While Astore’s book 
chapter focused on a primarily American post-WWII phenomenon, the excessive admiration of 
German fighting prowess he described has also long existed among non-American historians, as 
demonstrated by works like van Creveld’s Fighting Power. 
Despite the efforts of many historians to correct the record in recent years, criticisms of 
American combat leadership continue to appear in the historiography of World War II. For 
example, in his recent book Command Culture, Jörg Muth relied on timeworn assessments like 
that found in Russell Weigley’s Eisenhower’s Lieutenants in his attempt to demonstrate 
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American commanders’ supposed lack of aggressiveness (“command culture”). Weigley asserted 
unaggressive American generalship led to unnecessarily lengthy operations, false expectations 
that the Germans would demonstrate similar caution in battle, and the discouragement by 
superior officers of any boldness among their subordinates. Muth repeated Weigley’s 
assessment, still often heard today, that America could have shortened the war through bolder 
generalship, but relied instead on materiel superiority to win in a slow, methodical fashion.549  
Muth cited various standard-bearers of this flawed but remarkably resilient narrative like 
Martin Blumenson, who in a 1989 article on America’s World War II leaders in the European 
Theater of Operations (ETO), assessed American generals as “generally workmanlike rather than 
bold, prudent rather than daring, George S. Patton, Jr. being of course a notable exception.” 
Muth even cited the deeply flawed Fighting Power in his effort to prove the ineptitude of 
America’s World War II combat leaders, despite Muth’s admission that “some of his [van 
Creveld’s] findings have been proven incorrect by recent research.”550 
Criticism of American officers usually focuses on their supposed lack of boldness and 
daring, and Blumenson ranks among many historians who hold Patton up as the exception 
among an otherwise mediocre pool of officers. Part of the reason for this narrow view probably 
lies in the historical focus on the better-known commanders of armies and army groups, and to a 
lesser extent the most famous senior aviators and navy admirals. Such histories often contrast 
Patton’s constant requests for more resources and freedom of action (along with counterfactual 
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assessments of what he could have accomplished had his requests been granted) against accepted 
Allied strategy, such as Eisenhower’s determination to maintain a broad-front strategy. 
Eisenhower emphasized keeping pressure up along the entire Western Front and avoiding any 
action that might overextend part of the line and form a salient for German counterattacks to 
exploit. 
Even recent histories continue to criticize Eisenhower for his adherence to this strategy, 
supporting the image of the unimaginative American general capable only of grinding down the 
Germans in a laborious and bloody attrition-based strategy. In Decision at Strasbourg: Ike’s 
Strategic Mistake to Halt the Sixth Army Group at the Rhine in 1944, historian David P. Colley 
quoted historian Stephen Ambrose, who claimed, “attrition is always a cautious and 
unimaginative strategy.” Building on this broad oversimplification, Colley argued, “with Ike in 
command, there would be no grand envelopments, no surprise or bold maneuvers by the 6th 
Army Group to outwit or outflank the Germans,” and assessed General Eisenhower “lacked the 
boldness of a Patton or a Rommel; and he did not have Montgomery’s detailed understanding of 
tactics and strategy.” Colley made these claims to support his criticism of Eisenhower’s decision 
to refuse Lieutenant General Devers’ request to attack across the Rhine into Germany in 
November 1944. Colley blamed this “mistake” on Eisenhower’s supposed lack of boldness and 
imagination, while discounting the many reasons Eisenhower found Devers’ plan flawed. 
Primarily, Eisenhower concluded the attack would create unacceptable risk by creating weak 
points in the Allied line, while offering little promise for the decisive results Devers imagined 
due to the rough terrain that Allied forces would face once across the river. Eisenhower had 
learned from the disastrous results of giving Montgomery free reign to launch the bold and 
complex Operation MARKET-GARDEN two months earlier, and only a month after he refused 
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Devers’ request, the Germans executed a bold counterattack against a weak point in the Allied 
line in the Ardennes. This led to the costly and morale-shaking Battle of the Bulge – just the sort 
of opportunity Eisenhower did not want to offer the Germans in 6th Army Group’s sector.551 
Histories of World War II often describe Patton’s counterattack during the Battle of the 
Bulge as an example of the kind of bold maneuver most American commanders simply lacked 
the capability to plan or lead. This maneuver did prove significant in limiting the success of the 
German offensive, but commanders in many units, both American and British, contributed to the 
Allied victory. Analysis of this offensive also demonstrates the fallacies that can result from 
comparisons of American and German commanders’ combat leadership. Senior German Army 
officers attempted to convince Hitler to call off the counterattack he planned in the Ardennes 
because they knew they lacked the resources to exploit an initial penetration, however 
successful, and their forces would culminate quickly and with significant losses that they had no 
means to replace. Despite these protests, Hitler insisted on executing the counterattack – 
demonstrating the motivation for this high-risk operation stemmed from his irrational leadership, 
rather than his officers’ boldness. Although the Battle of the Bulge ended as Hitler’s staff 
predicted, the operation illustrates the wisdom of the broad front strategy Eisenhower adhered to, 
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since the Wehrmacht remained dangerous even in its weakened state, and such setbacks, while 
temporary, still proved damaging to morale among the troops and on the home front.552 
Even in those areas where terrain might have favored more bold maneuvers, limited 
logistics capacity meant supplying a bold localized offensive would require limiting fuel, 
ammunition, and other supplies along the rest of the front – a significant risk Eisenhower wisely 
chose not to take. Winton’s Corps Commanders of the Bulge highlighted the fallacy of equating 
officer quality with boldness and daring by focusing on six corps commanders who provided 
crucial leadership during the two-month long operation. Winton revealed the key contributions 
of six American general officers: Gerow, Middleton, Ridgway, Millikin, Eddy, and Collins – 
many of whom remained in relative obscurity in the historical record due to historians’ tendency 
to focus on large unit commanders (even Ridgway remains better known for his service in the 
Korean War than WWII). Historians should produce more studies like Winton’s, something 
which might help shatter the myth of the “workmanlike” American general.553 
Peter Schifferle provided additional rationale for the broad front strategy in America’s 
School for War, arguing that despite mechanization and other technological advances, the unit 
density along the relatively short Western Front caused the lines to stabilize much as they did 
during the First World War. While this never led to the trench warfare the AEF experienced, it 
did cause the Allies to resort to a slow, steady, attrition-based offensive, simply due to the 
physical characteristics of the theater of operations. However, the officers responsible during the 
interwar period for educating the Army’s future senior leaders drew from their experience of 
stabilized front operations – particularly during the Meuse-Argonne offensive – when 
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formulating the doctrine and designing the organizations the Army employed in 1944-45. This 
doctrine and organization, relying on penetrations achieved through massive firepower and 
infantry-artillery cooperation, turned out to be perfectly suited for the form of combat the Allies 
encountered in the campaigns of 1944-45.554  
Historians such as Creveld, Ambrose, Blumenson, and Colley have long criticized 
American generals for the doctrine they employed, along with forward-thinking officers like 
McNair who worked between the wars to develop that doctrine. The U.S. Army’s interwar 
officer education system also serves as a comment target of such critiques, leading to accusations 
of stalled intellectual development between the wars. Few historians have recognized the 
appropriateness of the doctrine developed by veterans of the AEF for the dynamics of the Second 
World War, which turned out, particularly on the Western Front of the European Theater of 
Operations, more similar to those of the First World War than different. Instead, histories of 
WWII often argue American officers’ employment of this doctrine demonstrates their lack of 
imagination or incompetence, rather than recognizing that it served as the key source of their 
ability to lead America’s rapidly mobilized forces to victory against one of the most experienced 
and tactically competent armies the world has ever seen.  
Critics of American officers have mistakenly devalued competence, assessing the quality 
of their leadership based on criteria like boldness, charisma, and maverick behavior – 
characteristics necessary to satisfy admirers of the Wehrmacht and the myth of Auftragstaktik. 
Peter Schifferle provides a particularly insightful explanation for this phenomenon:  
Perhaps the greatest irony of the interwar General Staff School education was that the failure to 
resolve a very controversial issue – whether to focus on teaching future commanders or teaching 
future staff officers – was itself of great benefit to the fielded force in World War II. The 
conflation of commandership and staff officer skills, exemplified in the name change in the early 
1920s to the Command and General Staff School, actually assisted the leaders of combat 
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divisions in World War II. They were educated like the dragoons of old who, when on foot, were 
told they could defeat any mounted force and, when on horseback, were told that they could 
defeat any dismounted unit. Leavenworth students were continually informed that as general staff 
officers they needed to know everything the generals had to know so they could assist them with 
proper staff work. As potential generals, they were told they would need to know everything that 
their staff knew to better teach less qualified subordinates and to better appreciate the estimates 
they would receive from a staff during combat.  
This dual focus on generalship and staff skills enabled the relatively small pool of Leavenworth-
trained officers to not only bring their own individual skills to either job, but also train and assist 
those officers around them who found themselves in a command or staff role having had no 
Leavenworth education or only the abbreviated course offered during mobilization. Combined 
with the War College education received by most of the Army’s senior leaders, the American 
officer corps’ broad and challenging educational experience during the interwar period resulted 
in a level of competence that enabled them to fight effectively despite lacking a so-called 
“command culture.”555  
Lesley McNair made essential contributions to this educational system and the doctrine 
and organizations officers studied in the Army schools, ranging from his service on the post-
WWI inaugural faculty at Leavenworth to his appointment as Commandant there in 1940. He 
also benefited from the War College education, which gave him invaluable experience that 
prepared him for his wartime roles at GHQ and AGF. U.S. Army officer education stands out as 
one of America’s greatest successes during the interwar period, and an area in which America 
prepared more effectively before World War II than any other war. 
Along with McNair’s increased responsibility as AGF commander came new challenges, 
many of which resulted from the rapidly expanding mobilization process. The problem of 
categorization and allocation of new recruits to the various military specialties emerged as one of 
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the most significant challenges he faced. As Robert Palmer described in Army Ground Forces 
“Study No. 5” on “The Problem of Quality” in procurement of AGF enlisted personnel: 
There were various reasons for the relatively inferior quality of the human raw material made 
available to the ground combat arms. One was the absence of a central system of personnel 
classification and assignment for the armed forces as a whole. Another was the Army’s own 
system of Classification.556 
As described above, Selective Service allowed the practice of volunteering, which served as the 
sole source of Navy and Marine recruits through the end of 1942 (the Navy and Marine Corps 
also procured most of their officers through volunteering, usually before they had received any 
military training, selecting them on the basis of civilian education and experience). This ensured 
“many thousands of men of the finest physical types, and of high degree of education and 
personal initiative, remained outside the operations of Selective Service and hence outside the 
Army.”557 
Of those men who did end up in the Army, many volunteered – and an overwhelming 
percentage of volunteers in 1942 chose the Army Air Forces, while only five percent chose 
infantry or armor. These factors combined to divert the vast majority of the highest-quality 
recruits to the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Forces, and many of these recruits served in the 
technical services in non-combat roles. Intelligence testing only added to the problem. 
Throughout 1942 and 1943, War Department policy required diversion of an ever-increasing 
percentage of the Army’s best recruits from the AGF to either the AAF or ASF based on their 
score on the Army General Classification Test (AGCT). After two years of reliance on the 
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AGCT, first implemented in 1940, War Department personnel believed they had validated the 
test’s ability to measure a recruit’s capacity to learn by comparing their test scores to their 
performance in Army training courses. By 1942, the test served as the primary tool for 
measuring recruits’ learning ability, allowing classification of each recruit in Army Grade I 
through V (“rapid learners” to “slow learners”). War Department policy directed an even 
distribution of inductees by intelligence classification to the three functional commands; 
however, the classification system further disadvantaged the AGF by aligning civilian skills with 
military specialties. Since no civilian skills translated directly to service in the infantry, armor, or 
artillery, almost every recruit received a specification serial number (SSN) below 500 (technical 
fields) leaving very few for classification to a combat specialty (SSNs above 500). Every step of 
the classification process incrementally reduced the pool of recruits available for assignment to 
combat positions.558 
Therefore, the AGF received soldiers far shorter, weaker, and less intellectually capable 
(according to the Classification System’s standardized tests) than the average recruit. Army 
historians noted, “one commander observed in a moment of exaggeration, his hardest problem 
was to find competent enlisted men to act as instructors, because ‘everybody higher than a 
moron’ was pulled out for one reason or another.”559 As historian Theodore Wilson noted, “The 
AAF claimed nearly twice as many Group I and II men than the AGF, and the proportions of Is 
and IIs grabbed by the ASF was 30 per cent higher than that of the AGF. At the other end of the 
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scale, the AGF contained more than five times as many Group V soldiers as the AAF and almost 
four times as many as the ASF.”560 
General Lear, commander of the Second Army, urged McNair in July 1942 to use the 
kind of advertising the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Forces used so effectively to attract 
volunteers. McNair disdained personal publicity, but recognized the wisdom of Lear’s advice, 
particularly since his efforts to influence War Department Policy directly since assuming 
command of AGF had no effect. This led McNair to make an Armistice Day Address to Troops 
of the AGF titled “The Struggle is for Survival.” While directed to the AGF, the transmission of 
this address over national radio networks ensured it reached a wide cross-section of the 
American populace. In the speech, McNair noted the nation’s observation of Armistice Day 
every year since 1918, recognizing an achievement largely stemming from the valor displayed by 
the AEF’s ground forces during the First World War. McNair reminded his listeners of “war-
hardened enemies pouncing on green American troops, taking every possible advantage of our 
lack of training and battle experience. Pearl Harbor was another such case.”561 
Pointing out that Germany and Japan “comparatively speaking, both always have been at 
war or preparing for it,” McNair described the enemy not as admirable for their military 
tradition, but formidable – and argued America’s non-militaristic tradition made its preparation 
to fact this enemy in combat particularly challenging. He noted this preparation required both 
personnel and materiel – and emphasized the latter requirement gave “even our vast industrial 
system a few headaches.” Regarding the personnel question, McNair described the achievements 
of the previous year – particularly at the 1941 maneuvers – and stated the ground forces 
                                                          
560 Theodore A. Wilson, "Who Fought and Why? The Assignment of American Soldiers to 
Combat," in Time to Kill: The Soldier's Experience of War in the West, 1939-1945, ed. Paul Addison and 
Angus Calder (London: Random House UK, 1997), 300. 




possessed generally competent soldiers and officers. However, he argued training alone could 
not prepare an army for the demands it would face – “soldiers – our kind of soldiers – must be 
right inside.” This meant,  
Our soldiers must have the fighting spirit. If you call that hating our enemies, then we must hate 
with every fiber of our being. We must lust for battle; our object in life must be to kill; we must 
scheme and plan night and day to kill. There need be no pangs of conscience, for our enemies 
have lighted the way to faster, surer, and crueler killing; they are past masters. We must hurry to 
catch up with them if we are to survive. Since killing is the object of our efforts, the sooner we 
get in the killing mood, the better and more skillful we shall be when the real test comes. The 
struggle is for survival – kill or be killed.562 
Even today, one can imagine the immense impact of these words on the American public, and 
the present or future members of the Army that fought the war. With American forces only just 
beginning to engage in direct combat in the Pacific and Mediterranean Theaters, many 
Americans remained in a state of denial or ignorance regarding the immensity of the task the 
nation faced. 
As Palmer noted, this speech prompted negative reactions from some members of the 
public, “even after a year of declared war with enemies well known to be ruthless.” However, 
oversimplifications of the speech and its impact dominate the historical record, like the brief 
mention of it in Nothing Less than Full Victory, in which historian Edward G. Miller summed up 
the content of the speech by merely stating, “[McNair] told the public that the purpose of an 
army was to make skillful killers of men.” Miller described the speech’s impact even more 
simply: “the media had a field day.” Not only have most histories similarly neglected to describe 
the contents of McNair’s speech in detail, they also typically (and incorrectly) implied that it 
caused an overall negative public reaction. A review of dozens of newspaper clippings and 
letters that contain responses to the speech, collected by Clare McNair in folders and scrapbooks 




that she later donated to the Library of Congress, revealed that the majority of both the media 
and individuals who wrote to McNair directly responded favorably to the speech.563  
McNair’s efforts throughout 1942 to raise awareness in the War Department of the 
significant deficiencies in quality caused by the Selective Service and classification processes 
echoed the ever-increasing number of complaints from field commanders, who the official 
history noted, “protested repeatedly to Headquarters, Army Ground Forces that they were 
receiving men of too low a mental quality to be trained.” Commanders argued it made no sense 
to develop expensive equipment only to entrust it to un-trainable soldiers, and said AGCT Class 
V soldiers posed a danger to themselves and their units when given access to lethal weapons. 
The Air Forces and Service Forces used exactly the same arguments to support their need for the 
majority of the high quality recruits, but they remained the strategic priority throughout 1942 
based on the assumption America’s initial engagement in combat would largely entail Army Air 
Force operations. A number of additional factors worked in the AAF and ASF’s favor, from the 
difficulty of changing bureaucratic policies in effect since 1940 to the widespread belief that the 
War Department planned only temporary preferential assignment of high-quality troops to the 
AAF and ASF. As these policies continued throughout 1942, various branches or units of the 
ground forces used similar arguments to petition McNair for preferential allocation of the best 
soldiers assigned to the AGF. McNair refused these requests largely out of principle, arguing that 
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favoring part of the ground forces would disadvantage the rest – particularly the infantry – just as 
War Department policies disadvantaged AGF as a whole.564  
Two additional factors added to the severity of the AGF’s quality problem. Even before 
the reorganization of March 1942, the Air Forces recognized the Selective Service Act’s 
classification system did not divert nearly as many recruits to its ranks as it did to the Service 
Forces. The aviation industry, still in its infancy, represented a small minority of America’s 
skilled workers. This led Selective Service boards to exclude potential recruits with aviation 
expertise from conscription. Therefore, the Army Air Forces requested the War Department 
institute a policy that required at least seventy-five percent of all white inductees assigned to the 
Air Corps have an AGCT score of at least on hundred. Convinced by the Air Corps’ argument 
that it required this proportion of above-average intelligence personnel to accomplish its mission, 
the War Department put the requested policy in place. This set in motion a yearlong battle 
between the Air Corps and McNair, who argued the Ground Forces needed intelligent personnel 
just as badly to serve as combat leaders. Twice in 1942, McNair convinced the War Department 
to rescind the preferential policy, but in each case, it quickly reinstated it, with minor 
modifications. In fact, the strategic decision taken in the summer of 1942 to employ air power 
over Europe in large numbers before commitment of ground troops enabled Arnold to gain War 
Department support for a modified “71-percent” rule, which actually had an even worse impact 
on the Ground forces than the previous “75-percent” rule. The new rule, approved in September 
1942, allocated 71 percent of personnel who scored above 100 on both the AGCT and the 
mechanical aptitude test to the AAF. This resulted in the assignment of a larger aggregate 
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number of high-quality recruits to the AAF, where the majority served in non-combat roles, even 
though the name of the new policy implied it would have the opposite effect.565 
The debate continued well into 1943, leading to changes in policy, but none of these 
changes resulted in any significant improvement of AGF’s quality deficit, and preferential 
assignment of the highest intelligence recruits to the AAF continued well beyond the summer of 
1943. In addition, the War Department continued to support a policy directing that any qualified 
enlisted man could apply for pilot training or officer candidate school (each required men in 
Class I or II with AGCT scores over 110) which siphoned even more quality men away from 
ground combat units.566  
Finally, adding to the challenges posed by these various policies, a shortage of junior 
officers led Marshall to direct unit commanders to scour their divisions for potential officer 
candidates. By the summer of 1942, divisions resorted to examining men with only one year of 
high school, but still could not provide the desired number of qualified officer candidates. This 
led the War Department staff, many of whom believed division commanders simply did not want 
to release already trained soldiers for officer training, to seek a new solution to the shortage of 
junior officers. They recommend in September 1942 implementation of the Army Specialized 
Training Program (ASTP), which would remove high-quality recruits from the replacement pool 
and send them to college, and then to military training as officers. Marshall approved this 
program in December 1942, resulting in the drain of more than 100,000 of the best recruits (men 
with scores over 115 on the AGCT) from the replacement pool. McNair opposed this program 
from the beginning, and presented his opposition formally on October 4, 1942 in a memorandum 
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to the War Department. He saw no value in sending these soldiers to college, believing they 
could receive faster and more appropriate training in military units under wartime conditions, 
particularly considering the AGF’s severe shortage of high-quality men. McNair’s memo had no 
effect – but Marshall had already approved the program, and AGF paid the majority of its cost. 
The ground forces provided forty-seven percent of the total personnel who participated in the 
ASTP, despite the fact that AGF already received a far smaller share of high-quality personnel 
than AAF or ASF, and made up less than a third of the total Army forces.567 
The Army’s replacement system represented another significant challenge related to the 
issue of soldier quality. The War Department announced on March 18, 1942 that the 
reorganization of 9 March would not change existing replacement policies or procedures. 
Viewing the replacement issue as a Troop Basis matter, meaning one involving broad policies 
regarding allocation of manpower within the Army based on projected personnel requirements 
by unit type and year, the War Department left the Adjutant General in charge of assignment of 
inductees to replacement centers, and of graduates of those centers to units and other 
organizations. The War Department established the priorities that drove the Adjutant General’s 
replacement apportionment decisions. This left AGF to focus on its primary mission of activating 
and training units, while the Replacement and School Command oversaw the replacement 
system.568 
The replacement training system added to the problem of soldier quality in 1942 because 
it used unit mobilization requirements, not combat losses, as the basis for replacement allocation 
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decisions. This meant Replacement training Centers (RTCs) failed to account for the 
disproportionate losses between branches and services in combat. As the official history noted,  
Hence in 1942 the Quartermaster Corps had as large an RTC capacity as the Field Artillery; the 
Signal Corps a larger capacity than the Armored Force; and the Medical Department half as large 
a capacity as the Infantry. In the Infantry the number of replacements trained as riflemen, cooks, 
and clerks corresponded to the number of men in each of these jobs called for in Tables of 
Organization of infantry units, without allowing for the fact that when battle losses began to occur 
the casualty rate among riflemen would be higher than among cooks. 
After the declaration of war in December 1941, the War Department decided not to expand 
RTCs in proportion to the Army’s overall expansion. New units would receive fillers from 
reception centers, while units overseas or alerted for overseas movement would receive 
replacements from RTCs. War Department policy for RTCs rested on the principle that “service 
units, requiring a larger number of technically trained men than combat units, should receive a 
higher proportion of fillers already branch-trained than should units of the combat arms.”569 This 
put in place yet another policy underpinning the procurement and allocation of Army personnel 
that funneled higher quality and better trained troops to the ASF and AAF, rather than the 
infantry and other ground combat units,. 
By November 9, 1942, AGF again urged the War Department to streamline the process 
by establishing general (rather than specialty-specific) Zone of Interior replacement depots. 
Among the various reasons AGF recommended this policy, it would reduce the demand for 
quality officers to run the depots – an ongoing problem.570 The War Department supported this 
request, establishing one such depot near each coast to hold and process overseas replacements 
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for all arms and services except the Air Forces. It also decentralized assignment procedures, 
delegating this authority to the three functional commands. Therefore, as the AGF approached 
the end of mobilization in 1943 and shifted its focus to replacement operations, it possessed the 
authority to direct AGF replacements to specific units. However, it still suffered the effects of the 
many other longstanding policies like volunteerism and classification testing that ensured the 
ground forces received the lowest quality personnel. AGF also had no control over the 
movement of replacements to reception depots overseas, and from there to soldiers’ gaining 
units. This process often took several weeks, resulting in replacements losing many of the 
benefits of the initial training they received before shipping out, arriving at their units out of 
shape, demoralized, and no longer familiar with basic job skills.571  
The many problems with the replacement system’s administration revealed by combat 
operations in North Africa prompted the War Department to assign greater responsibility for 
oversight of the replacement system to AGF.572 Once Marshall assigned this task to McNair, he 
traveled both to various replacement centers and to Tunisia to investigate the problem personally, 
discovering first hand various abuses of the system. He learned that some commanders in North 
Africa chose to form new units from personnel at replacement centers rather than sending the 
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replacements to their intended units. Other commanders admitted they made it a habit to travel to 
replacement centers and hand-select their replacements, without regard to their intended unit or 
even unit type. This latter practice often resulted in problems like armor-trained replacements 
ending up in infantry units, negating the practical usefulness of any unit-specific training those 
replacements received before shipping out.573  
In 1943, the War Department gave McNair direct responsibility for the administration of 
the ground forces’ individual replacement system, and provided guidance for implementing 
various changes to the existing system, requesting AGF’s response before making final decisions 
on those changes. The War Department based its guidance to McNair largely on the findings of 
The Committee on Revision of the Military Program, formed in early summer 1943 to look at 
Army personnel problems as a whole. This same committee recommended reduction of the 
Army Troop Basis to a cap of eighty-eight divisions, based largely, according to the official 
history, on a national personnel crisis – although as discussed above the reduction really 
stemmed from the inability of industry to equip any more divisions. In its recommendations, 
issued on June 7, 1943 the committee proposed an extension of the replacement-training program 
to six months, including unit training, and provision of well-trained replacements in the interim 
by moving soldiers from recently mobilized and trained units into the replacement pool. This 
recommendation resulted in part from field commanders’ preference to promote soldiers from 
within their own unit ranks, causing them to request assignment of replacements only in the 
grade of private).574 
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The Committee on Revision of the Military Program also suggested that AGF should 
consider training replacements in units rather than in replacement centers as a way to increase 
training effectiveness. This latter recommendation would have led to a system more like that 
used in the British and German Armies, in which replacements trained in units and these units 
replaced others in the line so they could reconstitute. Given the decision to form only eighty-
eight divisions, and the preference of American field commanders to rebuild broken units with 
individual units rather than replace them with new (unknown and presumably not combat 
hardened) units made this recommendation impractical. Further, McNair believed six months of 
replacement training was excessive, and recommended thirteen weeks. In August 1943, the War 
Department increased the replacement-training program to seventeen weeks, but retained the 
individual replacement system, assigning implementation and oversight responsibility to AGF.575 
To manage this new responsibility, McNair directed the establishment of the 
Classification and Replacement Division within the AGF. He also attempted to correct several 
systemic problems AGF personnel identified, in part by recommending clarifications to War 
Department Circular 85, which described the physical and psychological requirements for 
overseas service. McNair and his staff found that doctors tended to apply stricter medical criteria 
to replacements the nearer to the combat zone they arrived, while assuming stateside medical 
personnel simply took a lax approach to applying clear standards. For example, AGF inspectors 
discovered that some soldiers threw away issued dental appliances in hopes of avoiding overseas 
service by failing a later exam. To deal with such issues, McNair recommended clarification of 
dental standards at a minimal and simple level: “ability to masticate the Army ration.” He also 
sought the removal of “mental” as a medical evaluation category for replacements due to the 
subjectivity involved in assessing a recruit’s mental capacity, and the tendency for recruits 
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classified at the upper end of the intelligence scale to receive preferential assignment to the AAF 
or ASF. The War Department did not accept all of McNair’s recommendations, but it did accept 
many, including them in a new policy document it published in the late summer of 1943: 
“Preparation for Oversea Movement of Individual Replacements” (POR). This document 
remained in effect until mid-1944, when the growing shortage of personnel forced the War 
Department to lower physical and mental standards for new recruits even further.576 
AGF inspectors discovered particularly troubling problems when they examined the 
process by which the ASF moved replacements into combat theaters. The AGF staff initially had 
no desire to assume responsibility for the replacement system, and until reports from deployed 
commanders began to indicate problems, AGF leaders believed the ASF established an oversaw 
an effective replacement system. However, reports of poor discipline among replacements 
received in theater from the ASF’s Shenango, Pennsylvania Replacement Center led Brigadier 
General Alexander R. Bolling, the AGF G-1 (Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel) to conduct 
an inspection visit on May 17, 1943. The official history described Bolling and the other AGF 
staffers as “shocked by their findings.” Bolling, “who in the past strongly favored the operations 
of replacement depots by the Service Forces,” recommended AGF take over responsibility for 
operations at Shenango.577 
After discussing the situation with the War Department, AGF instead established two 
new replacement depots for its own replacements, one on each coast and both in operation by 
August 1943, while the ASF retained Shenango for processing and movement of Service Forces 
replacements. Thus, after August 1943 AGF managed all replacement functions for Ground 
Forces from two new depots (one at Fort Meade, Maryland, capable of handling 18,000 
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replacements, and the other at Fort Ord, California, with a capacity of 7,000 replacements). In 
doing so, AGF implemented and ensured the efficacy of functions ranging from medical 
processing, equipment issue, individual training, shipment of replacements overseas. As Palmer 
and Keast noted, 
Improvement in the quality of replacements in the ground arms was soon noted. The Inspector 
General reported on 30 October 1943 that since the establishment of the depot at Fort Meade 
replacements reached the East Coast staging areas better equipped and clothed than before, and 
with more confidence and eagerness to go overseas, though a few had still not qualified with their 
primary weapons. Reports from Italy received through the AGF Board were in general favorable. 
The Fifth Army found that replacements were better than they had been in the Tunisian campaign 
and that infantry replacements in particular were good, though some had inadequate knowledge 
of their weapons. By the time of the Fifth Army reports (November and December 1943) infantry 
replacements had either benefited from the 17-week program in replacement centers or had come 
from units well along in their training. The fact that, despite all efforts, some men lacked 
proficiency with their weapons may be attributed to difficulties in the training and processing of 
certain types of specialists.578 
Once AGF established and ran its own replacement system, the quality of ground force 
replacements quickly improved.  
These improvements, while welcomed by field commanders, could only raise the overall 
quality of the ground forces to limited degree. Many other longstanding personnel procurement 
issues continued to divert the highest quality recruits away from the ground forces, even after 
AGF took over responsibility for its own replacement system and lengthened replacement 
training to seventeen weeks. National personnel shortages caused by the competing demands of 
active military service and war production made quality problems worse. This left the Army 
short 330,000 recruits by September 1942, and led President Roosevelt to approve a 
recommended massive reduction in the planned end strength of the Army, resulting in the 
updated Troop Basis of July 1, 1943 that allocated 500,000 fewer personnel to the Army than 
projected in early 1942. Most of the resulting reductions in strength affected AGF units, even 
though they made up less than twenty percent of the total personnel strength of the Army. For 
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example, AGF had planned to mobilize and train 125 ground combat divisions by mid-1943, but 
it only received enough recruits to form ninety divisions, even as both the ASF and the AAF 
enjoyed a net increase in personnel strength.579  
With no end to the nation’s personnel shortages in sight, the 1943 Troop Basis ended up 
halting AGF expansion for the rest of the war. The War Department capped AGF’s end strength 
at ninety divisions, and total personnel in AGF grew from 2,471,000 at the end of 1942 to only 
2,502,000 on March 31, 1945 – the date the war ended in Europe. This negligible increase in 
aggregate numbers forced AGF to create the seventeen divisions required to grow from the 
seventy-three mobilized by mid-1943 to the ninety authorized by the new troop basis mostly by 
from troops freed up by the disbanding of various non-divisional units. For example, many of the 
necessary soldiers came from demobilized antiaircraft battalions deemed no longer necessary 
because the Allies had achieved air superiority in Europe by early 1944.580 
The low caliber of recruits assigned to the ground combat arms led to significant 
challenges for the Army Ground Forces upon their entry into combat. McNair foresaw this 
problem in early 1942 and struggled thereafter to reverse the various policies that caused it. 
Nevertheless, it took combat experience and the shockingly disproportionate casualties suffered 
by the infantry to finally convince Marshall and the War Department to take action to correct the 
problem.  
After struggling since the beginning of 1942 to draw the attention of War Department 
leaders to the various policies that funneled the vast majority of quality recruits to the AAF and 
ASF, McNair finally appeared to get the magnitude of the problem across to General Marshall in 
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February 1944. Marshall asked McNair on February 5 what he thought the War Department 
could do to find urgently needed infantry replacements. In response, McNair showed statistics to 
Marshall that demonstrated the true magnitude of the problem. The numbers demonstrated that 
although the infantry made up only eleven percent of all Army personnel during the campaign in 
Italy, it had suffered sixty percent of the total casualties incurred during that campaign. Marshall 
conveyed this disturbing information to President Roosevelt the next day, noting that the 
increased requirement for infantry sure to result from the upcoming execution of Operation 
OVERLORD would only exacerbate the problem. He also sent a memo to his staff directing 
them to confer with McNair and then propose to him means to improve appreciation of the 
infantry soldier. This memo read, in part,  
I am wondering just how we should go about dignifying the infantry rifleman . . . . It might well 
be charged that we have made the mistake of having too much of air and tank and other special 
weapons and units and too little  of the rifleman for whom all these other combat arms must 
concentrate to get him forward with the least punishment and losses. I don’t want to discourage 
the rifleman and yet I want his role made clear and exalted. I don’t want to unduly alarm the 
families of riflemen and yet it is important that some action be taken.581 
After years of reliance on a personnel system built on flawed logic, Marshall finally recognized 
the problem – just four months before the planned invasion of mainland Europe. 
Meanwhile, the field commanders continued to make do with replacements that remained 
too few in number and of disappointingly low quality. Most of the reasons for the low quality of 
the infantry in early 1944 stemmed from decisions made years earlier, and neither McNair nor 
Marshall could do much to improve the situation this late in the war. Marshall did finally cancel 
the ASTP in early 1944, at McNair’s urging, a decision that freed up 73,000 high-quality 
personnel for addition to the replacement pool. Demonstrating Marshall’s awareness of the 
severity of the quality problem AGF struggled with, all of these men returned to the Army as 
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AGF replacements, and 55,500 of these men went to infantry divisions. Even this made little real 
difference at a point in the war when for more than four years various policies had diverted the 
highest quality troops, both in terms of physical and mental classification, to the AAF and ASF. 
McNair fought these processes tenaciously from their inception, but could not convey to 
Marshall the severity of their impact until early 1944, far too late to correct the damage they 
caused before execution of Operation OVERLORD.582 
McNair did propose several initiatives in response to Marshall’s memo to his staff of 
February 6 intended to improve both the morale of the infantry and the image of the American 
infantryman among the public. His recommendations included creation of a badge that only 
infantrymen could earn, various speeches and engagements with leaders of industry, and a 
massive media campaign. One can see the result of these efforts in articles like one published in 
Time on April 10, 1944. This article described McNair’s recent trip to Fort Bragg, North 
Carolina, to award the first new “Expert Infantryman” badge to Technical Sergeant Walter L. 
Bull – a twenty-six year old former steel worker from Baltimore. The article described the twelve 
requirements for earning the badge, including demonstrating proficiency at scouting and 
patrolling, field sanitation, physical fitness, marksmanship, and completion of training in “live 
fire” events during which bullets flew only thirty inches over the infantryman’s head. The article 
also reported the posthumous awarding of the Congressional Medal of Honor to Private Nicholas 
Minue for valor in action during the Tunisian campaign the previous year. Finally, it described 
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the respect soldiers, sailors, and aviators had for the infantry due to the arduous nature of their 
job.583  
While such efforts came far too late to improve the quality of the infantry before the D-
Day invasion of Normandy, they did improve the infantryman’s morale, and McNair hoped they 
would soon result in the provision of higher quality infantry replacements. McNair’s public 
relations efforts also appeared to have a significant impact on American leaders of industry and 
the media. For example, William I. Nichols, editor of This Week, sent McNair a symbolic check 
for one dollar on March 7, 1944, in payment for his “article of tribute to the Infantry,” which 
Nichols scheduled for publication on April 2. In Nichols’ words, “having served for some time 
as a dollar-a-year man for the War Production Board, it gives me a certain pleasure to reverse the 
situation and enroll a good government man like yourself as a dollar-a-year writer for This 
Week.”584 
McNair also implemented the “Soldier for a Day” initiative at various Army installations 
across the United States including Camp McCoy, Camp Shelby, and Fort McClellan. This three-
day series of demonstrations for leaders of industry took place from 14-16 June, 1944, giving 
them the opportunity to interact with the combat troops preparing to deploy overseas at these 
installations, observe them in training, and see firsthand the employment of the clothing and 
equipment they had produced for the Army’s combat troops. The program had a very positive 
impact on the many civilian industrial leaders who participated, as demonstrated by the many 
letters they sent to McNair after the event, expressing their appreciation of the opportunity to 
interact with mobilizing American soldiers, and the admiration they held for them. These letters 
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still exist in the AGF files at the National Archives, but evidence of this and the many other 
initiatives McNair led to improve the lot of the infantry during the war remain largely absent in 
the secondary literature on the war. McNair even reached out Mr. Paul Gallico of the Writers’ 
War Board, and thanked him on March 18, 1944 for the letter he wrote to active fiction writers 
across America in connection with the “Infantry Program,” encouraging them to place “the 
Infantry story before a reading group which [AGF is] very anxious to reach.”585 
Despite these efforts, by March 1945 fewer than 1,200,000 soldiers served in one of the 
Army’s 89 divisions (only 87 of which actually served in combat), out of a total U.S. Army 
strength of 8,157,386, and the vast majority of these men had come from the lowest-classified 
recruits inducted into the Army. McNair fought to improve the lot of the ground combat soldier, 
particularly the infantryman, throughout his time at AGF, but his achievements mostly remained 
limited to his direct area of responsibility – mobilization training of new units and, beginning in 
1943, AGF replacements. He did achieve some broader successes with his “Infantry Program,” 
but these consisted mostly of symbolic gestures like the creation of the expert infantryman’s 
badge, along with various public relations efforts that sought to elevate the image of the 
infantryman both within the Army and among the public. These efforts did improve morale 
among the infantry somewhat, and over time led to minor increases in the quality of infantry 
replacements. McNair could achieve little, however, to change the systemic problems in place 
since 1940. These problems led to the creation of American infantry divisions that accomplished 
many of the war’s toughest missions, despite their formation from a pool of recruits that came 
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from the Selective Service’s lowest mental and physical classification levels. These divisions 
bore the vast majority of battle-related casualties throughout the war.586 
Combat experience therefore served as the most effective method of creating high quality 
infantry officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men. Once the government capped the 
number of combat divisions at ninety, the personnel assigned to these units had many 
opportunities to gain combat experience, since large unit commanders had to leave divisions in 
the line for extended periods without a break, filling losses with inexperienced individual 
replacements. This fact does little to support the often-cited myth of overwhelming American 
materiel superiority, particularly given the fact that the revised troop basis of 1943 stemmed not 
from a personnel crisis, as the official history claims, but from the inability of industry to 
produce enough materiel to equip the additional divisions originally planned. 
National-level management of industrial mobilization rarely features as a significant 
factor in histories of the Second World War. Instead, histories of the war tend to focus on 
limitations of various weapons systems like antitank guns, tanks, machine guns, and the tank 
destroyer, usually presenting these limitations as the result of interbranch quarrels between 
military leaders, or those officers’ – particularly McNair’s – inability to visualize the true nature 
of modern warfare. This warrants a brief review of these topics, typically presented as the most 
important ones related to the development of military equipment for use during World War II, 
before addressing the often-ignored flaws in the industrial mobilization process, and the 
challenges these created for McNair and the AGF – problems they had no ability to control. 
The tank destroyer, in particular, has long served as a primary source of many historians’ 
criticisms of McNair. In a document summarizing the results of his review of McNair’s 
                                                          
586 Robert R. Palmer, "Study No. 4: Mobilization of the Ground Army," (Washington, D.C.: 
Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946), 38-39. 
 
365 
correspondence after the war, Army historian Kent Roberts Greenfield identified the tank 
destroyer as the topic most often discussed. This correspondence demonstrated many complaints 
from the field regarding mixed performance of tank destroyers in combat, and efforts by McNair 
to influence the modification of tank destroyer doctrine and training to improve its 
performance.587 Much of the weapon systems’ difficulty stemmed from fundamental 
disagreements festering since the early days of GHQ. As Christopher Gabel pointed out, 
“General Marshall favored experiments with self-propelled mounts. McNair acceded, but he was 
never really reconciled to the self-propelled weapon.” Further, McNair advocated a more 
cautious approach to antitank weapon employment than that reflected in the official doctrine, 
finally approved by the War Department, and published on June 16, 1942 as FM 18-5, Tank 
Destroyer Field Manual, Organization and Tactics of Tank Destroyer Units. McNair “suggested 
that tank destroyer forces would ‘emplace and camouflage themselves’ when faced by hostile 
tanks,” but the approved doctrine described a much more offensive-minded approach, 
exemplified in the Tank Destroyer Center’s official motto: “Seek, Strike, and Destroy.”588 
The creation of a separate Tank Destroyer Center, an expedient deemed necessary by 
General Marshall to prevent the Infantry or Cavalry Branch from simply incorporating the new 
weapons into their existing organization and doctrine, led to significant problems executing this 
aggressive doctrine. The offensive mindset instilled in separate tank destroyer units required the 
ability to fight as members of combined arms teams, since the open-turreted, thin-skinned 
vehicles remained highly vulnerable to the guns of enemy tanks. However, isolating the Tank 
Destroyer Center from the other branches meant few commanders, upon receiving tank destroyer 
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units as reinforcements, knew how to employ them, even had the tank destroyers benefited from 
the necessary intelligence, road priority, advantageous terrain, and all-tank enemy threat 
envisioned in FM 18-5 – factors that rarely materialized. The new doctrine’s emphasis of 
coordination of independent tank destroyer unit operations, rather than true combined arms 
integration, only added to the problem.589 
As evidence arrived at the War Department that the tank destroyer was not meeting its 
expectations in the Mediterranean or European Theaters of Operation, McNair and AGF adjusted 
tank destroyer doctrine and training methods based on guidance received from OPD. However, 
the late fielding of effective tank destroyers meant much of the early criticism stemmed from the 
poor performance of expedients as much as flaws in doctrine. The Ordnance Department debated 
the details of tank destroyer design with Bruce for months, leading the War Department to form 
a Special Armored Vehicle Board chaired by Brigadier General W. B. Palmer. The Palmer board 
criticized the Tank Destroyer Center for inflexibility and making unreasonable demands, but 
finally approved a tank destroyer design in late 1942 that met Bruce’s specifications. By this 
time, the Army was already engaged in combat in the Pacific and North Africa, and the 
campaign in Tunisia exposed many challenges with the existing tank destroyer expedients and 
doctrine.590  
The 37-mm, still the primary antitank gun in use during the campaign in North Africa, 
served as a particularly common target of criticism. However, as demonstrated above McNair 
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had known for years the gun lacked the power to face modern tanks, and believed Ordnance 
Branch would field a more capable weapon before the need arose to employ antitank weapons in 
combat. Delays caused by debates over the details of tank destroyer design delayed this process. 
However, this serves as only one example of the problems caused by a system in which the AGF, 
whose units would actually employ new weapons systems, could only suggest the design 
specifications it desired. AGF relied throughout the war on the ASF’s technical services to 
develop new weapons, and Ordnance Branch often modified design parameters as it saw fit or 
believed necessary. In addition, units conducting training under AGF’s supervision prior to 
deployment used training rounds, and in many cases, they apparently did not realize different, 
armor-piercing ammunition existed for use in combat. Upon hearing reports of the dismal 
performance of the 37-mm gun in North Africa, AGF sent a team of observers to study this and 
other problems. In a report prepared on February 21, 1943, these observers noted that in several 
instances they found antitank gunners in North Africa unknowingly using 37-mm training ammo, 
a factor that obviously contributed to the gun’s lack of effectiveness.591  
Over time, many commanders developed field expedient methods for employment of 
tank destroyers that improved their usefulness. In perhaps the most important lesson 
commanders gleaned from combat operations in both the Mediterranean and European Theaters, 
they learned that antitank guns proved most effective when commanders placed them in mutually 
supporting positions, closely integrated them with infantry, and employed them in as members of 
the combined arms team.592 The concentration of tank destroyer doctrine development and 
training at an independent center surely contributed to the delay among field commanders in 
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learning how to employ them as the members of the combined arms team. Nevertheless, 
Marshall believed, probably correctly, that only this method would lead to development of the 
weapon system he envisioned, rather than simply another form of tank or combat car. 
Despite their flaws, Harry Yeide pointed out the ease of criticizing tank destroyers with 
the benefit of “20-20 hindsight,” noting several factors worth considering when reflecting on the 
overall performance of the tank destroyer in WWII. For example, since the U.S. Army had never 
fought a mechanized war before, it could only plan for one based on reports received from 
observers, and these all agreed on one point – through the end of the German campaign against 
France, neither tanks nor static antitank defenses had stopped German tanks. Yeide also argues 
that for once, at least the developers of antitank doctrine and weapons were not “re-fighting the 
last campaign.” Yeide concluded, like Gabel, that modification of doctrine and eventual fielding 
of effective weapons made tank destroyers and antitank guns effective and respected members of 
the combined arms team.593 The findings of the Cook Board support this conclusion. The board 
did not recommend scrapping the tank destroyer concept. Rather, it not only recommended 
retaining the tank destroyer and antitank gun, it also advised investing more money and effort 
into these systems to enable development of improved weapons systems in each category.594  
U.S. combat equipment of various types received criticism throughout the war. Much like 
the tank destroyer, the M4 Sherman medium tank remained a topic of debate both throughout 
and after the war. The M4 Sherman, with its excellent reliability, speed, maneuverability, and its 
medium-caliber gun seemed well suited to commanders like Patton for its intended mission of 
striking enemy rear areas and exploiting breakthroughs by attacking enemy infantry and artillery 
units. However, other commanders did not share Patton’s enthusiasm for the Sherman, and by 
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1945, complaints from field commanders about the relative superiority of German Panthers and 
Tigers prompted Eisenhower to seek feedback from armor division commanders on the 
performance of the Sherman. The commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions reported 
back to Eisenhower in March 1945 with scathing criticisms of the Sherman, complaining of 
excessive losses of tanks and crews, and insisting the speed and maneuverability of the Sherman 
did not make up for its vulnerability to German tanks and anti-tank guns. These reports 
supported the widespread frustration among field commanders with the War Department’s 
apparent refusal to consider fielding a heavy tank on par with the German Panther and Tiger.595 
Accounts of the tank issue, in particular, often imply an ignorance of the real problem on 
the part of Eisenhower and his superiors, and discount the challenges production, shipping, and 
fielding of a heavy tank would have created for American industry. They also emphasize those 
areas where historians find American equipment deficient, and ignore the great successes of 
other weapon systems. For example, American artillery represented one of the greatest success 
stories of the war. Not only did American combat units possess a large number of effective 
howitzers; by 1942 the experiments the Gunnery Department at Fort Sill had conducted a decade 
earlier, with McNair’s support, had led to a remarkable ability to rapidly adjust and then mass 
fires onto enemy targets, both stationary and mobile.  
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The U.S. Army’s first combat encounter against the Germans at Kasserine Pass, usually 
presented by historians as a decisive defeat for the Americans, demonstrates the frequent 
overemphasis of German armor superiority and failure to acknowledge the capability of 
American artillery at this early stage of the war. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel overran the 
forward elements of the 1st Armored Division’s defenses after two days of fighting at Sidi Bou 
Zid largely due to the failure to place defending units in mutually supporting positions or employ 
the various American combat units effectively as combined arms teams. On the afternoon of 
February 15, 1943, Eisenhower approved the First Army commander’s request to shift the Allied 
line back to stronger defensive positions. However, the confusion caused by many overrun and 
retreating units and the lack of time to establish a well-prepared defense resulted in further 
tactical setbacks over the next several days. Finally, on the evening of February 21, Brigadier 
General Paul Robinett, leading Combat Command B (CCB) of the 1st Armored Division, joined 
forces with Major General Terry de la Mesa Allen’s 1st Infantry Division. The two units worked 
through the night to assemble a strong defensive position, linking adjacent units’ defensive 
positions, placing antitank guns in covered and concealed positions, and massing all available 
artillery, linking them via a centralized fire control nets and pre-registering fires in the most 
likely enemy avenues of advance.596 
Once the attack came the next morning, the improved effectiveness of Robinett’s antitank 
guns due to their proper emplacement, combined with the rapid, accurate, and devastating fires 
of his massed artillery stopped Rommel’s attack, forcing a German retreat. By the next day 
Robinett and Allen even contemplated a counterattack, called off due to the need consolidate 
their forces as part of an overall effort to strengthen other areas in the Allied defensive line. 
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Thus, when one focuses on a few days of tactical defeats in the early stages of the battle, 
Kasserine Pass can seem to represent the decisive defeat of an American division in its first 
encounter with the German Army in combat. One finds this interpretation of the battle in 
numerous accounts. However, by viewing the battles of Kasserine Pass as tactical actions in the 
overall Allied campaign in North Africa, one understands they represent only brief setbacks in a 
largely successful campaign for the Allies that culminated in the decisive defeat of all Axis 
forces in North Africa after a series of Allied tactical victories in the coming months. More 
importantly, overemphasis in the historiography on the American defeat at Kasserine Pass has 
not only obscured the remarkable success of the Americans’ first campaign against the Germans. 
It has also overshadowed the remarkable success of early-war American combat equipment when 
its crews employed it properly – particularly covered and concealed antitank guns and massed 
artillery fires coordinated through direct observation and a consolidated fire direction radio 
net.597  
While historian Orr Kelly presented a generally negative picture of American 
performance at Kasserine Pass in Meeting the Fox, unlike many historians, he placed the battle in 
the larger context of the campaign. He also described the ultimate Allied reversal of the German 
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offensive at Kasserine, although he did not acknowledge directly the significance of the 
American superiority not just in numbers but also in employment of equipment. For example, 
Orr emphasized American superiority in numbers of howitzers but not in artillery fire 
procedures. However, Kelly did quote Rommel’s observations of American performance after 
the campaign:  
Although it was true that the American troops could not yet be compared with the veteran troops 
of the Eighth Army, yet they made up for their lack of experience by their far better and more 
plentiful equipment and their tactically more flexible command. In fact, their armament in 
antitank weapons and armored vehicles was so enormous that we could look forward with but 
small hope of success to the coming mobile battles. The tactical conduct of the enemy’s defense 
had been first class. They had recovered very quickly after the first shock and had soon 
succeeded in damming up our advance by grouping their reserves to defend the passes and other 
suitable points.598 
While many historians have leveled criticisms against McNair for his contribution to the 
supposed inadequacy of American combat equipment during prewar mobilization, many rely on 
Kasserine Pass as a textbook example of these failings – an example that fails under scrutiny. 
When one views the Kasserine Pass battles as part of a months’-long campaign, the ultimate 
outcome of both the battle and the campaign provide evidence of the effectiveness of the 
equipment the U.S. Army employed during the war, particularly employed in accordance with 
the doctrine, organization, and procedures McNair helped develop during the interwar period. 
Russell Weigley established the longstanding accepted wisdom regarding the 
performance of the U.S. Army during World War II in the Epilogue to Eisenhower’s 
Lieutenants, in which he wrote, “the German army remained qualitatively superior to the 
American army, formation for formation, throughout far too many months of the American 
army’s greatest campaign. In the end, it was its preponderance of material resources that carried 
its army through to victory in World War II.”599 The military history community owes Russell 
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Weigley a great debt for not only writing some of the most comprehensive and well-researched 
histories of the U.S. military, but also for helping build the foundation on which American 
military history rests. However, the military history community must somehow break free of this 
deeply flawed but remarkably resilient narrative of the U.S. Army’s experience in World War II.  
Despite the ever-growing body of evidence that should cast doubt on the materiel 
preponderance argument (much of which contributed to the narrative above), one still hears it 
whenever military historians gather. For example, a panelist at the 2011 Society of Military 
History (SMH) Conference in Lisle, Illinois argued (to paraphrase) that the U.S. Army never 
learned to conduct combined arms mechanized warfare as effectively as the German army during 
WWII. Nobody in the room objected – not one hand went up to voice an opposing opinion, ask 
for a clarification, or even request a simple explanation – how, then, did the U.S. Army defeat 
such a qualitatively superior German army?600  
The foregoing analysis of Lesley McNair’s career demonstrates that America found itself 
as unprepared for industrial mobilization in 1940 as it did in 1917. Further, the nation did not 
turn on a dime, achieving a remarkable transformation into a powerful militarized society in a 
few months or even two years. Rather, several years after Protective Mobilization took effect, the 
Army had to adjust its troop basis in July 1943, when it stopped forming new divisions because 
America lacked the ability to equip them. The American soldiers who invaded the beaches of 
Normandy on D-Day and then fought their way across Western Europe to defeat Germany did so 
in the face of disadvantages that make the material preponderance argument seem like fantasy. 
The Army employed divisions (and ground forces in general) consisted of the nation’s lowest-
quality recruits, and faced a German army that Steven Lauer convincingly demonstrated 
measured up in 1944-45 to the German army of 1939-40 both qualitatively and qualitatively. 
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Lauer’s comparative analysis of the U.S., British, and German armies demolishes the myth of a 
German Army on the Western Front made up of old men and boys. The Russians encountered 
this phenomenon in the final effort to defend Berlin, but the American Army confronted the best 
the German Army had to offer in Normandy and all its major campaigns through the end of the 
war in Western Europe.601  
The U.S. Army also, rather famously, relied on much equipment that one can best 
describe as “good enough” when compared to piece for piece against German weapons like tanks 
and antitank guns. However, the Army employed the M4 Sherman tank and other equipment that 
proved inferior to German weapons not because of a lack of awareness or imagination. As 
described above, American commanders frequently insisted they needed better tanks and guns, 
but limitations in the nation’s industrial and shipping capacity meant the U.S. Army still 
employed in 1944-45 much of the equipment that it first used in North Africa in 1942-43. 
American combat commanders also relied on a flawed replacement system that kept units in the 
line without a break, providing inexperienced and marginally trained individuals to replace 
experienced casualties, rather than pulling divisions out of the line to rest and reconstitute while 
fresh divisions took their place. 
In short, the material preponderance narrative simply makes no sense. That conclusion 
begs the question: what explains the U.S. Army’s success during World War II, particularly 
against the Germans in the ETO. Something enabled those low-quality soldiers, led by 
“workmanlike” generals, and operating inferior equipment, to defeat the vaunted Nazi enemy. 
The analysis above supports the conclusion that this mysterious “something” exists in the 
doctrine developed between the wars, tested and refined in the maneuvers before WWII, and 
ingrained in the minds of the American soldier through the most effective individual and unit 
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training system the Army ever implemented. The Army’s foundation of solid doctrine and tough, 
realistic training helped it overcome its deficiencies in human raw material (as evaluated by 
standardized mental capability tests and measures of physical size and strength) and subpar 
equipment (which rarely matched the quality of the German counterpart piece for piece, but did 
possess the advantages of reliability and economy of shipping space). 
A few historians have worked in recent years to dismantle the materiel preponderance 
argument, much like Brian Linn so convincingly overturned Weigley’s “grand theory” of 
American military operations in his 2002 critique of The American Way of War.602 A few 
examples will suffice to demonstrate the view that the U.S. Army could and did stand toe to toe 
against the German Army and win, on numerous occasions. These works show American 
success during WWII resulted largely from the Army’s logical organization, sound doctrine, and 
the arduous training that helped the American citizen-soldier learn this doctrine and overcome 
his lack of combat experience to develop into a highly skilled and professional warrior. 
Several “revisionist” histories have emerged in recent years that add to the slowly 
growing evidence that refutes the “materiel preponderance” argument. One of the earliest such 
histories, Keith E. Bonn’s When the Odds were Even, provided a comparative analysis of the 
training and doctrine of the U.S. and German armies that met in the Vosges Mountains in the 
winter of 1944-45. Bonn argued that “the published American tactical and operational doctrine 
was so similar to the German Army’s that it shared its Clausewitzian validity almost point for 
point. “ Further, Bonn described the differences in American and German organization as an 
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American advantage. Often criticized for his strict adherence to the principle of generalized 
training, McNair accepted the creation of only a minimal number of specialized units (for 
example, airborne divisions and ranger units), and espoused the view that specialized soldier 
training should take place in the unit rather than during induction training. Bonn pointed out that 
the American adherence to three basic division types throughout the war, as opposed to the 
Germans’ reliance on many specialized divisions, not only simplified American logistics, but 
also, “most importantly, diminished the friction in command and tactics so prevalent on the 
German side.” Finally, Bonn argued U.S. Army doctrine was particularly well suited to work in 
concert with its unit organization – particularly the triangular division and its combat commands 
and Regimental Combat Teams. This meant, “unlike the Germans . . . whose organization for 
combat sometimes failed to accurately reflect the needs of tactical and operational doctrine, the 
Americans’ organization was admirably suited to the task.”603 
Historian Peter Mansoor, in his book The GI Offensive in Europe sought to rejuvenate the 
image of the American infantry soldier by forming an argument that “the Army of the United 
States accomplished its mission in western Europe because it evolved over time into a more 
combat-effective force than Germany could sustain on the battlefield.” While Mansoor makes a 
somewhat circular and unconvincing argument, introducing little new information into the 
debate, his book represents another addition to the “revisionist” American school of WWII 
history.604 
In Victory at Mortain, historian Mark J. Reardon added another counterpoint to the 
“materiel preponderance” school by focusing on Germany’s first major counteroffensive against 
an American unit on the European continent. On August 7, 1944, five panzer divisions attacked a 
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single American infantry division defending in the small French town of Mortain. Reardon 
argued, “for the first time since D-Day, American small-unit commanders were remaining alive 
long enough to learn their trade [how to apply their doctrine in combat conditions]. By 
examining the fighting that took place, one can discern how the U.S. Army was beginning to 
evolve into the proven and professional military machine that went on to win the war in Europe.” 
Among the many interesting insights in Reardon’s work, he revealed the usefulness of the towed 
antitank gun in the hedgerows of Normandy, where the rough terrain made them far more 
effective than tanks in frontline anti-armor defense. While Reardon acknowledged the risk of a 
thin front-line anti-tank defense, lacking depth or the means to reinforce the line at a point of 
penetration, the effectiveness of the guns deterred the Germans from risking the heavy losses 
necessary to achieve a penetration. Reardon also emphasized the effectiveness of the infantry-
artillery team, whose doctrine the Army had firmly established before the war. Reardon argued, 
“combined training was carried on until infantry and artillery became thoroughly indoctrinated in 
the operational procedures necessary to coordinate their actions on the battlefield.605 
Reardon acknowledged the infantry-tank component of the doctrinal infantry-artillery-
tank combined arms team lacked the efficacy of the infantry-artillery relationship, but he made 
the important point that this gap proved just as common among infantry and armor units from the 
same division as it did between infantry units and reinforcing GHQ tank battalions. Rather than 
lack of habitual relationships, the hedgerows of Normandy presented the primary challenge 
facing the infantry-armor team, since they made the motorized or mechanized infantry particular 
vulnerable to concealed German defenders and deterred the infantry from accompanying the 
better-armored tanks on the attack. Over time, however, training and combat experience enabled 
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the infantry and armor to mature into the effective combined arms element envisioned in 
doctrine, and combined with the power of massed, observed artillery fires, enabled U.S. combat 
forces to maintain a steady advance in extremely difficult terrain against well-trained and 
equipped German units enjoying the advantage of the defense. This maturation process did not 
rely on innovation – or the creation of new doctrine on the spot as some histories imply – it 
simply involved the learning and battle-hardening process necessary to enable American combat 
units to execute their doctrine effectively in demanding combat conditions. Within a month of 
establishing the beachhead, combat units in Normandy had learned to operate effectively as 
combined infantry-artillery-armor-engineer teams, supplemented with close air support when 
available. This enabled them methodically to fight their way through some of the toughest terrain 
imaginable, against the vaunted German Army, and maintain steady progress despite the lack of 
reserve divisions and their reliance on inexperienced individual replacements to replace combat 
losses.606  
This speaks volumes about the effectiveness of U.S. Army doctrine, too often unfairly 
criticized based on the experience of unseasoned units encountering combat for the first time – a 
situation for which not even the best training can prepare a unit. One sees the true success of 
American combined arms doctrine in World War II when reading the accounts of units that, after 
their initial exposure to combat conditions, gained the experience that enabled them to apply the 
doctrine they learned in unit training and large-scale maneuvers in actual combat conditions. 
Reardon’s work stands out as a superior narrative that tells this story clearly and convincingly. 
Finally, in his recently published Carrying the War to the Enemy, Michael R. Matheny 
took issue with works such as David Johnson’s Fast Tanks and Heavy Bombers and William 
Odom’s After the Trenches for their overemphasis of tactical doctrine and adoption of (or failure 
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to adopt) new technologies. Matheny argued this caused these historians and many like them to 
miss the “evolution of U.S. military thinking at the operational level of war. It was at this level, 
particularly in dealing with logistically supportable joint and combined-phased operations, that 
senior American commanders did particularly well and laid a foundation for the Allied victory in 
World War II.” Matheny emphasizes the Army’s interwar education system, rather than the 
“published doctrine or scholarly works of American officers” as the source of “the rudimentary 
understanding of joint and combined operational art developed [at CGSC and the AWC] and . . . 
imparted to a generation of senior American officers.” 
These works illustrate the growing awareness of the fundamental importance of sound 
doctrine to the success of American combat units during World War II. These authors understand 
material preponderance does not explain American success during the war, even if they take 
different approaches to arguing for the effectiveness of American military doctrine and the 
personnel who inculcated and employed it in combat theaters around the world. These American 
combat personnel defeated even the vaunted German Army, despite its superior combat 
experience, its advantage of fighting on the defensive in extremely rough terrain, and the moral 
determination that came from knowing that with each step back, they grew closer to defending 
their homeland and families from unconditional surrender. 
Lesley McNair contributed to the development of the doctrine the American soldier 
employed successfully during World War II throughout his four-decade long career. He served in 
military education assignments at Fort Leavenworth and the ROTC unit at Purdue, he tailored 
doctrine to organization in the development of the triangular division, he worked for years on 
antitank doctrine when few if any of his peers seemed interested in the topic, and he inculcated 
Army doctrine in mobilizing units while serving at GHQ and AGF. He also understood long 
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before many of his fellow officers that the American military would not enjoy unlimited 
resources, and ensured combat units went to war trained, organized, and equipped with doctrine 
that combined efficiency and effectiveness in a manner appropriate to the actual combat 
conditions they would face. Serving as yet another target of criticism, McNair’s adherence to the 
concepts of streamlining, pooling, and task organization not only held true to fundamental pillars 
of American doctrine and organization, but proved instrumental in maximizing the effectiveness 
of the 88-division Army America sent to war in 1942. 
Contrary to the often-read criticisms of pooling as a concept both unique to McNair and 
forced by him on an Army generally opposed to the concept, the official history argued, “over 
pooling in principle there was little or no disagreement. Differences of opinion arose over 
particular cases. The most controversial of these concerned tanks, tank destroyers, and 
antiaircraft artillery.” The inherent mobility of these weapons, and their specialized nature that 
meant not all situations lent themselves to their employment, made them natural candidates for 
pooling in large, mobile reserves. This gave senior commanders the ability to mass specialized 
assets where needed depending on the combat situation, terrain, and other factors, many of which 
commanders could not predict ahead of time. The cost in the lack of formation of habitual 
relationships between these units and those organic to divisions did not outweigh the benefit of 
the flexibility their pooling gave large-unit commanders.607 
In 1942 and 1943, the argument for pooling anti-tank (AT) guns, tank destroyer (TD) 
units, and antiaircraft artillery (AA) units seemed particularly compelling to McNair. He did not 
believe air and tank attacks would only occur in independent, massed formations, as his critics 
have claimed. However, he recognized from observations of ongoing combat operations that the 
most dangerous such attacks did come from massed air and tank attacks. This seemingly minor 
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difference represents an important distinction between McNair’s actual views and the way many 
historians have represented them since the war. Further, it was not until 1944 that counter-
arguments for inclusion of these specialized assets as organic divisional units began to 
proliferate, and this stemmed more from the recognition of the value of these weapons for 
performing a secondary role as additional direct and indirect fire support assets when not acting 
in their primary role. One of the most vocal advocates of dropping the pooling concept and 
providing organic tank destroyer and antiaircraft units to combat divisions, McNair’s former 
platoon leader, Jacob Devers, began to petition the War Department directly to change the 
pooling policy after observing combat operations in North Africa in February 1943. McNair’s 
own G-3, Brigadier General John M. Lentz, also adopted an anti-pooling view around the same 
time as Devers, writing in a memo to McNair that he believed combined training suffered 
because of pooling.608  
McNair responded to Devers via the War Department by pointing out Devers’ argument 
for providing TD and AA units to divisions could just as easily apply to GHQ tank battalions, air 
base defense units, and command post and train defense units. McNair argued the question came 
down to whether America sought to build an offensive or a defensive army – in other words, 
whether the Army’s emphasis was in providing security to all units or maintaining the flexibility 
to mass capability where needed to defeat the enemy’s forces through offensive action. McNair 
also pointed out Devers’ proposals would require an additional of 24,000 .50-caliber AA guns 
and 7,200 75-mm AT guns in addition to the number already fielded – something McNair 
apparently understood better than most of his peers that the industrial base simply could not 
accomplish. The War Department supported McNair and retained the concept of pooling in the 
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debate with Devers, and did so again in May 1943 when the ASF proposed drastically increasing 
the number of AA and AT units to provide defense to logistics convoys.609 
Pooling, another concept attributed to McNair as though an original idea he “decided” to 
impose on the Ground Forces, stemmed from a War Department directive of October 2, 1942 to 
complete an Army-wide “downward revision of Tables of Organization.” To comply with this 
directive, McNair formed a Reduction Board, constituted of “No-Men” who would accomplish 
the War Department’s required across-the-board cut by twenty percent of motor vehicles and 
fifteen percent of personnel, all “without lessening the combat strength of any unit or upsetting 
the doctrine of its tactical employment.” Given the requirement to possess “exact knowledge of 
every item and every individual in unit tables,” McNair – one of the few men in the Army with 
this level of detailed knowledge regarding the composition of the Ground Forces – directed and 
participated in the board’s efforts, “frequently saying ‘No’ to his own ‘No-Men.’” The Reduction 
Board remained in existence for eight months, from November 1942 through June 1943, 
reviewing almost every AGF unit and methodically removing every piece of equipment not 
allowed in the ground rules set for the board, or determined as nonessential. “Cuts were not 
applied piecemeal or in a negative mood. The whole theory of army and corps organization, and 
hence of pooling and of inter-unit support, was undergoing constructive revision at the 
headquarters of the Army Ground Forces at the same time. Each unit was reshaped with an eye 
to its place within corps or army.” 
Finally, task organization dated back to the development of the triangular division, where 
McNair played a key role, but not as a decision maker or even a commander, but as the chief of 
staff of the PID. He developed the new tables of organization based on War Department 
guidance, planned and oversaw the tests, and prepared test reports; the RCTs and combat 
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commands that became integral components of division organizations were neither McNair’s 
original idea or concepts he forced on the AGF once Marshall selected him as Ground Forces 
Commander. One wonders at the proliferation of histories that not only criticize these concepts, 
largely based on dramatic misrepresentations of the initiatives they actually represented, but that 
ascribe them to McNair as concepts he conceptualized and directed on his own authority on the 
Ground Forces. Historical examples abound that illustrate the effectiveness of these concepts. 
McNair played a key role in each, from implementing War Department policy to training the 
AGF to fight in accordance with these principles. If anything, he deserves credit for his loyalty to 
Marshall in the face of much criticism directed at McNair personally, and praise for training the 
Army to fight effectively even while relying due to significant and quite real constraints in 
materiel production and shipping capacity.  
Just one example will serve to show how McNair managed to turn what some might have 
considered very limiting policy on its head and use it to the Army’s advantage. As mentioned 
above, McNair provided invaluable assistance to the Gunnery Department of the Field Artillery 
School in the early 1930s as they worked to develop more effective and faster fire direction 
procedures. He proved a strong advocate because of his strong belief based on direct combat 
experience in the superiority of observed fires, his support of centralizing control and pooling 
resources when it would make them more effective, even if it meant taking resources away from 
commanders that had traditionally controlled them, and his inherent innovative nature. Building 
on the concept of pooling, McNair helped to see the Gunnery Department’s experimentation of 
the early 1930s through to its logical conclusion in the massed fires techniques employed to such 
great effect in the repulse of Rommel’s Afrika Korps at Kasserine Pass and innumerable other 
operations in every major theater and campaign of the war. The immense firepower provided by 
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massed, observed artillery fires emerged, according to historian Frank Comparato, as “the most 
powerful force (excepting the atomic bomb) to come out of the war.”610  
Even Russell Weigley recognized the wisdom of McNair’s support of the concepts of 
streamlining, pooling, and task organization, which represented his understanding of the modern 
battlefield – an understanding that Weigley, unlike many historians, acknowledged as correct. 
Weigley quoted McNair in History of the United States Army, “An armored division is of value 
only in pursuit or exploitation. For plain and fancy slugging against an enemy who is unbroken 
or at least intact the tank battalion or group is adequate.” Weigley went on to observe: 
The war proved to be much more a war of the old infantry-artillery team than the German 
campaigns of 1939 and 1940 had suggested. Once good antitank weapons had been developed 
and their tactics well planned, tanks alone could not force a breakthrough. What they could do 
well was to join tactical aviation in cooperating with the infantry as a sort of superartillery. In this 
role they did break at last the tactical deadlock which had gripped the battlefield for nearly a 
hundred years.611 
In short, the tank by itself could not create significant, sustainable breakthroughs; it took 
motorized/mechanized infantry supported by mobile artillery, and advanced communications 
equipment. The shortage of almost all motorized and mechanized equipment and the war-long 
shipping constraints meant the concentration of combat power necessary to achieve McNair’s 
vision not only benefited from, but required streamlining, pooling, and task organization. His 
support of these War Department policies demonstrates the validity of McNair’s vision of the 
modern battlefield. 
                                                          
610 Comparato, Age of Great Guns. 





A Career Cut Short 
Although Lesley McNair served exclusively in staff positions during World War II, he 
routinely visited commanders in the field to observe training and evaluate leadership directly. 
This desire to see the results of his organization and training efforts first hand led him to visit 
combat troops at the front on two occasions during the war. In 1943, McNair traveled to Tunisia 
to observe AGF troops in action. While watching American soldiers conducting an attack on 
April 23, during the final stages of the campaign to eject Rommel from North Africa, he suffered 
shrapnel wounds in the arm and head. This conferred upon McNair the dubious distinction of 
being the first American general officer wounded in combat during the war. It also earned him a 
huge amount of press coverage, in which some initial reports indicated he would be “out of 
action” for several weeks, and credited his steel helmet for saving his life (a piece of shrapnel 
was embedded in his skull, penetrating within less than an inch from his brain). True to form, 
McNair spent only two days in hospital before beginning his return trip to the United States, and 
in a little more than a week, he was back at work at AGF headquarters.612 
The dozens of accounts in newspapers and magazines that covered McNair’s wound and 
recovery mostly provided a positive account of a dedicated general officer traveling to the front 
to observe the combat performance of the ground troops he had been responsible for training. 
Some accounts mentioned McNair’s admission that his wounds resulted from his failure to 
                                                          
612 Lesley J. McNair, "Diary," April 15 - May 5 1943, National Archives and Records 
Administration, College Park, Maryland, RG 337, CG AGF Files, Box 1. McNair appears to have kept no 
diaries during his long career, with the single exception of this short trip diary documenting his visit to the 
front in Tunisia. 
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follow his own training principles and observe the attack from a properly covered and concealed 
position, but even these stories placed McNair’s conduct in a highly positive light.  
These commentaries offer a portrayal of the event that varies in tone from the account 
provided by Steven E. Clay in his history of the 16th Infantry Regiment, which recalled McNair’s 
wounding through the eyes of a soldier of the 1st Division: 
An incident occurred this day that is at once humorous, tragic, and indicative of how the 
misinterpretation of a combat situation can cause unintended consequences. After the attack 
began that morning, efforts to speed up the regiment’s forward movement drew criticism from a 
high-ranking visitor to the 1st Division, Lieutenant General Leslie [sic] J. McNair. McNair arrived 
in the 2nd Battalion’s area to personally assess its attack: “F Company was pinned down on the 
ridge in front of us. General McNair wanted to see the action, apparently believing we weren’t 
being aggressive enough. By exposing himself on the ridge, our position was subjected to artillery 
fire during which he was wounded and our F Company First Sergeant was killed. I remember the 
General’s aides bringing him off the hill into a jeep and speeding away to the Bn Aid Station. So 
much for him.”613 
While illustrative of the cynical humor often identified with the infantry soldier, this short 
passage is also poignant, for it mentioned the death of a company first sergeant in the artillery 
barrage that wounded McNair – an event completely overlooked by the press in their frenzy to 
report the injury suffered by a senior officer. No media report of the artillery barrage that 
wounded McNair, at least none among the dozens Clare collected from newspapers all over 
America or located in other archives containing McNair papers, mentioned this non-
commissioned officer’s death. McNair also apparently never spoke of it, indicating that he 
probably never learned of the first sergeant’s death in the barrage. A failure to comment on such 
a tragedy would not fit McNair’s character, particularly given his tireless efforts to acknowledge 
the bravery and sacrifice of the American infantryman.614 
                                                          
613 Steven E. Clay, Blood and Sacrifice: The History of the 16th Infantry Regiment from the Civil 
War through the Gulf War, 1st ed., Cantigny Military History Series (Wheaton, IL: Cantigny First 
Division Foundation and the 16th Infantry Regiment Association, 2001), 167. 
614 Various, "Clare McNair's Newspaper Clippings." 
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McNair returned to the front a second time, in 1944, visiting Normandy to observe the 
breakout from the beachhead during Operation Cobra enroute to his new assignment to relieve 
Patton as commander of the First U.S. Army Group (FUSAG). The Allies created the simulated 
FUSAG headquarters, based in Dover, England, and placed it in command of some real and 
some fictitious units, including the Third Army, which upon the formation of FUSAG had not 
yet departed for England. Through an elaborate deception involving false radio messages, 
newspaper stories, and an increase in both real and simulated military activity, FUSAG gave the 
appearance of an army group preparing an amphibious assault against the Pas-de-Calais. This 
worked quite effectively, preventing the Germans from predicting and massing defending forces 
at the location of the impending Allied amphibious assault, or even knowing after the D-Day 
assault whether the Allies planned a second landing. The deception worked particularly well 
because Eisenhower selected George S. Patton, whom the Germans considered America’s 
greatest general, as the FUSAG commander. With the impending arrival of the Third U.S. Army 
Group from the states, which Patton would command in battle, the Allies needed a replacement 
for Patton at FUSAG with a similarly recognizable name, and not only did McNair fit that bill, 
but with mobilization of new divisions complete, his job at AGF was essentially done.615  
On this visit to the front, General McNair died on July 24, 1944 of wounds inflicted by 
errant American bombs in a preparatory attack during Operation COBRA that injured or killed 
hundreds of Americans. McNair’s death, which the Army initially reported as the result of 
German fire but later admitted was the result of a poorly aimed American aerial barrage, 
prevented him from witnessing the eventual victory of the ground forces he worked so diligently 
to prepare for combat. In a final cruel twist of fate, his only son, Colonel Douglas C. McNair, 
                                                          
615 Ambrose, D-Day, June 6, 1944, 82-83; European Theater of Operations Adjutant General, 
"Assignment of Command of First United States Army Group," July 21, 1944, McNair Papers, National 
Archives and Records Administration, St. Louis, MO. 
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died twelve days later on August 6, 1944 in the Pacific Theater of Operations, killed by a 
Japanese sniper while serving as Chief of Staff of the 77th Division on Guam.616 
Clare McNair learned of her husband’s death while rolling bandages at the War College 
officers’ club for the Red Cross – one of many volunteer activities in which she had engaged 
throughout his career. A general officer from the AGF entered the room, sat down and spoke to 
her briefly, and escorted her out of the room. Among the dozens of letters of condolence that 
Clare received in the period after her husband’s death, her correspondence with General John 
Pershing merits particular mention. The McNairs had maintained contact with General Pershing 
throughout McNair’s career, and Pershing was one of the first to contact Clare directly upon her 
husband’s death. On July 28, Clare received a letter from him that read: 
The sad news of the untimely death, at the front, of your distinguished husband has shocked and 
grieved me, and my deepest sympathy goes out to you. General McNair’s services with the 
Punitive Expedition, and with the A.E.F. in France, are, of course, entirely familiar to me, and I 
have followed his subsequent brilliant career with particular interest and great admiration. 
Certainly, his contribution to the success of our present war effort has been considerable. In his 
passing the leadership of our armed forces has been dealt a severe blow. Indeed, the army, the 
country, and the United Nations have suffered a tremendous loss. 
Clare replied on August 1, 1944, just five days before Doug’s death, thanking Pershing for his 
kind letter and expressing her appreciation for his kind words about her husband. She sent him a 
birthday greeting the following month, from Santa Barbara, California, where she had traveled to 
stay with Doug’s widow and help care for his daughter, her only grandchild, Bonnie Clare 
McNair. Clare described Bonnie Clare, only eleven months old at the time, as “a precious baby 
and so happy that she is bringing healing to our broken hearts.”617 
                                                          
616 Kahn, McNair, Educator of an Army, 1-2. 
617 Various, "Letters of in Response to Lesley McNair's Death in Normandy," July - September 
1944, McNair Papers, U.S. Library of Congress, 73. The McNair genealogy casts further doubt on 
speculation Clare might have burned her husband's papers in grief, remarking on her notable composure 
upon learning of his death; James Birtley McNair, McNair, McNear, and McNeir Genealogies: 
Supplement, 1955 (Los Angeles, CA: James Birtley McNair, 1955). 
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McNair received his only wartime military awards posthumously. On August 3, 1944, 
Secretary of War Stimson presented Clare two oak leaf clusters for the Distinguished Service 
Medal her husband had earned in France during the First World War, and an oak leaf cluster for 
his Purple Heart. Various senior military and political leaders paid tribute to McNair on May 25, 
1945, at a ceremony at the Army War College. Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall 
and General Courtney H. Hodges, commander of the First Army, made remarks in remembrance 
of McNair’s efforts as AGF Commander. The ceremony closed with Bonnie Clare McNair 
unveiling a commemorative plaque that read, in part, “As commanding general of the Army 
Ground Forces he planned, organized, trained, and equipped the ground forces of the United 
States for their victorious participation in the Second World War.”618  
Despite the high praise and obvious respect he had earned from many of the nation’s 
most senior military and civilian leaders, McNair did not die a wealthy man. In fact, as Time 
Magazine reported in 1944, when McNair died at the age of sixty-one, after forty years of 
military service, he left behind an estate worth only $2,720. To supplement this small nest egg – 
typical of officers of the time who received very meager pay and benefits, Clare received the 
pension of a retired major general (McNair had never received permanent promotion to 
Lieutenant General), which amounted to fifty dollars a month. Required to vacate military 
quarters upon his death, Clare moved out of the home where she and Lesley had recently 
celebrated their thirty-ninth wedding anniversary, renting a small apartment on Connecticut 
Avenue in Washington, D. C., and accepting a job with the U.S. State Department to make ends 
meet.619  
                                                          
618 "Honor to Lesley J. McNair," Field Artillery Journal 35, no. 7 (July, 1945): 386. 
619 Second lieutenants in 1944 earned $2,595 a year; brigadier generals with dependants earned 
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Senate Bill 2468, first proposed in 1952, sought, to secure permanent promotion to their 
highest position for the many retired and deceased officers who had served as high-ranking 
generals during the war, but due to the temporary nature of their promotions, reverted to their 
highest permanent grade at the war’s end. Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., wrote 
Honorable Richard B. Russell, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 
urging him to support this bill, which he sought to “provide suitable recognition of the 
distinguished services of these officers rendered in positions of great responsibility and 
importance . . . . The promotions to be authorized by this legislation would be in keeping with 
the rank accorded other Army officers who held similar wartime commands during the same 
limiting periods.” Since Lesley McNair had served as a temporary lieutenant general, but had 
worked directly for the Army Chief of Staff in a command considered equivalent to an army 
group command, the measure, if passed, would lead to a posthumous promotion for him to 
general (four-star). This would also improve Clare’s financial situation – a desire expressed by 
several supporters of the bill who were friends of the McNairs before and during the war. The 
Senate finally passed the bill on May 4, 1954, and it gained the House of Representative’s 
approval on July 7, 1954. Shortly afterwards, Clare McNair received a letter from the Adjutant 
General’s office notifying her of Lesley McNair’s posthumous promotion to (four-star) general, 
effective September 10, 1954.620 What the gruff McNair would have thought of such instances 
recognizing his contributions to America’s victory one can only speculate. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,885626,00.html (accessed March 13, 2012), The article 
concluded, "the military careerist, whose peactime responsibilities should be large and whose wartime 
responsibilities may be awesome, can expect only to die poor.". 
620 Kahn, McNair, Educator of an Army, 1; Kleber, "McNair," 697; McNair, McNair, McNear, 
and McNeir Genealogies: Supplement, 1955, 43-44; Herbert M. Jones, "Herbert M. Jones to Mrs. Lesley 
J. McNair," September 10, 1954, McNair Papers, National Archives and Records Administration, St. 
Louis, MO. Many historians, unaware of McNair's posthumous promotion, incorrectly refer to him as 
"Lieutenant General McNair" rather than "General McNair," his correct rank. 
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McNair in Retrospect 
General Lesley J. McNair has long remained an enigma to many military historians, 
largely because no comprehensive study of his career exists in the historiography of the U.S. 
Army. As has been noted in this study, few historians have written about McNair’s service as 
Commandant at Fort Leavenworth, Chief of Staff of the Provisional Infantry Division, or Chief 
Artillery Training Officer on the AEF Staff. Even fewer, though (Edward Coffman is an 
exception) have written about McNair’s pre-World War I service, and even these historians have 
revealed the history of only a tiny fraction of his thirteen years of service before the First World 
War. The history of the thirty-six years of his career prior to World War II has remained, until 
now, mostly scattered amongst various archives, and those aspects of his World War II service 
that do appear in the secondary literature contain far more errors than historical fact.  
McNair’s relative obscurity among senior U.S. military leaders of that era chiefly resulted 
from his wartime service in staff positions. Even when he served as commander of Army Ground 
Forces, from 1942-44, he led a “functional command” giving him a role many historians equate 
to a senior-level staff position. The longstanding belief that no records of McNair’s early career 
existed might have contributed to this phenomenon, but in the end this seems unlikely, given the 
fact that the records cited here were no harder to obtain than any others stored at the handful of 
major historical archives in the United States. Whatever the reason, many historians of the 
Second World War have analyzed General McNair’s performance in his two key roles at GHQ 
and AGF based on limited knowledge of the history of his thirty-six years of service before the 
war. 
One example serves to drive this point home. A panelist at the 2010 Society for Military 
History Conference demonstrated quite effectively the result of the widespread lack of 
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knowledge regarding General McNair when he opined that, with respect to Army motorization 
efforts prior to World War II, “McNair got everything wrong.”621 This statement reflects far 
more than one individual’s shallow understanding of McNair’s contributions to the mobilization 
effort the nation undertook beginning in 1940. It reflects the uninformed view historians who 
study the early twentieth century Army hold regarding McNair’s service throughout his forty-
year career. However, even lacking detailed knowledge of the history of McNair’s military 
service, one might hesitate to dismiss so readily the efforts of an officer entrusted by officers like 
John Pershing, Charles Summerall, Malin Craig, and George Marshall with a number of the most 
important innovative efforts and positions of responsibility in the Army. 
As has been discussed, General Pershing personally selected McNair from the many 
officers on the 1st Division staff to serve as the senior artillery training officer in the AEF 
General Headquarters in 1918, rapidly promoting him to become the AEF’s youngest general 
officer. Shortly after the war, Charles Summerall selected McNair to serve as the Hawaiian 
Department G-3 operations officer, and to lead both the development of a new Oahu defense 
plan and a major experiment to test the ability of Army units to defend an island from a naval 
attack. In the mid-1930s, Chief of Staff Malin Craig selected McNair to serve as the chief of staff 
of the Provisional Infantry Division, making him the key individual responsible for designing the 
division the Army would employ during World War II. In 1939, General Marshall hand-picked 
McNair to serve first as the Commandant at Fort Leavenworth to redesign the officer education 
system there, and later to serve first as Chief of Staff, General Headquarters and then as the 
Army Ground Forces commander, making him the main individual responsible for training the 
American ground forces that fought the Second World War. If one is to believe that McNair “got 
                                                          




everything wrong,” they must explain the longstanding professional respect, based on direct, 
personal interaction that officers like Pershing and Marshall had for McNair, leading them to 
select him for tough jobs and elevate him to positions of significant authority and responsibility. 
The lack of information on McNair’s early career in the historical record has led many 
historians to arrive at unfounded criticisms of McNair’s actions both during the interwar years, 
and throughout World War II. A thorough understanding of the depth and breadth of McNair’s 
experience, combined with a closer look at the dynamics that drove the dynamics of the War 
Department’s command arrangements and its management of the mobilization effort reveal 
McNair has served as an easy target for a great deal of unfounded criticism. In many cases, he 
provides a recognizable name with which to associate an oversimplified explanation of a 
seemingly simple, but actually quite complex issue. In others, historians’ limited knowledge of 
McNair’s background combines with a poor understanding of various national-level strategic and 
political processes that exceeded McNair’s span of control. The result, as argued in this study, 
has been a flawed analysis and a tendency to reinforce longstanding myths that make up the 
accepted wisdom regarding the interwar years and World War II. It is time to finally move away 
from this accepted wisdom and dismantle the standard narrative of World War II as a story of 
American materiel preponderance overcoming the U.S. Army’s overmatched soldiers and 
workmanlike generals. 
The evidence necessary to overturn this flawed narrative exists. Through the efforts of a 
growing number of “revisionist” historians, one can gain ready access to much of the evidence in 
the secondary literature on the early-twentieth century U.S. Army. One hopes that this effort to 
achieve an accurate and balanced assessment will continue, and detailed searches for additional 
data in the historical archives will yield further evidence and prompt additional insights. While 
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historians have made great strides in the past two decades to improve modern understanding of 
the U.S. Army’s military effectiveness during World War II, and the interwar and mobilization 
period innovations that enabled the Army to achieve that effectiveness, much work remains to be 
done to overturn the long and resilient accepted wisdom regarding America’s war effort. 
This study seeks to contribute to this effort by offering several useful insights. The fact 
that an individual’s archival records do not exist in a consolidated record stored at a single 
location does not mean those records do not exist. An officer’s service primarily in staff roles 
also should not lead historians to the conclusion that officer’s career does not merit detailed 
historical analysis. Arguably, the addition of yet another history of George Patton, Omar 
Bradley, or George Marshall only adds incrementally to the existing store of “great commander” 
histories, each of which seems to offer less original analysis. Perhaps the deepest and most 
plentiful area in which to conduct historical research of the early-twentieth century Army lies 
precisely in the much-neglected field of the staff officer. In an Army often described as 
commander-centric, the explanation for victory or defeat lies remarkably often in the capabilities 
and actions of the staff or the combined actions of the staff and its commander. 
The foregoing analysis provides an example of the wealth of insights one can gain by 
developing a deeper understanding of the experience and ideas of one such staff officer. As the 
above study shows, a number of important continuities stretch across the four decades of 
McNair’s career. Each of these help explain his contributions in the critical final four years he 
served, particularly when viewed within the larger context of the many complexities presented 
by America’s interwar isolationist stance and economic crisis, and the dysfunction of the civil-
military relationship that hamstrung the mobilization effort. Contrary to many critical analyses, 
McNair developed a remarkably accurate concept of modern warfare. In those areas that fell 
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within his span of control, McNair provided invaluable service to the nation in preparing the 
Army to fight in the conditions he anticipated they would face. In doing so, he established the 
model for the Army training system that is still in use today. In those areas where McNair has 
drawn the most criticism, such as his advocacy of antitank guns, minimal overhead, streamlining, 
pooling, and task organization, the analysis offered here demonstrates McNair did not invent and 
impose upon the ground forces these concepts. Rather, even in cases where he understood and 
anticipated their necessity, his efforts to adhere to them merely represent implementation of War 
Department policy and of General George C. Marshall’s, ultimate decision-making authority.   
When one considers the scope of McNair’s career, which includes experience in a wide 
range of peacetime and combat positions as a commander, staff officer, educator, war planner, 
and expert trainer, several threads of continuity emerge. The continuities identifiable in McNair’s 
early career help explain how an officer steeped in the experience of World War I navigated a 
myriad of contingencies throughout the difficult years of the interwar period – and the even more 
significant challenges of national mobilization – enabling him to train a capable ground force 
despite innumerable obstacles that stood in his way. These continuities included high standards 
of officer competence and physical fitness; an emphasis on maneuver and flexibility enabled by 
responsive and devastating firepower and combined arms operations; a long-term dedication to 
professional education; an understanding of the efficiency achieved through streamlining and 
pooling; and a constant quest for innovative solutions to longstanding problems. One sees 
evidence of these continuities throughout the first three and a half decades of McNair’s career, 




By recognizing and grasping the significance of these continuities, and the relevance they 
provided to McNair’s ideas regarding modern warfare and the combined arms doctrine and 
training necessary to execute it, one can see the presence of various contingencies often 
overlooked in studies containing broad-brush depictions of McNair. This makes possible a more 
balanced evaluation of his successes and failures, and an understanding of the many factors that 
limited McNair’s authority and freedom of action – factors that he lacked the ability to control. 
These systemic issues remain the centerpiece of the largely untold story of World War II, and 
more generally the twentieth century U.S. Army.  
Ideally, the foregoing analysis not only enhances historical understanding of the career of 
General Lesley McNair, but also highlights the need to conduct further such studies. Historians 
of the U.S. Army can break free of the conventional wisdom of World War II by moving beyond 
analyses of tactics and technology to the systemic issues that serve as the root causes of U.S. 
Army effectiveness. Studies in this vein remain relevant for understanding U.S. Army 
effectiveness not only during McNair’s lifetime, but also in the nearly seventy years since he 
died while observing the Ground Forces he trained as they embarked on their final campaign to 
defeat the German Army in the European Theater of Operations. The Ground Forces 
accomplished this feat not because of materiel preponderance. As has been argued, America’s 
dysfunctional civil-military industrial mobilization effort ensured the nation never achieved its 
production goals or synchronized its military and industrial production strategies. Rather, they 
did so by relying on the fundamentals McNair helped to develop throughout the interwar period, 
ideas about how to fight and win wars which the Army incorporated into its 1941 doctrine, and 
which McNair instilled in the psyche of the American soldier by leading the most effective pre-
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